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Military

TA. 7 COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT BOS

Positive Performance

7.3.2 Fix/Maintain Equipment

* MICLIC maintenance and operation:

1. Operators are using their manuals.
2. PMCS is completed to standard and leaders are putting more emphasis on maintaining the system.
3. Units are meeting the STRAC requirement allowing one rocket and practice charge to be fired per system.

7.4.3.4 Perform Chaplaincy Activities

* Unit ministry operations:

1. Unit ministry teams (UMT) provide "real world" ministry to soldiers, ie. Pastoral care on the battlefield to counter the trauma of combat conditions.
2. UMTs are correctly assessing the specific religious needs of their units. Some use religious preference profiles, which will highlight the requirements of minority faith groups. This ensures their needs, particularly during high holy days, are met.
3. UMT individual readiness continues to improve as chaplains' physical fitness and common soldier skill proficiency improves.

7.5.2 Supply the Force

* Engineer battalion resupply operations: the engineer battalion CSS planners, HHC commander and the support platoon leadership plan, coordinate and execute routine supply operations to standard. This includes:

- identifying and coordinating for the required supplies.
- determining tactically sound Logistics Release Points (LRP).
- executing the resupply mission IAW the established timeline.

Techniques: for planning and coordinating battalion-level LOGPAC operations.
1. Determine what each company LOGPAC will consist of, based on logistical requirements.
2. Coordinate the movement to and from the LRP.
3. Develop a system to coordinate changes in logistical requirements reflecting any last minute task organization.
4. Establish procedures:

-for receiving hard copy reports
-delivering and receiving unit mail and distribution

Procedure: each unit should develop a standard LOGPAC as part of the TACSOP. This standard LOGPAC would be pushed to units, unless modified by the current situational requirements.

Needs Emphasis

7. Combat Service Support

* Task force scout platoon CSS planning:

PROBLEMS:
1. Too often the CSS for the scout platoon is an afterthought by the task force battle staff.
2. Scout platoon leaders are often forced to try and coordinate with internal and external elements for support, without command emphasis from the task force.

RESULT: Scout platoon leaders do not have the time to do the planning and coordination for mission support, either for CSS or CS. Therefore, too often the necessary support is not tasked and is unavailable when needed. This further results in mission failure.

Techniques:
1. The TF commander, XO and S-3 must become more directly involved in the CS/CSS planning process to support scout platoon operations.
2. Incorporate commander's guidance into WARNOs.
3. Put greater detail into FRAGOs and OPORDs to ensure scout platoon support requirements are understood and coordinated well in advance.
4. The TF XO (or S-3, depending on staff organization/responsibilities) should synchronize the support for the scouts, so the scouts are free to deploy on their mission as early as possible. The scouts must move with the confidence that all necessary support is in place and available when the scouts need it.

7.1 Arm

* Class V estimates: Task force level leaders and CSS planners are experiencing the following:

PROBLEMS:
1. Accurate Class V on-hand inventories are not being conducted.
2. Failure to track ammunition available to draw.
3. Poor management of ammunition haulers.
4. Planners fail to consult the battalion FDO about the scheme of fires for artillery, and the expected consumption based on the mission.
5. CSS planners are not associating specific support requirements with battalion Critical Fire Support Tasks (CFST).
6. Too many units are not being considered for resupply until it is too late to rearm in time to prevent mission failure.
7. When resupply is required, CSS and operations personnel do not have accurate information about:
- where ammunition is located
- which trucks are loaded with what ammunition?
- how long will resupply actually take once the appropriate trucks are finally dispatched?

Techniques:
1. Develop an execution matrix for ammunition resupply that will ensure key ammunition information is being tracked accurately, requested and then pushed. The execution matrix would include the following:

- required ammunition numbers, by battery, to accomplish CFSTs.
- specification of ammunition to be carried by the ammo platoon and/or their repositioning requirements.
- list reconfigured load plans, by bumper number, to be used by the ammo platoon.

* Unit ammunition status reporting: units are having difficulty forecasting, managing and resupplying ammunition because they are not working with accurate ammunition counts.

PROBLEMS:
1. Battery leaders are not actively conducting ammunition accounting, and fail to place emphasis on the importance of accurate counting.
2. Subsequent resupply further worsens the overall accounting problems.

RESULTS:
1. Units begin their deployment into combat with inaccurate counts.
2. Inaccurate reporting and mismanagement hampers the S-3, S-4, FDO and Battery Ammunition Officer (BAO) in accurately forecasting ammunition for subsequent operations.

Procedures: to enhance ammunition accountability
1. When the S-3, S-4 and FDO receive confirmation about the ammunition, by type and lots, the BAO will draw, they should immediately develop the initial issue plan.
2. This plan separates ammo that needs calibration from other ammo.
3. When the BAO and the battalion XO confirm the ammo has been configured to meet the battery's Unit Basic Load (UBL), distribution is made.
4. Batteries then confirm receipt, by count, when reporting back their upload.
5. Develop a simple FM report for transmission to the S-3 and the battle staff providing a status of ammo expended, received and on-hand.
6. Battery commanders must bring their ammo status update to every OPORD.
7. TOC personnel must be trained to track ammo expenditures, based on unit execution of the scheme of fires.

7.3.2 Fix/Maintain Equipment

* Operator level maintenance: In too many units DA Form 2404 is not completed to the standard specified in DA Pam 738-750, Maintenance Management Update, 14.

PROBLEM: most often the forms lack the maintenance supervisor verification and/or the NSN for required parts.

Procedure: PMCS training at Home Station should require maintenance to be conducted IAW the applicable operator's manual, and record the PMCS results on DA Form 2404 IAW the DA Pam listed above.

7.3.2.1 Perform Preventative Maintenance

* Crew checks of tank crosswind sensors: many tanks have crosswind sensors that give incorrect readings.

Techniques:
1. Check the crosswind sensors in the draw yard; repair or replace defective sensors.
2. Do not rely on a computer self-test to determine the accuracy of the crosswind sensor.
3. Doctrinal reference: see FM 17-12-1, page 5-5 for procedures to check the crosswind sensor.

7.4.3.4 Perform Chaplaincy Activities

* Unit ministry operations:

PROBLEMS:
1. Commanders do not adequately understand religious support and its potential to help soldiers maximize their potential on the battlefield. Too many commanders neglect the potentially valuable support the unit ministry team provides.
2. Chaplains are not functioning adequately as staff officers in the Tactical Decision Making Process (TDMP). A lack of understanding about TDMP by chaplains hinders their efforts to be proactive as plans are formulated. This is another reason the problem above continues. Chaplains need to be able to produce a religious support plan, and articulate it to the supported commander.
3. Division chaplains and NCOICs are generally not involved with unit training before, during or after unit deployments.

Techniques:
1. Chaplains need to involve themselves in the TDMP process in their role as a contributing staff officer. This will enhance their tactical and warfighting visibility within the command. The increased visibility and credibility should generate more, and adequate, support from the command.
2. When division chaplains were actively involved in supporting the activities of subordinate chaplains, the entire unit ministry team (UMT) process functioned more efficiently and effectively.

7.4.4 Provide Health Services

* Combat health support planning: medical units are generally deficient in the planning, management and execution of medical operations.

PROBLEMS:
1. Combat Health Support (CHS) planning is not integrated into the brigade planning process.
2. Too often the FSB medical company commander is unable to participate in the orders process because of operational responsibilities.
3. The FSB support operations officer is often tasked to participate in the brigade orders process, but lacks the necessary experience in medical operations.
4. FSB medical companies do not establish standardized treatment facilities. EXAMPLE: various shapes and sizes of tentage for treatment space.
5. FSB medical companies do not exhibit standardized blood management procedures.

RESULTS:
1. Medical operations are usually not synchronized with BCT operations.
2. The set-up and layout of most treatment facilities hinder the smooth flow of patients because of either the size and/or layout of the treatment facility.

Techniques:
1. Incorporate medical planning into all Home Station training field exercises.
2. The FSB medical company must practice the set up of treatment facilities in a field environment to ensure a practical configuration based on projected treatment requirements.
3. Always incorporate the use and management of ground and air evacuation assets into field training exercises.

7.4.4.1 Provide Medical Treatment

* Crew-level self/buddy aid: crew members generally fail to administer needed aid prior to medical personnel arrival.

RESULTS:
1. When medical personnel do arrive, they must spend extra time administering basic care which should have been done through the self/buddy system.
2. The time spent in this basic care prior to evacuation usually results in the needless loss of life on other parts of the battlefield. The large number of casualties to be serviced by small numbers of medical personnel means that any time wasted results in loss of life.

Technique: Maneuver commanders must reemphasize self/buddy aid during Home Station training. This will greatly assist the timely treatment of patients and clearly will result in additional saved lives across the entire battlefield.

7.4.4.2 Evacuate Casualties

* Casualty evacuation (CASEVAC) operations:

PROBLEMS:
1. Inadequate casualty evacuation planning at brigade, task force and company/team level; includes combat service elements as well.
2. The assets necessary to execute CASEVAC are too often not correctly positioned for timely execution.
3. It is apparent that too many units are inadequately trained in CASEVAC procedures, to include self/buddy aid.

Techniques:
1. Take the time at Home Station to qualify as many soldiers as possible as combat lifesavers.
2. Leaders should check certified aid bags and/or multiple first aid kits as part of pre-combat inspections.
3. Medical evacuation personnel, both ground and air, must be trained to stay aware of the tactical situation. This will assist in locating evacuation assets where they can best quickly respond for immediate support.
4. CASEVAC must be considered as part of the Tactical Decision Making Process by the integrated battle staff.

7.4.4.3 Provide Preventative Medicine

* Field artillery battalion field sanitation practices and procedures: FA battalions are generally not establishing, managing and executing proper field sanitation practices and procedures.

PROBLEMS:
1. Units routinely transport Class I, III and IV on the same cargo vehicle used to transport garbage and trash. Often these vehicles just finish off loading garbage and trash, then immediately upload Class I, with no time allotted for proper cleaning and sanitation.
2. Many units deploy with no field sanitation SOP, technical manuals, field manuals, or even field sanitation teams designated.
3. Many units deploy with less than half of the required standard field sanitation team supplies and equipment.
4. Unit leaders and field sanitation team members do not routinely check food (hot or cold) prior to it being served.

Procedures:
1. Leaders and supervisors at all levels need to implement an effective field sanitation SOP.
2. Teams need to be on orders, trained and equipped to perform this important function.
3. Use the medical NCO to quarterly evaluate field sanitation teams during field training exercises at Home Station.
4. Include field sanitation kits on pre-combat inspections.
5. NOTE: historically, 80% of the hospital admissions of U.S. forces during a conflict are from disease and non-battle related causes.

7.5.1.2 Move/Evacuate Cargo, Equipment and Personnel

* Task force level Unit Maintenance Collection Point (UMCP) operations:

PROBLEM: Doctrinal repair evacuation criteria were not followed, nor were METT-T factors used to produce mission specific criteria.

RESULT: UMCPs routinely become collection points for disabled vehicles requiring large amounts of time/assets to displace to the BSA.

Technique: BMOs should conduct a maintenance estimate to determine which vehicles could be better repaired in the more stable confines of the BSA. This would preclude the 4-6 hour time to displace from UMCPs.

7.5.2 Supply the Force

* Class III supply operations:

PROBLEMS:
1. Class III resupply operations are too often not synchronized between the MSB, the FSB and the maneuver task forces.
2. Resupply windows for the Brigade Combat Team (BCT) tend to be rigid time periods rather than event driven.

RESULTS:
1. The FSB and the maneuver task forces have difficulty reaching their required capacity from resupply operations.
2. The time driven, rather than event driven resupply too often causes less than full capacity forward at the start of combat operations.

Technique: the BCT must train to be flexible in developing Class III resupply windows. The windows must support maneuver operations, while concurrently maintaining the maximum capacity possible within storage and transportation assets.


TA.6 Mobility/Survivability BOS & Nuclear/Biological/Chemical (NBC) Narrative



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