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TA. 5 INTELLIGENCE BOS

Positive Performance

5.2.2 Evaluate Physical Environment

* Task force S-2 terrain analysis: Task force S-2s are better articulating how terrain will impact the threat's available courses of action.

Techniques:
1. More accurate Modified Combined Obstacle Overlay (MCOO) result in more accurate depictions of enemy avenues of approach into sectors/zones.
2. Improved identification of:

- enemy kill sacks
- potential friendly engagement areas
- defensible terrain
- specific potential system and equipment locations
3. Better use of TERRABASE products, and 1:24000 scale maps.
4. Improved coordination with supporting elements, such as engineers.

* Engineer terrain analysis into IPB: engineer planners continue to improve their detailed terrain analysis through map reconnaissance, TERRABASE and/or TOPOSKIMMER products, and ground reconnaissance.

Technique: prior to a rotation, units develop area of operations MCOOs that include:

- line of sight analysis
- restrictive terrain analysis
- impacts of off limits/no dig/restrictive dig limitations

5.3.2 Prepare Reports on Enemy Intentions

* Task force S-2 Enemy COA development: TF S-2s demonstrated a better ability to develop multiple enemy COA for use in the Tactical Decision Making Process (TDMP).

Techniques:
1. From FM 34-130, use the following criteria:

- suitability
- feasibility
- acceptability
- uniqueness
- consistency with doctrine
2. From FM 71-123, use the following developmental steps:
1) determine the decisive point
2) determine the supporting efforts
3) determine purposes
4) determine essential tasks
5) task organize
6) establish control measures
7) prepare COA sketch and statement Needs Emphasis

5.1 Collect Information

* Reconnaissance and surveillance (R& plan development and use:

PROBLEMS: at brigade level
1. Lack of staff integration in development and execution of R& plan.
2. S-2s not receiving subordinate element R& plans.
3. PIRs not adjusted throughout the reconnaissance effort.
4. NAIs not updated and disseminated to subordinate elements.

Technique: Refer to FM 34-2-1 for an explanation of each staff officers' role in the integration of IPB products, including the R& plan. Development and use of event templates and a decision support template will drive the R& effort designed to focus NAI observation.

* Planning, synchronizing and supervising the reconnaissance effort:

PROBLEM: Too many units at task force level delegate the entire responsibility for planning, integrating and supervising the reconnaissance effort to the S-2.

RESULT: Too often, a failed reconnaissance effort. The staff is unable to determine threat weaknesses and strengths. This hinders the development of courses of action that avoid threat strengths and exploit threat weaknesses.

Techniques: train at Home Station to integrate the reconnaissance effort IAW the following command and staff responsibilities.
S-2:

1) identification of collection requirements derived from the IPB process.
2) identification of reconnaissance and surveillance assets available.
3) integration of R& assets into a collection plan that matches collection requirements against collector capabilities, and is focused on threat course of action determination.
S-3:
1) tasking assets to support the collection.
2) synchronizing the reconnaissance plan with combat multipliers, ie. engineers, retrans, fire support, CSS, etc.
3) ensure the R& plan is as well integrated, synchronized, and supported as the operations plan. TF commander: while ultimately responsible for the entire process, the coordination and staff integration as best executed by the S-2 in conjunction with the S-3.

NOTE: the role of the Executive Officer in this process will be dependent upon the XO's commander directed focus, i.e., Operations or combat service support.

* Firing battery observation posts:

PROBLEM: While firing batteries habitually establish observation posts (OP), they are rarely properly positioned, equipped, or briefed; their purpose is unclear to them.

Technique: to determine the number and positioning of OPs.
1. Use IPB products to determine the type of enemy force expected, the direction the enemy will travel, and the enemy strength and composition.
2. Given the above, the battery commander develops the fire support plan.
3. Based on the fire support plan, the battery commander can choose the number of OPs, their location, and their specific purpose in support of the mission.
4. The platoon leader can then properly position, equip and brief the OPs with engagement and reporting criteria.

* Reconnaissance, Surveillance, and Security (RS2) operations:

PROBLEMS:
1. Units usually fail to begin planning for RS2 until after receipt of the brigade OPORD.
2. RS2 planning usually is done simultaneously, but apart, from the task force mission planning process.
3. Task force S-2s and BICCs create an R& plan in isolation, without staff integration.
4. R& plans are often late, and scout platoons rarely have sufficient time to conduct adequate troop leading procedures.
5. Scout platoons are sent out with no fire, CASEVAC, commo, or resupply plan, and with little information about the current enemy situation.
6. Security operations are usually relegated to the counter-reconnaissance company without adequate task force support, or supervision.
7. The remainder of the task force only provides local security of their own assembly areas.

RESULTS:
1. Dead and wounded scouts; sporadic communication with surviving scouts; no reconnaissance focus; little useful intelligence.
2. Successful penetration by OPFOR reconnaissance, and near perfect intelligence of BLUFOR disposition and activities.

Techniques: Produce an RS2 OPORD prior to receipt of the brigade OPORD
1. RS2 OPORD: covers all recon, surveillance and security tasks for subordinate elements prior to LD or defend time.
2. Brigades plan 24-48 hours in advance for follow-on missions. Once brigade completes SITEMPs, EVENT templates, and R& plans, the task force liaison brings these products to the task force TOC.
3. The task force night shift, for example, could then produce the RS2 OPORD for the follow-on mission prior to current mission execution. This RS2 OPORD could, as necessary, be adjusted following the current battle outcome.
4. Task force could issue the scout platoon and company/team commanders an RS2 OPORD shortly after the current battle. This would allow adequate time for troop leading procedures, and help focus the battle staff on the next mission.

NOTE: for this technique to be successful, the battle staff must practice this RS2 OPORD preparation to high standard at Home Station prior to deployment.

5.1.1 Collect Information on Situation

* Employment of FOX vehicles and squads:

PROBLEM: FOX squads are usually attached to company teams, where they are rarely used as the brigade S-2 intended. Brigade S-2s and chemical officers template chemical strikes and designate areas as NAIs. FOX squads, however, are seldom missioned to overwatch these NAIs.

Technique: while there may be exceptions, FOX squads should remain under brigade command and control, to conduct NBC reconnaissance based on the brigade R& plan. This facilitates the intelligence collection, insuring more detailed, accurate information for dissemination to subordinate elements.

5.2.1 Evaluate Threat Information

* Threat models:

PROBLEM: S-2s rarely deploy with threat models. Instead they deploy with situational templates tailored to missions they believe they will execute.

RESULT: S-2s are generally not able to successfully participate as an active enemy during course of action wargaming. The lack of valid threat models also hinders the S-2s ability to conduct predictive analysis.

Technique: S-2s must deploy with threat models that include HVTs, doctrinal templates, and descriptions of tactics and options. These models will greatly enhance S-2's ability to successfully conduct Step 3 of the IPB process. Doctrinal reference: FM 34-130.

* Determine threat capabilities:

PROBLEMS: too many brigade and battalion/task force S-2s are not referencing threat doctrinal principles, tactics, techniques and procedures when trying to determine threat capabilities and actions.

Technique: In addition to referencing doctrinal publications for current threat doctrine and TTP, S-2s should also develop a critical events list. This list is actually a flow chart providing a narrative description of enemy tactics and operations for each enemy course of action.

RESULT: improved predictive analysis, and products useful during battle staff COA wargaming sessions.

* Engineer understanding of threat capabilities:

PROBLEMS: engineer planners do not understand enemy engineer capabilities and are unable to portray their capabilities to the commander and battlestaff.
1. Improper templating of threat conventional, reserve and situational obstacles in the defense negatively impacts course of action wargaming and the subsequent synchronization of the operation.
2. Engineers exhibit difficulty relating threat engineer effort to the intelligence collection and analysis effort. This hinders the development of friendly high value targets (HVT).

Techniques:
1. Engineers must be able to identify critical enemy engineer assets to assist in the HVT development, and prioritization.
2. During offensive operations, engineers must be capable of describing terrain and weather effects on both friendly and enemy assets; they must articulate threat capabilities for mobility, countermobility and survivability.
3. Engineer threat analysis must be integrated with the S-2 and the remainder of the battle staff.
4. Doctrinal references:

- TRADOC Pamphlet 350-14, Heavy OPFOR Operational Art Handbook
- TRADOC Pamphlet 350-16, Heavy OPFOR Tactics Handbook
- CAC & Ft. Leavenworth 350-1, Heavy OPFOR Organization Guide

5.2.4 Integrate Intelligence Information

* Company/team level IPB:

PROBLEMS:
1. Company/team commanders do not analyze terrain for:
  • intervisibility lines
  • dead space
  • choke points
2. Company/team commanders fail to consider the enemy's use of terrain.
3. Fail to consider the enemy's weapon system emplacements and their effect on friendly maneuver.

RESULTS
1. Offensive missions: BLUFOR elements consistently maneuver into enemy engagement areas.
2. Defensive missions: BLUFOR elements establish a defense with too much dead space not covered by observation and indirect fire and/or obstacles to channel to enemy into a friendly engagement area.

Techniques:
1. Using the task force SITEMP, terrain analysis, weather data, intelligence annex, PIRs, etc., the commander further breaks down the terrain and the enemy to determine their collective effects on the company/team mission.
2. This analysis should result in the determination of intervisibility lines, dead space and choke points, etc. These direct the building of viable engagement areas for defensive operations, or help determine the best axis of advance to follow for an offensive mission.
3. Doctrinal references: FM 71-1, Chapter 2; FM 71-2, Chapter 2; FM 34-1.
4. Home Station Training: use TEWTs as an effective means of training terrain analysis, and using the results of the analysis to more effectively plan offensive and defensive operations.

5.3 Prepare Intelligence Reports

* Integration of IPB products:

PROBLEMS:
1. While the Intelligence School and Center teach Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield concepts well, the specific application of the IPB process, what products must be produced by whom, when, and to what standard are not clearly articulated anywhere except the Combat Training Centers.
2. The staff planning process at task force/squadron level, and specific IPB integration, is generally not understood or articulated to the S-2 by the commander, executive officer or the S-3.

Techniques:
1. Use existing FM's as the source for process explanation and examples: FMs 34-130, 34-3, 71-123, 34-2-1. Although these FM's do not provide totally adequate examples of fully integrated IPB products, they represent an adequate doctrinal starting point.
2. Train at Home Station to develop SITEMPS that will facilitate the Tactical Decision Making Process, including the staff integration between the S-2 section, the S-3 section and all other relevant staff elements at TF/Squadron level. Refer to CALL Newsletter 95-12, Tactical Decision Making: Abbreviated Planning, CALL Newsletter 95-7, Tactical Operations Center (TOC), and CTC Quarterly Bulletin, 2d Quarter, FY 96, "Battalion S-2s: Back to the Basics" for additional techniques and procedures relevant to staff integration.

* Task Force S-2 SITEMPS:

PROBLEMS:
1. Task force S-2 SITEMPS lack sufficient detail to assist the commander and battle staff visualize how the enemy will fight at the critical point
2. S-2s are not developing multiple enemy courses of action (COA), and possible enemy branch plans from the selected enemy COA.
3. S-2 SITEMPS do not account for all the enemy combat multipliers.

RESULT: task forces wargame friendly COAs without a clear understanding of how the enemy will fight. Also, failure to properly wargame friendly COAs against selected enemy COAs and branch plans hinders the task force's ability to develop viable branches and sequels to counter enemy reaction to friendly maneuver.

Techniques:
1. TF S-2 must develop multiple enemy COAs and possible branch plans.
2. S-2s must also, at Home Station, practice their wargaming responsibility to serve as a thinking, uncooperative enemy.

* Decision Support Templates (DST): designed to assist the commander, DSTs depict where enemy and friendly events may or may not occur relative to time phase lines, NAIs, TAIs, trigger points and decision points.

PROBLEM: Brigade level staffs generally do not develop a detailed decision support template (DST), and do not use DSTs in the brigade main CP to help fight the battle.

Techniques:
1. Doctrinal references: Use FM 34-130 and FM 71-123 to understand how to develop a DST, and then how the commander and battle staff can use the DST as a decision support tool.
2. DST should be used in conjunction with the appropriate level synchronization matrix. Make full use of any possible Home Station training opportunity to exercise staff integration by creating and using products designed to support the Tactical Decision Making Process.

* Field Artillery battalion S-2 analysis and reporting:

PROBLEM: Too many FA battalion S-2s fail to use intelligence summaries (INTSUM) and periodic intelligence reports (PERINTREP) to show where the enemy is now and to predict the impact the enemy will have on future operations.

RESULT: Most S-2s fail to recognize critical enemy events, and predict their impact on the battalion.

Technique: develop an Enemy Critical Events Matrix, a graphic matrix annotated into the situation/event template.
1. This matrix synchronizes enemy events with critical fire support tasks (CFST), priority intelligence requirements (PIR) and force protection measures.
2. Build the matrix with four columns:

- (1) PIR/CFST/force protection measures (FPM)
- (2) enemy event
- (3) target number
- (4) actions/remarks
3. Sequential steps on how to use the matrix:
- list in chronological order, the enemy event corresponding to the PIR/CFST/FPM
- assign a number to each row
- fill in the appropriate target number, where applicable
- next to each row under the action/remarks column, write the appropriate action, ie. Report, etc.
- on the overlay, place a circled number 15 to 20 minutes prior to where your event template indicates the enemy event will take place.
- while you are battle tracking, when enemy actions trigger an event in the location anticipated, execute the action indicated on the matrix.

RESULT: Using this matrix will focus battery commanders, the FA battalion S-3 and the FSCOORD on critical events effecting their continual decision requirements. As an S-2, this matrix can result in predictive, rather than reactive analysis as part the staff integration process.

5.3.3 Prepare Reports on the Battlefield Area

* Battlefield effects evaluation:

PROBLEMS:
1. S-2s rarely integrate weather effects on both friendly and enemy operations.
2. S-2s rarely produce the Modified Combined Obstacle Overlay (MCOO); they only focus on unrestricted, restricted and severely restricted terrain.

Technique: follow the steps outlined in FM 34-130, pages 2-22 to build a MCOO. Continue to effectively use TERRABASE products and OCOKA factors in determining battlefield effects.


TA.4 Command and Control BOS Narrative
TA.6 Mobility/Survivability BOS & Nuclear/Biological/Chemical (NBC) Narrative



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