Military

SURVIVE TO LEAD

This is the preferred method of maintaining command continuity. Historically, experienced veteran commanders make fewer mistakes and their units take fewer casualties than those commanded by first time replacements.

Position for the Whole Battle, not Just the Initial Contact

There is no shaking the impression that leaders themselves are partly at fault for the high loss rates. Some commanders appear to be translating the battle proven doctrine that officers must lead forward into a dogma that officers must be at the point of an attack or in the center of a defensive position astride the main enemy axis of advance.

It is also possible that officers misinterpret the principle that the commander must share battle risks to mean that he must be at the point of greatest danger.

The commander should not walk point, unless that act of personal courage is the key to the success and survival of the unit.

During World War II, LTC Batchelder, commander of the 1st battalion of the 67th Armor, awarded the Silver Star with three Oak Leaf Clusters and the Bronze Star with Oak Leaf Clusters, made use of General Rommel's maxim: "a maxim of caution, combined with supreme dash at the right moment." [3]

Batchelder led forward, which was key to the esteem in which he was held by his men:

"Perhaps he had never spoken to them personally but when the going was rough, when fear slowed them down, he had been up there with them, sharing their dangers and leading them forward. At times he asked of them the impossible, but they did it, because he did it with them." [4]

Leading forward was the foundation of Batchelder's remarkable execution of operations, especially in the attack. During the Siegfried Line Campaign, Batchelder's presence "on the ground throughout the attack, in a position of vantage from which he could divert and control the action, undoubtably speeded it to its successful conclusion with a minimum of loss." [5]

Yet, most of the time Batchelder kept away from the most exposed positions. He "followed the action closely," his command post right behind the attack, but usually did not lead it. [6] When he established a stationary command post, it was well forward but secure from observation and tough enough to withstand artillery fire. He preferred strong German basements.

There is no "magic" position on the battlefield which will guarantee a commander's safety. Off to the side and towards the rear has the advantage of posing less apparent threat to enemy gunners. A command vehicle being in the midst of many similar vehicles is less likely to be singled out. But each commander must evaluate his positioning according to the factors of METT-T.

In any case, a doctrinal positioning of commanders would be unwise as this would simply enable the enemy to develop a method for targeting commanders. The Germans apparently had such an SOP. During armor ambushes, they targeted the third vehicle in a column and worked forward. Using this method, they expected to eliminate the company commander and one platoon leader.

The majority of commanders "killed" at the NTC chose positions where they quickly became involved in firefights and lost the ability to direct their forces. As soon as they became an active participant in the firefights, they also became high priority targets for enemy gunners.

Keep Your Head Down

"They couldn't hit an elephant at this dist . . . "
--Last words of Union General John Sedgwick, killed during the battle of Spotsylvania, 1864.

Our historical research indicates that direct fire and mines account for the majority of command vehicle kills.

However, small arms and observed indirect fire cause the majority of casualties among actual commanders as they attempt to see and control the battle from exposed cupolas or when they abandon their disabled tracks.

Wounds to the head, face, upper torso and arms are the most common followed by burns. NOTE: The Israelis issue Nomex uniforms to all armor crews and mechanized troops. Vehicle commanders and other exposed crew members wear flak jackets similar to the current US vest. As a result, their officer casualties were reduced by an estimated 50% during the Lebanon Campaign in 1982.

Weigh the Risks Against the Returns

Historical records indicate that experience and judgement are factors which enhance survivability. Bold, risk-taking commanders, who had their commands ripped from them by wounds or vehicle destruction, generally experienced feelings of personal frustration and failure regardless of the battle's outcome.

Consequently, most of these commanders tried to avoid a repetition and worked on the principle of risking little if there is little to be gained.

To a certain extent this experience of loss can be reproduced on training battlefields where commanders are left out of play until end of mission.

It is important because this touch of caution seems to be the difference between audacious and reckless commanders. This also has the advantage of exercising the command succession system.

Only at the decisive moment did LTC Batchelder move to the very front. For decisive advantage, he accepted supreme danger. Thus on 20 November 1944, his battalion, attacking towards Gereonsweiler, took its intermediate objective, a hill. Pausing on the objective, the tank commanders were surprised as Batchelder shot past them in his light tank, "urging them to get moving without delay toward the next objective." [7] He then led the assault on Gereonsweiler.

The effectiveness of Batchelder's intervention was all the greater because he took such extreme risks only at decisive junctures. His men were galvanized into action only because they were astounded by their battalion commander's move and realized how important immediate resumption of the attack must be for him to make it.

Brigadier General S.L.A. Marshall made clear in his classic Men Against Fire why commanders must reserve "darting to the front so as to tease on the hounds" for the decisive moment:

"In extreme emergencies, when the stakes are high and the failure of others to act has made the need imperative, such acts are warranted. But their value lies largely in their novelty. A commander can not rally his men by a spectacular intervention in the hour when they have lost their grip if they have grown accustomed to seeing him run unnecessary risks in the average circumstances of battle."

Lieutenant Colonel Batchelder's actions at Gereonsweiler were not unique. In March, 1945, he watched another attack develop. When the battalion met heavy resistance that threatened to stop it, LTC Batchelder "moved up to join the lead tanks and direct the continuation of the advance." [8]

By judging carefully when to take these risks, LTC Batchelder emerged from the war unscathed, save for injuries sustained wen his landing craft was sunk during the Normandy campaign. More importantly, he was able to provide decisive, experienced leadership throughout the campaign.

Get Some Sleep

"No human being knows how sweet sleep is but a soldier."
--John S. Mosby, COL, C.S.A.

In "Sinai Victory" BG Marshall observed:

". . . exhausted men cannot fight . . . even a few minutes of sleep can turn a beaten fighter into a champion. Worse that the risk of being surprised is that of trying to engage when the physical power of one's own force is almost totally depleted. . .

These are simple guides to action. By most commanders today, they are honored more in the breach than observance."

The words are as true today as when they were written in 1958.

Commanders who fail to follow their sleep plan court disaster. As stress and fatigue build up, safety awareness goes down, mistakes are made, and casualties occur.

After almost a week of battle in the Golan Heights, LTC Kahalani fell asleep near a vehicle exhaust pipe and failed to awaken as it burned away a three-inch patch on the back of his leg. About the same time, his deputy commander, groggy from lack of sleep, accidently shot himself in the hand with his submachine gun and had to be evacuated.

At the NTC, sleep deprivation causes leaders at all levels to make mistakes and decisions which directly or indirectly cause the "death" of not only themselves but their units. Some examples are: giving incoherent orders, forgetting important tactical intelligence, issuing contradictory instructions, or simply falling asleep in a location unknown to subordinates.

Maintain a Low Profile on the Battlefield

Commanders become high priority targets if they are recognized for what they are by the enemy. Commanders must work to eliminate their telltale signatures.

In most cases, (96% at the NTC), the major difference is the additional radio antennae on command vehicles. Three to four are normal. Some commanders have mounted additional dummy antennae on all the vehicles in their unit to deceive the enemy as to command presence.

Reading maps, shouting commands, and authoritative gesticulations may have been the reason why several commanders in the 67th Armor were singled out by German snipers.

This is not to say that commanders should not have distinctive signatures recognizable by their own men. Unquestionably, effective command and control requires that superiors recognize their chief subordinates and subordinates their superiors.

Proper devolution of command when a leader is hit requires that their vehicle is known to subordinates.

PLAN FOR COMMAND SUCCESSION

Keep Track of Your Commander

A problem at the NTC and common in historical accounts is the disappearance of the commander at a critical point in the battle. His disappearance is either not noticed immediately or his subordinates are unsure of what action to take. Nothing triggers the command succession procedure.

Doctrinally, the S3's main battle station is with the TF Commander in the command group (FM 71-2J, Chapter 2-17a). A more common technique used at the NTC is to position the S3 on a separate axis or avenue of approach to extend command and control throughout the sector.

The ALO and FSO vehicles frequently become separated from the TF commander in the heat of battle and in rough terrain.

Command vehicles break down or are destroyed. Radios malfunction. Many times no one sees it happen, or if they do, they do not recognize that it is the commander who is unhorsed. Even if the commander is uninjured, he is isolated and out of contact.

The task force commander and his deputy need wing men. These vehicles provide protection, act as backup command vehicles, or initiate the command succession process when the commander's tank/track is hit. One unit fix is to detail the vehicles from the line companies.

Minimize the "Leadership Gap"

The tempo of operations and intensity of conflict has increased dramatically in recent conflicts. The Israelis faced a Soviet trained and equipped Syrian Army during the October 73 War. The IDF's 7th Armor Brigade fought an average of three battles a day for three days as the Syrians committed echelon after echelon trying to achieve a penetration in the Golan Heights.

Given a similar scenario and the current NTC loss rates, we would need to replace our task force commanders on a daily basis.

At the NTC most task forces take from 15 to 20 minutes to reestablish command and control after a task force commander's "death." This is too long.

A Soviet motorized rifle regiment, at attack speed, can cover six kilometers in fifteen minutes. Unless the unit can reestablish command swiftly, the Soviets have the opportunity to control the decision cycle and retain the initiative.

As a result of their experience against Soviet-style opponents, the Israelis utilize and train to the standard of immediate assumption of command by the deputy commander. To accomplish this, the deputy commander is usually forward in a combat vehicle within visual sight of the commander.

Whatever method is used, it must have an effective trigger mechanism and it must be practiced in training under realistic circumstances. With no advance notice, the subordinate leaders need to know by rote who will take charge, what to do, and how to act on the commander's intent until the succession is complete. The deputy commander, whether the XO or S3, must be trained to assume command in the midst of a battlefield's chaos. This can only be accomplished through home station training and rehearsal.

Move to the Sound of the Guns

"It is even better to act quickly and err than to hesitate until the time of action is past."
--Clausewitz: On War, 1832

One of the most important historical lessons learned is that the immediate effect of commander's death is a loss of initiative while the unit reestablishes command on the battlefield.

Leaderless units tend to remain stationary in the defense and lose momentum in the attack. NTC instrumentation data shows that in many units the volume of fire drops off or becomes disjointed after a commander's death. This is usually the result of the enemy being allowed to break contact as friendly units fail to reposition or pursue.

"To take no action is to take undecided action."
--Robert S. McNamara: 4 July 1965

Conclusion

Modern mid-intensity conflict brings on increased speed and tempo to operations on the AirLand battlefield. Instead of hours or days to replace commanders, we must now think of minutes and seconds. We must prepare now to retain command continuity if we are to retain the initiative. We must prevent unnecessary losses if we are to fight outnumbered and win.

Commanders and their subordinates must be constantly looking for ways to keep themselves and their soldiers alive. No one is better positioned to increase survivability than the troops in the field. Even minor tactical tricks, learned in real or simulated combat, can keep leaders alive for the next fight.

Of course, continuity lessons learned by individuals and units in the field will yield maximum benefits only if distributed Army-wide. Those with insight into ways to minimize casualties, and the leadership gap whether born of reflection or experience, will be making a decisive contribution to Army combat power by sharing their knowledge and tips with the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL).

Table of Contents

Subject III: Historical Perspective

NCO Corner