TA.4
Command and Control (cont)
4.2
Assess Situation
*
Commander and staff use of Friendly Force Information Requirements (FFIR) and
Essential Elements of Friendly Information (EEFI):
Commanders
and staffs do not develop or use commander's critical information requirements
to assist in managing information.
PROBLEM:
Most staffs do an adequate job of developing and answering the command's Priority
Information Requirements (PIR), but often ignore:
-
Friendly Force Information Requirements (FFIR), which allows the commander
to "see himself" and determine the capabilities of his unit, and
-
Essential Elements of Friendly Information (EEFI), which is information that
must be protected from the enemy. Techniques:
1.
Commanders and staffs should read Battle Command Battle Lab pamphlet, "Leadership
and Decision Making for War and Operations Other Than War, 22 April 1994, to
gain understanding on how to develop PIR, EEFI, and FFIR and use these tools
to focus information flow on the key pieces of information the commander needs
to know.
2.
Use FFIR to focus battle captains in the brigade TOC on what they need to be
looking for and what to let the commander know about immediately.
3.
Use EEFI to focus brigade OPSEC and security efforts.
*
Military Intelligence company parallel planning process:
MI
company teams do not use parallel planning procedures to assist in conducting
continuous operations.
RESULT:
Units that do not plan and execute simultaneously are not ready to collect
against new targets when the current mission ends or changes. Techniques:
1.
Use the electronic warfare (EW) platoon leader as a planner, leaving the POC
chief as executor. The EW PL can then track on the supported unit planning
process and develop the company order and graphics while the current battle
is being fought.
2.
The IEWSO should ensure he is providing constant updates during the brigade's
planning process to facilitate parallel planning.
4.2.2
Project Future Requirements
*
Personnel estimates in the Tactical Decision Making Process (TDMP):
S-1s
typically have trouble completing an estimate for their portion in the tactical
decision making process.
PROBLEMS:
1.
Examples provided in current FM 101-5 and FM 101-10-1/2 are considered by most
S1s to be too cumbersome and lengthy for the task force S-1 to properly complete.
2.
Data tables in FM 101-5 and FM 101-10-1/2 are outdated and do not reflect the
increased lethality of the modern battlefield. Technique:
Task
force S-1s should concentrate their estimates on personnel strength of the
task force (number of combat platoons and key leaders available), and a good
casualty estimate (utilizing updated casualty data) to:
-
assist the medical platoon leader in positioning supporting FAS and MAS
-
estimate the impact EPWs and refugees will have on the scheme of maneuver 4.2.3
Decide on Need for Action or Change
*
Predictive analysis during battle:
The
Main CP is not able to analyze information that they receive to provide the
commander with a picture of what the enemy will do, and make recommendations
of actions that we should take.
RESULT:
The Main CP has become a reporting node with its focus on relaying to higher
levels, not on tracking the battle and recommending what to do next. Techniques:
1.
The battle staff XO, S2, S3, AIR, and FSE need to track the battle at the map
board and "think one step ahead of friendly/enemy forces".
2.
Use the event matrix, SITEMP, and decision support matrix to conduct predictive
analysis and provide a recommendation to the commander.
4.3
Determine Actions
*
Task force fire support element (FSE) mission preparation:
TF
fire support elements fail to plan and supervise the preparation phase of combat
operations.
PROBLEMS:
1.
FSEs usually deploy with less than well thought-out fire support critical task
charts and/or critical task checklists.
2.
Charts and checklists are rarely referred to prior to the issuing of the TF
order and are not prioritized for the company/team fire supporters. RESULT:
Company/team fire support personnel cannot efficiently use the time available
to accomplish critical fire support tasks prior to LD or the defend NLT time.
Techniques:
1.
TF FSEs use products developed and practiced at Home Station.
2.
Checklists can be helpful in determining critical fire support tasks.
3.
TF FSEs should develop fire support warning orders to speed information flow
down to company/team level. These warning orders can be integrated into TF
WARNOs.
4.
TF FSE must incorporate critical fire support tasks into the TF timeline to
ensure visibility and accountability during the preparation process.
5.
TF FSE should develop and practice a battle drill for tracking the status of
tasks identified in the fire support priority of work timeline and the TF timeline.
*
Forward Support Battalion Tactical Decision Making Process (TDMP):
CSS
units seldom conduct the elements of the doctrinal orders process during the
formulation of operations orders (OPORDs).
PROBLEM:
The FSB rarely conducts a full and complete orders process during the development
of its OPORDs.
-
failure to properly manage time
-
lack of familiarity with the doctrinal orders process
RESULT:
FSB's orders lack detail and fail to integrate the Battlefield Operating System
(BOS). The outgrowth of this is the lack of detailed and coordinated BCT CSS
rehearsals for each other during rotations. Technique:
Incorporate
and practice the orders process and CSS rehearsals at Home Station in both
daily garrison operations and periodic field exercises.
*
Engineer battalion staff parallel planning process:
Engineer
battalion staffs are not prepared to conduct a structured parallel planning
process.
PROBLEMS:
1.
The battalion staff's wealth of knowledge and experience is not integrated
into the Assistant Brigade Engineer's participation in the brigade planning
process.
2.
Lack of integration precludes commander's guidance and decisions being received
by the Assistant Brigade Engineer.
3.
Battalion staffs lack understanding that their planning cannot begin after
the brigade issues its order.
4.
Task force engineers are unable to integrate enemy and friendly engineer capabilities
and terrain analysis prior to the task force commander's guidance and course
of action development. RESULTS:
1.
Assistant Brigade Engineer's input to brigade planning process may not be in
line with commander's guidance.
2.
Brigade planning process has no depth
3.
Battalion OPORD not produced in a timely manner
4.
Subordinate units do not receive their staff/commander analysis and guidance
early enough to integrate, early on, in the task force planning processes.
5.
Task force engineers miss the window of opportunity to best effect task organization,
scheme of maneuver and combined arms rehearsals. Technique:
Engineer
battalion staffs must practice the Tactical Decision Making Process (TDMP)
at Home Station with the brigade staff so they are familiar with their orders
process and able to parallel plan in conjunction with it.
*
Company/team direct fire planning:
Company/teams
have exhibited an inability to do direct fire planning in both offensive or
defensive operations.
PROBLEMS:
1.
Task forces are unable to mass two-thirds or more of their firepower in any
of the engagement areas or objectives without avoiding target overkill.
2.
Distributing and shifting of fires, the most difficult task, is rarely explained.
Technique:
Develop
and practice direct fire planning drills at Home Station for both offensive
and defensive operations.
*
Battalion/task force scheme of maneuver development:
Task
force S3s and commanders struggle through course of action development and
refining the COA into a scheme of maneuver.
PROBLEMS:
1.
Most S3s do not know where or how to start COA development.
2.
Task forces normally develop a movement formation and general actions on contact
or actions on the objective, but never get to the details of what it is they
want their company/teams to really accomplish.
3.
Task and purpose are rarely assigned to company teams. The same problems exist
at company team level. Technique:
Chapter
2 of FM 7-20 provides excellent information on developing a COA and scheme
of maneuver.
*
Fire support mission analysis integration with maneuver elements: Fire
support integration into the mission analysis is usually not to standard.
PROBLEMS:
1.
Task force commanders are going through the Tactical Decision Making Process
(TDMP) and into battle without knowing what fire support assets were available
to support their mission.
2.
FSOs and ALOs do not identify critical information usually provided by brigade,
such as:
- specified
tasks
- implied
tasks
- assets
available
3.
Fire support integration into the mission analysis is lacking detail from incomplete
organizing and battlefield calculus.
4.
Throughout operations the task force FSNCO did very little to assist the FSO
in the conduct of mission analysis. It is critical that the FSNCO gather all
data, conduct mission analysis, and prepare the mission analysis with few if
any planning factors.
Techniques:
1.
FSOs and ALOs must identify specified and implied tasks, limitations, and assets
available for the mission. A great deal of assistance in gathering this information
must be accomplished by the FSE in the absence of the FSO. 2.
Clean digital communications during planning and coordination will greatly
assist efforts in obtaining assets available information. Once assets available
data is obtained, the FSO needs to translate it into meaningful information
the maneuver commander can use. 3.
Develop a standard mission analysis format that the FSNCO can follow and fill
out the blanks for the needed planning factors. The use of the FSNCO will save
time for the FSO and ensure that work on mission analysis can begin immediately
without the FSO being present. 4.
Early, thorough analysis of all specified and implied early speeds up the planning
process for the FSE, allows early coordination with outside agencies, and a
timely WARNO can be sent to the FISTs. 5.
Ensure that the supporting FA battalion understands the criticality of providing
timely and accurate ammunition data upon request. *
Task force level battle staff mission analysis integration:
Mission
analysis is not conducted as an integrated battle staff function.
PROBLEMS:
1.
The battle staff does not: - meet
at the Main CP
- receive
an overall brief of upcoming operations by the task force XO or SC AIR
- conduct
a mission analysis of their proponent BOS while the task Force commander,
S3, and FSO are at brigade
- receiving
the brigade order
2.
Frequently, the ADO and logisticians are not informed that the Main CP has
received the order or given the time that the mission analysis is going to
be conducted.
RESULTS:
Without a fully integrated mission analysis, the S2 and S3 will not be able
to conduct a mission analysis brief to the commander with all specified, implied,
mission essential tasks identified. Technique:
The
battle staff needs to conduct mission analysis integrating all of the key players
as outlined in CGSC ST 101-5, Command and Staff Decision Process. See CALL
Newsletter 95-12, Tactical Decision Making: "Abbreviated Planning."
*
Task force level Tactical Decision Making Process (TDMP):
Battle
staffs lack the training required to conduct the tactical decision making process
to standard.
RESULTS:
1.
Task force commanders too often begin to dominate the staff planning process
so it becomes the commander's process instead of a staff process. 2.
Task force commanders too often spend most of their time at the Main CP supervising
the staff. 3.
Task force commanders are unable to supervise the critical events that ensure
their intent is understood through subordinate unit OPORDS and rehearsals.
4.
Task force commanders cannot assess the task force preparation first-hand.
*
Task force planning for additional enemy courses of action:
PROBLEMS:
1.
Most task forces develop and wargame one course of action (COA) to defeat the
enemy most likely COA. 2.
As part of mission analysis, task force S2s develop and brief the enemy most-likely
and most-dangerous COAs. The commander and staff then develop the task force
plan to defeat the enemy most-likely COA. 3.
During wargaming, the S2 fights the enemy most-likely COA against the task
force plan. Because of limited time, the wargame ends without fighting other
possible enemy COAs.
RESULTS:
1.
Task forces are typically unprepared to adjust/react to another enemy COA during
the battle: - no
adequate contingency plans or decision support products to react to other possible
enemy COAs
- inadequate
graphic control measures to maneuver their company/teams
2.
Piecemeal commitment of the task force 3.
Confusion on the battlefield Techniques:
1.
Task force S2s must develop at least two possible enemy COAs and identify the
most likely. 2.
The S2 should identify the possible enemy branches from the most likely COA
and include those on the task force SITEMP. 3.
Task forces should develop a primary plan to defeat the enemy most likely COA
but also have built-in contingency plans to defeat other possible enemy branches.
As many possible enemy branches as feasible must be wargamed and a DST developed
to assist the commander with decision making during battle. 4.
Wargaming must be focused, with product outcomes of the wargame clearly identified.
TA.4
Command and Control BOS Narrative, Part 1
TA.4,
Part 3
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