TA4. Command and Control (cont)
4.3 Determine Actions
* Fire support information dissemination and the planning process: The task force FSO does not have a system to disseminate information as acquired/required to subordinate elements, adjacent units, and HHQs, once a decision comes out of the planning process.
Procedures: The task force FSO needs to develop a system which allows for rapid and accurate flow of information to enable parallel planning at all echelons.
1. Disseminate information in WARNO format.
2. Have FSNCO develop a checklist of FS considerations from FMs 6-20-40, 71-1, 71-2, 71-123 which the FSO can quickly review upon his return to the TOC.
3. Commander's guidance to FSO should contain all the elements described in CALL Newsletter No. 95-12, Tactical Decision Making: "Abbreviated Planning", Appendix C, pg. C-2, and should focus the FSO and permit him to develop a clear and concise concept for fires.
4. Products from commander's guidance should be:
- An approved concept for fires
- WARNO to HQ FSE and FS personnel
- An initial fire plan to support the security/counter-recon force
- An update to the DS FA Bn S3.
5. FSO should be an integral player during COA development and provide FS capabilities and limitations for each COA.
6. Products from the wargaming/synchronization session should be:
- Draft Fire Support Execution Matrix (FSEM)
- Target list
- Initial observer plan
- FM brief to HQ FSE and DS Bn S3
- Positioning requirements for FS assets
- Any additional FS assets required
7. Establish FS SOP which describes and delegates responsibility to the FSNCO to perform in FSO's absence.
*Integration of mission analysis: Mission analysis is rarely conducted as an integrated Battle Staff function.
PROBLEMS:
1. Battle Staff does not conduct parallel planning
- Battle Staff assembles at task force (TF) command post (CP) while TF Commander, S-3, and FSO receive brigade order at brigade
- Battle Staff does not conduct mission analysis of respective BOSs
2. Frequently, some members (CSS-related) are not even informed of receipt of the order and mission analysis.
RESULT: TF planning does not fully identify specified, implied, and essential tasks for brief to commander.
Techniques:
1.
Battle Staff conduct mission analysis integrating all key planners.
2.
Conduct mission analysis while others are at brigade CP; refine analysis upon
their return, prior to writing the restated mission.
*Integration of the S-2 into the planning process:
PROBLEMS:
1. Frequently, S-3 and selected staff conduct Tactical Decision Making Process (TDMP) without integrating other staff sections.
2. S-2 not included in friendly COA development.
3. S-2 does not always know how to apply enemy doctrine to tactical level of planning with regards to enemy's use of terrain and all BOS.
RESULTS:
1.
S-2 has little impact on development of friendly COA.
2.
Plans not fully integrated and inadequately consider realistic ECOA.
Techniques:
1. Include S-2 in friendly COA development.
2. S-2s must increase their knowledge of enemy use of terrain and BOS at tactical level, both in formal schools and at Home Station through study and emphasis during training.
*Templating of enemy's use of persistent and non-persistent chemical agent:
PROBLEMS:
1. Brigade Chemical Officers frequently fail to plan for enemy's use of chemical agents in the entire brigade AO, from its rear boundary forward, in developing a chemical use template.
2. Chemical reconnaissance vehicles (FOX) rarely receive a clear task and purpose from the brigade chemical officer in R & S plans.
RESULTS:
1.
The chemical reconnaissance plan is not adequately planned and resourced.
2.
Lack of specificity to FOXs in planning results in a poorly executed chemical
reconnaissance plan.
Techniques:
1.
Continue to include FOXs in R & S plans and rehearsals, but give them more
specific tasks.
2.
Follow doctrine of FMs 3-19 and 3-101-1 for chemical reconnaissance plans.
*Integration of engineer cell elements with brigade S-2 during IPB:
PROBLEMS: The brigade S-2 does not regularly integrate engineer cell elements (Assistant Brigade Engineer (ABE)/ Engineer battalion staff) during IPB.
1. S-2 prepares Modified Combined Obstacle Overlay (MCOO) and Situational Template (SITEMP) without engineer representation, skills, or knowledge.
2. Improperly visualized enemy for later phases of TDMP.
RESULTS:
1.
Incomplete IPB products.
2.
Affects COA development and wargaming phases of TDMP.
Techniques:
1. Fully integrate ABE/Engineer Battalion staff into IPB development process:
- Templating enemy engineer capabilities
- Begin in initial stages of TDMP and continue throughout planning
2. Train on integration at Home Station.
*Reserve operations integration: Reserve operations need refinement in planning and integration.
PROBLEMS:
1. Lack of positioning guidance and triggers for commitment for reserve during planning.
- Reserve commander does not participate fully in planning.
- Positioning guidance, priority for commitment, and clear communication procedures not given to reserve.
2. Reserve commander seldom briefs back brigade commander
- Does not participate in brigade rehearsal.
- Must deduce mission
RESULTS:
1. Independent action by reserve rather than integrated with commander's intent.
- Reserve commander does not understand his role in brigade plan
- Reserve follows designated TF.
2. Many offensive maneuver opportunities for decision lost.
- Reserve reinforces failure or a dilemma rather than success
- Reserve attached to main effort or TF in contact
Techniques:
1. Treat reserve commander as separate maneuver commander in planning.
- Include him in rehearsals.
- Require him to brief back brigade commander on plan(s).
2. Give reserve a mission, to include:
- Positioning guidance
- Priority of commitment
- Communications procedures.
3. Plan and execute commitment of reserve for decisive action to achieve goal rather than to prevent failure or solve problem.
4. Teach reserve operations more specifically in service schools.
*Maneuver unit (heavy & light) direct fire planning: Both heavy and light infantry companies/teams have experienced difficulty in direct fire planning in offensive or defensive operations.
PROBLEMS:
1. Heavy infantry:
- Unable to mass fires in engagement areas (EAs) or objectives without target overkill
- Distributing and shifting of fires not explained
2. Light infantry:
- Company level planning rarely includes the following essential control measures: target reference points (TRPs); maximum engagement lines; direct(and indirect) fire triggers; engagement criteria.
- Commanders do not adjust these control measures to the terrain.
RESULTS:
1.
Target overkill in engagement areas (EAs) or objectives.
2.
Weapons positioning precludes massing fires and mutual support from adjacent
companies/platoons.
Techniques:
1.
Obtain and use Infantry School student handout on direct fire planning, SH
7-45.
2.
Incorporate SH 7-45 into future editions of FM 71-123, 71-1, and 71-2.
3.
Emphasize direct fire planning, including "Tactical Exercise Without Troops"
(TEWT), at the Infantry School.
4.
Incorporate training on direct fire planning in Home Station training.
PROBLEMS:
1. Commanders do not visualize how the enemy will use combat multipliers to shape the battlefield to his advantage.
2. Companies/teams do not rehearse actions on contact prior to crossing the line of departure (LD).
3. Actions on contact often consist of halting and returning fire
- At targets beyond range
- Without maneuvering
4. Units do not train for simultaneous forms of combat with the enemy.
RESULT: Company/teams:
- Rarely execute effective actions to enemy combat multipliers on contact
- Do not achieve fire superiority against the enemy
- Fight on the enemy's terms rather than on their own terms
Techniques:
1.
Learn how the enemy will employ his combat multipliers to shape the battlefield
in his favor.
2.
Develop SOPs for reactions to contact, including multiple forms of contact,
with enemy forces and their use of combat multipliers.
3.
Rehearse actions on contact, to include multiple forms of contact, during Home
Station training.
*Commander's concept for fires: Task force (TF) commanders frequently have difficulty issuing a clear concept for fires.
PROBLEMS:
1. TF commander's concept for fires did not consider the following:
- Enemy order of battle
- Battlefield calculus to achieve desired results, including combat multipliers
2. TF FSO developed scheme of fires without identifying:
- What commander's desired effect were
- What critical tasks commander wanted FS to accomplish to influence enemy order of battle and to protect the force
3. Engagement criteria not established by phases of the operation.
RESULTS:
1.
TF FSO cannot develop an adequate scheme of fires.
2.
Mortars and CAS habitually omitted.
Techniques: The concept for fire support should address :
1. Who will indirect fires affect
2. What are desired effects
- Destroy, neutralize, suppress
- Assigned number or percent of vehicles by type and/or personnel
- Delay, disrupt, interdict
3. How will it be accomplished
4. Where will it be accomplished
5. When will it occur (enemy event preferred to time)
6. Why does it need to happen
*Engineer planning integration within brigade planning process: Engineer battalion staffs do not regularly plan in parallel with brigade staffs.
PROBLEMS:
1. Engineer battalion staffs do not use their proximity to the brigade staff:
- To expedite their own planing
- To influence the brigade staff through immediate input to the assistant brigade engineer (ABE).
2. Engineer staffs do not seek out information/OPORDs received by brigade.
3. Reduced engineer input to brigade TDMP
- terrain analysis
- enemy abilities templating
- friendly capabilities input
- minimal resourcing and timelining of assets
4. Engineer OPORD does not give staff information to TF engineers to allow use in TF TDMP.
- parallel planning with TF
- engineer company OPORD not synchronized with TF plan
RESULTS: Unsynchronized plans and/or delayed engineer battalion OPORDs.
1. Engineer battalions are delayed in beginning their own mission analysis process.
2. Once behind the brigade staff, engineer battalion staffs become non-players in the TDMP.
3. ABE becomes only engineer in brigade TDMP.
4. Engineer battalion OPORD
- Incomplete, delayed, not synchronized with brigade plan
- Needs FRAGOs to correct
5. TF engineers' OPORD not synchronized with TF plan.
Techniques:
1. Train engineer battalion staffs in TDMP and procedures of their supported brigade and practice OPORD processes in field training at Home Station.
- Insure all staff members understand their roles and responsibilities in the battalion OPORD process
- Staff members understand their input to the ABE for brigade OPORD process.
2. Battalion XOs fill role of "Chief of Staff":
- Direct and control battalion OPORD timeline
- Involve entire staff
- Prevent delays
- Ensure timely OPORD issue
TA.4,
Command and Control BOS Narrative, Part 1
TA.4,
Part 3
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