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TA. 5 INTELLIGENCE BOS

5. Intelligence BOS

* Understanding the IPB process: S2s know and understand the IPB process. They are familiar with the logical flow of templates, ie. doctrinal to situational, and the uses of each. S2s generally do well at templating enemy positions, however many have difficulty discussing and portraying the enemy's end state.

5.1.1 Collect Information on Situation

* S2 understanding of unit intelligence requirements: S2s are anticipating and providing aviation intelligence requirements. Both aviation specific and ground maneuver requirements are addressed.

5.1.1.2 Collect Physical Environment Information

* Terrain analysis: S2s identify mobility corridors and avenues of approach into the Area of Operations and Area of Interest, and then identify enemy decision points; this information is integrated into an event template. What must be improved is the use of these products in the overall task force planning process.

5.2.1 Evaluate Threat Information

* Knowledge of enemy doctrine: Overall most S2s display a good working knowledge of threat doctrine. Doctrinal manuals are present and used.

5.3.3 Prepare Reports on the Battlefield Area

* Improved engineer integration into the IPB process: Engineer planners work with brigade S2s to produce SITEMPS accurately depicting the doctrinal array of battle positions and obstacles in the defense, which allows better focusing for the R&S plan and execution. In offensive operations, the depiction of location and probable employment of engineer assets help the brigade and task force staff wargame and develop OPORDS.

Needs Emphasis

5. Intelligence BOS

* S2 shop organization and time management: S2 shops too often are not organized to delegate task completion. S2s produce all IPB products themselves. Most staff sections are not organized to divide the labor necessary to produce products in a timely manner.

Procedure: Establish specific responsibilities for each member of the section in the production of S2 "products." Make full use of NCOs and soldiers assigned; minimize their assignment to additional duties during those periods when their specialized skills are needed to quickly develop the necessary products. Train each section member at Home Station to perform their assigned tasks, and cross-train them to do each others job.

5.1 Collect Information

* Task force R&S planning problems impact on scouts: Task force commanders are not giving guidance to scout platoon leaders until after they issue the TF OPORD, but they expect the scout platoon to LD prior to the TF. Also, the TF S2/S3 does not have the R&S plan complete until after the TF OPORD.

Technique: Have the scout platoon leader accompany the TF commander to the brigade OPORD. After the OPORD, the commander gives guidance to his scout platoon leader. The TF staff then places a priority on completing the R&S plan before the TF OPORD. This would give the TF scouts time to plan their mission.

* R&S plan not integrated with other staff elements: The majority of S2s develop the

R&S plan without integrating the other staff elements. This process is not driven by the XO or the S3 in support of the overall plan development.

RESULT: the R&S plan is partially focused on coverage of NAIs, and not synchronized with other BOS elements.

Technique: Change the approach to R&S plan development, to R&S order development. When approached as an order, staff integration becomes more likely because of the procedures inherent in the orders development process.

* Problems in R&S plan development and utilization: S2s experience difficulties in developing and using the R&S plan. Brigade S2s rarely receive subordinate unit's R&S plans, which results in poor identification of intelligence gaps. S2s also rarely adjust PIR during the recon effort or during the main battle.

* Lack of detailed R&S planning leads to collection problems:

PROBLEMS:

1. S2s will use the Situation Template in developing NAIs, but usually fail to consider the exact composition and disposition of the enemy's counterrecon threat.

2. Collection plans consistently lack enough detail to identify the expected time and type of enemy activity at particular NAIs for the tasked asset.

3. S2s have become the sole staff agency responsible for R&S planning. Rarely is there adequate coordination between the S2 and the S3 to integrate the R&S plan with the maneuver plan.

* Failure of HMMWV scouts to dismount: During reconnaissance missions, HMMWV scouts are not dismounting to recon danger areas, such as defiles or blind curves. They are also not dismounting at intervisibility lines even though there is sufficient time to do so.

Technique: With a three man crew, the vehicle commander must do the dismounting. The driver must stay with the vehicle in case they need to move quickly. The gunner stays with the vehicle to man the primary weapon system.

* Military intelligence company focus: MI companies are not always focused on executing the maneuver commander's intent as a first priority.

PROBLEM: state of the art equipment allows us to find and collect on virtually any signal communication. However, the tendency is collect everything, rather than concentrating on those nets most likely to meet the commander's Priority Intelligence Requirements.

Technique: At Home Station, during training exercises, force analysts to choose/sift through several sources to determine the critical nets required, and then task only those sources for collection by subordinate teams.

* Electronic support system locations: Electronic support (ES) systems are placed too far forward. Direction Finding (DF) systems have an inherent capability to "stand off" from their targets. Within their planning capability, the farther away from their target, the greater the survivability of the system, such as DF.

Technique: Use the doctrinal "stand off" distances listed in the 34-series FMs. Use these planning distances, with terrain, baseline width, and target transmitter output power as the basis for planning the location of a DF baseline. DF baselines should be located only as far forward as needed to be effective. This will increase the survivability of these critical combat multipliers.

5.2.1 Evaluate Threat Information

* Threat evaluation: The delegation of this task within the S2 section needs improvement.

Technique: Use section personnel designated in the unit TSOP for this task. Train at Home Station their ability to complete the identification of threat weapon system capabilities and employment norms. These analysts must also be knowledgeable about threat doctrine, tactics, techniques, procedures and equipment. The key is to have the appropriate information available to the rest of the staff prior to mission analysis.

5.2.2 Evaluate Physical Environment Information

* Use of terrain analysis in COA development: S2s rarely use the modified combined obstacle overlay (MCOO) developed at Home Station to assist terrain analysis. RESULT: S2s do not effectively conduct detailed analysis, nor do they provide a clear and concise picture to the commander about the potential effects of terrain on the maneuver plan.

Technique: S2s should conduct detailed terrain analysis based on the needs of the commander.

1. Provide enemy avenues of approach.

2. Identify intervisibility lines.

3. Identity potential engagement areas and enemy fire sacks.

4. Identify weapon system firing lines.

5. Identify potential lines of communication.

TF engineers, working with the S2, can provide additional detailed terrain based information.

1. Restrictive terrain analysis (go/no-go)

2. Line of sight/intervisibility lines

3. Geological analysis (from division/corps) for soil conditions; hydrology; off limits or no dig/restricted dig limitations.

5.3 Prepare Intelligence Reports

* S2 SITEMPs lack sufficient detail: In an effort to shorten the deliberate planning process, S2s are not developing multiple enemy courses of action (COA). The S2 shortens enemy COA development by failing to depict the enemy's most dangerous COAs or threat models that would assist the staff in visualizing how the enemy would fight, and how the enemy would look entering potential engagement areas (EA). RESULT: the TF is hindered performing proper battlefield "calculus." TFs develop inadequate SITEMPS for COA development and wargaming because detailed threat models are not developed.

Technique: S2s should prepare enemy SITEMPS and threat models for the enemy's most dangerous and most probable COAs. FM 34-130 discusses development of a SITEMP, although the manual does not address the level of detail necessary to adequately support the Tactical Decision Making Process.

* Failure to develop event template with matrix: S2s experience difficulties developing and using an event template and matrix. There are particular problems identifying critical enemy events and then integrating them into an event template and matrix. RESULT: Wargaming is hindered because the staff does not know when and where High Value Targets and High Payoff Targets will be. Therefore, decisions about how and where to attack those targets are not made.

Technique: Integrate an enemy critical events list into the event template matrix, and tie those critical events into NAIs and TPLs in the development of the event template and matrix. See FM 34-130, page 3-54, figure 3-2-11 for a good example of an event matrix.

* S2s analysis and reporting procedures, Field Artillery battalion: Too often by the time S2s report "current" information, the information is outdated. Intelligence summaries (INTSUMs) and periodic intelligence reports (PERINTREPs) are designed to show where the enemy is now and predict the impact on future operations. The failure to, either use these formats, or to graphically depict these events will result in the S2 failing to see critical enemy events and their impact on the battalion.

Technique: see the sample matrix below for an example of an "Enemy Critical Events Matrix." This matrix synchronizes enemy events with critical fire support tasks (CFSTs), priority intelligence requirements (PIRs), and force protection measures.

1. List in chronological order the enemy event that corresponds to the PIR/CFST/FPM. Assign a number to each row.

2. Fill in appropriate target number where applicable.

3. Next to each row under the action/remarks column, write the appropriate action, report, etc.

4. On the overlay, place a circled number 15 to 20 minutes prior to where your event template indicates the enemy event will take place.

When the battle tracking of enemy actions triggers events in a location you anticipated, execute the appropriate action/report. RESULT: this matrix will focus on those critical enemy events battery commanders, the S3 and FSCOORD need to be aware of in making critical decisions. This allows you to produce predictive analysis rather than reactive analysis.

* Incomplete IPB: Commanders and staffs fail to conduct a complete IPB. They do not follow processes outlined in FM 34-130. In many cases they do not develop a full understanding of the enemy or weather or terrain. Seldom do intelligence personnel accurately develop the enemy's most likely or most dangerous courses of action.

Technique: Use the IPB procedures in FM 34-130 to improve the ability to complete the IPB process. This will result in the systematic production of products to support staff estimates, the planning process, and mission execution decisions by the maneuver commander.

* Company/team IPB: IPB at Co/Tm level is either not done, or not done to the level of detail necessary.

PROBLEMS:

1. Co/Tm commanders are not templating down to the individual vehicle, or dismounted fighting position.

2. When vehicles are templated, the potential dismounted threat is often ignored.

RESULT: If a plan to kill the enemy is developed, it does not include killing the enemy dismounts. This ultimately costs the unit the combat power destroyed by hand-held anti-tank weapons.

Technique: Co/Tm commanders should learn more about threat dismounted infantry tactics, and incorporate this into Co/Tm IPB. The concept of operations/scheme of maneuver must include plans to defeat both the mounted and dismounted threat.

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