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Most units come to the NTC claiming force protection as both a mission essential task and a training objective. However, despite this advertised importance, few units arrive prepared to protect their soldiers and equipment from unsophisticated simple Level 1 threats. Why is this? Because simultaneously conducting base defense operations and performing logistical support missions is very difficult. The primary function of the forward support battalion (FSB) is to provide logistical support to the brigade combat team (BCT) so keeping the BSA perimeter at 100% manning all the time is not possible. FSB operations officers must think outside the box and creatively balance their logistical support mission with their equally important brigade support area (BSA) defense mission. What follows are doctrinally based recommendations for effective BSA defense.
Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB)/Reconnaissance and Surveillance (R&S)
Probably the most important characteristic of the defense (IAW FM 3-0, Operations) is preparation and begins with thorough IPB. Most units hold the S2 responsible for IPB. However, most support units have only a junior enlisted soldier with little or no experience in IPB serving as the S2. The real IPB responsibility then falls on the S3, who is very likely a junior captain who only knows IPB from the one class at the officer advance course. In the end, IPB is reduced to nothing more than placing a couple of named areas of interest (NAIs) on a sketch or an overlay. The S3 then completes an R&S plan by assigning NAI observation responsibility to units within the BSA. What the inexperienced S2 and S3 fail to realize is that IPB and R&S are necessarily intertwined.
According to FM 34-130, Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield, IPB is a systematic, continuous process of analyzing the threat and environment in a specific geographic area. It is designed to support staff estimates and military decision-making. Applying the IPB process helps the commander selectively apply and maximize his combat power at critical points in time and space on the battlefield by determining the threat’s likely COA and describing your unit's operating environment and the effects of the environment on your unit.
IPB consists of four steps:
- Define the battlefield environment.
- Describe the battlefield’s effects.
- Evaluate the threat.
- Determine threat COAs.
Units conduct IPB prior to and during the initial planning for an operation and continue to perform IPB during the conduct of the operation. Each function in the process is performed continuously to ensure that the products of IPB remain complete and valid and that you provide support to the commander and direction to the intelligence system throughout the current mission and into the preparation for the next.
For the brigade/regiment rear area, IPB starts immediately upon arriving at the NTC and continues through the completion of the campaign. R&S is an extension of IPB in that it applies the unit’s mission (in this case base defense) to what was learned about the battlefield environment (terrain and enemy).
The following two principles of R&S are defined and discussed in FM 34-2-1, Tactics, Techniques, And Procedures For Reconnaissance And Surveillance And Intelligence Support To Counter-Reconnaissance:
- Tell commanders what they need to know in time for them to act.
- Do as much as possible ahead of time.
The R&S plan must be developed so it directly addresses what the commander wants to know. In essence, the R&S effort (as with the intelligence effort in general) is commander-oriented and commander-directed. Therefore, a successful R&S plan cannot be developed until the staff determines exactly what the commander needs to know. These items of information become the priority intelligence requirements (PIR) and are the start point for the R&S plan. The clearer and more precise the commander’s PIR, the better the S2 or S3 will be able to develop the R&S plan to answer them. Common PIR aski the following questions:
- Which avenue of approach (AA) will the enemy use and when?
- Which fixed- and rotary-wing air AAs will the enemy use?
- How will the enemy deploy in their attack?
- Under what circumstances will the enemy use NBC weapons? How will they be employed?
- What effects of weather provide a key advantage or disadvantage to you or the enemy?
- Where is the enemy artillery?
The commander, with the help of the staff, focuses PIR on exactly what will determine the outcome of the battle. To better focus R&S efforts, keep PIR down to a manageable number. Normally, a unit can only concentrate on three or four at any one time.
To become proficient in the IPB/R&S process the BSA staff should deliberately train on IPB and R&S development at home station. Focus on the establishment of NAIs, the threat COAs, and position listening post (LP)/observation posts (OPs) and patrols to collect information from all established NAIs. Since all LP/OPs cannot be manned 24 hours a day (due to the logistical support mission) develop an R&S plan that has them manned during the most likely time for a specific threat activity to take place (based upon the IPB with detailed PIR). Develop detailed routes for mounted and dismounted patrols as required by mission, enemy, terrain, troops, and time available (METT-T) and assign to military police (MP), quick reaction force (QRF), or other available units within the BSA. Always request adjacent units in the rear area, such as units in the aviation assembly area and the division or corps support areas, to observe NAIs whenever practicable. Use all available assets as information sources, especially as ambulance transfer points (AXPs), maintenance support teams (MSTs), and convoys/logistics package (LOGPACs) move in and out of the BSA. Require all soldiers to check out at the FSB tactical operations center (TOC) prior to leaving the BSA for a briefing on threat and pertinent information requirements. Debrief units that operate outside the BSA upon return.
Competent R&S execution is the fruit of a good plan. The S3 ensures LP/OPs are manned when required and can communicate with the TOC. Additionally, units or assets tasked to conduct patrols have to be held accountable for executing these patrols. It is a common occurrence at the NTC for the S3 to believe that NAIs are being observed when in fact they are not. Numerous times, Level 1 enemy elements infiltrate the BSA defenses after moving through a supposedly observed NAI. There is a tendency for the S3 not to disseminate the R&S plan to all the subordinate units in the BSA, and they fail to issue a fragmentary order (FRAGO) on any modifications. Updating the R&S plan daily and briefing it to all elements at a daily meeting helps resolve this.
These considerations should assist FSB S3s and staffs in planning and executing an IPB process and R&S operation that will save lives and enable mission accomplishment.
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