TA.
3 AIR DEFENSE BOS
Positive
Performance
3.1
Process Air Targets
*
Air attack early warning:
Techniques:
1.
Air defense units pass directed early warning on command nets at all levels
to ensure the word gets to the lowest levels.
2.
Commanders at all levels are more aware of the air threat and the benefits
of early warning.
3.
Air defense LNOs rebroadcast early warning on command nets, as appropriate,
rather than just passing the warning to a brigade battle captain to disseminate.
Needs
Emphasis
3.1
Process Air Targets
*
Task force level early warning:
PROBLEMS:
1.
While air defense units arrive with a plan to disseminate early warning (see
observation above), there are too many instances where supported maneuver elements
fail to sufficiently disseminate the warnings.
2.
These dissemination problems most often result from a failure to exercise the
procedure during Home Station training; the air defense esarly warning plan
works for the air defense battalion, but breakdowns occur within the supported
maneuver elements.
RESULT:
too many instances where maneuver company teams have insufficient warning to
execute the appropriate air attack drill. Techniques:
1.
The early warning system must be fully understood and practiced by all elements
within the Brigade Combat Team (BCT).
2.
Procedures for air defense elements and maneuver/support elements must be clearly
defined within unit SOPs, and then practiced during training exercises.
3.
Warning plans must have necessary redundancy and establish clear and effective
triggers based on different threats.
*
Air defense TOC battle tracking:
PROBLEMS:
1.
The battery commander, forward with the main effort, is too often the only
member of the battery headquarters with knowledge of what is happening in the
fight.
2.
Platoons fail to pass information to the TOC because they are involved communicating
with supported elements.
3.
XOs are not pulling information from platoons.
4.
TOCs do not plot unit positions, track ammunition and fuel status, or track
the movement of supported forces.
RESULT:
the TOC is unable to provide recommendations to the commander on courses of
action based on mission changes or gaps in coverage. *
Development of air defense plans:
PROBLEMS:
1.
Air defense commanders and LNOs do not use S-2 products to develop air defense
plans to counter the threat.
2.
AD commanders fail to plan in sufficient detail. EXAMPLE: they do not take
the templated location of enemy obstacles, and use this to develop breach site
protection, based on the templated obstacle and the ordnance release line for
threat aircraft. This would allow the AD commander to position fire units to
destroy enemy aircraft before ordnance release.
3.
AD units are not plotting and tracking templated enemy special munitions such
as FASCAM. This results in AD element driving into FASCAMs or chemical contaminated
area that S-2s had templated and confirmed. 3.3
Integrate Air Defense Fires
*
Air defense integration in the planning process:
PROBLEMS:
1.
Air defense officers and their representatives are often not integrated into
the supported units TOC operations or the planning process.
2.
Too many AD officers fail to fully understand their responsibility as a special
staff officer, and do not provide the necessary input during the planning process.
3.
Too many AD section sergeants, serving as LNOs, do not have the training in
either TOC operations or the Tactical Decision Making Process (TDMP).
RESULTS:
1.
Poor early warning execution.
2.
Inadequate Class V and maintenance support.
3.
Unsynchronized casualty evacuation planning and execution.
4.
Inappropriate engineer support prioritization. Technique:
The AD officer and section sergeant must be trained at Home Station to be able
to work successfully in conjunction maneuver elements they will support. Specifically,
they must both be able to execute their functions as staff members during the
TDMP. This entails coordination for Home Station training with elements the
AD unit could be tasked to support during a deployment.
*
Air defense coverage against reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition
(RSTA) aircraft:
PROBLEMS:
1.
Maneuver task force leaders are not employing the Bradley Stinger Fighting
Vehicles (BSFV) platoons to provide air defense coverage against RSTA aircraft.
2.
BSFV platoons are used to provide air defense coverage of the ground counter
reconnaissance force.
RESULT:
Air defense assets are not used to cover other air avenues of approach into
the main battle area; this gives the enemy observation of company/team battle
positions. Techniques:
1.
Air IPB should encompass air threat objectives and the tactics the enemy would
employ during the counter reconnaissance fight. Develop a Decision Support
Template (DST) which includes air avenues and NAIs/TAIs corresponding to the
threat's probable course of action.
2.
Then, position air defense assets to support the air avenues and TAIs.
*
Air defense against air insertions:
PROBLEM:
Air defense platoon leaders are not proficient in developing air defense courses
of action against templated landing zones (LZ) and drop zones (DZ). Platoon
leaders are attempting to defend LZ/DZ by positioning air defense assets on
the LZ or the DZ.
RESULT:
BSFV platoons cover only a small number of LZ/DZ locations; too often BSFV
squads do not get early engagement against aircraft deploying troops because
the enemy uses an LZ/DZ not occupied by air defense assets. Procedure:
use
the air IPB process to identify air avenues of approach and NAI/TAI in the
rear battle.
Technique:
Position
air defense assets along the air avenues of approach to cover more than one
LZ/DZ site and to engage aircraft before troops are deployed.
TA.2
Fire Support BOS Narrative
TA.4
Command and Control BOS Narrative
|
NEWSLETTER
|
|
Join the GlobalSecurity.org mailing list
|
|
|
