*Electronic support team back-up systems: Electronic support (ES) teams are not proficient in the use of back-up systems. Most ES teams are equipped with a back-up system (PRD-10, 11, or 12) employed when the primary system (TRO-32) is down.
PROBLEMS: 1.when required to set up and operate the PRDs, most teams demonstrate a lack of proficiency in their use, resulting in a reduction in the amount of intel collected.
2. TSO-138 (Trailblazer) teams are not normally equipped with any back-up system.
Technique: Devote more time during Home Station training to training with back-up systems to avoid gaps in intel coverage when primary systems are down. Practice crew drills, and use PRD systems during FTXs to gain proficiency.
* Pre-combat checks and boresighting of direction finding (DF) systems: PCCs and boresighting of DF systems are not being conducted on a regular basis. PCCs and boresighting is conducted by shooting lines of bearing (LOBs) on radio transmitters at known locations. This determines the accuracy of the individual DF system and the DF net. Operators or technicians can then make adjustments to equipment and/or plotters can then adjust LOBs to increase the DF targeting accuracy. Operators of newer and more sophisticated systems tend to conduct LOB checks less frequently or not at all.
Procedure: PCCs and boresighting should be conducted IAW SOP on all DF systems. This should be done every time the system displaces and at least once daily during continuous operations.
7.3.2.1 Perform Preventative Maintenance
* Bradley boresight device accuracy test; boresight retention test:
PROBLEMS:
1. Many company/team commanders and master gunners are not familiar with the boresight retention test and its importance.
2. The boresight device accuracy test is rarely conducted to ensure the instrument is within tolerance.
3. Many master gunners believe that the BFV is a BOT weapon system with a one-time boresight, and that zeroing is the only requirement for effective gunnery.
4. Poor live-fire performance can be attributed, in part, to the lack of preparation by BFV crews.
Techniques:
1. Incorporate the boresight retention test into pre-combat checks.
2. Make the test mandatory, rather than optional as perceived by many.
3. Follow the test procedures in FM 23-1.
7.4.3.4 Perform Chaplaincy Activities
* Unit ministry team deficiencies:
PROBLEMS:
1. Lack of coordination at Home Station often results in UMT members not being listed with those scheduled to draw equipment at the NTC.
2. UMTs continue to deploy without adequate coverage for Catholic soldiers. This results from a lack of priority in using priests to support deployments and NTC rotational deployments.
3. Brigade UMTs do not adequately understand the importance of staff supervision and coordination and control of religious support assets on the battlefield.
4. Units continue to deploy to the NTC without their chaplains.
5. UMTs arrive at the NTC without the necessary basic soldier skills to survive in a combat environment.
6. UMTs do not know how to use commo equipment.
7. Chaplains and chaplain assistants are not being allowed to drive because of an NTC policy prohibiting officers from driving. Chaplains are also not being allowed to move to critical areas on the battlefield because commanders fear they will get lost or injured.
Techniques: Regular participation in unit field training will go far in integrating chaplains into the warfighting aspect of unit life. Inclusion of chaplains as key staff members involved in unit training and preparation for deployment will help integrate chaplaincy functions, and result in the elimination
of many/all the problems noted above.
7.4.4 Provide Health Services
* Medical support planning: Combat health support planners develop combat health support plans without understanding the maneuver plan.
PROBLEMS:
1. Brigades do not conduct parallel planning, ie. combat health support planners are not present for mission analysis and COA development.
2. Planners continue to write the combat health support plans without doing a casualty estimate, and without knowledge of medical asset status and capabilities.
Technique: Have combat health planners participate in the entire staff planning process; integrate them into unit training at Home Station.
7.4.4.2 Evacuate Casualties
* Stinger team CASEVAC: CASEVAC of Stinger teams is particularly a problem during offensive operations. Many ADOs intend to evacuate Stinger teams through the company/team or troop they are supporting. Often poor planning and coordination result in less than satisfactory CASEVAC for the Stinger teams.
Technique: Stinger team CASEVAC works best when handled internally with a dedicated vehicle and personnel; several units have successfully had the Stinger platoon sergeant travel with the main effort and then move where needed to assist in the evacuation effort.
* Signal unit CASEVAC: Retrans, RAU and relay teams tend to be among the most forward deployed assets; they also have the highest DOW rate.
Techniques: 1. Remote teams need at least one combat lifesaver qualified soldier. 2. PCIs for the teams should include a certified aid bag or multiple first aid kits.
3. Leaders should wargame solutions for the most exposed systems and pre-position vehicles to support CASEVAC.
* Casualty feeder cards: Casualties feeder cards are too often incorrectly filled out. Medical company personnel do not have the information necessary to complete and/or correct the cards.
RESULT: incorrect or missing information can delay notification of next of kin.
Procedure: Wounded soldiers' chain of command is responsible for collecting the cards and ensuring they are filled out completely and correctly. After checking the cards, they are forwarded to the battalion S1 section and then up the chain of command to the division G-1 section.
* Engineer battalion CASEVAC: The engineer battalion's casevac process suffers from a lack of organic medical assets, as well as a lack of engineer CASEVAC integration into the TF CASEVAC plan.
PROBLEMS:
1. The died of wounds (DOW) rate for units has increased because engineer companies do not understand the workings of the TF BAS, the AXPs, and not knowing where to evacuate patients.
2. An increasing number of wounded soldiers are being incorrectly evacuated directly to C/MED in the FSB because that is what is trained at Home Station. RESULT: the extended distances almost guarantee a wounded soldier will DOW from not receiving definitive care earlier.
Technique: The engineer battalion staff must provide FRAGOs to the companies on any changes to the brigade combat health support plan based on brigade FRAGOs and/or changes resulting from any CSS rehearsals.
* Scout platoon CASEVAC: The forward evacuation of scout platoon casualties is normally not considered curing the TF planning process. When evacuation is required, the lack of planning results in additional DOWs.
Technique: Scout platoon evacuation planning must be integral in the TF planning process for any combat operation. Assets must be available to conduct the evacuation as required.
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to TA.7 COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT BOS: part B
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