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7.1/7.2 Arm/Fuel

* Execution of FARP operations: Units have good plans for FARP operations and execute them well. Successful FARP operations are distinguished by the planning and coordinating of all actions in the FARP prior to the mission, and rehearsals of FARP operations with elements using the FARP and the internal support platoon.

7.3.2 Fix/Maintain Equipment

* MICLIC maintenance: MICLIC maintenance is improving. Operators are using the TM and seem more familiar with the system. PMCS is being done the by the book, and leaders are putting more emphasis on the system.

7.4.3.4 Perform Chaplaincy Activities

* Brigade Unit Ministry Team battle tracking: Brigade UMTs arrive understanding the basic elements of the orders process; how to extract needed information from the necessary documents; how to analyze the information to determine where and how to deploy available religious support assets on the battlefield. This improved performance is the direct result of supervisory chaplains aggressively using AARs and "lessons learned" from other brigades to create positive change.

* Unit ministry team operations: UMT's are effectively conducting "before engagement" ministry during the onward movement phase of brigade operations in a successful effort to "Nurture the Living," as stated in FM 16-1.

Needs Emphasis

7.1 Arm

* Class V estimates: Units are not conducting Class V estimates to determine their RSRs, then comparing it to their CSRs and schedule of fires to plan resupply operations based on priorities and resupply triggers.

PROBLEMS:

1. Battalion leaders and CSS planners are not conducting accurate inventories of Class V on hand, tracking munitions available for draw, and managing ammo haulers by bumper number.

2. The battalion FDO is not being consulted on the schedule of fires or expected expenditures. 3. CSS planners are not associating specific support requirements for the battalions critical fire support tasks (CFSTs).

RESULT: The realization that units are not correctly resourced or not being considered for resupply until it is too late to rearm in time to prevent mission interruption.

Technique: CSS and operations planners should develop a worksheet that prompts them to answer key questions in estimating expenditures for future operations. - The worksheet serves as a checklist to ensure that ammunition is racked accurately, requested, pushed.

- Next, convert the worksheet estimates to resupply triggers which are included on an execution matrix.

- Finally, publish these ammo numbers in the FASP, which will reflect ammo required, by battery, to accomplish their respective CFSTs. The FASP will specify ammo to be carried by the ammo platoon and/or prepositioning requirements.

- After coordination with the BAO, publish the preconfigured load plans by bumper number that the ammo platoon will use.

7.2 Fuel

* Class III supply operations: Resupply operations between MSB, the FSB and maneuver TFs lack the necessary synchronization to be effective, resulting in the FSB and the TFs having difficulty in reaching capacity from resupply operations. Resupply windows within the BCT tend to be rigid time periods versus event driven, and do not consistently support maneuver operations by maintaining full capacity forward at the start of combat operations.

Technique: The BCT must train to become more flexible in the development of Class III resupply windows. These windows should be flexible enough to support operations and at the same time maintain the maximum capacity possible within storage/transportation assets.

Back to NTC BOS LIST
Back to TA.6 MOBILITY/SURVIVABILITY BOS & NUCLEAR/BIOLOGICAL/CHEMICAL (NBC) STATEMENTS
Go to TA.7 COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT BOS:part A, STATEMENTS