SECTION
II
TA.1 MANEUVER BOS
Positive Performance
1. Maneuver
* Platoon leader crosstalk improving: Platoon leaders are crosstalking more on Co/Tm nets during operations. For example, they are providing ranges to targets. Generally, platoon leaders are more effectively coordinating their actions with less involvement by the company commanders.
* Doctrinal manuals: being used more during planning and preparation, by task force staff officers, company commanders and platoon leaders.
1.1.1.3 Move through air
* Aviation maneuver techniques: Attached helicopter crews perform good terrain flight procedures. Individual crews are performing well; they are cognizant of dust signatures, maintaining backdrop and they make good use of shadows.
* Aviation route planning: Attack helicopter battalions do well at assessing the enemy air defense threat and translating that into their attack route planning. Battalion staffs, during the IPB process, assess the threat well and plan air routes which offer the maximum terrain masking.
1.3.2 Occupy terrain
* Defense: adjacent unit coordination at Co/Tm level: TECHNIQUE: Commanders are meeting on unit boundaries and in the engagement area to identify flanks. Further improvement would result from coordination of dead space, obstacles, and direct fire plans.
Need Emphasis
1.1.1 Position/Reposition Forces (Units and Equipment)
* Counter-Reconnaissance operations are inadequate to secure/protect the force: Task Force counter-recon emphasis has diminished the overall task force security posture. Most task forces conduct a linear, picket line-like search for enemy reconnaissance elements, content to destroy some percentage of the overall enemy reconnaissance threat. Little consideration is given to the task force area of operations in depth, or to local security of task force sub-units "behind" the LD/FLOT. PROCEDURE: Task forces must conduct security operations throughout the depth of their sector, including both direct and indirect fire planning. Counter-recon operations, by themselves, are rarely adequate to secure or protect the force. Security operations must also include the tactical assembly area.
* MP platoon employment: Brigades have limited knowledge of the doctrinal roles and capabilities of a direct support MP platoon. The MP platoon leader is normally involved in the brigade's wargaming and planning process, but he is not given mission guidance and mission priority by the brigade S3. Brigades consistently fail to include the MP platoon's mission in the brigade order. The S3 normally places the MPs under the operational control of the BSA.
1.2 Engage Enemy
* Actions on contact: Units generally fail to plan for all forms of enemy contact and reactions to the contact. Task force battle drills either do not exist or are not understood well enough to be executable by subordinate elements. This is also true at company/team level, where battle drills are poorly understood, practiced or rehearsed. Co/Tms continue to drive into enemy engagement areas unable to achieve or maintain tactical formations. This results in their inability to mass firepower. TECHNIQUE: There are at least seven forms of enemy contact -- visual, direct fire, indirect fire, close air support, electronic/jamming, NBC, obstacles. Units must plan for the possibility of any or all these forms of contact throughout the depth of the battlefield and at potentially critical points in the battle. Commanders must be able to "see themselves" at critical points in the battle, anticipate when and where the enemy will employ various forms of contact. This requires the plans for battle drills at these points to fight through the contact. These battle drills should be rehearsed at all echelons and then incorporated into unit SOPs.
1.2.1 Employ Direct Fire
* Direct Fire Planning and Execution: Co/Tms exhibit an inability to do direct fire planning for both offensive and defensive operations. Task Forces are unable to mass two-thirds or more of Co/Tm firepower in any engagement area or objective without target overkill. Fire distribution, and the shifting of fires is rarely explained or rehearsed. Range cards, platoon sector sketches, and company fire plans (if they exist) are not linked. This hinders the ability of commanders to focus, shift or mass fires with sufficient control.
* Conduct of boresighting: Bradley Fighting Vehicle (BFV) companies rarely boresight all vehicles to standard. PROCEDURE: Follow the procedures in FM 23-1; crews will then know to refer the nightsight and the auxiliary sights; to boresight the coax and/or the TOW. Leader supervision will insure the tasks are completed to standard.
* MILES boresight and zero: Boresight and zero procedures conducted in assembly areas are not done to standard. The inability of BLUFOR to hit with MILES is more indicative of a lack of understanding about MILES rather than gunnery skills. PROCEDURE: Refer to the CALL/NTC MILES Handbook, 94-5, December, 1994 for techniques and procedures for reinforcing the doctrinal boresight and zero techniques.
1.3 Control Terrain
* Problems massing combat power during movement to contact: Units fight "piecemeal" and are unable to mass on the opposing force. Once making contact with the lead OPFOR unit, BLUFOR habitually does not fix or maneuver. The major contributor to this problem is the march formation. Most units are spread out 7 to 10 kms in length from advance guard company to trail unit. This results in a lack of mutual support, which provides the OPFOR the opportunity to mass on individual BLUFOR companies. This ultimately leads to TF destruction. TECHNIQUE: Design schemes of maneuver to position the elements in depth where they can maneuver effectively to destroy forces once contact is made. The wargaming process, ie. action-reaction-counterreaction, can sort out the most viable scheme of maneuver. Then conduct rehearsals, including actions on contact, to better refine what should happen when contact is made .
* Shaping the battlefield - deep battle: Brigades normally do not plan and execute a deep fight to shape conditions for the success of the close fight. While staffs understand the concept of deep operations, they rarely are able to achieve the commander's desired effects. This is partially the result of commanders not giving realistic guidance. Another source of problems results from not considering all combat multipliers during the planning process. For example, it may not be until a rehearsal (or even during execution) that the brigade realizes the need for more combat power at a certain point in the deep battle. As the other BOS add their piece into the fight, artillery and CAS plans are adjusted. This significantly alters the original plan and "desynchronizes" the fight. The resultant piecemeal application of combat power leads to failure. TECHNIQUE: Wargame all combat multipliers. The process must include all of the enemy and friendly critical events so that there are no major unforeseen actions necessary. This best results from starting the planning process at the decisive point and planning backwards to the initial friendly disposition.
Table
of Contents
TA.7
Combat Service Support BOS
TA.2
Fire Support BOS Narrative
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