TA.
2 FIRE SUPPORT BOS
Positive
Performance
2.1.1
Select Target to Attack
*
Brigade use of COLTS, scouts and aerial observers to support deep operations:
Brigades
generally make good use of Combat Observation Lasing Teams (COLTs), scouts
and aerial observers to support deep observations.
Techniques:
1.
The current MTOE including six COLTs allows brigades to employed trained observers
throughout the depth of the battlefield.
2.
Brigades echelon observers into the fight, providing continuous coverage.
3.
Thoroughly brief and rehearse teams prior to insertion; debrief and refit concurrently.
4.
To handle increased command and control requirements, many units have created
a platoon headquarters "out of hide" to assist with command and control of
deployed teams.
2.3
Integrate Fire Support
*
Integration of mortar platoons:
Task
force fire support officers (FSO) are integrating mortar platoon leaders into
the staff planning process.
RESULT:
Better synchronization of security and counter reconnaissance force operations
and the scheme of fires. Techniques:
1.
Routinely include mortar platoon leaders in the Tactical Decision Making Process.
2.
TF FSOs should consider using mortars to support security and counter reconnaissance
operations.
3.
Keep in mind 2/3 range capability and the inherent ammunition adjustments,
ie. Smoke and illumination rounds.
4.
The Fire Support Element (FSE) should plan targets during mission analysis,
and then disseminate the targets to the scout platoon leader and the mortar
platoon leader.
5.
The security force FSO and the mortar platoon leader must link up when the
mortar platoon is to support security/counter reconnaissance operations.
6.
Battle tracking and situational awareness of current operations must be monitored
by the FSE.
Needs
Emphasis
2.
Fire Support
*
FSE organization and procedures:
FSEs
are generally not organized to provide positive control of fires from planning
to execution of the fire support plan.
PROBLEMS:
1.
Brigade FSEs generally do not have all the manuals on hand to facilitate complete
fire support planning.
2.
Personnel responsibilities are not fixed prior to deployment.
3.
All graphics are not posted on the fire support map, ie.threat graphics, current
targeting intelligence, flight routes, fire support coordinating measures (current
and future).
5.
The fire support charts posted next to the map do not facilitate the control
of fires during mission execution. Procedures:
for
brigade FSE SOP
1.
Specify personnel duties and responsibilities.
2.
List manuals to be on hand.
3.
Specify the graphics to be posted and updating requirements.
4.
Develop charts which facilitate the control and clearance of fires for the
current battle.
Technique:
for
Brigade FSE organization
Note:
it
is not feasible to run shifts for all FSE personnel. It is advised to urge
personnel during key times in the PLAN-PREPARE-EXECUTE cycle in order to be
successful. Specifically it is recommended that the FSO, FSNCO and the target
officer do not work shifts.
2.1
Process Ground Targets
*
Field artillery battalion Jump TOC operations:
there
is a significant degradation in the field artillery battalion's ability to
provide timely, massed fires when the battalion conducts Jump TOC operations
during combat operations.
PROBLEMS:
1.
Once the FDC or the FDO releases control of battalion fires, the Jump FDC or
the controlling platoon FDC do not have the required information or precise
procedures to control and mass fires.
2.
The problems controlling and massing fires occurs whether the battalion FDC
moves with the Jump TOC or the TOC main body.
3.
The FDC does not have the personnel or equipment to maintain both a fully digital
and manual back-up system.
RESULTS:
1.
Artillery is piecemealed.
2.
Reduced effects on targets.
3.
Delays in the delivery of fires. Techniques:
IF
the battalion selects, or is forced, to use Jump TOC FDC, the availability
of the below listed tools will facilitate the successful Jump FDC take over
of operations. NOTE: even with these tools available, the Jump FDC operation
must be carefully planned and prepared. The Jump TOC operation must be trained
at Home Station prior to deployment.
Tools
to have on hand:
1.
Current written fire order standard: established prior to the operation and
disseminated to the platoon FDCs, this establishes and streamlines voice order
procedures.
2.
Written attack
3.
High Payoff Target List: this helps determine the order in which targets are
attacked. The HPTL is critical when several fire missions are requested at
once, or fire missions start to get backed up.
4.
Current ammunition count: The Jump FDC must know the ammunition count by battery
or platoon, particularly for ammunition critical to a given mission. &EXAMPLE:
for defensive operations it is more critical to track DPICM, RAP, FASCAM, Copperhead,
red bag and white bag powders. For offensive operations: DPICM HE, smoke, red
bag and white bag. For night operations: add illumination.
5.
Written/Printed Target List: This includes refined targets and known point,
if established.
6.
Current SITMAP: the FA battalion S-3 should have a back-up map for jump operations.
The map should have all maneuver graphics and targets posted. Prior to executing
a jump operation, the map should be updated with firing unit location, fire
support coordination measures, FLOT, and observer locations. A range protractor
should be available to add and update range limitations.
7.
Fire Support Execution Matrix: The FDO is often required to develop his own
matrix based on the addition of the task forces scheme of fires. If the battalion
passes control to a platoon FDC, that element must have the same or similar
tool, as well as an understanding of the overall scheme of fires.
8.
TC 6-40: This is the most important manual for use in the Jump FDC: for computation
of smoke and FASCAM data. Although the platoon FDC could require a platoon
FDC to determine this data, it may not always be possible or desirable. NOTE:
the
Jump FDC is only designed to control battalion fires for a limited period of
time. The longer the Jump FDC is required to control fires, the more tools
will be needed to perform the mission.
2.2
Engage Ground Targets
*
Task force standard for establishment of day/night triggers in defensive operations:
PROBLEM:
Personnel do not understand the various techniques for establishing triggers,
and the advantages/disadvantages of each. Techniques:
1.
Existing terrain triggers are always first choice
-
mix sand and diesel fuel in an empty 5 gallon anti-freeze can for use as long
range thermal trigger (5 kms +). -
mount 3 x 3 foot reverse polarity paper on plywood for a medium range thermal
trigger (inside 5 kms). 2.3
Integrate Fire Support
*
Transition from deep to close fight: Brigades
experience difficulty transitioning from deep operations to support of the
close fight.
PROBLEMS:
1.
Task force observes are routinely not in position to observe enemy formations.
2.
Targets are not planned along likely enemy avenues of approach.
3.
Task force observers are not in communication with the appropriate fire support
agencies to attack targets of opportunity.
4.
Task force fire support plans are not adequately synchronized with brigade
plans.
5.
Fire support rehearsals are not conducted in sufficient detail to identify
gaps between brigade and task force fire plans. Techniques:
1.
The brigade FSO must enforce collection of task force fire support plans in
sufficient time to review them prior to conducting the fire support rehearsal.
2.
The brigade FSO then ensures TF plans address all tasks to subordinate units
specified in the brigade order.
3.
The brigade FSO also ensures TF plans support the brigade plan.
4.
Conduct a brigade fire support rehearsal in sufficient detail to ensure continuity
from deep to close to rear.
*
Fire support for counter reconnaissance:
PROBLEMS:
1.
Too often task forces do not produce a fire support plan in support of counterreconnaissance
operations.
2.
In instances where a plan is produced, there is insufficient coordination for
the assets necessary to accomplish the mission.
3.
In too many instances, task force FSO fail to get/receive adequate guidance
from the task force commander and the FSCOORD.
4.
S-2s are too often not consulted about tactics and techniques the enemy uses
in their regimental reconnaissance missions. Techniques:
1.
The FSO must plan the counterreconnaissance battle with the S-2.
2.
Plans do not need to be elaborate:
-coordinate
the assets, ie. Mortars or artillery. -obtain the commander's guidence for
counterreconaissance fires.
-task
sufficient elements to execute the fight.
-give
observers the authority to refine planned targets in
conjunction with
the
counterreconnaissance force commander.
TA.1
Maneuver BOS Narrative
TA.3
Air Defense BOS Narrative
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