SECTION
II
TA.2 FIRE SUPPORT BOS
Positive Performance
2.2 Engage Ground Targets
* Positioning Observers to Support the Deep Fight: Brigades generally made good use of Combat Observation Lazing Teams (COLT), scouts, and aerial observers to support deep operations. The current MTOE change to include six COLTs in heavy brigades allows brigades the flexibility to employ trained observers throughout the depth of the battlefield. Brigades also have the flexibility to echelon observers into the fight, providing for continuous coverage, better briefings, and rehearsals of teams being inserted. Concurrent refit operations are also possible. Observers inserted deep had a much greater success rate in surviving long enough to accomplish their mission, resulting in an increase in the effectiveness of deep fires, compared to the prior three quarters.
2.3 Integrate Fire Support
* Aviation Attack Battalion commander's intent for fires: Better articulated intent for fires results in the battalion fire support coordinator being able to better prioritize fire support and focus fire support execution at the critical time and place. Fire support coordinators are able to take the intent and produce a realistic and effective concept of fires which is integrated into the scheme of maneuver.
* Aviation Attack Battalion fire support coordinators: Directly involved with the S2 and S3 in the development of High Payoff Targets. The fire support coordinators are advising the commander and targeting team on the following: ability of the fire support system to defeat high payoff targets; the best means of attack; the best type of munitions to achieve the commander's desired results.
Need Emphasis
2. Fire Support
* Manual Fire Direction Center (FDC) Operations: FDCs are not operating manually IAW FM 6-40 or their own standing operating procedures (SOP). Many FDCs are using firing charts, TFTs, and GFTs as their means of secondary checks of their BCS data. However, they often are not conducting manual operations correctly. Many FDOs do not understand how to derive a GFT setting from BCS data, causing long delays in firing when manual data doesn't check with BCS. Targets are not drawn on the firing chart or even on a target overlay on the FDC map.
Recently, some FDOs have even set up the chart incorrectly. FDOs and FDC chiefs are not always updating their manual data for new meteorological data, resulting in an unsafe secondary check system that is often out of tolerance for range, quadrant, and deflection. BUCs are often ignored which leaves the FDC with no secondary check if BCS fails. In the alternate FDC , neither the chart operator nor the BCS operator is prepared to take over the battery in case the primary FDC is destroyed.
* Hasty Survey Techniques: Artillery firing battery leaders, upon occupation, have become too reliant on the PADS in determining both location and direction. In cases where PADS is not available, leaders either don't know or understand basic hasty survey techniques. These deficiencies negatively impact on battery ready to fire times.
* Battery/Platoon Operations Center (BOC/POC) Operations: BOCs/POCs are not operating IAW 6-50 and their own SOPs. They are not properly utilized. They are not staffed, equipped, or trained to track the tactical situation, logistics, or to command and control the battery or platoon. Additionally, BOCs are not prepared to assume fire direction responsibility when the battery FDC is destroyed. BOCs/POCs are always addressed in SOPs, but seldom implemented.
* Fire Support Element (FSE) Organization: FSEs are not organized to provide positive control of fires from planning to execution of the fire support plan. Brigade FSEs generally do not have all of the manuals on hand to facilitate complete fire support planning. Personnel responsibilities are not fixed prior to deploying to the field. All graphics are generally not posted on the fire support map. Threat graphics, current targeting intelligence, flight routes, all fire support coordinating measures (current and future), and friendly positions are not routinely updated.
2.1 Process Ground Targets
* Fire Support Plan - Transition From Deep to Close: As brigades prepare to transition from deep operations to the close fight, task force observers routinely are not in a position to observe enemy formations; targets are not planned along likely enemy avenues of approach and task force observers are not in communication with the appropriate fire support agencies to attack targets of opportunity. This is primarily due to a lack of brigade staff supervision that would ensure the task force plans are synchronized with the brigade plan.
2.1.2 Select Fire Support Attack System
* Aviation Units are not planning the employment of CAS: Information critical to employing CAS is not disseminated to the aeroscout observers. Employment of CAS is not rehearsed. PROCEDURE: FSOs must disseminate CAS call signs, frequencies, aircraft type, weapons load, Initial Point (IP) location, and IP to target time to all observers. FSOs must plan and coordinate target marking and SEAD fires. FSOs must assign primary and alternate responsibility for final control of CAS, target marking, and SEAD timing.
2.1.3 Develop Order to Fire
* Triggers in Defensive Operations: Problem Example - while conducting defensive operations, the task force FSNCO was ordered to emplace task force triggers for each target. The TF had no standard for these triggers, so the NCO gathered no materials. The triggers used were hasty, and developed by lazing the area beyond the target and marking azimuth and vertical angle to the target. The triggers were from 2,500 meters to 5,000 meters beyond the target. This distance did not correspond with the artillery battalion's reaction time or the time of flight.. TECHNIQUE: Recognize that existing terrain triggers are first choice and that hasty triggers can work; develop an SOP for what will be used as a physical trigger on the ground. Establish a realistic distance for the trigger, based on enemy movement rate versus our reaction time, for either total reaction time or time to fire.
2.2 Engage Ground Targets
* Aviation Observers: Aviation observers do not understand realistic fire mission processing times. Aviation units do not train to compute trigger points to engage a moving target at the designated intercept point. Observers also do not understand how to use fire mission processing time, time of flight and target speed to determine the distance between the trigger point and the intercept point.
2.2.2.2 Reduce Enemy Equipment Effectiveness
* Counterfire: Field artillery units, primarily FSOs, DS battalion S3s and S2s consistently fail to plan effectively and manage Firefinder Radar Zones.
2.3 Integrate Fire Support
* Rehearsals: Brigade level - fire support rehearsals generally consist of a verification of the brigade consolidated target list and an overall discussion of the scheme of fires. This is due primarily to the scheme of fires not being developed as part of the initial planning effort and not being formalized by a cooperative effort of the brigade staff. RESULT: Subordinate units do not know the overall scheme of fires until the brigade rehearsal. This causes the rehearsal to be an explanation of the scheme of fires rather than a rehearsal of them. TECHNIQUE: Use the brigade fire support execution matrix to detail responsibilities for subordinate units and observers. As the brigade receives bottom-up refinement, ensure that task force level plans are in accordance with the brigade plan and ensure that all players rehearse their piece prior to the brigade rehearsal. Task Force level - three types of rehearsals are used to synchronize the fire support plan and all A2C2 elements: map rehearsal; combined arms and table rehearsal; an FM fire support rehearsal. However, the FM fire support rehearsal provided only a review of the scheme of fires. Too much time is spent on issues not critical to the successful conduct of the mission. Also, shortcuts during the wargaming process make rehearsal difficult because too many unresolved issues remain in the plan.
* Integration into the mission analysis: TF commanders are going through the tactical decisionmaking process and into battle without knowing what fire support assets are available to support their mission. Often the FSO identifies the required information, but the S3 seldom integrates it into the mission analysis briefing. PROCEDURE: The FSO must identify specified and implied tasks, limitations, and assets available for the mission. The FSE must assist in gathering this information in the absence of the FSO.
* Extraction plans for deep observers: Brigades do not plan for the successful extraction of deep observers in the event they are injured or compromises. Brigades plan the insertion of deep observers in great detail. However, very little thought is given to extracting these observers if necessary. Additionally, the died of wounds (DOW) rate for deep observers this quarter is in excess of 90%. TECHNIQUE: Extractions must be planned in the same level of detail as insertions, and extraction must be considered first. If the extraction of teams from planned positions is not possible, then consider alternate positions or do not insert them.
* CAS not synchronized: CAS generally not directed against the commander's high payoff targets at the critical place and time to ensure success of the brigade's mission. Additionally, control of CAS is usually an afterthought of the brigade staff, rather than being integrated thoroughly in the brigade plan. Airspace Coordination Areas (ACAs) are not planned in advance, deconflicting gun-target lines and attack aviation battle positions. SEAD plans are not usually coordinated to deconflict times in the battle. RESULT: CAS sorties being aborted or a loss of aircraft to air defense systems.
* Commander's concept for fires: TF FSOs develop concepts for fire without really identifying what the commander's desired effect are and what critical tasks he wants fire support to accomplish to influence the enemy order of battle and force protection. Engagement criteria are not being established by phases of the operation to focus commanders, observers, and the artillery battalion S3/FDC. Mortars and CAS employment options are habitually being omitted. PROCEDURE: FSOs need to be very familiar with the enemy order of battle and be able to calculate desired effects with ammunition/systems available to achieve the commander's intent. The concept should include: percentage of desired effects or the number of vehicles that will be affected in any particular enemy formation or specialty weapons (AT5 or artillery.) The commander should approve the written concept before any fire support annex being published to ensure it is correct.
* Artillery movement plans: Field artillery battery positions and air routes are not deconflicted. PROCEDURE: Artillery battalion S3s must plan positions around established air routes to ensure fires will not violate air routes. If positions must be placed where fires will violate air routes, an Airspace Coordination Area (ACA) must be established. FSOs must verify the deconfliction of positions with air routes during planning and rehearsals.
Aviation specific: Aviation units have difficulty clearing fires into the ground maneuver zone. Aviation elements typically receive missions to attack reserve forces; stop enemy penetrations; conduct forward screens; flank screens of ground forces. These missions often require the aviation unit to request fires into the ground maneuver zone/sector. Poor coordination of these fires result in fratricides or near fratricides. PROCEDURE: Ground maneuver and aviation units must develop a plan to clear fires and rehearse the plan. The plan must include alternate communications methods. The plan may include permissive or restrictive fire support coordination measures, and on order boundaries to expedite fires.
Table
of Contents
TA.1
Maneuver BOS Narrative
TA.3
Air Defense BOS Narrative
|
NEWSLETTER
|
| Join the GlobalSecurity.org mailing list |
|
|
|
