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Military

TA.4 Command and Control (cont)

* Fire support information dissemination and the planning process: The task force FSO does not have a system to disseminate information as acquired/required to subordinate elements, adjacent units, and HHQs, once a decision comes out of the planning process.

Procedures: The task force FSO needs to develop a system which allows for rapid and accurate flow of information to enable parallel planning at all echelons.
1. Disseminate information in WARNO format.
2. Have FSNCO develop a checklist of FS considerations from FMs 6-20-40, 71-1, 71-2, 71-123 which the FSO can quickly review upon his return to the TOC.
3. Commander's guidence to FSO should contain the nine elements described on ST 101-5, COmmand and Staff Decision Process, page 1-2-11, and should focus the FSO and permit him to develop a clear and consise concept for fires.
4. Products from commander's guidance should be:

  • an approved concept for fires
  • WARNO to HQ FSE and FS personnel
  • an initial fire plan to support the security/counter-recon force
  • an update to the DS FA Bn S3.

5. FSO should be an integral player during COA development and provide FS capabilities and limitations for each COA.
6. Products from the wargaming/synchronization session should be:
  • draft Fire Support Execution Matrix (FSEM)
  • target list
  • initial observer plan
  • FM brief to HQ FSE and DS Bn S3
  • positioning requirements for FS assets
  • any additional FS assets required

7. Establish FS SOP which describes and delegates responsibility to the FSNCO to perform in FSO's absence.

* Battalion Maintenance Officer (BMO) production of staff products: BMOs are generally unprepared to produce the staff products needed to support their task force.

PROBLEMS:
1. Most maintenance officers do not understand that their staff products need to give their commander and their unit a clear picture of how they plan to support the fight and what their unit's combat potential for the mission will be.
2. BMOs have improved at producing timelines but are rarely synchronized with the task force/squadron's timeline.
3. Timelines are seldom updated.
4. Repair and recovery plans are normally done late and not integrated into the unit's plan.
5. Warning orders and operation orders either lack detail or are ignored.

RESULT: Maintenance platoon is left unaware of what is happening and incapable of continuing the mission once key leaders are unavailable.

Techniques:
1. Maintenance officers must be present when the planning process begins with a maintenance estimate that gives a brief, but accurate status of the unit's capabilities and limitations. Estimates must be updated throughout the planning and preparation phases.
2. Maintenance officers must be included in the planning process/orders drills conducted by the unit at Home Station.
3. Maintenance officers need to be trained and held responsible for producing the products required to allow the commander an accurate vision of his combat potential and how that combat potential will be sustained on the battlefield.
4. Require the maintenance officer to issue his own platoon warning orders and operations orders for each training event during Home Station training.

* Brigade staff course of action development: Most brigade staffs do not understand course of action development.

PROBLEMS:
1. Courses of action are not fully developed prior to starting wargaming.
2. The five-step methodology for developing COAs described in CALL Newsletter 95-12, Tactical Decision Making: Abbreviated Plan, and CGSC ST 100-9, Techniques and Procedures for Tactical Decisionmaking, is not followed.
3. Most COAs are dictated by the commander or developed by one or two officers without staff input.
4. Staffs often get in such a hurry to begin wargaming that they do not fully formulate each BOSs role in the approved COA. RESULT: BOS reps are still trying to figure out what their role in the COA is during the wargame.

Techniques:
1. Brigade staffs read and use the five step COA development methodology.
2. Staffs should take 30 to 40 minutes prior to initiating the wargame (while plans CPTs are gathering tools for the wargame) to ensure each BOS rep understands the concept for his peice of the fight.
3. Wargaming should refine and synchronize the plan and determine triggers for execution.

* Brigade staff conduct of the Tactical Decision Making Process (TDMP):

PROBLEMS:
1. The brigade planning process does not generally follow the guidance outlined in Chapter 1 of FM 71-123.
2. The brigade targeting team does not synchronize between the battlefield operating systems, and fails to develop:
  • a meaningful high payoff target list
  • a wargame-derived scheme of fires
  • a target list that supports the scheme of maneuver

3. The reconnaissance and surveillance plan does not focus on generating targetable information for engagement by lethal and non-lethal means.

RESULTS:
1. The various staff elements develop their plans in relative isolation.
2. There is no plan to link lookers with shooters to synchronize fires with maneuver.

Techniques:
1. In Home Station training, use the methodology for the brigade planing process in Chapter 1 of FM 71-123.
2. Focus targeting team members on following the decide, detect, deliver methodology outlined in FM 6-20-10 to develop a plan that will link lookers to shooters and result in a scheme of fires that is synchronized wit the scheme of maneuver.

* Task force FSO wargaming participation:

PROBLEMS:
1. Task force FSOs generally sit through the wargaming sessions and participate very little.
2. The task force wargaming session develops the synchronization matrix and initiates the synchronization of all task force elements, and participation by the task force FSO and ALO is critical.
3. Most FSOs do not fill out Fire Support Execution Matrix (FSEM) or target list during the wargame; production of these documents generally occurs after the staff breaks up.


RESULTS:

1. Without interaction with the task force staff, the FSEM is not as effective as it could have been and is not in synchronization with the task force plan.
2. Lack of integration between direct and indirect fires causes the FSO to work harder than necessary to synchronize the scheme of fires after the order is published.

Technique: The FSO must actively participate in the task force wargaming session. His participation initiates the synchronization of the fire support and maneuver plans. Because the FSO requires a great deal of detail to prepare a complete FSEM, he will often drive or at least set the pace for the wargame session. Participation by the FSO and ALO is just as critical as developing the FSEM and target list.

* Company/team level planning for actions on the objective: Company/team commanders are not sufficiently planning actions on the objective.

PROBLEM: The major emphasis of company/team commander planning goes into the move from the assembly area to the final objective.

RESULT: Confusion on the objective. Plans for employment of direct fire, when and where to dismount infantry, and how to clear the objective are not sufficient.

Technique: Use reverse planning from actions on the objective as described in FM 71-2, pg 2-23. Reverse planning from actions on the objective is an excellent method for enhancing synchronization of the attack. It serves to clarify the commander's intent and to prevent over- emphasis on movement..

4.3.2 Develop Courses of Action

* Task force course of action (COA) development: Task force commanders and staffs do not understand how to develop a Course of Action (COA).

PROBLEMS:
1. COAs are not developed based on the commander's decisive point.
2. COAs do not define in doctrinal terms what the company/teams are to do.
3. COAs are not in enough detail.
4. COAs are frequently not developed with the S-2's SITEMP.
5. COAs are frequently not developed on a map when the terrain can be taken into account.

RESULTS:
1. Lack of optimum synchronization in the scheme of maneuver.
2. Broad concepts of operation rather than detailed, fully-developed COAs.
3. Wargaming tends to be COA development rather than an exercise to synchronize the operation.

Techniques:
1. Read and use Chapter 2 of FM 7-20 for development of COAs.
2. FM 101-5-1 provides the correct doctrinal definitions that should be used when assigning company/team task and purpose.
3. Adhere to doctrinal planning process outlined in FM 71-123, ST 101-5, and CALL Newsletter 95-12, Tactical Decision Making: Abbreviated Planning.
4. Make sufficient time available to the brigade staff to conduct detail planning. The result would be improved synchronization in the brigade's overall execution of its operations.

* Designation of a reserve in courses of action (COA): Brigades often do not designate a reserve in COAs and when one is designated, it often has no clear mission or commitment criteria.

PROBLEMS:
1. Reserve not designated especially on operations where there is sufficient combat power to do so.
2. When reserves are designated, they often are given little or no guidance.
3. Reserve positions and route of probable deployment are not reconned.
4. Specific criteria tied to a clear trigger and designated in a DST are not formulated.

RESULT: Reserve commanders are often confused as to their task and purpose.

Technique: FM 71-3 states that a reserve gives the commander the flexibility to deal with unforeseen contingencies. In future operations, brigades should plan for and designate a reserve, ensuring that reserve missions are sufficiently detailed to provide the reserve commander a clear understanding of the brigade commander's intent and commitment criteria for its employment.

* Planning to use dismounted infantry in company/team offensive operations: Companys/teams are not planning for the use of dismounted infantry in the attack.

PROBLEM: Improper enemy analysis; commanders do not anticipate the enemy use of dug-in infantry in MRC positions.

RESULTS:
1. Positions for vehicles providing fire support to the infantry are not planned.
2. Dismount and pick-up infantry points for the infantry are not planned.
3. No rehearsal is conducted.
4. If the infantry do dismount it becomes an uncoordinated reaction with a higher possibility of fratricide.

Techniques:
1. Commanders should do a detailed enemy analysis to determine the possibility of enemy infantry in the objective.
2. Commanders should then plan and rehearse for the possibility of dismounting the infantry to eliminate the enemy threat.
3. The commander determines if when, and where infantry dismounts based on his analysis of the factors of METT-T and the degree of risk he is willing to accept (FM 71-2, pg 3-37).

4.3.3 Analyze Courses of Action

* Fire support wargaming integration: Fire support integration during the wargame is still not to standard.

PROBLEMS:
1. Fire support integration during wargaming of branch plans is usually not done.
2. The S3 usually focuses strictly on maneuver.
3. FSOs and ALOs are expected to participate in the wargame only as observers.
4. Integration of radar zones with the maneuver plan is forgotten.
5. Integration of mortar priority targets and mortar positioning is seldom accomplished.
6. Integration of the reconnaissance and surveillance plan with the fire support plan is never done.
7. Prioritising or focusing fires for different phases of the operation is not done.
8. Integrating CAS targets into the plan is not done.

RESULT: The lack of fire support integration into the wargaming process leads to a disjointed use of fire support assets with an end result being a loss in ability to mass on the enemy and an overall inability to protect the force.

Techniques:
1. FSOs and ALOs are key players and they must be fully integrated in the wargame for fire support to be properly integrated into the plan.
2. Targeting/scheme of fire is developing during the wargame. The ALO must be present and plan CAS even if brigade has not allocated any CAS to the task force. Usually task forces are allocated CAS in the middle of execution, so if the ALO is not ready to use it in a moments notice, it will be wasted.

* Task force battle staff wargaming: Wargaming is not focused and does not synchronize the task force plan.

PROBLEMS:
1. During the wargame, the TF XO does not facilitate the process and the battle staff loses its focus on the critical events that need to be wargamed and the relationship between events and the decisive point.
2. The wargame ends up taking all day or night with only the most aggressive participants providing input and the rest of the staff writing their annex without fully synchronizing their BOS.
3. TF routinely conduct wargaming without:
  • refined SITEMP
  • Event Template
  • fully-developed and integrated COA
  • having identified enemy and friendly critical events

RESULTS:
1. The lack of a refined SITEMP and Event Template makes it hard for the commander and staff to visualize the enemy. Plans are not focused on killing the enemy and protecting the force.
2. We do not understand the enemy's use of combat multipliers. This prevents us from anticipating their use and developing our actions for the various forms of contact.
3. The lack of a developed and integrated COA before the wargame results in the wargaming process becoming a COA development session.
4. Without having identified both the enemy and friendly critical events, we cannot properly scope our wargaming process, make assumptions about events that will not be wargamed, or identify contingencies/branch plans that must be developed.

Techniques:
1. The TF XO or S3 needs to take charge of the wargaming process and needs to ensure that the battle staff stays focused on the critical events and the decisive point.
2. Units need to use a synchronization matrix to help facilitate and record events that are being wargamed by phase and synchronized by BOS.
3. TFs must train the planning process at Home Station. Through this training each staff officer must identify the products needed to conduct each step of the decision making process and the end products that each step generates. The Commander's Battle Staff Handbook, dated 15 May 93, is a good reference. The end product of this training will be a staff SOP with incorporated drills that will allow the TF staff to produce a quality order in a timely manner.


TA.4 Command and Control BOS Narrative, Part 2
TA.4, Part 4



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