Military

How do we synchronize the logistical effort throughout the depth and breadth of the battle space? Who needs what? When do they need it? Where do they want it? When will it arrive at the brigade support area (BSA)? Who will move it? These are but a few questions that logisticians deal with while supporting a brigade combat team (BCT) at the National Training Center (NTC). Most support operations officers have a good understanding of how they want to accomplish this task, but many quickly become overwhelmed with daily missions and lose track of future operations. A support operations officer is pulled in many different directions. There are the maintenance and BSA tenant meetings, combat service support (CSS) rehearsals, and the late night planning sessions at the brigade tactical operations center (TOC). Each of these events is critical in coordinating the logistics effort. To be successful, however, a support operations officer must balance his time between planning future operations, preparing for the next mission, and executing daily operations. He must have the tools and procedures in place that provide the situational awareness needed to make decisions. He must anticipate changes and adjust plans accordingly. Logistics synchronization is tough work. However, when you prepare the logistics battlefield, understand how all of the pieces work together, and use available tools and techniques, the logistician can simplify this complex task and effectively support the BCT.

The Process

Most CSS leaders lose sight of the fact that logistics planning, preparation, and execution is a continuous process. There is no doubt that most support operations officers and forward support battalion (FSB) commanders understand that they must balance their time between planning, preparing, and ensuring mission execution. However, most are quickly overcome by the current mission and become ineffective in planning and preparing for future operations. The logistician must balance time and energy between planning future operations, preparing for the next mission, and executing support for on-going operations. To accomplish these tasks, logistics leaders must have the tools, to include but not limited to, effective and tested TACSOPs (brigade and forward support battalion FSB), synchronization matrices, up-to-date wing boards in the rear command posts (CPs), and current graphics and overlays representing maneuver, enemy, obstacle, and service support. Most importantly, leaders in the rear command posts must have procedures in place to fuse the information received and present it on a recurring basis to both decision makers and planners.

Pre-Deployment Planning

Planning at home station prior to deployment provides the foundation for all future operations within a new theater of operations. Thorough estimates provide the support operations officer with a starting point for developing the support concept. However, a concept of support is exactly that – an initial plan for how you think you will support future operations. FM 100-10, Combat Service Support provides doctrinal templates for each of the tactical logistics (TACLOG) functions to use as a starting point for concept development. Combined with the estimates that are developed during the planning process, the plan starts to evolve. Tools such as logistics estimation workbook (LEW), operations logistics (OPLOG) planner, and automated casualty estimator (ACE) assist the logistics planners in this task. Experience plays a key role in the concept development. Finally, unit tactical standing operating procedures (TACSOP) and external SOP are used to make the jump from doctrine to actual mission execution.

In most cases, we develop well thought out and executable concepts of support. However, what we fail to do is analyze how the entire process will function in its totality. In most cases, our concepts of support lack a sound logistics battle rhythm. The support operations officer must overlay logistics status (LOGSTAT) report timelines, unit issue times, unit re-supply (LOGPAC) times, and main support battalion (MSB) supply push times to ensure that requested supplies can flow efficiently throughout the battlefield. (See Figure 1 – Logistics Battle Rhythm).

In most units these procedures for requesting and issuing supplies and providing required services are SOP, but for some reason we change our business practices when we deploy. Changing the way your organization does business immediately prior to or during a deployment can and will significantly impact the quality of mission execution. Task force logisticians who decide to reduce the number of daily LOGPAC from two to one impact on the FSB as much as the brigade S4 introducing a new LOGSTAT format and reporting timeline upon deployment. Support operations officers and the logisticians of the BCT must make appropriate adjustments as the mission changes. They must also recognize inefficient operations or procedures that just do not work and make adjustments to the plan, as required, in order to make the system more efficient and effective.

Military Decision Making Process (MDMP)

Logistics representation and participation in the planning process does not stop upon deployment. In fact, it is essential for the logistician to be adequately represented during MDMP. A support operations officer plays a critical role and must participate at key times during the process to ensure logistics plans are synchronized with maneuver plans. He is the FSB commander’s representative in this process. As such, he uses his experience and understanding of the various TACLOG functions to analyze and employ available logistics assets in support of the current and future missions. The support operations officer must participate, if only during key events such as mission analysis and war gaming. All too often, the support operations officers become overwhelmed with other missions and delegate planning to logistics planners in the brigade S4 shop. Instead of being a planner, the support operations officer becomes an executor of someone else’s plan. The other by-products of limited support operations officer involvement in MDMP are incomplete and inadequate orders including service support annexes and CSS graphics. If produced, annexes lack specificity and executable detail. In many cases, units are not provided clear task and purpose and triggers for executing key actions are not defined. The support operations officer does not have time to produce service support annexes and graphics by himself, but his involvement in the process ensures that the details required in the logistics plan are adequately addressed.

Preparation

Support operations officers should depend on accurate and timely LOGSTAT reports in order to ensure adequate supplies are available to support the BCT’s mission. However, most unit LOGSTAT reports do not accurately reflect the status of on-hand supplies or what the unit requires to accomplish its mission. In many cases, units have no idea what supplies they have on hand in subordinate units but want more anyway. When done correctly, LOGSTAT requirements flow as part of the normal daily supply flow to the BSA. However, because we lack discipline in the reporting of unit requirements, we resort to emergency re-supply, and this becomes the norm. Personnel, equipment, and logistics resources are redirected from other assigned tasks in order to embark on emergency resupply missions that most often fail to deliver by line of departure (LD) time anyway. Although most units successfully accomplish their mission, inability to accurately report requirements on a daily LOGSTAT report desynchronizes the entire logistics effort and places undue burdens on the soldiers who are forced to perform around preventable logistics shortfalls.

The CSS rehearsal is the last chance prior to mission execution to ensure that all TACLOG functions are fully synchronized. The CSS rehearsal brings together all key logistics operators to rehearse logistics operations. However, unlike the combined arms rehearsal, the CSS rehearsal usually lacks rigor and detail necessary to flush out and provide adequate resolution. CSS rehearsals normally turn into war-gaming sessions because as part of the MDMP, logisticians do not fully integrate into the war-gaming process. They fail to question specific aspects of the maneuver plan that may not be fully supportable, or they fail to plan logistics support necessary to accomplish specified tasks. As a result, CSS portions of orders generally lack the executable detail necessary to synchronize logistics support. Finally, most units do not produce consolidated CSS graphics. CSS graphics, if produced, are usually handed out after the CSS rehearsal and rarely before logistics operators have begun to execute their missions.

Execution

Improvisation happens when logistics is not synchronized with the maneuver plan. To synchronize the plan, the support operations officer must first be an active player in the planning and preparation phases of the operations. He must understand current and projected missions. The support operations officer has to develop and maintain some management tools that will allow him to know what he has planned right now and allows him to look out and project requirements 24 - 48 - 72 hours into the future. The synchronization matrix is one possible solution. The synch matrix provides logistics operators at all levels a snapshot of all logistics missions scheduled for a specific period. It can show supply issues, receipts, key unit and support locations, and periods of time when support is not available. Most importantly, a synchronization matrix allows logisticians to look at known support requirements, integrate new requirements planned for upcoming missions, and adjust missions during the planning and preparation phases rather than immediately prior to or during the execution phase. When updated on a recurring basis and in enough detail for mission execution, synchronization matrices become the basis for future fragmentary orders and critical event listings in the support operations shop. The support operations officer and his supply and maintenance personnel can use the synch matrix along with wing board data to determine shortfalls in required support or determine when to request additional supplies for the FSB.

Conclusion

Logistics synchronization at the BCT level is truly graduate level work. We must begin to use synchronization matrices that take much of the guesswork out of the process. Even experienced logisticians fail to use the tools and doctrine available to assist them. When done correctly, commanders can use the synch matrix as an execution matrix. For the support operations officer and his staff, the matrix is both an execution checklist and a planning tool for future operations. The process of synchronization is never ending. Planners are constantly planning for future missions. Leaders at all levels are preparing their units and soldiers to execute the future operations, while someone is always in the process of re-supplying, maintaining, transporting, or providing combat health support. Support operations officers owe it to their customers to provide continuous, responsive, and anticipatory logistics in support of combat operations. They also owe their executors a well thought out plan that provides task and purpose and allows the time to plan and prepare soldiers to execute the mission.