* Brigade staffs - developing and using multiple enemy COAs during the planning process: Brigade staffs have not been developing and synchronizing viable plans against multiple enemy COAs during the planning process.
Technique: The staff must consider multiple options available to the enemy commander when developing the brigade's scheme of maneuver and the branch plans to defeat the enemy regardless of the enemy COA.. Potential enemy options include:
- variations in the type of formation
- the axis or axes of advance
- location of the enemy's main effort
Staffs must become proficient in wargaming in order to be able to quickly wargame the most likely COA and leave sufficient time to adequately wargame contingencies.
* Task force FSO concept of fires development: TF FSOs develop concepts of fire without really identifying the commander's desired effects and what critical tasks he wants fire support assets to accomplish.
PROBLEMS:
1. Engagement criteria is not being established by phases to focus commander, observers and the artillery battalion S3/FDC.
2. Mortars and CAS employment options are habitually omitted.
3. The eventual written concept too often does not equate to what the ground maneuver commander really wants or intends.
Technique: The concept of fire support should address:
1. Who will the fires support?
2. What are the desired effects?
3. How will the mission be accomplished, ie. what combination of fire support assets?
4. Where will it be accomplished?
5. When will it be accomplished?
6. Why does it need to be accomplished?
7. Use the "bullet format" for the concept of fire support: critical fire support tasks stand alone, and are placed in sequential order. If there are more than 6 or 7 "bullets," then fire support is probably being overe tasked.
* Brigade A2C2 procedures: Brigades have no A2C2 procedures established, resulting in ineffective airspace coordination and hazardous situations for rotary wing aircraft.
PROBLEMS:
1. Efforts to execute A2C2 are minimal to nonexistent.
2. Brigade staffs do not have a formal A2C2 cell.
3. Brigade staffs are not well versed in A2C2 procedures.
4. Brigade staffs make little or no effort to coordinate the use of airspace.
5. A2C2 planning and coordination routinely falls to the aviation LNO with poor results.
Procedures:
1. Identify the need for Army airspace.
2. Begin concurrent staff planning: a. Once identified, the S3 allocates initial airspace for the insertion (air corridors, LZs, PZs, etc.)
b. Aviation LNO: Works with the S3 developing air corridors based on the mission, aircraft type, enemy situation, etc.
c. S2: Identifies threats to the aircraft and recommends, as necessary, modifications to the air corridors.
d.. FSO: Identifies airspace control measures' effect on fire support, and then recommends necessary changes.
e. ADA LNO: Plans changes to WCS based on the insertion.
f. ALO: Plans for coordinating altitude and separation distances.
3. S3 Air finalizes coordination with the A2C2 team and ensures all graphic control measures are included on the brigade graphics and the necessary coordinating instructions are in the brigade OPORD.
4. S3 Air coordinates with higher headquarters and adjacent units for A2C2.
5. S3 Air continues to coordinate airspace throughout the preparation phase for the mission. Coordinates with the A2C2 team as changes or refinements occur.
6. A2C2 is rehearsed during the combined arms rehearsal. A2C2 is also rehearsed at all subordinate rehearsals, as required.
Techniques:
1. Open and close air corridors only while aircraft are transiting the corridor. Leaving the corridor in effect continuously needlessly restricts fire support.
2. Plan aerial OPs and air BPs off of the air corridor.
3. Only open section (between aerial check points) of air corridors as the aircraft transit that section.
4. Plan air corridors behind or to the flanks of artillery batteries and mortar platoons/sections.
5. Consider TF mortar platoons/sections when planning A2C2.
6. Include air corridors on brigade graphics.
7. Ensure indirect fire support elements are aware of the coordinating altitude in air corridors.
8. Establish NFAs on aerial OPs.
9. Require aircraft to report aerial checkpoints (ACPs) when transiting air corridors.
* Brigade deep battle planning: Brigades rarely plan or execute a deep fight designed to set a specific condition or set of conditions to allow the close fight to be successfully fought.
PROBLEMS:
1 Brigade staffs do not view missions within the battlefield framework - deep, close, rear, security and reserve. Thus the fire support plan is not designed around the deep, close, rear concept.
2. Plans which do incorporate deep fires, usually executed by COLTs, are written with no specific task, purpose or end state.
Technique: One result of wargaming should be a specific, measurable end state for deep operations.
EXAMPLE:
TOO GENERAL: " the COLTs will acquire targets and call for fire on them."
SPECIFIC: " As the enemy occupies its fighting positions, COLT 4 will execute Target AJ 0016 in order to destroy two BMPs from the southern MRP which will allow TF 1-16 IN to have a 5:1 force ratio at the point of penetration and successfully breach."
This SPECIFIC example would be the product of wargaming. It gives a task and purpose to the deep fire support. This is an example of the level of detail we must achieve during wargaming.
* Fire support integration into staff wargaming: While fire support is being better integrated into wargaming of the basic plan, when branch plan wargaming is done there is little or no fire support participation.
PROBLEMS:
1. S3s concentrate almost solely on maneuver.
2. FSOs and ALOs are relegated to observer status.
3. Radar zones are not integrated with the maneuver plan.
4. Mortars and mortar positioning is not integrated.
5. Priority targets are not designated.
6. The fire support plan is not integrated with R&S planning..
Technique: FSOs and ALOs should be active participants in the entire wargaming process, including the development of branches and sequels to the base plan.
* COA development and wargaming: Units routinely experience significant problems with both COA development and then wargaming of COAs.
PROBLEMS:
1. Brigade staffs seldom use the five step methodology to develop COAs described in FM 101-5, ST 101-5, or CALL Newsletter 93-3, The Battalion and Brigade Battle Staff.
2. Commanders either dictate most COAs, or one or two key staff officers develop them without other staff input.
3. In short-cutting the five step process, most staffs do not examine force ratios by arraying the forces available.
4. Most staffs fail also to develop all parts of the battlefield framework (deep, close, rear).
5. By not using a doctrinal COA development methodology, staffs fail to develop a critical events list because they have not fully developed a scheme of maneuver.
Technique: Use the references above for more detailed discussion of the 5 step COA development process.
The 5 Steps:
1. Analyze relative combat power
2. Array initial forces
3. Develop the scheme of maneuver
4. Determine C2 means and maneuver control measures
5. Prepare COA statement and sketch.
4.3.1 Issue Planning Guidance
* Fire support integration into staff mission analysis: Too many TF commanders go through the tactical decision making process and then into battle without know what FS assets are available to support their missions.
PROBLEM: FSOs and ALOs do not identify critical information, usually provided by brigade, such as specified and implied tasks, as well as assets available.
Technique: Good digital commo during planning and coordination greatly assists efforts to obtain assets available information. When the FSO receives this information, he needs to translate it into meaningful information the maneuver commander can use.
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