* Time management: Most units do not effectively manage time, and often produce inadequate timelines. Despite unit commanders and staffs acknowledging the importance of time management and adherence to the 1/3 - 2/3 rule, the majority of units fail to properly manage their time.
Techniques: The development of realistic timelines for critical events in the planning process is a skill that must be developed and practiced at Home Station. The numerous tasks which must concurrently occur during the planning phase of an operation require significant practice in order for a battle staff to be able to proficiently execute the tactical decision making process. Effective time management is a logical byproduct of decision-making proficiency.
* Company/team rehearsals: Too often company level "rehearsals" are no more than backbriefs. The rehearsal allows participants to become familiar with the concept of operations and the scheme of maneuver and fires.
Technique: Rehearse how to rehearse at Home Station. Reference FM 71-123 or CALL Newsletter 91-1, Rehearsals for successful rehearsal techniques.
* Task force rehearsals: Task force rehearsal too often do not focus on critical events, ie. actions on the objective. Units routinely fail to plan offensive missions in sufficient detail, and then rehearsals for those missions also lack detail.
Technique: Both planning and preparation for offensive operations should begin with actions on the objective and then work back to the tasks preceding crossing the line of departure. Rehearsals are extremely important in validating a detailed plan, and uncovering aspects of the plan which might have to be changed to be successful.
* CSS rehearsals (medical): Medical personnel are not pinpointing medical asset locations (forward aid stations and main aid stations) by the time the CSS rehearsal begins. The eventual location of the aid stations is not adequately disseminated to brigade elements. RESULT: unnecessary died of wounds casualties, particularly soldiers from elements such as COLTs, GSR teams and scouts. Further problems are caused by units not understanding their respective CASEVAC responsibilities.
Technique: Medical treatment facility locations and CASEVAC procedures must be totally understood by all elements within the brigade - combat, combat support and CSS personnel. These procedures must be exercised during Home Station training so that timely treatment minimizes the DOW rate.
4.4.1.2 Coordinate Support
* Task organizing and control of FOX vehicles and squads: FOX squads are continually attached to Co/Tms, where they are rarely used as the brigade S2 intended. While brigade S2s and chemical officers template possible chemical strikes and designate sites as NAIs, FOX vehicles are seldom given the mission to overwatch these areas.
Technique: Although situationally dependent, command and control of FOX assets is usually best maintained at brigade level. NBC recon is part of the overall intel collection effort, producing information about NBC hazards. Squads in FOX vehicles get this information by conducting the collection in areas of potential threat.
4.4.3 Provide Command Presence
* TAC/TOC locations: The positioning of command and control nodes frequently does not adequately support the fight throughout the depth or extent of the brigade sector or zone. Positioning generally supports the initial fight, but as the battle progresses the TAC and main CPs are not in position to adequately to control the fight, or are displacing during critical stages of the battle. CP repositioning is not thoroughly planned, wargamed or synchronized.
Technique: The brigade XO, S3 and staff must identify, during wargaming, potential critical points in an operation in order to synchronize the positioning of CPs to insure constant support to the commander. Also, staffs must develop and practice drills for tear down and set-up, including a detailed information dump to the command and control node accepting control of the fight while the other node displaces.
4.4.4 Maintain Unit Discipline
* Engineer company tactical discipline:
PROBLEMS:
1. During Tactical Assembly Area procedures leaders are not submitting personnel, ammunition and fuel status reports; M8 alarms are not deployed; range cards, sector sketches and fire plans are not developed or submitted.
2. During company and platoon troop leading procedures, leaders are not conducting pre-combat checks and inspections.
3. Company and platoon OPORDs lack significant details. Leaders do not use graphic control measures, sketches to portray the scheme of maneuver/fires. Scheme of engineer operations are not fully developed, usually including only LD time, formation, generic route and the TF's objective name and location.
4. Too often engineer leaders do not understand how the enemy will use engineers and the amount of breaching operations a maneuver task force may be required to execute.
5. MICLIC reload plans lack detail; MICLIC reload sites not designated; number of MICLICs required not accurately estimated.
Technique: Units must work during Home Station training to develop and refine their collective skill in the basic tasks and procedures outlined above.
4.4.5 Synchronize Tactical Operations
* Integration of indirect fire with direct fire and maneuver: Units focus most of their planning and preparation on TF movement.
PROBLEM: Very little consideration is given to maneuver in the doctrinal sense, ie. positioning of combat forces to gain a positional advantage over the enemy to deliver direct and indirect fires.
RESULT: TFs do not plan to focus, distribute, mass, shift or control direct and indirect fires.
Technique: Use the Infantry School publication, SH-7-45, Fire Planning Handbook, June 1993 as a source of techniques for TF-level maneuver and fires integration.
* Engagement area development: TFs continue to struggle in the process of EA development, particularly with the synchronization of supporting fires with direct fire assets, and the execution of disengagement criteria. NOTE: see CTC TRENDS - NTC, 1QFY95, section II, pages II-10,11 for an example sequence of events for a TF FSO to work with a maneuver TF in EA development.
* Aviation FSE coordination with ground maneuver brigade: Attack aviation FSEs are not coordinating their operations with ground maneuver brigade COLTs. RESULT: lack of synchronization and duplication of efforts within the area of operations.
PROBLEM: COLTs and AHBs often use the same FA delivery units to accomplish their mission. They often have the mission to observe or attack the same targets.
Technique: FSOs should coordinate with ground maneuver brigades, through higher headquarters, or request direct coordination. They should deconflict artillery positions affecting air routes through the ground brigade AO; mutual supporting indirect fires; complimentary suppression of enemy air defense; fires support integration of the close and deep battle.
* Fire support to counter-reconnaissance and security forces: TF FSOs are not involved in developing the FS plan supporting the counterrecon/security force.
Technique: TF FSOs must plan the counterrecon battle with the S2. The plan can be simple; coordinate the assets, either mortar or FA, then obtain the commander's guidance for fires in the counterrecon fight. Ensure adequate commo is available to observers. Ensure the observer has the authority to refine the planned targets in conjunction with the counterrecon force commander.
* ALO and FSO/FSCOORD coordination: Those units who make this coordination have much better suppression enemy air defense (SEAD) results than those units who put SEAD low in the target priority list. SEAD is of greatest importance when the enemy is dug in; SEAD of least importance when the enemy is on the offensive.
Technique: Not having to coordinate SEAD for a moving target lets the air come in quicker and hit the target before it gets any further. Include CAS into the brigade rehearsal to help coordinate all fire support assets.
* Synchronizing obstacles with indirect fire and maneuver: Co/Tm commanders rarely integrate obstacles and indirect fires to support their scheme of maneuver.
PROBLEMS:
1. Indirect fires and obstacles are planned from the top down, and company commanders are generally not allowed or encouraged to nominate targets and influence the TF obstacle plan.
2. Commanders usually do not understand or brief the TF fire support plan as part of their OPORD.
RESULTS:
1. Lack of situational awareness from soldier through leader.
2. Fratricides caused by not knowing the location of friendly minefields.
3. Failure of commanders to sight-in obstacles to maximize direct fire range and capability.
Technique: Units must use Home Station training to develop the synchronization skills necessary to effectively integrate direct fire, indirect fire, and maneuver with obstacles in order to maximize the assets effectively used to defeat the enemy.
4.5 Employ Tactical C3CM
* Planning for communication support of brigade COLTs: Brigade signal officers too often do not adequately plan to provide commo support to brigade COLTs inserted deep beyond the line of departure/line of contact.
PROBLEMS:
1. COLTs do not have adequate commo equipment to maintain constant commo with the CP. 2. Brigade signal sections often do not have the resources to provide an FM retrans to support the COLTs commo net to the FA unit.
3. Units generally fail to coordinate early in the planning process.
Technique: Keeping the artillery signal officer informed about enemy SITREPS allows him to adequately plan the deployment of FM retrans. Early coordination could result, for example, in the decision for the retrans team to be OPCON to the brigade signal officer with the mission to establish and maintain the FM link from the COLTs to the artillery unit.
Back
to NTC BOS LIST
Back
to TA.4 COMMAND AND CONTROL BOS: part D, STATEMENTS
Go
to TA.5 INTELLIGENCE BOS, STATEMENTS
|
NEWSLETTER
|
| Join the GlobalSecurity.org mailing list |
|
|
|
