UNITED24 - Make a charitable donation in support of Ukraine!

Military

TA.4 Command and Control (cont)

4.4.1.2 Coordinate Support

* Coordinate CSS support during brigade operations: Units do not fully coordinate with adjacent units during brigade operations.

PROBLEMS:
1. Units often conduct operations that place CSS assets in positions from which they can support multiple operations.
2. Units failing to coordinate with adjacent units place CSS units in positions in which they interfere with each other.

RESULTS:
1. CSS units do not fully support the mission
3. Valuable training in logistical support is lost.

Techniques:
1. Focus on CSS coordination in AARs, showing how adjacent unit's CSS assets can support their operations; extend focus down to TF level.
2. Add mission of coordinating with adjacent units for CSS to troop leading procedures (TLP); add task to METL for training.

4.4.3 Provide Command Presence

* Task force fire support element (FSE) preparation phase supervision:

PROBLEM: TF FSEs usually deploy with FS critical tasks charts and/or checklists:
- they rarely refer to them prior to issue of TF order
- they do not prioritize them for company/team FS

RESULT: Company/team FS personnel cannot use time efficiently to accomplish critical FS tasks in a timely fashion.

Techniques:
1. TF FSEs must follow products developed at Home Station

- determine critical FS tasks
- develop FS WARNOs to company/team fire supporters
- fire support WARNOs integrated into and issued as part of the TF's WARNOs
2. Incorporate critical fire support tasks into TF time line.
3. Develop battle drill for tracking tasks identified in priority of work timeline and the TF timeline.
- to facilitate tasking of assets by TF to accomplish fire support preparation tasks
- to properly brief TF commander on state of fire support preparedness as execution time approaches

4.4.4 Maintain Unit Discipline

* Engineer company tactical discipline: Engineer companies must improve their tactical as opposed to their technical planning.

PROBLEMS:
1. Tactical assembly area (TAA) operations
  • not submitting personnel/supply status reports
  • not deploying M8 alarms
  • not planning local defense properly or in sufficient depth

2. Company/platoon troop leading procedures (TLPs)
  • not conducting pre-command checks/pre-command inspections (PCC/PCIs)
  • OPORDs lacked significant details: graphics; TF scheme of maneuver; CSS plan support to company scheme of maneuver
  • Scheme of maneuver/scheme of engineer operations not fully developed; usually only contained: unit LD time; formation; general route; TF objective name/location.
  • enemy use of engineers
  • amount and type of breaching operations for TF to accomplish

RESULTS:
1. Important tactical measures and procedures neglected.
2. Even some technical matters slighted, such as MICLIC reload plan.

Techniques:
1. Develop and train SOPs that address normal tactical operations and planning in the field in addition to technical training and planning.
2. Train/prove/refine in local training area or even next to unit motor pool.

* Military intelligence company unit discipline:

PROBLEMS:
1. Basic functions of unit were generally not being executed to standard by MI company teams:
  • getting to places on time
  • staying at a duty location
  • uniform and protective gear worn
  • guard duty not being executed

2. MI unit leaders apparently enforcing execution selectively or allowing questions or complaints and not identifying problem personnel and dealing with them as appropriate.

Techniques:
1. Leaders demand and expect that soldiers perform basic soldier functions to standard without questions, complaints, or selective enforcement.
2. Identify problem personnel and take appropriate action.

4.4.5 Synchronize Tactical Operations

* Obstacle plan integration: Obstacles do not attack enemy maneuver and rarely multiply the effects and capabilities of firepower.

PROBLEMS:
1. Obstacle plans are developed in a vacuum.
  • units fail to adjust obstacle plans to take into account wargaming results
  • units rarely take into account terrain in their obstacle plan

2. Units are unable to relate obstacle result terms (i.e., turn, fix, block, disrupt) to their direct fire plan.

RESULTS:
1. War gaming at TF level rarely helps synchronize various portions of the obstacle plan.
2. Even if obstacles were integrated at TF level, the intent is not achieved at lower levels.

Techniques:
1. Read FM 90-7.
2. At a minimum, conduct a sand table exercise on obstacle plan integration as a combined arms OPD.

* Close Air Support (CAS) synchronization: Although CAS planning has improved, it is still not regularly synchronized with other fire support assets or with the scheme of maneuver.

PROBLEMS:
1. CAS generally is not directed in planning
  • against the commander's high payoff targets
  • at the critical time(s) and place(s) for the commander's concept

2. Despite adequate plans for controlling CAS, it is not well synchronized in execution with A2C2 and SEAD.

RESULTS:
1. While CAS contributes significantly to destruction of enemy weapons systems, it does not deliver as much to success of the brigade's mission as it might.
2. CAS lacks focus in execution.

Techniques:
1. Integrate Air Liaison Officer (ALO) into planning process and targeting teams:

-CAS planned against appropriate targets at appropriate times
-ALO understands plans to incorporate SEAD and A2C2 measures
- to ensure synchronized attack with all FS systems
2. Include ALO in FS rehearsal to ensure he understands task, purpose, and plan for CAS execution.
3. Rehearse Tactical Decision Making Process (TDMP) within brigade TOC so key decision makers understand how and where CAS will support the scheme of fires.

* Company/Team CSS synchronization: Co/Tm leaders do not consistently develop coherent CSS plans which support the unit's maneuver/plan.

PROBLEMS:
1. Co/Tms and XOs rely on TF to plan and execute CSS at company level, develop plans not based upon METT-T considerations..
2. Units rarely tailor or develop casualty evacuation and vehicle recovery plans with sufficient graphic control measures.

RESULTS:

1. Classes I, III, IV, and V supplies do not arrive in time or in needed quantities.
2. CSS plans fail or experience difficulty in execution at company level.

Techniques:
1. Stress company CSS plans in tactical scenarios in live fire and force-on-force.
2. Highlight issues and causes and effects in relation to CSS planning at company level in AARs of tactical training at home station.

4.5 Employ Tactical C2W

* Electronic surveillance team pre-combat checks and pre-combat inspections:

PROBLEM: ES Team/platoon leaders are not conducting thorough Pre-combat checks (PCCs) or Pre-combat inspections (PCIs). Relying on memory rather than using a written checklist.

RESULTS:
- EA system inoperable due to missing ground strap
- EW system ran out of fuel
- two backup EW systems inoperable due to missing parts
- weapons wouldn't fire due to lack of maintenance
- backup manpackable EW systems ran out of batteries

Technique: ES teams need to include thorough, written PCC/PCI checklists in their SOPs and team leaders should use these before every mission. PSGs or platoon leaders should follow up with PCIs.

* Traffic analysis cell functions:

PROBLEM: The traffic analysis cell does not maintain a current data base of historical analytical observations, reconstruct radio nets, plot manual direction finding results, or provide feedback to the collection/jamming teams.

RESULT: The traffic analysis cell was essentially a glorified radio-relay facility.

Techniques:
1. The EW platoon leader and sergeant must take a more active role and interest in the traffic analysis cell function.
2. Hold the cell accountable for what it does/does not accomplish, ensuring basic standards taught at the schoolhouse are maintained.

*Electronic surveillance jamming effectiveness reports:

PROBLEM: Timely and accurate Jamming Effectiveness Reports (JERs) are not reaching the Platoon Operations Center (POC) during the conduct of an EA mission to have the desired effect.

Techniques:
1. The ES system tasks with monitoring the enemy frequency must be sitting on that frequency steadfastly.
2. ES system must provide timely and accurate JERs to the POC when:

- the jamming is not effective (the POC directs the appropriate action to the subordinate EA team).
- the jamming is effective (the POC can direct reacquisition efforts as quickly as possible).
3. Place an EW system with hearability to the target area, not collocated with the EA system or between it and the target area. Task it to monitor the target net to determine the effectiveness of the mission.
4. The monitoring system should assign an effectiveness rating from a pre-established scale, to provide timely and well-understood input to the POC.
5. Standardize the issuing of JERs. A two-minute interval during a jamming mission would help enforce the timeliness and importance of these reports.

*Electronic warfare team taskings: The Platoon Operations Center (POC) is unable to adequately track the tasking of its EW systems and utilize the collection/jamming assets to their fullest potential.

PROBLEMS:
1. The POC relied heavily on the EW teams to coordinate amongst themselves with little or no guidance from the POC to accomplish the mission.
2. POCs show lack of knowledge on both the capabilities and limitations of its EW systems and how to effectively run either a collection or jamming mission.

Technique: The POC crew should receive initial/refresher training at home station on the capabilities and limitations of its EW systems to enable them to properly plan for coordination and synchronization of their EW assets.

Procedures: Both the POC and EW teams should develop SOPs that present a clearer definition of each other's role and responsibilities.


TA.4 Command and Control BOS Narrative, Part 4
TA.5 Intelligence BOS Narrative



NEWSLETTER
Join the GlobalSecurity.org mailing list