SECTION II / TA. 4, Part 4 COMMAND AND CONTROL BOS: NATIONAL

TA.4 Command and Control (cont)

4.4 Direct and Lead Subordinate Forces

* Cross talk on the task force (TF) command net during battle: Task force commanders dominate TF nets during the fight.

PROBLEMS:

1. There is a lack of cross talk among subordinates and specialty platoon leaders on the command net.

2. Too often in the OPORT, paragraph 5 fails to establish who has priority on the net during certain events or phases of the battle.

RESULTS:

1. Subordinate commanders and specialty platoon leaders do not coordinate on the command net during the fight.

2. Subordinates do not know who has priority on the net during certain events or phases of the battle.

Techniques:
1. Establish priority for cross talk on the net by event or phase during OPORD or rehearsal.
2. Include guidance on use of nets during paragraph 5 of OPORD.

* Task force executive officer's (XO) battle staff role: The battalion XO is often a dysfunctional participant on the battalion battle staff.

PROBLEMS:

1. Home Station:

commanders fail to clearly identify the roles and responsibilities of the battalion XO and how he works with the S3.
TF XO tends not to be involved in the orders process until a major training event.

2. Arrival at NTC

XO must move and sustain force
TOC personnel not used to how the XO operates
many commanders and S-3s resist XO functioning as integrator of BOS

3. Middle of NTC rotation

XO finally integrates BOS and directs staff
XO sent to UMCP to raise TF OR rate

4. End of NTC rotation

all synchronization dropped in TOC
XO manages maintenance only
TF practices "survival"

RESULTS:

1. Unit deploys to NTC without a clear idea of the roles and responsibilities of the TF XO.

2. TF fails to coordinate BOS early in rotation

3. TF loses XO later in rotation to "fix" CSS.

4. Many XOs become TF commander's maintenance troubleshooter.

5. Lessons about successful staff integration by the XO gained in the middle of the rotation are lost.

Techniques:
1. Clearly make the TF XO the Chief of Staff for the Battalion

- right-hand man to commander with authority and responsibilities required

- S-3 works for XO in garrison as well as in field

- all elements of BOS must be stressed and integrate into every level of training
2. Logistics exercises

- executed by full staff, including S-3

- commander to drill XO as Chief of Staff, including leading orders process
3. Hold Battalion Maintenance Officer (BMO) responsible for maintenance and informing XO of maintenance issues.

- do not commit XO as maintenance action officer/troubleshooter

- bring Forward Support Battalion (FSB) commander forward if maintenance overwhelms battalion resources

* Brigade Tactical Air Command (TAC), Tactical Operations Center (TOC), and Command Group functions during mission preparation and execution: The roles of Brigade command and control nodes are often not clearly delineated.

PROBLEMS:

1. The TAC is often nothing more than a communications relay station.

2. The TOC controls too much and loses focus of its doctrinal functions:

Maintain situational awareness and keep common view of fight
Help CDR see and execute upcoming actions

RESULT: The TAC and the TOC are not used to their full capacity during mission preparation and execution.

Techniques:
1. Brigade Commander, XO, and S3 must determine together:

-Each node's mission (see FM 71-3)

-manning for each node

-Use all nodes during preparation for and execution of mission
2. Man and empower TAC to actually help fight the fight

-Help execute the close fight

-Command and control other operations, such as security fight, movements, or track defensive preps
3. Focus TOC on its functions:

-Fight the deep fight

-Synchronize the BOS in the fight

-Forecast outcomes and provide CDR analysis

-Plan future operations

* Mortar platoon Standing Operating Procedures: Most mortar platoons do not have a workable SOP or adhere to the one they have.

RESULT: In the absence of key leaders, ie, platoon leaders and platoon sergeant, subordinate leaders could not execute the leaders' intent.

Technique: Prepare workable SOPs, issue them to each squad leader, and ensure every soldier knows their SOP.

* Task force (TF) fire support officer (FSO) planning and tracking defensive preparations: Often, task force FSOs have difficulty planning and tracking preparations for defensive operations.

PROBLEMS:

1. Ineffective time management.

2. Lack of defensive planning checklist

3. Task force often fails to identify critical FS tasks needed to effectively integrate fires and maneuver.

4. Incomplete delegation of responsibilities to FSNCO.

RESULTS:

1. Integration and synchronization with key BOS representatives (S-2, S-3, engineer) were not tracked on TF time line, such as:

use of Small Emplacement Excavators (SEE) to dig survivability positions for dismounted operations and mortar pre-stock
target refinement to ensure planned versus actual obstacles were covered with indirect fires
emplacement of indirect fire triggers
CFZs for critical units (TF reserve, battle positions)

2. FSNCO did not receive priorities of work or effort to accomplish staff supervision tasks.

Techniques:
1. Develop checklist SOP (using FMs 71-123, 6-20-20, 6-20-40); checklist should consider the following:

-Survivability options for Co/Tm FSOs

-RSOP of OPs/tactical occupation

-Obstacle planning/integration of fires/coordination

-Trigger emplacement

-Mortar positioning

-CAS

-Positioning of TF FSO/ALO/TACP

-Radar zone planning

-Restrictive fire support coordination measures (FSCM)

-Land management/positioning of artillery units

-Special missions/munitions

-Staff supervision

2. Determine FS tasks critical to TF

-Put FS tasks on TF timeline

-FSO decide which tasks he will supervise

-Delegate remaining tasks to FSNCO with priority of work/effort

4.4.1 Prepare Plans or Orders

* Engineer battalion HHC commander use of troop leading procedures (TLP): HHC commanders have not regularly used troop leading procedures after receiving the engineer battalion operations order(s).

RESULTS:

1. His tactical plans are not prepared systematically

2. HHC commanders less effectively command and control their companies.

Techniques:
1. HHC commanders must use TLPs, with estimate of situation, METT-T, and IPB, to coordinate, plan, direct, and control the execution of CSS missions for every battalion mission.
2. HHC commanders should formally issue an OPORD, even orally and abbreviated, to his subordinate elements.

* Task force fire support element (FSE) use of WARNOs:

PROBLEMS:

1. Prior to operations, FSE/FSOs did not consistently issue WARNOs to fire support teams (FISTs).

2. All information to FISTs came from TF WARNO to company/teams, but TF WARNO did not have separate FS paragraph.

RESULTS:

1. Critical FS information, e.g., brigade target which TF had to trigger, brigade concept for fires, targets, TF sector, not passed to FIST.

2. Late selection of OPs to support TF missions and slow parallel planning. Techniques:
1. TF FSE reproduce key parts of brigade OPORD and issue as WARNO #1 to FISTs:

- Brigade scheme of fire support

- commander's concept for FS, target list
2. Issue WARNO #2 to FISTs after COA decided:

- specific tasks/targets for each co/tm

- support parallel planning by subordinates

4.4.1.1 Develop and Complete Plans or Orders

* Brigade fire support rehearsals: Frequently not conducted to standard

PROBLEMS:

1. Generally consist of verification of brigade consolidated target list and overall discussion of scheme of fires

2. No cooperative effort with brigade staff:

poor or no scheme of fires developed in initial part of planning process
scheme of fires not published with brigade order

RESULTS:

1. Subordinate units do not know overall scheme of fires until brigade rehearsal:

rehearsal becomes explanation of scheme of fires, not rehearsal
rehearsals lack structure and do not include all key players.

2. Rehearsals do not:

establish responsibilities
reinforce synchronization of fires with maneuver actions and triggers

Techniques:
1. Subordinate units have clear understanding of brigade scheme of fires before conducting FS rehearsal.
2. Use brigade FS execution matrix to detail responsibilities for subordinate units and observers.
3. Ensure TF-level plans coordinate with brigade plan and players have rehearsed their parts before brigade rehearsal

- ensure all key participants are on net prior to rehearsal

- FSCOORD gives his guidance

- FSOs and observers fight the plan as they envision it unfolding during execution.

* Air defense (AD) battery rehearsals:

PROBLEMS:

1. Rehearsals of integrated AD battery plan not taking place or not to standard.

2. Rehearsals not conducted with all participants present.

3. FM rehearsals rather than sand table rehearsals conducted.

Techniques:
1. During the brigade rehearsal:

- AD battery participants conduct AD rehearsals

- When TF commanders and S-3s return from brigade rehearsal, then make any adjustments to the AD plan
2. Conduct sand table rehearsals, as a minimum.