* Field artillery battalion ability to track subordinate unit preparation: After developing a detailed plan, and publishing FASP directing specific subunit actions to be accomplished before mission execution, battle staffs have no mechanism to track the accomplishment of these actions, and assess the battalion's preparation.
Technique:
1. Create an checklist addressing battery-level preparations for combat. Use one version for offense and one version for defense, each with blanks for add-on requirements. Laminate and use the operations NCO to track the battery preparation for battalion.
2. Make use of backbriefs. Have battery commanders read the FASP prior. Shortly after the brief, before the battery commanders leave the TOC, have them backbrief: - restated mission - critical FS tasks - pre-combat checks they will direct - critical logistics requirements
- battery critical event timeline
3. These battery timelines can then be used in conjunction with the checklists described above to help the TOC NCOs track battery operations.
4. Execute a battalion level "battle stations" net call (two hours prior to an operation; 30 minutes after) designed to disseminate critical information and to ensure the battalion is also prepared for future operations.
* Field artillery battery troop leading procedures: Battery SOPs do not provide the basic information to make the process organized and efficient. Additionally, the eight step procedures must be modified for battery operations.
PROBLEMS:
1. Units have no checklists for conducting pre-combat checks for routine, recurring METL-based tasks.
2. Too often commanders do not develop timelines for critical events, ie. PCI times, rehearsal times, movement times, resupply times, etc.
3. Battery commanders too often include information in their OPORDs that is either not relevant to the operation, or sufficiently refined to be useful to subordinates.
4. Supervision is still the weakest step in the procedures: failure to conduct PCIs; no spot checks for standard adherence; not checking range cards, weapon positioning, etc.
Techniques: 1. Create standard Pre-combat check lists to support routine, recurring, METL-based collective or tasks.
2. Create an orders checklist to help focus information gathering and dissemination to section chiefs and soldiers.
3. Use a fill-in-the-blank OPORD, but add a timeline of critical events.
4. Focus on leader supervision of critical tasks.
5. Conduct rehearsals to standard every time.
4.4.1 Prepare Plans or Orders
* Task force staffs - timely production of OPORDs and FRAGOs: Units lack a disciplined process to produce timely, complete OPORDs and FRAGOs. Overall, battle staff training levels are low, and the roles and responsibilities of each staff officer/NCO are not clearly defined. Although TF staffs have a good understanding of the doctrinal planning process, it is evident that these same staffs are not well drilled and therefore cannot produce detailed plans quickly. RESULT: plans lack adequate detail, are not well integrated and therefore have little chance of success.
Techniques:
1. Establish a solid doctrinal foundation for an abbreviated, time-constrained tactical decision-making process applicable to TF level.
2. TF commanders must develop and implement rigorous Home Station battle staff training programs. These programs must first establish proficiency in the deliberate process, and then progress to more time constrained execution of the tactical decision making process.
* Inadequate Decision Support Templates, execution matrices, etc.: Execution matrices and decision support products developed during the planning process are generally inadequate and not integrated with the higher headquarters concept of operations/scheme of maneuver.
PROBLEMS:
1. TF staffs are not well trained in wargaming, frequently getting bogged down in small details, or just doing a superficial job.
2. Too often staffs do not list critical enemy and friendly events.
3. In some cases, units fail to wargame COAs at all and begin OPORD development.
4. Some commanders see no use in DST/DSM products, and rely only on their "feel" of the battle to make their tactical decisions.
Techniques: Use two phases of wargaming.
1. The initial wargaming occurs after the commander gives his planning guidance, and if he directs that more than one COA be developed. This initial wargaming is done to the level of detail necessary to provide a sound COA recommendation to the commander.
2. The second wargaming occurs after COA approval, when the commander also refines his planning guidance and intent. This session is a synchronization session and is done to the level of detail that time allows. This should be the most time consuming step in the planning process.
3. Wargaming products:
- detailed execution or synchronization matrix
- decision support matrix or template
* Planning for employment of a reserve: Brigades often do not designate a reserve. RESULT: at critical points in the close fight, brigade commanders have no options as the battle progresses. In those instances where a reserve is designated, the reserve commander either does not get a copy of the brigade OPORD, or gets it late. Seldom does the reserve element participate in brigade rehearsals, and too often the reserve commander has little or no idea of his specific task, purpose or commitment trigger.
Technique: Brigades should normally have a reserve. The brigade staff must establish commitment criteria, and then rehearse time/distance factors to ensure the reserve can maneuver to be at the right place at the right time to positively influence the battle.
* Direct fire planning - offensive missions: Co/Tms are still not developing offensive direct fire plans. Co/Tm commanders do not plan how to kill the enemy. Typically, platoons are told to occupy an attack by fire position, orient on a specific platoon, and kill it. Commanders fail to divide enemy vehicles among the platoons; platoons are not give adequate task and purpose.
Technique: Detailed direct fire planning must be done for offensive operations. Start planning with actions on the objective, and then conduct detailed "backwards planning " of the balance of the operation. The direct fire planning must be done in conjunction with the scheme of maneuver, and with the plan for supporting fires. This level of detail Co/Tm synchronization must be practiced at Home Station prior to deployment.
* Mortar platoon integration into task force planning: Mortar platoon leaders are rarely integrated into the staff planning process, which results in their not being synchronized with the security or counter-recon force or the scheme of fires.
Technique: The FSO should adopt the mortar platoon as a vital fire support combat multiplier. If the TF commander fails to include the mortars in the planning process, the FSO can integrate the platoon and develop a plan to support the security and counter-recon elements. Link-up the security force FSO with the mortar platoon leader. Targets planned by the FSE during mission analysis, should be disseminated to the scout platoon leader and the mortar platoon leader.
* CSS Tactical Decision Making Process: CSS units seldom use the tactical decision making process during the formulation of OPORDs.
PROBLEM: FSBs rarely conduct a full and complete orders process during the development of their OPORDs because of both time constraints and an apparent unfamiliarity with the doctrinal orders process.
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