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It is axiomatic that a battalion commander must place himself at what he considers to be the decisive point on the battlefield. The commander uses the characteristics of the battle itself to determine the point at which he can best bring to bear his unique set of personality traits, technical skills, and tactical acumen to facilitate battlefield success. Different kinds of operations necessitate different kinds of decision-making, and different kinds of decision making require different considerations in determining where the commander should place himself on the battlefield for optimum effect.
Effective battlefield leadership depends upon effective relationships. The commander is essentially the focal point of several important relationships that must be simultaneously functioning positively if the unit is to succeed in combat. The most obvious of these are relationships between key people in the organization, such as subordinate commanders and staff. Next most apparent are the relationships between units, such as that between brigade headquarters and the subordinate battalions. Not as visible, but equally important, are the relationships between doctrinal elements that must function synergistically under the rubric of battle command. The focal point of the synergy is the person of the commander himself. Consider the following excerpt from FM 3-0, Operations:
Command occurs at the commander's location, whether at a command post, infiltrating at night with light infantry elements, or in a combat vehicle with the decisive operation. Commanders balance inspiring soldiers through leading by example with the need to maintain C2 continuity. Even when equipped with advanced C2 systems, commanders carefully consider their personal location and its impact on their ability to recognize opportunities…Commanders at all levels locate where they can not only exercise command but also sense the battle. Sometimes this is at the command post; sometimes it is face to face with subordinate commanders and soldiers. (FM 3-0, June 2001, Para. 5-73, p. 5-18)
This article provides support battalion commanders some analytical food for thought as they determine which operations require mobile, forward presence and which require a more static presence in the tactical operations center (TOC). The question of battlefield placement for company commanders is relatively easy; companies are executing rather than planning entities. At the opposite end of the spectrum, brigade commanders have greater mobility than battalion commanders, enabling them to rapidly shift locations via aircraft or a choice of vehicular platforms. Thus, initial placement for a battle is less of a dilemma. Experience leads to an inductive observation that support battalion commanders struggle with the issue of where to place themselves because they lack a decision model for figuring it out. Many FSB commanders do not come into the campaign with a decision-making methodology for placing himself on the battlefield. Most merely drive around the brigade support area (BSA) during the battle, dropping in on the TOC every now and again, not really sure of where they can best influence the current fight or the next one.
Offensive and defensive operations require different intellectual foci, as the doctrinal offensive and defensive operational characteristics from FM 3.0 illustrate:
OFFENSIVE (para. 7-8, page 7-4)
- Surprise
- Concentration
- Tempo
- Audacity
DEFENSIVE (para. 8-7, page 8-2)
- Preparation
- Security
- Disruption
- Massing Effects
- Flexibility
Whether in offensive or defensive operations, the commander's essential functions are to visualize, describe, and direct operations using both analytical and intuitive decision making methods. Analytical decision-making uses a "process based on generating several alternate solutions, comparing the solutions to a set of criteria, and selecting the best course of action…[It is] methodical and time consuming [and] not appropriate to all situations…." (FM 3-90.3, The Mounted Brigade Combat Team, para. 3-5, pages 3-2, 3-3). By way of contrast, the same FM describes intuitive decision making as focusing "on assessing the situation rather than comparing multiple courses of action (COAs).” It relies on the commander's…"intuitive ability to recognize the key elements of a particular problem or situation, to reject the impractical, and to select an adequate COA to solve a problem" (FM 3-90.3, para. 3-6, page 3-3).
While much of the discussion in FM 3-90.3 focuses on the use of analytical decision making before a battle and intuitive decision making during a battle, the key distinction for the battalion commander trying to decide where he can best influence the battle is the type of operation he is mounting. Offensive operational characteristics simply are more intuitive and defensive operational characteristics are more analytical. Since intuitive reasoning depends more on observation, interpersonal interaction, and the ability to sense the tenor of a particular set of physical circumstances, offensive operations lead one to urge the commander forward out of the TOC. In contrast, the more deliberate, defensive planning make it more valuable for the commander to have access to the elaborate communications architecture, automation tools, and staff expertise in the TOC during the fight.
There is a relationship between the type of operation being conducted, the type of decision making the battalion commander is mostly going to have to utilize during that type of operation, and the battlefield locale that most likely will lend itself to best enable that type of decision making. One might argue that it is the follow-on fight and not the current one that is the key determinant in the FSB commander's location during the present battle. This notion is worthy of consideration, but the degree to which it is valid depends on how long the commander has between operations to plan and position his units for success.
Carl Von Clausewitz characterized battlefield decision making as a process of coming to grips with both a myriad of current events and the potential range of future branches and sequels that may arise from these events, admonishing future generations of leaders to remember that, "if the mind is to emerge unscathed from this relentless struggle with the unforeseen, two qualities are indispensable: first, an intellect that, even in the darkest hour, retains some glimmerings of the inner light that leads to truth; and, second, the courage to follow this faint light wherever it may lead." This essay is designed to be a small pinpoint of light on the path to battlefield success.
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