Military

At 0030 hours, 2 km from the U.S. Brigade Support Area (BSA), the guerilla team leader conducts his pre-combat checks to ensure his teams are ready for the night’s mission-- a raid aimed at the U.S. support element command and control (C²) nodes and the fuel tankers they are using to resupply the heavy U.S. forces encroaching on their homeland. The team leader never thought he would be able to conduct his rehearsal on terrain that overlooked his target, but since there are no U.S. observation posts in this area, he is glad to take advantage of rehearsing overlooking the terrain he will fight on. His only concern is the occasional vehicle patrol, but his security team has sharp ears, and they will hear a vehicle coming long before it arrives. After completing his pre-combat checks (PCC), the team leader conducts a final rehearsal of the plan, ensuring that his assault, support, and mortar teams understand the plan.

His terrain model enables his poorly educated but dedicated guerillas to understand the plan. His sniper team and a civilian sympathizer conducted a recon of the base earlier and diagrammed the locations of the main headquarters, the fuel assets (conveniently near the perimeter wire), and the locations of the U.S. heavy weapons. When the rehearsal is done, he sites in his two mortar tubes personally and ensures the crew understands their mission. When he calls for them on the American made two-way radio (using a different channel than the Americans, of course), they will fire upon their pre-selected targets until they begin to take fire, or he arrives and calls off the mission.

Little has changed in the base since the Americans arrived here five days ago. After initially establishing a wire barrier, they constructed a predictable arc of very shallow positions around the perimeter. The heavy weapons appear to be manned at all hours, but the waist-high brush on the south side of the perimeter should allow his assault team to reach the wire unobserved. Once inside the base, there is enough ambient light from poorly shielded tents that he should be able to lead his team to their targets.

His assault team’s mission is to penetrate the perimeter and place their explosives at the base headquarters and around any vehicle with antenna wires running to it. If they avoid contact, they will have about two minutes to place more explosives around the fuel trucks before their first charges detonate. The assault team knows that if they are compromised, they are to activate their home-made smoke bombs and yell the one word of English he has taught them – “gas.” He has seen the Americans conduct rehearsals for gas and has consistently observed chaos within the base.

The support team will establish a position on the southwest side of the base where they can cover the base’s main entry point as well as support exfiltration of the assault team if necessary. Their machine guns are trained on the crew-served weapons positions on this side of the perimeter and on the soldiers at the main gate. The machine guns and their two RPG missile launchers should slow any attempt at pursuit from the main gate and allow their mortar team more than enough time to damage the Americans.

With a final communications check, the team leader checks his watch and moves out with his guerilla force to strike a crippling blow to the unwelcome invaders.

BSA Defense

This scenario occurs too often at the National Training Center, and if not for the heavy-force combat focus here at the NTC, brigade after brigade would be forced to go back to the military decision making process (MDMP) drawing board to adjust the plan based on the loss of critical assets to small, wily guerilla forces. But the scenario itself is not unique to NTC. The brigade support area (BSA) has too large a footprint to rely on passive defense measures for protection, but because the BSA units conduct such personnel-intensive missions, the BSA is unable to fully commit to an active defense. This makes proper planning and execution of the BSA defense critical.

The mission of BSA defense is just that -- an implied task the BSA must accomplish in order to accomplish its specified tasks. Planning for the defense mirrors the MDMP, beginning with mission analysis and ending with the execution and supervision of the mission. In the mission analysis phase, the S3 section must first take account of the BSA’s defensive assets as well as its shortcomings. These include but are not limited to crew-served weapons, anti-tank weapons, claymores, pyrotechnics, communication assets, vision enhancing equipment, Class IV and V stocks, engineer assets, and armored vehicles. In coordination with the S2, the S3 must determine how to best employ these assets given the terrain and the enemy’s suspected courses of action. Rather than attempting to define a one-size-fits-all BSA defensive plan, this article will focus on the fundamentals of BSA defense that leaders can apply to their unique situation. The narrative identifies many of the areas where rotational units demonstrate weakness at the National Training Center and addresses the roles of the S2 and S3 in planning and executing the defense. Observer/Controllers at the National Training Center have identified the following issues as consistent weaknesses for forward support battalions establishing their defense:

• Intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) not done to standard.
• Poor execution/supervision of the reconnaissance and surveillance plan.
• NCOs at the unit level are not enforcing the standard for fighting positions and concertina wire obstacles.
• Unit’s fail to cross talk with adjacent bases and fully utilize available assets within the BSA.
• The BSA commander and S2/3 rarely walk the line to ensure the perimeter is constructed in accordance with the unit’s tactical standing operating procedures (TACSOP).

The S2’s IPB: Where and How Will the Enemy Attack?

The S2’s intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) is the key to establishing an effective defense. The importance of a thorough IPB cannot be overstated. It cannot be a re-brief of the BCT’s IPB. The rear area IPB must be a product based upon the rear area situation (enemy and friendly forces, terrain, weather). The S2 must conduct a mini-MDMP from the enemy commander’s perspective in order to understand him, his capabilities, how the terrain favors his forces, how he’ll react to a given situation, and what risks he is likely to take. Based on their capabilities and the terrain, the S2 must identify enemy courses of action which have a high reward versus risk ratio to impede U.S. operations. To the best of his abilities, the S2 must know the following:

• The enemy’s capabilities (formation size, weapon systems, communications, vehicles, night vision equipment)
• The enemy’s most likely course of action (based on their capabilities, the terrain, and their strategic goals, what can they do without a lot of risk?)
• The enemy’s most dangerous course of action (what action could they take that would eliminate our ability to accomplish either a critical task or our mission?)

The S2’s ability to accurately determine the enemy’s most likely and most dangerous courses of action (COAs) is critical to proper planning of the defense. Additional information on IPB can be found in FM 34-130, Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield and the article entitled IPB: The Genesis of Force Protection & Base Defense in this newsletter.

The S2’s Collection Plan

After evaluating the terrain surrounding the BSA and identifying avenues of approach (AAs) and key terrain that best support enemy COAs, the S2 must put that knowledge to use. Frequently, staff officers focus on trails and valleys that can provide unobserved AAs, but equally important is the terrain that provides observation of the BSA and can thus be used for adjusting mortar fire, sniping, or the identification of high payoff targets within the BSA. Once the S2 identifies terrain that would aid the enemy, he designates these areas as named areas of interest (NAIs) and develops a plan to observe or deny the enemy this terrain. To cover these NAIs, the S2 plans listening posts/observation posts (LP/OPs), patrol routes, and/or observed obstacles to deny the enemy a possible COA. These elements of the observation plan may not require continuous coverage if the enemy does not have night vision devices or has shown a tendency to execute missions during daylight or high illumination periods. Remember, assets to support the observation plan are limited, so efficient use of these assets is critical.

Software, such as Terrabase, can aid the S2 in identifying terrain that can observe the BSA, as well as terrain that can observe the NAIs. The most efficient use of this software is to backwards plan your observation posts: conduct a 360° line of site check from inside your NAI and the program will identify terrain that allows observation on that NAI, identifying possible LP/OP positions. Without software that allows a line of site check, the S2 identifies observation posts through a terrain recon or with a map.

Armed with an enemy and terrain estimate and proposed NAI and LP/OP locations, the S2 is now prepared to provide the BSA commander and S3 with information vital to the execution of the defense. The S2’s IPB process doesn’t end at this point though; IPB must be continuously updated based on enemy and friendly actions in the theater.

The S3 and the Development of the BSA Defense Plan

Armed with the S2’s estimate of the enemy’s actions, designated NAIs, and proposed LP/OPs, the S3 can now focus the BSA’s limited assets effectively. Using the threat estimate and the BSA’s capabilities, the S3 develops his plan to defeat the enemy.

Early Warning – the Support Unit’s Best Chance

Early warning is a logistics unit’s best chance to succeed against Level 1 threats. The S3 must take advantage of the S2’s terrain analysis and collaborate with him to determine LP/OP locations, routes for roving patrols, and use of obstacles to either deny the enemy access to terrain (dead space forward of the perimeter or a hilltop with good observation of the BSA) or slow their advance along an AA.

Based on available assets, the S3 develops an observation plan detailing the following:

• NAIs and what action or thing a collection source is observing
• Collection sources and their positions (LP/OPs, patrols, forward elements)
• Times that each source is active
• Units to be tasked for the mission.

Prior to issuing the plan the S3 should ask the following questions:

• Can an OP at night really observe their NAI from 2 km away with a set of PVS-7s?
• Can a patrol element positively identify enemy vehicles in darkness?
• Could they tell the difference between friendly and enemy vehicles during the day?

When briefing the teams, the S2 ensures that each collection element clearly understands the area they will observe, and then checks their understanding of the mission and their role in it.

The Two Hurdles to Effective Intelligence Collection

Slow Emplacement of Assets. Occupation of the BSA is an extremely hectic time for the S2, S3, and leaders. Too often the placement of LP/OPs in support of the battalion plan is overlooked on arrival. Because of this, units are often very slow to emplace their collection assets at the new BSA location, leaving an unprepared base with no early warning. LP/OP teams should move to any new BSA location with the quartering or advance party. In addition to providing the BSA with near-immediate observation of battalion NAIs, these teams can provide additional security during the movement and on arrival at the new site.

PCC/PCIs. If the collection elements don’t understand the situation or don’t conduct good pre-combat checks and inspections (PCC/PCIs), the S2 and S3’s efforts are useless. Does your TACSOP provide a solid PCC/PCI checklist for these elements? Commonly overlooked items for an LP/OP or patrol include: fill device for the single-channel ground and airborne radio system (SINCGARS), binoculars, thermal sight, and a map with the area to be observed. Does it include a plan for briefing and debriefing collection teams by the S2? Do the collection teams understand what actions to take when things don’t go according to plan (actions on enemy contact, loss of communications, taking a casualty)?

In addition to efficient use of internal assets, the S3 should spearhead the intelligence sharing effort for units in the brigade rear area. Aviation, artillery, and military police units, as well as corps convoys and signal nodes in the brigade rear area can provide the BSA vital intelligence to assist in defeating the rear area threat. When a collection team informs the BSA TOC that five guerillas were seen moving away from the BSA, does the battle captain know to ask himself who else needs to know and then act accordingly?

Establishing the Perimeter: Build It Right the First Time

An effective perimeter defense should include obstacles that are observed from protected positions with interlocking fields of fire. The trend at NTC shows units are not constructing obstacles or fighting positions to standard. This was best demonstrated during a rotation when an enemy raiding team was observed 50m outside the wire from a fighting position. Before the position could radio his headquarters and attempt to suppress the enemy, they had breached the wire. Because the enemy attacked quickly, they were inside the BSA’s line of fighting positions before friendly soldiers reached them. Unfortunately the hasty fighting positions provided little cover or concealment from an interior threat. On this night, the enemy inflicted heavy losses on the BSA and exited the perimeter without taking any casualties. Because the obstacle and fighting positions were not constructed and integrated properly, a fight that should have ended at the perimeter wire turned into a defeat for the BSA, resulting in the loss of critical equipment.

A determined enemy can breach even well constructed triple-strand wire obstacles, but it requires several minutes and the proper equipment to breach it silently. Soldiers on the perimeter can use these minutes to alert the base and raise the defensive posture. A wire obstacle not constructed to standard can be breached in far less time and frequently requires no equipment or can be breached by pulling out the obstacle’s pickets and using them to raise or lower the wire for infiltration. The enemy need not breach the wire to inflict damage. Are we constructing our wire at least 35m (hand grenade range) from equipment and fighting positions?

The solution to these problems is quality home station pre-deployment training. Train leaders and soldiers on the proper construction of obstacles, specifically the construction of triple-strand concertina and then enforce the standard through spot-checks and supervision at all levels. Wire alone won’t defeat the enemy, but if we build our fighting positions properly it will provide a standoff zone to kill him from.

Fighting positions within the BSA are another significant weakness observed at NTC. Leaders are demonstrating either the lack of knowledge or lack of will to have their soldiers construct viable fighting positions. There are exceptions to this, but they are few and far between. Too often a unit will build a large position for their crew-served weapons and let their other soldiers fight from 5-day old hasty fighting positions. Fighting positions should be in a constant state of improvement, and it is up to the senior leaders to enforce this. Speaking of leaders, where do we want them during the fight? Establish command and control positions along the line for platoon and below leaders to direct the fight. These positions should have frontal, side, and overhead cover, in addition to radio or wire communications with higher headquarters. The more you sweat in training, the less you bleed in war.

Whoever Dies With the Most Toys…Loses

The BSA has numerous assets available to support the defense of the base. During mission analysis, the S3 should have identified available weapon systems and capabilities in the BSA and ways to leverage these assets in support of the defense:

• Field Artillery. Have we used the service battery commander and staff to plan and register targets for the BSA?
• Engineers. What engineer assets are available for use in establishing the BSA defense?
• ·nfantry/Armor. Are there any assets from the field trains that the BSA can use for defense? Thermal sights? M1 or M2 weapons? TOW or mortar systems?
• Anti-tank weapons. How many AT systems are in the BSA? Have we established anti-armor ambush locations inside the BSA? Have we established and rehearsed anti-armor ambush locations outside the BSA?
• Trip flares and signaling devices: Are they on-hand and used in conjunction with obstacles?

It is critical that the leaders in the BSA understand the equipment available for the defense and how to employ it for maximum effectiveness.

Follow Up or Suffer the Consequences

As a leader, you are responsible for what your unit does or fails to do. Often key leaders on the battalion staff don’t plan time into their day to spot-check the defense by walking the line with subordinate unit commanders. O/Cs rarely spot deficiencies in the defense that a unit leader could not have identified if they had only made the time to walk the line regularly. When BSA leaders make regular checks of the defense with the company leadership, the results are dramatic--unit leaders take ownership of any shortcomings, gaps in the defense are addressed and sealed, and the BSA leadership can identify training deficiencies and trends across the base.

As night falls on the BSA, the S3 feels comfortable that his perimeter is sealed and prepared to meet the enemy’s likely threats. His LP/OP teams are in place and the day’s patrols had only two chance contacts with guerilla forces in a valley the S2 predicted they would use. Even without running into the patrols, the hill they were likely trying to reach to observe the BSA had trip flares and other signal devices on the paths leading to an area overwatching the BSA and would have provided them adequate time to move the QRF or one of the stand-by patrol teams to the hill.

At the evening’s BSA tenant meeting, the unit commanders closed the loop on the deficiencies the S3 found on his morning perimeter drive. It was the second night in a row that the concertina wire in the south had been partially breached. Clearing the brush back 35m from the wire should discourage anyone from trying to breach that area again. Tonight’s QRF assembly and movement rehearsals along with tomorrow’s anti-armor ambush rehearsals should shake out the last few kinks in their plan prior to the BCT’s defense and ensure they’re ready for whatever comes their way.