PROBLEMS:
1. TF S4s experience difficulty with either Class III or Class V, and sometimes both, yet the TF S4s are not informing brigade about their problems..
2. In some cases combat vehicles ran out of fuel during offensive operations: fuel was not available to top off equipment prior to LD; during a planned tactical pause TFs did not conduct refueling and rearming operations.
Techniques:
1. During the maneuver and CSS rehearsals, TFs must discuss their plans to conduct refueling and rearming.
2. If additional assets are needed to reposition forward on the battlefield, the brigade S4 must know early enough to make the necessary arrangements.
3. TF S4s and executive officers need to provide brigade a more accurate assessment of the support they need and the support they are receiving. If additional support is required, the brigade XO and/or S4 can coordinate with the FSB and MSB to provide the assets.
* Scout platoon logistical planning and execution: The 10 HMMWV equipped scout platoon logistical requirements in many task forces has resulted in the scout platoon sergeant being responsible for the planning and execution of scout CSS. RESULT: scout platoon sergeant does not participate in mission planning, preparation and, in many instances, mission execution because he is at a CSS rehearsal, conducting LOGPAC operations or evacuating casualties.
Techniques:
1. Give the scouts a dedicated vehicle (cargo HMMWV, 21/2T or 5T truck with a driver and TC out of the support platoon) that brings the scout LOGPAC forward from the field trains to a scout AA.
2. During scout missions, this vehicle and crew can be staged in the combat trains until needed by the scouts.
3. Alternative technique: make the HHC XO or ISG bring the LOGPAC from the LRP to the scout AA. NOTE: both options require a dedicated ambulance to support scout CASEVAC.
4. Alternative technique: satellite off the closest company/team, however, this technique strains the CSS resources of the designated company.
5. TF may decide to "trade" a scout HMMWV for a cargo HMMWV. This gives the scouts a vehicle that can carry Class I/III/V, and evacuate casualties.
* Electronic warfare platoon resupply operations: EW teams ability to get supplied and stay in operation are often hindered by having to drive extreme distances to a rearward trains area to get fuel, water and food. After resupply the teams must deploy to a new site, usually farther forward. RESULT: increased system downtime.
Technique: Push LOGPAC forward to a location EW teams can quickly reach to resupply and then return. If the situation has CSS elements displacing, then at least put the LOGPAC where the EW teams can pass through LOGPAC enroute to their next site. Try to coordinate LOGPAC to be conducted in conjunction with OPORD issuance or unit rehearsals in forward locations.
* Artillery firing battery ammunition management:
PROBLEMS:
1. Battery commanders often go into battle with no apparent ammo plan. EXAMPLE: Before a day defend mission, one platoon had 127 HE rounds on hand, while another platoon in the same battery had only 35 HE rounds. One platoon had almost all the green bag propellant, while the other platoon had almost zero balance on green bag.
EXAMPLE: Another battery had an unequal distribution of calibrated white bag propellant, resulting in guns quickly expending calibrated white bag propellant and being called out of missions because of their inability to meet the conditions for accurate predicted fires.
2. While platoon leaders often know how much total ammo they have prior to a battle, the ammo is not managed at battery level.
3. Most battalion FASPS establish ammo resupply triggers, but the triggers are ineffective because the platoons could not track ammo expenditure during the battle.
4. Batteries with Platoon Operation Centers (POCs): POCs had an accurate count of ammo prior to the battle, but the ammo count was often never updated until sometime after the mission.
5. Batteries without POCs: FDOs or platoon leaders were to track ammo, but they do not have the time to accurately do so.
RESULT: batteries run out of extended range ammunition, for example, before requesting resupply; other batteries run out of DPICM before requesting resupply.
6. Battery commanders are often unaware of the ammo they will receive until it arrives in positions. This causes a delay as the commander decides on a distribution plan.
7. In batteries where the commander delegated ammo resupply to platoon leaders, the platoon leaders often took the ammo they needed from the nearest truck available. RESULT: ammo trucks with incomplete rounds - making ammo management and tracking by pre-configured combat load impossible at battalion level.
Techniques:
1. Ammo management is a battery commander function. Platoon leaders will not manage ammo beyond platoon level. Commanders must get involved cross leveling battery ammo prior to the battle.
2. Commanders must translate battalion resupply ammo triggers into number of rounds based on ammo on hand at the start of the mission.
3. Tracking ammo should be delegated to POCs, but the battery commander should keep the POCs focused on ammo during the battle so the commander can relate that to resupply triggers.
4. Keep platoon leaders involved in ammo management during mission execution; the FDO is usually too busy to manage ammo resupply.
5. Commanders must work with battalion to know how much ammo they will receive before it arrives. Sections should know how much ammo they will pick up before their ammo carriers come to the ammo truck.
6. PSGs should make an effort to supervise each section's draw.
7. Commander's must stress the necessity of combat configured loads to the battalion XO and ammo officer.
8. Have platoon leaders issue a timeline to sections to get their ammo properly configured. Section chiefs can then report to the POC that the ammo is properly configured, IAW the platoon leader's guidance. Then platoon leaders and PSGs can follow up ammo guidance with PCIs at section level prior to battle to ensure compliance.
7.7 Provide Military Police Support
* Doctrinal use of the Military Police:
PROBLEMS:
1. Too often MP platoons are just attached to FSBs and then rarely used for forward security missions during offensive missions, which could have proven crucial.
2. In rear security operations, FSBs usually do not specifically integrate their attached MP platoons into the base security plans. RESULT: confusion (especially at night) when MP teams are requested to supplement an FSB Quick Reaction Force with little or no prior coordination. This has caused accidents with equipment damage and fratricide.
Technique: Brigade and FSB planners consider in the MP platoons based on METT-T, and understand what roles and missions the MPs can effectively execute to support brigade operations, offensive, defensive, and rear area security.
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