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Military

TA. 6 MOBILITY/SURVIVABILITY BOS & NUCLEAR/BIOLOGICAL/CHEMICAL (NBC)

Positive Performance

6.3.1.1.4 Employ Protective Equipment

* Use of M8/M9 Chemical Detection Paper: Tank platoons are better using M8/M9 chemical detection paper as a result of better Pre-Combat Checks and Pre-Combat Inspections.

Technique: train the use of Chemical Detection Paper when training unmasking procedures at Home Station.

Procedure: standardize the location of M9 paper on vehicles and put the location in the unit SOP.

Needs Emphasis

6.1.1 Overcome obstacles

* Task force level deliberate breaching operations:

PROBLEMS:
1. Task forces fail to properly plan for and rehearse deliberate breaches.
2. Suppression, obscuration, security and reduction (SOSR) are not addressed in sufficient detail during the planning process.
3. Wargaming for breach operations is not detailed enough.
4. Criteria is not established for what determines when conditions are set, and when to commit the breach force.
5. Breach rehearsals lack sufficient detail at all levels.
EXAMPLES: 1) task force rock drills typically gloss over all details of the actual breach. 2) mounted rehearsals are often planned, but rarely executed.
6. Units also fail to plan for assault breaches.

Techniques:
1. Doctrinal reference: FM 90-13, Combined Arms Breaching Operations.
2. A deliberate breach implies the unit should have a detailed intelligence picture. This should allow the construction of a realistic rehearsal site, which should be used by all elements involved in the breaching operation.

6.3 Enhance Survivability

* CSS element defense planning, preparation and execution:

PROBLEMS:
1. CSS units consistently have difficulty planning and providing their own defense.
2. Initial quartering parties lack thoroughness.
3. Base cluster defenses often are based on poor quality fighting positions, an absence of sector sketches and weak coordination between supporting elements.
4. Execution of R& plans needs additional training.
5. Fire support and air defense planning and execution is not coordinated or complete.

Technique: Home Station training must be improved to fully integrate and exercise all aspects of base defense operations.

* Survivability/security of mortar platoons:

PROBLEM: in defensive operations, mortar platoons get very little or no engineer support/resources from their higher command to dig mortar positions which will increase survivability.

RESULT: not only is mortar platoon survivability jeopardized, the mortar platoons also then neglect other aspects about security and survivability preparation.

Techniques:
1. Mortar platoons must proactively establish sectors of fire, survivability positions and OPs.
2. Emplace crew-served weapons along likely enemy avenues of approach.
3. Coordinate with adjacent elements, when applicable.
4. The mortar platoon leader must learn to compete for the limited engineer support assets to enhance survivability positions; the platoon must be able to prepare their own survivability positions under the assumption they will not receive engineer support.

6.3.1 Provide Battlefield Hazard Protection

* Individual soldier load: Despite previous successes in reducing soldier load, there is a consistent trend indicating that average loads are increasing. Ruck sack and LCE loads are creeping toward the excessive in the effort to provide the soldier with the most effective fighting equipment. This includes improved night vision devices, thermal underwear, knives, survival tools, etc. The end result of this equipment burden is a rise in the weight soldiers must carry into battle.

Techniques:
1. Commanders must clearly designate the minimum and maximum packing list based on METT-T.
2. These restrictions/requirements must be strictly enforced by the chain of command at all levels.
3. Commanders must make some hard choices in the trade-off between mission accomplishment and the performance cost to mission accomplishment caused by excessive soldier load.

*Detection and reaction to chemical attack:

PROBLEMS:
1. Units react slowly to possible chemical attacks or contaminated areas.
2. Soldiers rely too much on M256 kits; they do not use M8/M9 paper when they should.

RESULT: the failure to use all available detection techniques can cause false readings, unnecessary casualties and the spread of contamination.

Techniques:
1. Remember that M256 kits detect only vapor, while M8/M9 papers detect liquid contamination.
2. Routinely incorporate NBC training into every possible Home Station training event.
3. While making use of FOX reconnaissance vehicles, it is very important to maintain soldier proficiency in the use of all available detection equipment.

* Chemical reconnaissance:

PROBLEMS:
1. Too many units are overly dependent upon the FOX reconnaissance vehicle to confirm or deny the presence of contamination.
2. Templated strikes are not plotted as NAIs in the R& plan.
3. No element is tasked to recon the templated strike area(s).
4. Contaminated units fail to use NATO marking kits; they expect the FOX vehicles to do the marking.

Techniques:
1. Task force planners should mark possible strike areas as NAIs during the Tactical Decision Making Process, and then assign observation responsibility to an element within the task force.
2. Units should plan to conduct a chemical reconnaissance without the assistance of a chemical recon platoon or element.
3. Templated areas may have to be checked several times to ensure they have not been contaminated since last observed.

6.3.1.1.2 Prepare Fighting Positions

* Field artillery battery-level defensive preparations:

PROBLEMS:
1. Firing battery commanders rarely plan or execute an effective battery defense.
2. Too many commanders fail to ask for, or receive, information from the S-2 about the expected enemy threat, avenues of approach, the effects of terrain on proposed positions.
3. Battery commanders conduct little or no IPB during their reconnaissance, and too many positions are found on enemy regimental or battalion avenues of approach.
4. Range cards are inaccurate.
5. Too many leaders fail to conduct Pre-combat inspections (PCI).
6. Too many leaders do not understand:
  • placement of target reference points (TRP) or range markers
  • the use of killer junior procedures (ground target direct fire FPF)
  • control of direct fire against ground targets

7. Defensive diagrams do not correspond to range cards.
8. Defensive schemes fail to consider all firepower available to the battery.
9. When defensive diagrams are attempted (many times they are not), they take two to three hours to complete.
10. Crew-served weapon maintenance and knowledge is poor.
11. Special teams are rarely rehearsed because of a lack of emphasis by battery leaders and poor time management.
12. Alternate positions are rarely prepared to standard.

Techniques:
1. Working with the S-2, battery commanders must analyze the terrain to pick positions that provide the battery the best passive defense while meeting the battery's critical fire support tasks.
2. The battery commander and platoon leaders must plan:

- battery direct fire defense
- survivability moves to alternate positions
- triggers for these moves
3. Batteries should reach a level of training proficiency where defensive preparations become a battle drill as a natural continuation of the occupation.
- get the basic defensive capability established as quickly as possible, ie. Assign sectors of fire to occupying elements. The gunnery sergeant in the advance party determines the sectors.
- establish the required TRPs.
- within one hour after the battery is ready to fire, complete platoon range cards and defensive diagrams.
4. Subsequent position improvement is METT-T dependent:
- quality of preparation is dependent upon leader involvement
- conduct PCIs
- conduct rehearsals so everyone understands their required actions

6.3.1.1.4 Employ Protective Equipment

* Use of chemical gloves by mortar platoons:

PROBLEM: Some unit SOPs state that mortarmen should not wear chemical protective gloves when in MOPP Level 4 because of potential problems with hanging the mortar rounds for fire while wearing the gloves.

Technique: Mortar platoons must train at Home Station to a level of proficiency where mortar missions can be successfully conducted in complete MOPP Level 4 equipment.

6.3.1.2.1 Decontaminate Personnel and Systems

* Planning, coordination and execution of decontamination operations:

PROBLEMS:
1. Task forces are generally unprepared to conduct thorough decontamination operations.
2. Contaminated elements fail to provide the personnel to augment the detailed equipment decontamination element.
3. Contaminated elements also fail to provide the personnel and equipment necessary to conduct detailed troop decon.

Techniques:

1. Remember the Chemical Decontamination platoon can provide one individual to coordinate with the contaminated element and then supervise decon operations.

2. Task forces must obtain and then control decontamination equipment at a central location, and then use the task force NBC officer or NCO to supervise the decon operation, in conjunction with the decon platoon leader.

3. Detailed, thorough decontamination operations must be trained at Home Station prior to deployment so troops are familiar with how the operations are conducted, and the time and equipment necessary, etc.

6.3.2.2.3 Employ Smoke/Obscurants

* Task force level employment of NBC assets:

PROBLEM: Task force commanders do not use their chemical staff section and NBC assets effectively. The assets are not adequately planned for, and therefore, are misused or under used during mission execution

Techniques:
1. Doctrinal reference: FM 3-100, pages 3-5 discusses how to use the chemical staff during the planning process.
2. Task forces should integrate NBC training exercises into their Home Station maneuver training in order to improve the task force chemical staff and the supporting chemical company elements proficiency. This training should routinely include the smoke, recon and decon platoons.
3. This integrated training will also solidify the support relationship and help improve the TF chemical staff proficiency by providing realistic, hands-on experience which will subsequently prove beneficial in advising the TF commander during the planning process.

* Smoke mission planning and coordination:

PROBLEMS:
1. Brigade staffs provide a directed smoke mission, but give execution control to the maneuver task force.
2. Too often the brigade directed smoke mission does not compliment the task force maneuver commander's scheme of maneuver.

RESULT: the desired effect of the smoke mission for both brigade and task force is not achieved.

Technique: smoke missions are generally executed more successfully when the planning, coordination and execution are controlled by the main effort task force.


TA.5 Intelligence BOS Narrative
TA.7 Combat Service Support BOS Narrative



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