TA.4 Command and Control (cont)
4.3.3 Analyze Courses of Action
*Wargaming: Wargaming rarely synchronizes the task force (TF) plan.
PROBLEMS:
1. Task force executive officers (TF XOs) do not facilitate the process:
- Staff loses focus on critical events
- Relationship between events wargamed and decisive point
2. Wargame takes too long
RESULTS:
1.
Only most aggressive participants provide input.
2.
Other participants write annexes without synchronizing their BOS.
Techniques:
1. TF XO or S-3 take charge of wargaming; keep wargame focused on:
- Critical events
- Decisive point
2. Use synchronization matrix to record events wargamed by phase and BOS.
3. Use NTC "How To" video, Wargaming, to demonstrate "a way" to conduct the wargame process.
4.3.5 Select or Modify Course of Action
*Developing a scheme of maneuver: Most task force (TF) S-3s and commanders struggle through course of action (COA) development and refining COA into a scheme of maneuver.
PROBLEMS:
1.
Most S-3s do not know where or how to start COA development.
2.
TFs normally develop a movement formation and general actions on contact:
- Rarely provide details on what they want companies/teams to accomplish
- Rarely assign tasks(s) and/or purpose to companies/teams.
Techniques:
1. Use ST 101-5, Command and Staff Decision Processes, to assist in COA development.
2. Focus on COA development by TF in training at Home Station:
- Detailed and precise for TF and by event
- Details, task, and purpose for companies/teams.
4.4 Direct and Lead Subordinate Forces
* Incorporation of Ground Surveillance Radar (GSR) teams into reconnaissance & surveillance (R& plans: When GSR leadership is not involved with task force S-2s and scout platoon leaders, the GSRs are rarely effective.
RESULT: Lack of GSR team involvement means:
- GSR teams are given missions too late to complete troop leading procedures (TLPs)
- GSR teams are not incorporated into R& plans
- Lost intelligence due to lack of established reporting procedures
Techniques:
1. Establish habitual relationships at Home Station so that GSR teams become familiar with the supported unit's SOPs and become integrated as a member of the bigger team.
2. Do not re-task-organize after every mission to ensure GSRs are always on the forward edge of the battle area (FEBA). GSR teams that are shuffled around do not have time to conduct TLPs, to rest, and refit.
* Battle command Tactical Standard Operating Procedures (TACSOP): Most units deploy with a brigade TACSOP, but most of the TACSOPs are recently written documents that have not been distributed and have rarely been used. Most TACSOPs adequately cover standard brigade operations but few have a copy, and few have read it or use it.
Techniques:
1.
Brigades must develop and use their TACSOPs well before deploying to theater.
Ensure everyone has a TACSOP and uses it.
2.
If the procedures do not work well at Home Station, refine them until they
do work.
* Planning for successful and unsuccessful maneuver operations: Communications planners do not plan for both successful and unsuccessful maneuver when developing plans to support the maneuver unit. The various forms of maneuver involve the movement of units and command and control elements on the battlefield. The success or failure of the maneuver influences the distances, locations, and timing of the movements. Communications planners must be prepared to support such movements in all circumstances.
Technique: The thought process of communications planners must include the consideration of not only the scheme of maneuver chosen to achieve the mission but it must also consider how support will be continued if both fully successful or failed operations occur.
4.4.1 Prepare Plans or Orders
* Deployment of Retransmit (RETRANS) Teams: RETRANs teams are too often looking for the high ground, with no sense of where the enemy is and no clear mission.
PROBLEMS:
1.
Brigade Signal Officers (BSO) tend to give RETRANS teams a brief warning with
no route and little guidance.
2.
RETRANS teams deploy with a lesson statement, but seldom a detailed OPORD.
3.
RETRANS have no familiarization with the task force plan.
Techniques:
1. BSOs must take time to provide the RETRANS team with a clear OPORD.
2. The RETRANS team chief must provide input in the development of his RETRANS mission so that any experiences he/she has is integrated.
3. The RETRANS team chief should attend orders brief or rehearsal to get an understanding of the mission they are supporting.
4. The BSO should insure the mission is understood by the team by having them backbrief their mission.
5. Reference FM 11-43 for a sample RETRANS OPORD.
* Level of detail in task force fire support annexes to OPORD:Task force fire support products produced as a portion of the task force OPORD lack detail.
PROBLEMS:
1. Fire support annexes fail to articulate the commander's intent through a concise, understood scheme of indirect fires.
2. Task force fire support annexes do not contain the task force scheme of fires.
3. The annexes are not detailed and do little to focus subordinates on the tasks to be performed.
4. Execution matrices have little value as preparation or execution documents and are seldom used by fire supporters in the brigade combat team (BCT).
5. The fire support officer is unable to clearly articulate the fire support plan during the task force OPORD briefing.
RESULTS:
1. Fire support executors are confused and maneuver commanders are frustrated as fire support repeatedly fails to influence battles.
2. Fire support is not synchronized, and fire support executors do not understand their roles and responsibilities for accomplishing the commanders's intent for fires.
Techniques:
1.The task force fire support plan must address/identify the following information:
- Sequence in which fire support tasks will be accomplished (wargaming results).
- Primary and alternate executor of each fire support task.
- Friendly or enemy activity which triggers each fire support task.
- The intent or end state for each task as it applies to the commander's intent for fire support.
2. The worksheet (or execution matrix) is designed to be a planning and execution tool, and should be included in the brigade operations when it is published.
3. The worksheet is initiated during COA development and fully developed during wargaming.
4. The Fire Support Officer (FSO), targeting officer, fire support NCO and Air Liaison Officer (ALO) must participate in the wargaming session.
* Planning for use of dismounted infantry in offensive operations: Units do not plan for dismounted operations on the objective. Dismounts typically ride in the back of vehicles and contribute to the operation by exercising the casualty evacuation plan.
Techniques:
1. Units must develop training plans that emphasize the tasks and purpose associated with dismounted operations.
2. Leader Training Programs (LTPs), After Action Reviews (AARs), and military publications should stress the importance of dismounted operations.
3. Execute dismounted operations routinely during Home Station training exercises to develop and sharpen these skills. Get dismounts out of vehicles whenever feasible.
* Air defense planning and coordination: Bradley Stinger Fighting Vehicle (BSFV) platoons usually do not understand the direct fire plan of the company/team battle positions which they are in or adjacent to.
PROBLEM: BSFV squads do not know the distances to trigger lines and target reference points (TRP).
RESULT: BSFV squads often attempt to engage out-of-range ground targets.
Techniques: BSFV squads must coordinate with company team commanders and platoon leaders to ensure they can properly identify TRPs and their distance from the BSFV position. BSFV squads will then have recognizable triggers for efficient self-defense fires and provide squads the ability to enhance the company team fire plans in ground mode if necessary.
* Fire planning to support reconnaissance/counter reconnaissance effort:
PROBLEMS:
1. Units rarely plan for use of indirect fires to support the reconnaissance and surveillance (R& effort.
2. Scouts are sent on missions without a fire plan that supports their movement or an understanding of the battalion's scheme of fires.
3. Coordination is not made with the artillery battalion to provide fires, and mortars are rarely positioned forward to support the R& effort.
Techniques:
1. Involve the task force Fire Support Officer (FSO) in planning and R& effort.
2. The FSO should:
- Provide the scouts or counter reconnaissance company a target list to support their mission
- Provide any fire support frequencies needed to call missions
- Provide a copy of the task force scheme of fires
- Coordinate with the artillery battalion to ensure they are able to provide fires to suppor the R& plan
- Consider positioning the mortar platoon forward to provide responsive fires in support of the R& plan
- Plan Restricted Fire Areas around scout observation points to avoid fratricide and facilitate clearance of fires. These must be continuously updated.
* Level of detail in Air Defense platoon orders: Operations orders (OPORDS) at the platoon level often lack sufficient detail to effectively focus the platoon or provide key information to allow the platoon leadership to anticipate battlefield conditions.
PROBLEMS:
1. Failure on the part of the platoon leaders to analyze the terrain within the area of operations and a poor understanding of the enemy's combat multipliers.
2. Terrain is often addressed in regard to its effects on mobility, but the essential question of its effect on AD weapon systems coverage is often overlooked.
3. There is little understanding of when and where the enemy will employ his systems to influence the fight.
RESULTS:
1. Weapons systems are placed in locations that do not facilitate the intended coverage plan.
2. The introduction of enemy combat multipliers catches the platoon by surprise without the appropriate action drill being anticipated or executed.
Techniques:
1. During the conduct of situation training exercise (STX) or other collective Home Station training events, place particular attention on the platoon orders process. Place emphasis on:
- The identification of key terrain
- Potential choke points
- Inter-visibility (IV) lines and their impact on AD weapon system coverage.
2. Use a 1:24000 map and the capabilities of Terra-Base related software to improve recognition skills.
3. To improve understanding of enemy capabilities, lieutenants should be taught to think in terms of the seven forms of contact and use these as a checklist to ensure the plan addresses the appropriate response when required:
- Direct Fire
- Indirect Fire
- Air
- Observation
- Chemical
- Obstacles
- Electronic Warfare
* Addressing nuclear, biological, chemical (NBC) sub-unit tasks in the operation order: The task force usually has no NBC annex or a location in the operation order (OPORD) to address NBC sub-unit tasks.
RESULTS:
1. The entire task force lacks understanding of
- What units are potentially in their formation
- The smoke support plan
- NBC reconnaissance plan
- Decontamination plan
- Automask criteria
2. Requires time to coordinate these tasks during valuable preparation time instead of having the information already in the OPORD.
Techniques:
1. Develop a one-page NBC concept of support annex that addresses
- The enemy threat
- MOPP level
- Automask criteria
- NBC recon plan
- Smoke support plan
- Decon plan
- Clearly defines task/purpose for NBC assets
-
Detailed coordination measures, such as
- Ensuring the smoke platoon mission is coordinated with the adjacent company/team
- Ensuring the recon team moving with the lead company/team attends the planning meeting, and then back-briefs the task force NBC section
- Identifying what phases of the mission the task force can expect enemy and friendly NBC events.
2. The NBC annex can be used by the company NBC NCOs to better understand the overall NBC defense of the task force and to provide staff assistance to their company/team commanders.
* Planning, management and execution of medical operations: Combat Health Support (CHS) planning is not consistently integrated into the brigade combat team (BCT) orders process, particularly light units.
PROBLEMS:
1. The Forward Support Battalion (FSB) Medical Company commanders are often not able to participate in the orders process because of operational responsibilities.
2. The FSB Support Operations officers often lack experience in medical operations.
3. The FSB Medical Companies exhibit an inability to execute blood management to standard.
Techniques:
1.
The BCT, in conjunction with its FSB, should ensure medical planning is incorporated
into Home Station training.
2.
Blood management should be programmed into Home Station training plans.
* Health services movement of aid stations: Health Service Support (HSS) units are seldom identifying triggers during battle for relocating the aid stations.
Technique: HSS units need to place emphasis on battle tracking to identify triggers for moving the aid stations.
4.4.1.1 Develop and Complete Plans or Orders
* MI Company Rehearsals: Terrain Model: MI companies are conducting map rehearsals or ineffective FM rehearsals rather than conducting thorough terrain model rehearsals. Rehearsals using a terrain model is the only way to enable leaders to visualize the battle by seeing how the BLUFOR and OPFOR are expected to maneuver across the battlefield.
Techniques:
1.
Each unit should construct a package of terrain model supplies, then use the
supplies to build a terrain model for each mission.
2.
The rehearsal should discuss the BLUFOR and OPFOR scheme of maneuver and fires.
TA.4
Command and Control BOS Narrative, Part 3
TA.4,
Part 5
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