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In CALL Bulletin No. 1-86, we discussed the problems of the divisional MI battalion being overwhelmed with EPW, refugees, and displaced persons. In response to that issue, we received an after action report of a two-week exercise conducted by the 105th Military Intelligence Battalion (CEWI) 5th Infantry Division (Mech). In this exercise, the Interrogation Prisoner of War (IPW) section received approximately 100 Enemy Prisoners of War (EPW) each day. It is fully understood that, doctrinally, additional IPW teams from higher echelons will augment the division's capability. However, even with these assets the situation could get quickly out of hand if large numbers of EPW are taken.

Doctrinal Guidance: Screen Them All?

FM 30-15, Intelligence Interrogation (para 3-23), states that "each detainee reports to an initial screener who questions . . .", implying that all EPW must be screened. Furthering the problem, directing organic efforts to either EPW or captured enemy documents (CED) is addressed both in FC 34-116 (para 4-2), Interrogation Operations, and FC 34-52 (pg 4-9 and 10), Intelligence Interrogation. Neither document gives clear guidance on how to decide whether to screen and interrogate selected personnel or to exploit CED. Both circulars do state that if CED cannot be exploited due to volume or type, they should be evacuated to the next higher echelon.

The IPW section found it impossible to screen every EPW and still be able to identify and interrogate those with the more important intelligence information. The problem was then how to quickly select the most productive EPW to interrogate, and report the obtained information to the proper staff elements. Additionally, a decision would have to be made on how to handle CED.

Who to Screen?

The solution to the EPW problem was to screen according to rank/duty position. This was based on the Soviet practice of only permitting selected individuals to have in-depth knowledge of the current operation. Company Commanders, Platoon Leaders, their Radio/Telephone Operators and Drivers, and First Sergeants were selected based on their exposure to unit operations plans, command posts, radio/telephone traffic, and the location of units at all echelons. Obviously, the individuals selected would vary according to the makeup of the EPW population. The Senior Interrogator had to constantly monitor the incoming EPW to ensure that high payoff EPW were not "lost in the crowd."

Captured Enemy Documents (CED)

The IPW section could not screen/interrogate EPW and exploit CED simultaneously. The 105th MI Bn decided to scan selected CED (maps, OPORD, etc.) for intelligence information (training with Soviet graphics is important to the process), and concentrate on the more perishable EPW information. Information missed in the initial scanning of CED can be obtained at the next higher echelon while EPW information must be obtained as soon as possible. This validates the concept for CED evacuation outlined in FC 34-116 and FC 34-52.

Several Cautions

These procedures maximize the amount of intelligence information obtained with the time and resources available. Several reminders are in order. First, the prioritization of effort must be based on the priority information requirements. Second, once the enemy catches on to the prioritization technique being used, all EPW may declare that they are rifleman, making it more difficult to find the high payoff individuals. Lastly, different criteria may apply outside of a European environment (such as in a LIC or other contingency operations).

Our thanks to the 105th MI Bn (CEWI) for sharing this information with us.

BRIGADE SUPPORT AREA SECURITY

Since the publication of the Brigade Support Area (BSA) security article in CALL Bulletin No. 1-86 (pg 9) in July 1986, TRADOC schools have been directed to align doctrinal manuals with the way heavy brigades are operating in the field. Future TRADOC publications will designate the Forward Support Battalion (FSB) Commander as the commander of the BSA for logistics operations and security. The Cdr, TRADOC, during the March 1987 Tactical Seminar conducted at Ft Leavenworth, stated that during field operations, the FSB Commander is to the Brigade Commander as the DISCOM Commander is to the Division Commander, a principle subordinate commander.

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