TA.4 Command and Control (cont)
*Obstacle planning and commander's intent: Obstacle planning and resourcing frequently is not performed in a manner which meets the commander's intent.
PROBLEMS:
1. Engineer commanders and staffs have not analyzed terrain (especially avenue of approach width) nor applied planning factors (adjusted for METT-T factors and prior mission experience).
2. Inconsistent reporting from subordinate engineer units on progress/status of execution.
RESULTS:
1. The obstacle plan is not properly planned (timing), resourced, or managed.
2. Obstacle plans presented to the commander are often unrealistic:
- level of effort (time and manpower) available
Techniques:
1. Early analysis by the engineer staff during Tactical Decision Making Process (TDMP):
- Key METT-T factors
- Constrained engineer effort estimate with appropriate resourcing calculations
- Material required and timelines
2. Subordinate engineer units report statuses of obstacle plan execution as required by timelines.
3. Adjust obstacle plan execution as needed, to include reallocation:
- assets
- materials
- efforts
PROBLEMS:
1. The brigade Main CP CSS planner too often prepares CSS plans based upon guidance received from the TOC, without input from the Forward Support Battalion security, plans and operations (FSB SPO) officer or even the brigade S-4.
2. The CSS staffs generally need to use METT-T more frequently in developing its plans to support a TF.
3. The CSS staff still needs to work on integrating the CSS plan with the maneuver plan.
4. CSS key leaders need to be more involved in the planning process:
- To ensure their plan is doctrinally sound
- Key leaders fully understand the plan, to include tasks and purpose of the TF
5. The S-4 and the combat trains command post (CTCP) must anticipate the TF's needs during battle in order to push supplies to the companies.
6. TF S-1 and S-4 are not integrated into the planning process.
RESULTS:
1.
The CSS annex developed does not contain adequate detail and is not synchronized
with FSB/MSB resupply actions.
2.
CSS plan is not synchronized with the maneuver plan and is not doctrinally
sound.
3.
Companies do not receive supplies or else receive them too late.
Techniques:
1. Practice the Tactical Decision Making Process (TDMP) including CSS planners during training at Home Station.
2. CSS planners learn and train on TDMP for their own training, to include use of METT-T factors.
3. Supported unit staffs must make a concerted effort to integrate CSS planners into TDMP:
- Train at Home Station
- Have S-1 and S-4 assistants or NCOs take over administrative duties at Home Station while they attend this training.
4. CSS planners must train at Home Station:
- To coordinate among themselves in planning--planners and operators
- Predictive analysis or forecasting requirements of supported TFs
- Aggressive inclusion in supported unit's TDMP
*Integration of Combat Health Support (CHS) planning: Most CHS planners developed CHS plans without understanding the maneuver plan and the enemy's intent.
PROBLEMS:
1.
A majority of brigades do not conduct parallel planning.
2.
CHS planners often write CHS plans without making a casualty estimate or understanding
the maneuver plan thoroughly.
3.
Most logistics planners do not use the brigade situation template when developing
their scheme of support.
RESULTS:
1. CHS planners are not present for mission analysis and course of action (COA) development.
2. Distribution of medical assets cannot support the number of casualties at a given site, and medical site locations conflict with maneuver units.
3. CHS planners place medical sites in templated chemical strike areas.
Techniques:
1. CHS planners participate in the entire Tactical Decision Making Process (TDMP) of supported unit(s), including mission analysis, COA development, enemy courses of action (ECOAs), commander's intent, and orders production, to prepare CHS plans synchronized with the maneuver plan.
2. CHS planners must prepare casualty estimates and consider ECOAs in order to develop a comprehensive health support plan for the supported unit.
*Health Service Support (HSS) integration in Task Force (TF) planning: HSS planners often do not participate in TF planning process.
Techniques:
1. TFs include HSS planners in Tactical Decision Making Process (TDMP) training at Home Station; if not included by TFs, HSS planners should initiate action to be included in TF TDMP training and exercises.
2. If HSS planners are not invited to participate, they must aggressively insert themselves into the TF planning process, either through the S-4 or the TF XO.
*CSS staff use of Mission, Enemy, Terrain, Troops Available, and Time (METT-T): Generally, CSS staffs fail to consider the factors of METT-T in their planning for support of the task force.
Techniques:
1.
Train CSS staffs on METT-T considerations at Home Station.
2.
Train CSS staffs to use METT-T in TF Tactical Decision Making Process (TDMP)
training and exercises at Home Station.
3.
Review and revise CSS unit SOPs to reflect considerations of METT-T factors
in planning.
*Battalion Signal Officer (BSO) integration into Task Force (TF) planning: TF BSOs were not generally integrated into the TF Tactical Decision Making Process (TDMP) during most rotations.
PROBLEMS:
1. BSO's relationship with TF battle staff tends to be better when BSO is a captain (CPT) rather than a lieutenant (LT); LTs may be intimidated or fear rejection.
2. There is insufficient integration to consider communications adequately or timely.
3. While there are attempts to consider communications under paragraph 5, Command and Signal, of the OPORD, there is rarely a communications annex written.
RESULTS:
1.
LTs do not offer communications advice or recommendations as well in TF staff
work as CPTs.
2.
No clear picture of communications support is available to TF members.
3.
Communications support not integrated into TF plan.
Techniques:
1.
Prepare written/graphical communications annexes for TF OPORDs; use examples
found in FMs 11-43 and 101-5.
2.
Integrate TF BSOs into TDMP; use him as TF communications expert (SME).
3.
Make BSOs CPTs where possible.
*CSS units Tactical Decision Making Process (TDMP): CSS units seldom conduct the elements of the doctrinal orders process during the formulation of operational orders (OPORD).
PROBLEMS:
1. CSS units do not recognize that the Forward Support Battalion (FSB) OPORD is mainly a Base defense order or movement order, not a CSS mission support order.
2. The FSB rarely conducts a deliberate orders process during the development of its OPORDs.
3. The role of the Battalion Executive Officer (XO) in the orders process is not well defined in most units.
4. The orders process remains decentralized.
5. The FSB's orders are often not integrated nor synchronized with all of the Battlefield Operating Systems (BOS), or its subordinate units.
RESULT: Because the S-3/XO fails to ensure BOS integration, the orders lack BOS-related annexes entirely or contain incomplete annexes that are not well integrated into a coherent BSA defense plan.
Techniques:
1. Have the Battalion XO function as the Chief of Staff and focus and guide the process through to completion.
2. The orders process should be incorporated and practiced at Home Station in both daily garrison operations and periodic field exercises.
3. Units that have developed an SOP to time-manage the orders process know what products they want to develop, the level of the quality given the time, and are able to achieve integrated and synchronized orders meeting their Commander's Intent.
4.3.1 Issue Planning Guidance
*Commander's intent in subordinate plans and orders: The commander's intent is frequently not reflected in subordinate element orders.
PROBLEMS:
1. Subordinate commanders do not understand commander's intent;
- Their own orders, graphics, and intent do not reflect intent of next two higher levels.
- Plans differ from what higher commander envisioned
2. No system to ensure subordinates build concepts and plans that will accomplish mission in accordance with higher commanders' intent
- Staffs rarely check compliance
- Higher commander often learns of discrepancy late in the Tactical Decision Making Process (TDMP)
RESULTS:
1.
Higher commanders' intent not accomplished.
2.
Higher commander cannot change subordinates' plans in time to reflect intent.
Techniques:
1. Establish systems for ensuring understanding and compliance with commander's intent early in TDMP.
- Confirmation briefs immediately following orders issues for understanding.
- Back briefs later for compliance and inclusion in subordinates' plans.
- Staff visits and direct communication with counterparts on use of BOS by subordinates.
2. Collect subordinates' graphics:
- Prepare common graphics
- Deconflict operation
3. Change TF plans early enough in TDMP to maintain coherence and synchronization.
4.3.2 Develop Courses of Action
*S-2 development of Enemy Courses of Action (ECOAs): S-2s do not regularly receive enough time during mission analysis to develop and present detailed ECOAs.
PROBLEMS:
1.
Units attempt to conduct TDMP rapidly and limit time devoted to mission analysis.
2.
S-2 does not complete realistic, detailed ECOAs until COA analysis/wargaming
or even until rehearsal.
RESULTS:
1.
S-2 cannot develop detailed, realistic ECOAs during mission analysis phase;
does not influence friendly COA development.
2.
Unit staff is surprised by ECOAs late in TDMP and must rework plan and orders.
Technique: Brief mission analysis only when S-2 has completed ECOA development.
*Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical (NBC) NCO participation in NBC planning: The brigade NBC NCO rarely participates in all phases of the Tactical Decision Making Process (TDMP).
PROBLEMS:
1. While brigade chemical officers are involved in all phases of TDMP, they generally do not possess the knowledge to plan for chemical assets to support the maneuver plan.
2. Brigades attach chemical assets to TFs with little or no guidance to TF chemical officers or NCOs on how to use them.
3. Chemical NCOs do not receive training in TDMP.
RESULTS:
1. The chemical staff often fails to synchronize the efforts of the smoke and decontamination platoons and the chemical reconnaissance squad.
2. Templating of chemical strikes and effects of smoke on the battlefield are not adequately completed or planned during TDMP.
3. Chemical assets do not support the brigade maneuver plan.
Techniques:
1.
Train the chemical staff to conduct the detailed planning and participation
in TDMP to support the maneuver plan.
2.
Train chemical NCOs in the TDMP; moreover, have them attend the Battle Staff
course.
3.
Do not overburden the chemical staff with additional duties that distract them
from their primary duties.
*Course of Action (COA) development and details: COA development often fails to produce plans with sufficient detail and precision for successful execution.
PROBLEMS:
1. Most brigades fail to conduct a COA development session as part of their Tactical Decision Making Process (TDMP).
2. While most brigades use an abbreviated form of TDMP in which the commander dictates a course of action, staffs fail to develop the COA fully:
- Into a draft plan with sufficient detail to synchronize the BOS
- Until wargaming, which develops the COA but fails to produce synchronization, precision, and detail needed for successful execution
3. COAs developed are not based upon commander's decisive point.
4. Task force (TF) S-3s cannot define doctrinally what they want companies/teams to accomplish.
5. COAs do not take into account S-2's situation template or terrain.
RESULTS:
1.
Brigades either fail to have a COA development session or wargaming or both.
2.
The plan lacks details and precision necessary for successful execution.
Techniques:
1. Fully develop a COA into a draft plan with enough detail to wargame effectively:
- Do battle arithmetic
- Check battlefield geometry, i.e., deep, close, rear
-
Develop a detailed concept of operations
- Clear tasks and purpose for each BOS
- Based upon commander's guidance
2. Wargame to produce details and products for final plan and orders:
- Event template
- Decision tools (decision support template, decision support matrix)
- High priority target lists
- Synchronization matrix
- Branch plans
3. Use ST 101-5, Command and Staff Decision Processes, to assist in COA development.
4. Use doctrinal definitions from FM 101-5-1 for assigning company/team purpose(s).
TA.4
Command and Control BOS Narrative, Part 2
TA.4,
Part 4
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