TA.
4 COMMAND AND CONTROL BOS
Positive
performance
4.1
Acquire and Communicate Information and Maintain Status
*
Forward Support Battalion TOC operations:
FSB
TOC Operations and battle tracking have improved:
1.
Level of detail in battle tracking. 2.
Use of battle graphics.
RESULT:
FSB TOC better functioned as information nerve center for BSA. Technique:
FSBs
continue to train TOC operations with emphasis on battle tracking.
*
Command post locations:
Selection
of command post locations has improved with respect to ability to maintain
communications.
1.
TAC operations have improved in battle tracking and supplemental FM and MSE
communications supporting its forward position on the battlefield.
2.
Brigade HHC commanders select better locations based upon ability to communicate
with subordinate task forces and battalion CPs.
3.
Substantial improvements in work division among TOC, TAC, and Command Group
during battle.
4.
CP movements included during wargaming process.
Techniques:
1.
Plan CP locations and movements during the wargaming process.
2.
Select CP locations based upon ability to communicate with subordinate TFs
and battalion CPs.
3.
Keep key leaders involved in communication matters; forward units and CPs must
be able to communicate consistently.
4.
Focus on division of work among TOC, TAC, and Command Group during battle.
4.1.2
Manage Means of Communicating Information
*
Communications node center jumps:
The
brigade S3 and signal officer are adequately planning and executing node center,
RAU, and relay team moves.
1.
System controllers have consistently planned for and successfully executed
multiple node center jumps.
2.
Signal battalion S3s, by coordinating with brigade signal officers, continue
to successfully plan and execute RAU and relay team movements well in advance.
RESULT:
Signal support to brigade scheme of maneuver is successful. Techniques:
1.
Rotational signal units should plan and execute three jumps during their rotation
at NTC.
2.
Signal battalion S3 and brigade signal officer should continue coordination
to allow early integration in the brigade planning process.
4.3
Determine Actions
*
Task force level direct fire planning:
Tasks
forces have a much better appreciation of direct fire planning. Defensive direct
fire planning is the strength of most units, but task forces are also beginning
to realize the importance of direct fire planning in the offense.
Techniques:
1.
Incorporate direct fire planning during the task force planning process.
2.
Develop appropriate fire control measures that allow companys/teams to mass,
focus, distribute, and shift direct fires.
3.
Conduct training at home station to sustain direct fire planning and execution
with an emphasis on offensive operations.
*
Company/team level use of 1/3 - 2/3 rule:
Company/team commanders are making a good effort to meet the 1/3 - 2/3 planning
time frame. This is providing the platoon more time for their own planning
and critical preparation for upcoming missions.
Techniques:
1.
Commanders issue all Operations Orders (OPORDs) either early in the morning
or late at night.
2.
Use Warning Orders (WARNOs) to help increase the amount of time the platoons
have to prepare.
3.
Get out as much information as early as possible instead of waiting for full-blown
OPORDs.
4.4.1.1
Develop and Complete Plans or Orders
*
Field artillery battalion technical rehearsals: FA
battalions are formalizing the Technical Rehearsal Process in unit SOPs.
RESULTS:
1.
It prepares the battalion for upcoming mission:- scheme
of fires
- ammunition
to fire
- fire
support coordination measures in effect
- special
requirements
.
2.
Exposes ammunition and position discrepancies early: - allows
correction
- gives
Bn current status of firing platoons
Techniques:
1.
Continue to refine the rehearsal process.
2.
Implement technical rehearsals into Home Station training.
4.4.1.2
Coordinate Support
*
Engineer battalion CSS staff integration:
Engineer battalions are improving the integration of S1 and S4 staff officers
into the planning process.
RESULTS:
1.
CSS annex to Engineer battalion OPORD provides more detail and critical information
for line companies.
2.
CSS annex is often the sole source of information to line companies because
they do not receive brigade or TF orders.
3.
Commander receives clearer picture of his ability to support a particular COA
based upon CSS. Techniques:
1.
Continue integrating the S-1 and S-4 in the Engineer battalion planning process.
2.
Provide clear, concise detail to companies on CSS in OPORD, even at expense
of redundancy with brigade/TF OPORD.
3.
FRAGO immediately any changes to companies. 4.4.3
Provide Command Presence
*
Mortar platoon pre-combat checks and inspections:
1.
Mortar platoons check equipment very well for upcoming missions. 2.
Most mortar platoons have, and use, a very good pre-combat inspection checklist.
Needs
Emphasis
*
Communication support to brigade COLT teams:
The
brigade signal officer often does not adequately plan to provide communications
support to brigade COLT teams inserted deep behind the line of departure/line
of contact (LD/LC).
PROBLEMS:
1.
COLT teams assigned to brigade do not possess adequate communications equipment
to maintain constant communications to the commander. 2.
Brigade signal sections often do not have the resources to provide FM retrans
to support communications from COLT team to the field artillery unit. 3.
Units seldom coordinate with or involve DS FA BN signal officer early in planning
and wargaming process. Techniques:
1.
Coordinate fully and early with the artillery signal officer to plan FM retrans
team support to brigade COLTs; provide timely and accurate information and
current enemy sitreps. 2.
Arrange for artillery retrans teams to be OPCON to the BSO to establish and
maintain the FM link to artillery units supporting brigade COLTs. 4.1.3
Maintain Information and Force Status
*
Logistical reporting system:
PROBLEMS:
1.
Unit combat loss reports are often flawed by lack of standardized format and
poor accuracy.
2.
There is not a system to update unit status reports between LOGPACs; therefore,
supply consumption and personnel changes are not available until the next LOGPAC,
which is too late for logisticians to react.
RESULTS:
1.
The logistics reporting system is unresponsive to unit demands. 2.
To obtain information, numerous follow-up calls are necessary, tieing up critical
communications. Techniques:
1.
Review report format for brevity, clarity, and accuracy. 2.
Adopt additional SOP measures to update logistics status more frequently than
with LOGPACs. *
Task force level DA Form 2406 reporting:
TF
DA Form 2406 reporting lacks accuracy.
PROBLEMS:
1.
Units habitually delay reporting combat vehicles which are not fully mission
capable. 2.
Units delete vehicles from report in anticipation of arrival of repair part
which will restore vehicle to FMC status 3.
Circle X delegation below TF level clouds accuracy of report. RESULTS:
1.
False representation of TF's combat power. 2.
Loss of accuracy and visibility of units' maintenance status. Techniques:
1.
Report vehicles as NMC until all deadlining faults are repaired. 2.
Maintain tight control and continuous reporting on circle X vehicles. *
Materiel readiness reporting and repair parts requisition status:
Rotational
units frequently have an inaccurate picture of equipment materiel readiness
and status of open repair parts requisitions.
PROBLEMS:
1.
Units do not transition well from garrison to the field environment and requirements
in using ULLS, SAMS ½, and SARSS. 2.
Accomplishment and tracking of DA Form 2404 flow requires more emphasis.
RESULT:
Units quickly lose track of inoperative equipment, parts required, and requisition
status. Techniques:
1.
Unit leadership should require the use of automated CSS systems in both Home
Station garrison and field use, especially SAMS 2 CO26 reports at BCT level.
2.
Develop and use a tracking system to determine total number of DA2404s required
daily versus accomplished. *
Main Support Battalion (MSB) tracking of high priority requisitions:
MSB
tracking of high priority requisitions via transportation manifests remained
inconsistent.
PROBLEMS:
1.
MSBs use manual transportation manifests inconsistently to maintain visibility
of intransit high priority parts. 2.
MSBs do not get manifests to Forward Support Battalions' support operations
prior to each shipment's arrival in the BSA.
RESULT:
The Brigade Combat Teams too often lack time to receive, accept and install
high priority deadlining parts. Techniques:
1.
CSS units develop systems for tracking high priority parts; use this system
daily at Home Station. 2.
Train on and use BLAST system at Home Station to build familiarity with MSE
equipment. *
Forecasting of logistical requirements:
Rotational
units do not consistently develop timely forecasts of logistical requirements.
PROBLEM:
Many units have difficulty reporting casualties, damaged/destroyed equipment
(Area Damage Control), and submitting daily LOGSTAT reports.
RESULT:
CSS units have great difficulty determining support requirements. Technique:
Use
every possible Home Station training opportunity to exercise logistical forecasting
and reporting procedures.
*
Personnel accountability:
PROBLEMS:
1.
Unit SOP personnel reporting requirements: - tracking
and receiving reports by S-1 or his staff
-
failure by S-1 to follow up on lower units' nets
-
reports not checked for accuracy with S-1 representative
-
no single point of contact designated for collecting reports
2.
A lack of cooperation by subordinate units, including "slice" elements.
RESULT:
Personnel reports are late and/or inaccurate. Techniques:
1.
Simplify unit SOPs and task individuals within S-1 section to routinely follow
up reports. 2.
Ensure that "slice" elements know and comply with their reporting requirements.
*
Use of Tactical Army CSS Computer System (TACCS):
PROBLEMS:
1.
Many units' Personnel Action Center (PAC) personnel are poorly trained in the
wartime capabilities of this system.
2.
Many units have not backed up their Home Station data base.
RESULTS:
1.
Units are afraid or unable to use the system.
2.
Units increase their workload. Techniques:
1.
Ensure PAC personnel train regularly on the wartime functions of their TACCS
systems. 2.
Back up home station unit data bases before deploying to NTC. 3.
Utilize the battle roster capability of the system at NTC. *
Signal unit situational awareness:
Signal
units continue to have difficulty disseminating information down to the level
of the individual soldier.
PROBLEMS:
1.
They regularly display poor situational awareness (friendly and enemy) at the
node center and remote sites.
2.
Battle tracking and information flow stop at the SYSCON, node management facility,
or company operations tent.
RESULT:
Soldiers often do not know what is going on in their sectors and are not aware
of the current threat (ie, air, ground, artillery, or NBC) Techniques:
1.
Signal units prepare some graphical portrayal of the scheme of maneuver/maneuver
graphics in their sector; keep this product updated. 2.
Conduct daily briefings at the node centers on current maneuver graphics, and
leaders check to ensure soldiers understand the current situation before departing.
3.
All soldiers receive a current situation briefing before departing. *
Jump Tactical Operations Center (J-TOC) operations:
TOCs
are still ill-prepared to conduct jump operations.
PROBLEMS:
1.
There are no standard packages or procedures on J-TOC operations and hand-off
between the main TOC and J-TOC.
2.
There are no formal procedures nor supplies to support jump TOC operations.
RESULT:
The intelligence, battle tracking, reporting, and tactical fire control efforts
all suffer. Techniques:
1.
Establish TTPs for each of the critical functions of the J-TOC:
-
intelligence hand-off
-
battle tracking
-
analyzing combat information (maneuver/radar acquisition)
-
producing combat intel and reporting 2.
Resource the J-TOC:
-
map board with map which mirrors that of TOC
-
S-2 charts similar to those in TOC S-2 Main
-
event/situation templates on map board
-
create J-TOC log/folder with copies of last INTSUM and RAG/DAG locations
-
J-TOC with radio nets which mirror those in TOC
-
box with required office supplies. 3.
Develop J-TOC battle drills:
-
duties and responsibilities
-
information exchange and update procedures with TOC
-
pre-command checks (PCCs) of vehicles and equipment
-
procedures for transfer of control and/or command. *
Predictive analysis and staff integration during battles:
PROBLEMS:
1.
Most command posts fight the battle in an inadequate TOC configuration, with
each staff section fighting the battle from inside its own M577.
2.
There is no adequate plan to share information with other staff elements.
RESULTS:
1.
The TOC does not share situational awareness, provide predictive analysis to
the CDR, or aid him in synchronizing all the BOS elements on the battlefield.
2.
The normal TOC configuration does not aid staff integration without a proactive
XO and staff. Technique:
Establish
one battle tracking board/map. Appoint one battle captain to update the main
battle board/map. All battlestaff officers provide input to the battle captain.
TA.3
Air Defense BOS Narrative
TA.4
Command and Control BOS Narrative, Part 2
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