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War is wasteful. It kills people and breaks things in large quantities. At the NTC, battalion task forces are routinely reduced to 50% or less strength in two hours of intensive operations. The ability of corps and divisions to reconstitute combat ineffective units, while continuing combat operations, is important to success on the battlefield.

Definition

There are no doctrinal manuals that adequately discuss reconstitution. The following definition from the approved operational concept is useful. Reconstitution is: "extraordinary actions taken by commanders to restore combat, combat support, and combat service support units to a desired level of combat effectiveness commensurate with mission requirements and availability of resources. These actions may include the re-establishment or reinforcement of command and control; the cross-leveling or replacement of personnel, supplies and equipment using command priorities to allocate resources; and the conduct of mission-essential training." Reconstitution does not include normal resupply and replacement operations.

No "Cookie Cutter"

Historical examples from both world wars, Korea, Vietnam, and the Arab-Israeli conflicts indicate that reconstitution is extremely situational dependent. There is no "cookie cutter" for reconstitution. However, there are some basic things that must be done. These are:

• Reconstitution is an operations function and can't be left to the G1/G4.

• Reconstitution operations must be planned in advance of tactical requirements. Planning must address:

  • The pushing of supplies and prestocking the reconstitution site prior to the unit's arrival.

  • Replacements

  • The condition of the troops (total time in combat, nature of most recent combat experience, length of rest prior to the fight, actual unit strength, number of replacements in unit).

  • The terrain and weather conditions (not only for the physical impact on men and equipment, but also the psychological impact on soldiers).

  • The unit's equipment condition/supply status.

  • Subsequent mission to be assigned to the force.

  • The feasibility of establishing multifunctional logistics "Reconstitution Task Force" (RTF).

  • Resources available (time, material, personnel, and training).

• Divisions, regardless of their type (light or heavy), require assistance from corps to reconstitute battalion size task forces.

• Once the decision has been made to reconstitute a force, the commander of this force requires quick and accurate damage assessments that address:

  • Command and Control

  • Personnel (psychological state is as important as numbers)

  • Equipment

  • Supply

  • Training

Training Difficult

Reconstitution training is difficult to accomplish due to the resources required, the multiple echelons involved, and the absence on "how to" doctrine. Realistic reconstitution training is best integrated into major field exercises.

Example of Reconstitution Training

This is how the V Corps trained on it during REFORGER 85.

• The operation was wargamed and the results showed that the Corps' covering force (the 11th ACR) would need reconstitution prior to recommitment.

• Supplies of all classes (including war reserve stocks of tanks and other major end items) were prepositioned in a designated reconstitution site.

• A Reconstitution Task Force (RTF) Headquarters was designated to handle all aspects of the reconstitution effort. This is the organization of that RTF: (Personnel involved are indicated if known)
  RTF Headquarters from 3d SUPCOM (15)
  
  HHD 85th Maint Bn (-) (50)
  
  596th Maint Co (-) (200)
  
  88th Maint Co (-) (20)
  
  15th Maint Co (310)
  
  521st Maint Co (TMDE) (-)
  
  68th Med Grp (-) (15)
  
  SP Trps Bn (-)
  
  95th Chem Co (-) (50)
  
  142d S& Bn. (-) (40)
  
  19th SPT Ctr (-) (4)
  
  64th RRD (-)

  LNOs from:

  181st Trans Bn
  
  22d Signal Bde
  
  205th Trans Bn (AV Maint)
  
  8th Maint Bn
  
  22d P & A Bn
  
  11th ACR

  The RTF assisted the 11th ACR Commander in the detailed damage assessment of: C2, personnel, equipment, and supplies to determine losses/remaining capabilities.

Simulated Areas

Areas that were simulated included:

• Issue of Theater equipment. Equipment was evacuated from the 11th ACR during the first day, taken to the reconstitution site, and reissued as theater equipment stocks.

• Issue of Class V basic load. Trailers with ammunition boxes representing the cubic size of the basic load were staged in the reconstruction site and a paper issue of Class V was conducted.

• Repair of battle damaged vehicles. Vehicles designated as battle damaged were assessed by Battle Damage Assessment Teams.

• Medical. A medical detachment was stationed at the site to provide support to the 11th ACR on arrival. During the 1st day of the FTX, casualties were designated and evacuated through the medical system.

• Replacements. Individuals who had been evacuated as casualties were returned from the combat support hospital to the Replacement Regulating Detachment (RRD) as hospital returnees. They were then returned to their squadrons.

Lessons Learned

Even in peacetime, with a comparatively long time to plan and coordinate the operation, there were lessons learned during the exercise. They include:

• Provide adequate admin/log communications from subordinate units to the echelon ALC and RTF headquarters. Use relay sites if excessive distances are involved. This helps in the ascertaining of logistical requirements, (major assemblies, Class IX, etc.) prior to closure into the reconstitution site. The sooner a RTF knows what the requirements are, the sooner requirements can be provided.

• Predetermine maintenance (Organizational and Direct collection points). (Trying to pick HET on/off load locations in the dark facilities hair loss by all concerned.)

• Orchestrate transportation assets between supply points to prevent lucrative targets when backlogs occured at the more time consuming supply points.

Caution and Challenge

This is by no means a complete list of techniques, procedures or lessons learned in reconstitution. It does represent the experience of the 3d SUPCOM in reconstituting the 11th ACR during REFORGER 85. In combat, the psychological state of soldiers is as important as their physical condition and numbers. Training and unit esprit play important parts in reconstitution that were not part of the REFORGER 85 exercise. Can your unit meet the challenge of reconstitution? If so, tell us; we want to observe your system and pass it on to the Army.

CLEARING INDIRECT FIRES IN THE REAR

The use of indirect fires in the rear area is one of the most responsive means available to a commander to rapidly engage a high level threat that could disrupt overall operations. Exercises have shown that it is critical to clear fires in the rear prior to attacking enemy targets. Failure to do so can cause casualties to friendly forces or host nation assets. The process of clearing fires in the rear is not addressed in detail in fire support doctrinal publications and only cursorily in FM 90-14, Rear Battle.

One means of facilitating the rapid engagement of targets, while providing safeguards for friendly forces, is by the use of fire support coordinating measures (FSCMs) found in FM 6-20, Fire Support in Combined Arms Operations. These FSCMs are as applicable in rear operations as they are in close and deep operations.

There are Differences in Use

The major differences in the rear are which FSCMs are used most frequently, who establishes them, and the restrictions that have to be associated with them. The authority to establish them must be given to the appropriate rear area commander who has an area of operation. Doctrinally, only commanders with an area of operation can establish FSCMs. (A base commander does not have an area of operation and, therefore, cannot establish a FSCM.) The following FSCMs are suggested for use in coordinating fires in the rear area.

Restricted Fire Area (RFA)

A Restricted Fire Area (RFA) could be established around a base/base cluster or along major supply routes (MSRs). The effect of the RFA would be no fires allowed in that area unless requested by the base/base cluster. This permits fires in support of the base without the additional step of clearing those fires with the establishing authority. This also permits fires along MSRs without closing the MSR to our own resupply and troop movement. The restriction on the RFA can be on certain types of munitions (i.e., no scatterable mines, or no Air Force 500 lb. or larger bombs with delay fuses). The establishing authority can allow the use of these munitions if they are deemed necessary.

No Fire Area (NFA)

A No Fire Area (NFA) could be established around population centers and critical facilities. This would prevent any fire into these areas unless authorized by the establishing authority or in cases of immediate self-defense.

Restricted Fire Line (RFL)

A Restricted Fire Line (RFL) should be established by the common commander of converging forces. This should be done when using a tactical combat force (TCF). If the tactical force is non-US, then the RFL will have to be established at the combined force headquarters that controls both the U.S. and non-U.S. force.

Free Fire Area (FFA)

A Free Fire Area (FFA) may be established around known enemy forces or planned around possible drop zones/landing zones.

How To

The use of these FSCMs in division rear is shown in the diagram below. In this case, the division is defending and an air assault force has been inserted in the division rear. The division's Rear Operations Officer has authorized the use of indirect fires by an artillery battery under his control. He has also commited a tactical combat force (TCF) to destroy the threat. (The diagram is not all inclusive of units in the division rear, but is designed to illustrate the detail with which FSCM planning must occur.)

EAC/Host Nation Interface

At Echelons Above Corps (EAC), FSCMs will require extensive coordination with the host nation and may in fact be established by the host nation. This coordination must ensure a common understanding of graphics and the exact meaning of the measure used.

Inherent Part of the Plan

The procedures for establishing FSCMs in the rear area must become part of the overall planning process. These measures should be routinely reviewed by higher headquarters, posted on rear TOC operations maps, entered into the TACFIRE system, and provided to the Air Force, reaction forces, and any TCF.

REAR OPERATIONS AND PERSONNEL SERVICES SUPPORT

This article by the Soldier Support Center was written for Personnel Services Support (PSS) units, but it applies equally to all units operating in rear areas.

All units in the rear area must perform self-protection tasks. PSS units don't normally do this very well. PSS Leaders must be tactically proficient in the planning and execution of the defense of their units. The defensive capabilities of PSS units are restricted by the limited number and types of weapons available. Using a Personnel Services Company (PSC), TOE 12 467L100, as an example, some key considerations to conducting successful base defense are:

The Threat

A PSC is a target for intelligence collection efforts. PSS units normally have available to them information (on at least division level) regarding their supported units' task organizations, locations, and strengths. There are numerous agents already positioned throughout Western Europe. There will also be significant numbers of SPETZNAZ type forces and the reconnaissance units of motorized rifle/tank divisions and regiments in our rear areas. The primary focus of all these forces is the collection of intelligence. This includes intelligence gained by raiding installations and conducting ambushes.

Security Tips

• Persons and vehicles entering the base must be subjected to control procedures; e.g., positive identification/restricted movement near "sensitivity zones." They lessen the possibility of covert intelligence collection.

• Specified points of entry and exit into your base (wooded area or city block) must be established and entry or exit at any other location prevented.

• Crew-served weapons support (M60 machineguns) must be provided at each point of entry or exit. Entry/exit points are the most likely to be attacked.

• Establish a centrally located "on order" reaction force with radio communications capability if possible (example PSC only has two AN/VRC-46 radios).

• Provide wire communications to critical points (entry/exit, LP/OP, and crew served weapon positions) around the perimeter.

• Perimeter security positions must be well prepared, camouflaged, and positioned to detect any enemy activities on or adjacent to perimeter boundaries. FM 21-75 and FM 90-10-1 give guidelines for field and urban terrain.

• Guards should not be obvious to outside observers.

• Rehearse your security plans and reaction forces repeatedly.

Training Tips

• When you start to train your unit for self-defense, there is a lot to be said for the philosophy of "every soldier a rifleman." FM 7-70 gives the basics of light infantry platoon and squad operations (the example PSC has roughly the strength of two light infantry platoons). FC 7-15 establishes battle drills for light squads and platoons. The Common Task and Infantry Soldier's Manuals should be the basis for tactical training.

• Train yourself and subordinate leaders in the fundamentals of terrain analysis, site selection, and preparation of defensive positions in urban and field locations.

• Understand the capabilities and employment of your assigned organic weapons (M-16s, M-203s, M-60s, M-249s) and other systems which may reasonably become available to the unit during operations (i.e., M72A2 LAWs, M202s, AT and AP mines, etc.).

• DA Cir 350-85-4 gives standards in weapons training. Demand crew and individual weapons proficiency. Their lives depend on it. Work weapons qualification into tactical exercises; don't just go to the range and qualify.

Security Versus Mission Requirements

Resources (approximately 20% or 16 personnel from the example PSC) will be required on a full-time basis to meet minimum security requirements. (Two shifts consisting of a guard and M-60 team [loader and gunner] for the entry/exit points and one, two-man LP/OP.) PSS commanders have to prioritize PSS functions to insure that critical strength accounting and replacement operations are performed in addition to self-defense. You have to do both. There are no security companies to pull bunker duty on the perimeter. The key is to train PSS units to function as they will fight.

MOVEMENT CONTROL

Could you take a brigade or division that is currently attacking east, break contact with the enemy, resupply it, move it over multiple routes 100 KM to the north, and immediately commit it to a counterattack into the flanks of a major enemy force in less than three days? Patton did it with a three division corps in 1944. For numerous reasons, the theory and practice of assemblying large forces and expediting their movement is fast becoming a lost art in the U.S. Army. Assembly and movement of reserves is one of the four activities that must be conducted as part of rear operations according to FM 100-5. Modern combat demands the ability to move and maneuver large forces throughout a fluid, nonlinear battlefield. Doctrine and regulations can prescribe conventional methods for the conduct of traffic control but cannot provide specific directions for all conceivable situations.

A Historical Perspective

During World War II, the German Army found a way to add increased flexibility to division traffic control. German commanders appointed an individual to act as a Traffic Regulation and Control Officer (TRACO) (not a US term).

The TRACO

The TRACO was briefed as to the commander's intent and over-all tactical plan and then given full authority to handle traffic control as he saw fit. He was able to quickly adjust SOPs and operations orders to rapidly changing situations. In addition to the MP type elements allocated to Battlefield Circulation Control (BCC), the TRACO needed signal assets, interpreters, and often engineers and additional augmentation by personnel from the German equivalent of our DISCOM. Situations in which a TRACO would be appointed were those in which traffic control was vital to the success of the operation (i.e., river crossings, rearward passage of lines, and major lateral movement). The TRACO was selected for technical movement control knowledge and tactical competence. (The Bundeswehr continues to use a TRACO today. He is normally appointed from the division's operations staff.)

Today to assist in control of their units and vehicles, the Soviets have a special traffic control company (3 Officers and 57 EM) in each division. The personnel of this company are trained traffic regulators equipped with distinctive black uniforms, white belts, gauntlets, helmets, signal flags, and wands. Before a march they are positioned along the march routes at critical points such as turns, intersections, chokepoints, and control points to direct column movements. Use of these traffic regulators permits less reliance on radio communications. Using such personnel, the Czechoslovakian Army put two tank regiments across a river in less than 45 minutes during DRUZHBA 86.

Today's Choice

There is a requirement for a unit movement czar within U.S. divisions and corps. In combat, divisions are faced with situations in which traffic control is vital to successful execution of operations. Current responsibility for movement is diffused between the operators and logisticians. We need standardization. Movements or reserves should be the responsibility of the echelon's rear TOC. The Division Transportation Officer is an obvious choice to perform the TRACO's function today. CALL would appreciate your ideas and help in identifying the techniques and procedures you use in moving large units during your FTXs.

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