COMBAT
SERVICE SUPPORT BOS
(Trends
are numbered sequentially for cross-reference and are not
in
any priority order.)
Positive
Performance
TREND
1
SUBJECT:
Company Maintenance Team
OBSERVATION
(Mech): Attaching a habitual company maintenance team to the airborne/air assault/antitank
company provides forward repair and recovery capability.
DISCUSSION:
Battalion
maintenance sections that attach a two-man maintenance contact team (on a cargo
HMMWV with tools and some parts) to D Company, can ensure "repair and recovery
are completed as far forward as possible and at the lowest capable echelon."
FM
7-20,
The
Infantry Battalion,
pg. 8-15. This habitual company maintenance team is always immediately available
to the company to verify and assess all faults found on its vehicles. Many
of these vehicles are repaired and returned as mission capable well within
the standard two-hour timeline for on-site repairs. SUSTAINMENT
TECHNIQUE:
Employ
the concept of using a dedicated, habitual slice company maintenance team attached
to AT D Company during tactical operations. The purpose of this team must be
"to provide a quick-fix capability for those items that can be repaired in
less than two hours and recovery capability for those items requiring more
extensive repairs." (FM
71-123,
Tactics
and Techniques for Combined Arms Heavy Forces: Armored Brigade, Battalion Task
Force, and Company Team,
pg. 8-33).
(TA.7.3.2
Fix/Maintain Equipment)
TREND
2
SUBJECT:
Preventive Maintenance Checks and Services (PMCS)
OBSERVATION
(Mech): Operator PMCS of weapon systems is normally conducted daily in the
light task force/battalion.
DISCUSSION:
The
operators of the battalion/task force's weapon systems conduct PMCS a minimum
of once daily. O/Cs observed that few maintenance faults occurred due to a
lack of proper PMCS. This is a strong example of "preventive" maintenance.
SUSTAINMENT
TECHNIQUES:
Leaders
throughout the task force need to reinforce to their soldiers the tangible
benefits of conducting a proper PMCS in accordance with their operator TMs
at least once daily.
(TA.7.3.2.1
Perform Preventive Maintenance)
TREND
3
SUBJECT:
Medical Personnel Clinical Application and Protocol
OBSERVATION
(Mech): Company/team medical personnel demonstrate outstanding clinical skills
and apply treatment to standard.
DISCUSSION:
Field
medical cards (DD Form 1380) are usually initiated properly. Triage and site
management improves with each mission. SUSTAINMENT
TECHNIQUE:
Sustain
EMT-level medical training and incorporate assigned physician's assistants
when applicable.
(TA.7.4.4.1
Provide Medical Treatment)
Needs
Emphasis
TREND
1
SUBJECT:
Light Engineer Platoon Integration into the Light Infantry Task Force (TF)
Logistics and Maintenance System
OBSERVATION
(Engineer): Most TFs do not adequately support the light engineer platoon.
DISCUSSION:
1.
Engineer platoons during heavy/light rotations are normally attached to the
light infantry TF for the duration of the operation. LOGSTATS forwarded to
the TF CSS team are usually filled at below a 25 percent rate during LOGPAC
operations. 2.
Engineer battalions are not resourcing the light TF combat trains with mechanics,
tools, and combat PLL before deployment so that the TF can support engineer
equipment during continuous operations in a harsh environment. Average final
engineer platoon operational readiness (OR) rates are below 50 percent. TECHNIQUES
AND PROCEDURES:
1.
The engineer platoon sergeant (PSG) must be familiar with FM
7-20
and
the TF's tactical SOP (TACSOP) that pertains to CSS operations. 2.
The platoon must coordinate and train CSS operations on a regular basis with
their habitually supported TF. 3.
LOGSTATS and Forms 5988E must be submitted on a daily basis at the TF's logistics
resupply point (LRP) to the HHC XO and/or TF support platoon leader. 4.
At the LRP, the engineer PSG must discuss support issues with the TF support
platoon leader. 5.
During the deployment planning process, the engineer battalion must resource
the engineer platoon with an engineer equipment mechanic, a toolbox, and combat
PLL. (TA.7.3.2
Fix/Maintain Equipment)
TREND
2
SUBJECT:
Preventive Maintenance Checks and Service (PMCS) Standards for Protective Masks
OBSERVATION
(Engineer): Soldiers do not perform PMCS on their protective masks as outlined
in the technical manual and are improperly maintaining their protective masks.
DISCUSSION:
1.
Protective masks are dirty. 2.
Soldiers are storing items other than their mask in the mask carrier. 3.
No PMCS is being conducted. 4.
Most protective masks do have DA Form 2404/ Form 5988E stored inside the carriers
with maintenance checks conducted prior to deployment. TECHNIQUES
AND PROCEDURES:
1.
Refer to:
a. STP 21-1-SMCT, page 425, Task Number: 031-503-1026 (Maintain
Your M40 Series Protective Mask With Hood).
b. TM 3-4240-339-10 (Operators Manual For Chemical-Biological
Mask).
2.
Have soldiers do weekly checks of their protective masks when deployed to combat
environment as outlined in TM 3-4240-339-10, and identify what day these results
must be turned in to the battalion to ensure protective masks are serviceable.
3.
Identify soldiers that do not have -10 TMs and order replacements. 4.
Ensure that protective masks are properly entered into the ULLS to ensure that
prescribed unit level maintenance is accomplished. 5.
In the tactical SOP (TACSOP), address pre-combat check/pre-combat inspection
(PCC/PCI) procedures to be conducted at different levels of command to ensure
protective masks are being properly maintained based on enemy NBC threat and
mission.
(TA.7.3.2.1
Perform Preventive Maintenance)
TREND
3
SUBJECT:
Maintenance and PMCS of Key Engineer Equipment
OBSERVATION
(Engineer): A majority of engineer units deploy to NTC with non-mission capable
(NMC) VOLCANO and MICLIC systems.
DISCUSSION:
1.
Most units arrive at the NTC with the wrong operator level (-10) TMs or do
not have current changes to the manual. 2.
Leaders do not understand the specific mechanical requirements of these systems,
and do not place adequate emphasis on these systems during Home Station maintenance
training. TECHNIQUES
AND PROCEDURES:
1.
Engineer battalions should develop an aggressive maintenance publications program,
and leaders at all levels should periodically inspect manuals to ensure that
they are on hand and current. Data on the most current manuals is available
through the FEDLOG system. 2.
Engineer battalions should identify a subject matter expert within the battalion
for each type of system. That person should then be designated as the battalion's
"master gunner" for that system. With the proper support, resourcing, and close
coordination with the appropriate Logistics Assistance Office (LAO), the battalion's
MICLIC or VOLCANO master gunner can develop comprehensive training programs
such as company- or battalion-level leader and operator equipment training,
with LAO support. 3.
Battalion-level combat systems-focused maintenance periods, where inspection
teams are assembled and all combat systems undergo a thorough technical inspection,
can assist in identifying problems early. Most important is to have trained
leaders who enforce the standards. (TA.7.3.2.1
Perform Preventive Maintenance)
TREND
4
SUBJECT:
Manning of Light Engineer Platoons
OBSERVATION
(Engineer): The light engineer platoon is not sufficiently manned to support
engineer planning and current operations in support of the light infantry task
force (TF).
DISCUSSION:
1.
Currently, the light engineer platoon leader must divide his time between planning
at the TF TOC and supervising current operations within the TF's battle space.
As a result, the TF is often left with no current operations tracking within
the TOC, and usually gets little input from the platoon leader during the preparation
and execution phases of the mission. 2.
Personnel turbulence has decreased the amount of time lieutenants are spending
in platoons, and those lieutenants already receive inadequate training on the
planning process at the Engineer Officer Basic Course. TECHNIQUES
AND PROCEDURES:
1.
The basic course should increase the level of training on the planning process
to better prepare lieutenants to fulfill their responsibilities as TF engineer.
2.
The current light engineer battalion organization should be changed by adding
a TF engineer cell for each supported TF. This cell should include an officer
(preferably a senior 1LT or junior captain), an NCO (preferably a senior staff
sergeant with squad leader time), and two enlisted soldiers. If command and
staff functions were split in support of the light TF, as they are at the brigade
and heavy TF levels (engineer battalion commander versus ABE; engineer company
commander versus engineer XO), engineer operations would be better integrated
into the TF scheme of maneuver. 3.
Equipment should include at least one vehicle and two radios. Personnel and
equipment authorizations should fall under the S3 section of the light engineer
battalion.
(TA.7.4
Man the Force)
TREND
5
SUBJECT:
Casualty Evacuation (CASEVAC): Unit Casualty Reporting
OBSERVATION
(Mech): Unit casualty reporting is not to standard.
DISCUSSION:
1.
Casualty types/categories, method of transportation, and estimated time of
arrival are often not reported before evacuation to the battalion aid station
(BAS). As a result, the BAS may displace to a subsequent location without realizing
casualties are en route. This markedly increases task force's died-of-wounds
(DOW) rate due to excessive evacuation time. 2.
Casualties often arrive without DA Forms 1155 and 1156, which hinders unit
patient tracking and replacement capabilities. TECHNIQUES
AND PROCEDURES:
1.
Incorporate casualty reporting into the unit tactical SOP (TACSOP). 2.
Exercise the procedures during platoon and company lane training. 3.
Standardize MILES casualty cards and DA Forms 1155 and 1156 throughout each
task force. For example, name data must be complete and cards must be placed
in the first aid dressing pouch. 4.
Line company medics and designated non-standard ambulance crews must report
pertinent casualty information to the BAS prior to evacuation.
(TA.7.4.4.2
Evacuate Casualties)
TREND
6
SUBJECT:
MICLIC and ACE Operator Proficiency and Training
OBSERVATION
(Engineer): Too many engineer units do not understand basic preventive maintenance
checks and services (PMCS) procedures or operating procedures for their MICLIC
and ACE systems.
DISCUSSION:
1.
Many units arrive at the NTC with ACEs and MICLICs in a poor state of repair.
The operators do not understand how to conduct PMCS to standard on these specific
pieces of equipment. Units often neglect the MICLICs, assuming that when they
arrive at the NTC the OCs will conduct a PMCS with them to standard, identify
all the faults for them, and show them how to rectify all the faults. 2.
Units are not trained on the equipment and how to properly employ it. ACE operators
are usually new and do not understand the standards of digging a vehicle fighting
position or breaching a berm or anti-tank (AT) ditch. TECHNIQUES
AND PROCEDURES:
1.
Units must train at Home Station on how to conduct a proper PMCS on the MICLIC
and the ACE. Units must also ensure that they have the most recent TMs and
changes for the equipment. It will also help to cross-train soldiers within
the company on these pieces of equipment. Having additional operators will
build flexibility into the employment capabilities of the systems. 2.
Units should not bring newly-licensed operators on the ACE to the NTC and expect
them to dig to standard vehicle fighting positions. Unit licensing programs
at Home Station should also include proficiency training on the equipment for
the various tasks which they may be required to execute in support of the task
force (TF). OCs at the NTC have developed the following chart to assist units
and operators in understanding the standards for survivability operations.
These cards are passed out upon the unit's arrival to NTC. 
(TA.7.4.5
Train Tactical Units and Personnel)
TREND
7
SUBJECT:
Skill Level 1 Training
OBSERVATION
(Engineer): Units are arriving at the NTC with soldiers who are inadequately
trained in 12B MOS-specific and common Skill Level 1 tasks.
DISCUSSION:
Skill
Level 1 tasks include common tasks such as navigation; reaction to chemical
attack; first aid/buddy aid; and 12B combat engineering tasks, such as mine
arming and emplacement. The impact of these skills on collective training is
considerable. TECHNIQUES
AND PROCEDURES:
Units
should ensure the train up conducted prior to an NTC rotation includes basic
skills training and not just collective task training. Tasks should include
those that support collective task training and those individual tasks that
help the soldier survive on today's battlefield. (TA.7.4.5
Train Tactical Units and Personnel)
TREND
8
SUBJECT:
Development of Unit Basic Loads (UBLs)
OBSERVATION
(FS): Too often field artillery units are deploying with no developed or published
UBLs.
DISCUSSION:
1.
Battalion leaders are not aware of what they need and have not divided the
required classes of supply into battery amounts.
2.
The requirements are not part of the battalion SOP; batteries cannot properly
develop their load plans. 3.
Distribution plans are not developed; units have not identified what host nation
support they may need. TECHNIQUES
AND PROCEDURES:
1.
Refer to FM
101-10-1/2, Staff
Officers' Field Manual Organization, Technical, and Logistical Data Planning
Factors;
historical data; supply usage requirements; operations logistics planner software;
FM
8-10-5,
Brigade
and Division Surgeon's Handbook Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures;
FORSCOM
Reg 700-3; and SB 8-75 for guidance on UBLs. 2.
Units need to have a clear understanding of all classes of supply. 3.
Include classes of supply in the unit tactical SOP (TACSOP). 4.
Appoint an OIC/NCOIC for each class of supply. 5.
Deploy a robust advance party that can open all accounts and begin drawing
supplies. (TA.7.5.2
Supply the Force)
TREND
9
SUBJECT:
Field Artillery Battalion Rearm, Refuel, Resupply, and Survey Point (R3SP)
Operations
OBSERVATION
(FS): Field artillery battalion staffs usually identify R3SP requirements but
often do not integrate or synchronize the operation with the tactical plan.
DISCUSSION:
1.
A lack of discussion of R3SPs during the planning process causes poor site
selection and unsynchronized execution within the battalion movement plan and
logistics plan. 2.
The S3s give poor or untimely ammunition guidance, which impedes the S4's effort
to consolidate the necessary R3SP assets (CL III [B], V, survey, and LOGPAC
if available) at the correct time and location. 3.
There is often no effective timeline and/or trigger. The R3SP site often turns
into a refuel operation or unit distribution effort because of inadequate triggers.
4.
The required equipment and assets, although available, are not postured forward
to execute an R3SP. 5.
A typical R3SP location is along the brigade MSR in an open field with no concealment
and poor dispersion. 6.
There is poor coordination between unit advance parties and the R3SP site OIC.
This causes delays and confusion during the operation. TECHNIQUES
AND PROCEDURES:
1.
The R3SP's principle mission is to rearm and refuel the battalion, with secondary
missions of providing survey update for the M109A6 and linking up LOGPAC vehicles
(if possible) or required unit supplies. The R3SP is not the only resupply
technique. It is, however, the most efficient method to rearm, refuel, and
resupply a battalion conducting a deliberate movement. A properly planned,
prepared, and executed R3SP is the combat multiplier necessary to allow the
battalion to continue the fight uninterrupted. 2.
The S4 integrates and synchronizes the execution of the R3SP with the battalion's
tactical plan. 3.
The S4 should position the R3SP site central to the Paladin position areas
to facilitate rapid execution. It must be tactically positioned with good concealment,
as survivability is a primary consideration for site selection. Maximize terrain
for cover and concealment and ensure good dispersion of assets. 4.
The S3 provides guidance (ammunition types and powders) to the S4 with sufficient
time for the battalion logisticians to execute the plan. 5.
The S4, considering battery ammunition status, remaining mission requirements
(estimate), and the battalion's on-hand ammunition, gives guidance to the battalion
ammunition officer (BAO) who, in turn, begins configuring ammunition.
a. The BAO should focus on configuring pure PLS loads of killer
ammunition with the correct powders.
b. Special munitions (i.e., FASCAM or smoke) can be linked
up with the appropriate unit at the R3SP or in the unit location.
c. The BAO notifies the S3 and units what is available at the
R3SP to include ammunition types.
6.
The ammunition PSG configures the R3SP in the field trains and possibly stages
it in a forward location. 7.
Combat trains assets are for emergency resupply during the battle and should
not be used; if they are used, they must be resupplied, reconfigured, or replaced
immediately. 8.
Ensure all assets are assembled early enough to conduct a rehearsal. 9.
The R3SP site layout should facilitate rapid execution.
a. Establish an entry point, track plan, multiple ammunition
upload lanes, by-pass lanes for vehicles not requiring ammunition, refuel points
with survey control points, and a LOGPAC/supply linkup point at the exit.
b. Each element within the R3SP should maintain tactical dispersion.
c. The R3SP site should be set up to maximize the use of the
multiple assets and be able to conduct multiple operations simultaneously.
10.
The S4, CAT CDR, or BAO should be the R3SP site OIC and be responsible for
site reconnaissance, conduct communications checks, and establish the R3SP
prior to units arriving.
a. The R3SP OIC ensures the site layout facilitates rapid execution
of R3SP.
b. Batteries should upload howitzers from battery ammunition
vehicles prior to arrival, thus minimizing vehicles that rearm at the R3SP.
c. Batteries should transload ammunition from battery ammunition
resupply vehicles (PLS) to section FAASVs, again minimizing R3SP execution
time.
d. This also will reduce the ammunition burden on the R3SP
assets.
11.
The R3SP site OIC positions the refuel point after the rearm point allowing
simultaneous operations, e.g., refueling howitzers while rearming ammunition
vehicles. 12.
The recon survey officer establishes the survey control points at the refuel
sites to facilitate simultaneous operations. 13.
The S4 should position LOGPAC vehicles (if available) near the R3SP exit to
link up with their unit as they depart the R3SP site. 14.
Inclusion of the R3SP in the battalion TACSOP is the key to success. The TACSOP
must establish responsibilities, timelines, a pre-R3SP advance party link-up
checklist, security responsibilities, and a site layout diagram. 15.
The R3SP is not the only resupply technique. It is, however, the most efficient
method to rearm, refuel, and resupply a battalion conducting a deliberate movement.
A properly planned, prepared, and executed R3SP is the combat multiplier necessary
to allow the battalion to continue the fight uninterrupted. By determining
possible conflicts early, a commander can find solutions or work with the battalion
to modify the plan. (TA.7.5.2
Supply the Force)
TREND
10
SUBJECT:
Class V Resupply of Mortar Platoons
OBSERVATION
(Mech): Class V resupply of the mortar platoons is consistently inadequate.
DISCUSSION:
1.
During force-on-force missions, the mortar platoon sergeant is frequently unable
to integrate CSS into rehearsals or fully develop Paragraph 4 of the OPORD.
These shortfalls have a direct impact on the platoon's ability to execute.
2.
Platoon sergeants usually coordinate for support through the supply system,
but requests are often cut due to the lack of support vehicles. TECHNIQUES
AND PROCEDURES:
1.
Mortar platoons must develop a working relationship with their support element
prior to deployment. 2.
SOPs must be established, standardized, and designed to push packages of Class
V forward. 3.
Consideration must be given to ammunition requirements during fire support
planning. It is therefore essential for the mortar platoon leaders or platoon
sergeants to be present during planning to advise on the types and quantities
of ammunition that will be required. For example, in a defense mission (day
or night), sufficient HE and WP rounds must be on site. As such, the mortar
platoon leader and platoon sergeant must maintain contact with the supporting
element to advise on any ammunition constraints. The platoon sergeant must
facilitate this process over the A/L net. 4.
Include rehearsals of battlefield resupply of Class V at platoon level.
a. Use triggers to help determine when and where Class V resupply
will occur.
b. Push forward the necessary resupply trucks that are to be
under the control of the platoon sergeant prior to crossing the line of departure
(LD).
(TA.7.5.2
Supply the Force)
TREND
11
SUBJECT:
Supply Management: Tracking Supplies in the FTCP
OBSERVATION
(Mech): The FTCP does not track on-hand and requested supplies down to the
company level.
DISCUSSION:
The
inability to track classes of supply down to company level results in a failure
to request mission critical supplies and an inability to deliver supplies during
LOGPAC to the appropriate place on the battlefield. TECHNIQUES
AND PROCEDURES:
Ensure
the FTCP tracks on-hand and requisitioned, supplies at the company level to
ensure the proper quantities of supplies are being requisitioned and also to
ensure that when these supplies are received that they can be distributed to
the end user in a timely manner.
(TA.7.5.2
Supply the Force)
TREND
12
SUBJECT:
Supply Management: Logistics Packages (LOGPACs)
OBSERVATION
(Mech): LOGPAC timeliness established in the unit SOP and OPORDs are rarely
met.
DISCUSSION:
1.
Units are not meeting their established logistics release point (LRP) times.
LRPs are established late and 1SGs return their LOGPACs to the LRP site long
after the published return time. 2.
The impact of LOGPACs returning late is:
a. Support platoons are unable to meet scheduled bulk resupply
of Classes I, III, and V in the brigade support area (BSA).
b. The HHC commander and support platoon leader are unable
to establish a timeline that includes pre-combat checks/pre-combat inspections
(PCCs/PCIs) and an adequate rest plan for their soldiers.
TECHNIQUES
AND PROCEDURES:
1.
Units should establish a realistic and attainable LOGPAC turnaround time. This
will facilitate planning and proper execution of resupply operations in the
BSA. 2.
Ensure that subordinate units in the task force treat LOGPACs as a critical
event and have enough command involvement to guarantee the timely return of
the LOGPACs to the LRP.
(TA.7.5.2
Supply the Force)
TREND
13
SUBJECT:
Class VIII Resupply System
OBSERVATION
(Mech): The brigade Class VIII resupply system is often inadequate.
DISCUSSION:
1.
A push-package system via LOGPAC is sometimes planned but seldom used. 2.
There is no periodic resupply plan. 3.
Ambulance back-haul capability is seldom used. TECHNIQUES
AND PROCEDURES:
1.
The forward brigade/division medical supply officer (brigade/DMSO) must establish
clear guidance and policy for medical resupply. 2.
When the LOGPAC system is used, the higher medical treatment facility (MTF)
must track Class VIII flow and verify receipt to customer units. 3.
Medical resupply packages must be clearly marked. 4.
Class VIII coordination/requests can be conducted directly by the medical platoon
leader and ambulance platoon leader during mission planning and CSS/CHS rehearsals.
Between missions, recommend supply point distribution with the MTF. 5.
Company and slice element medics and combat lifesavers must be considered in
the overall concept of support.
(TA.7.5.2
Supply the Force)
TREND
14
SUBJECT:
Battalion/Task Force Management of Class IV/V Barrier Material
OBSERVATION
(Engineer): Units do a poor job managing Class IV/V material, and often do
not incorporate it at all.
DISCUSSION:
1.
This is the most pervasive CSS issue that directly impacts the engineer force
at the NTC. Brigade combat teams (BCTs) continue to demonstrate that they are
not able to construct a defense unless the engineer force on the battlefield
assumes responsibility for Class IV/V material. Engineers have an interest
in assuming the Class IV/V plan because they do not want to fail, and because
they need the material in order for their soldiers to get some training. 2.
During the brigade CSS rehearsal, movement of Class IV/V barrier material is
almost never discussed, and if it is mentioned, it is not discussed in any
detail. 3.
Under the current Army of Excellence force structure, engineer battalions can
take the responsibility for Class IV/V transportation into sector, management,
security, distribution, and emplacement because they have the equipment and
soldiers to do the job. In the Force XXI design, however, the engineer battalion
troop strength is reduced by almost half and it loses most of its transportation
assets as well. Force XXI engineer battalions will not be able to manage Class
IV/V barrier equipment for their brigades; they simply will not have the resources.
As a result, TFs may not ever see Class IV/V barrier material that corps' assets
push into their sector according to the brigade plan. TECHNIQUES
AND PROCEDURES:
1.
The maneuver TFs must manage the material required to construct the defense.
The engineer force for the BCT can take measures to ensure that this happens.
a. Procedures.
Outline responsibilities clearly and in great detail in the brigade tactical
SOP (TACSOP). Make sure that each TF's TACSOP mirrors that of the brigade.
This improves the TF's chances that they will be prepared to assume the mission.
b. Plans.
When the BCT is planning for the defense, write detailed instructions in the
"Specified tasks to subordinate units," Paragraph 3, in the main body of the
order. The
instructions will not be read if they are only in the engineer annex.
By
including them in the body of the order, the TFs are more likely to execute
the mission. The brigade engineer must ensure the BCT commander knows what
is expected from the commander's TFs regarding the Class IV/V plan so that
the commander may clearly communicate this aspect of his intent.
c. Rehearsals.
The XO of the engineer battalion supporting the BCT has the opportunity at
the CSS rehearsal to make sure that maneuver TFs understand and acknowledge
their responsibilities to coordinate with, move, control, secure, and manage
their IV/V point. If it was omitted from the order, this is the time to give
clear instructions. The XO has the opportunity here to look into the eyes of
the SPO, brigade S4, TF S4s and ensure they look back with confidence and understanding.
d. Execution.
The engineer battalion S4 tracks the progress of the Class IV/V mission from
the time it leaves the corps' or division support area until it reaches the
Class IV/V point or obstacle site. He has knowledge of both the tactical plan
and the scheme of support. He can provide oversight of FSB support operations,
and coordinate transportation assets in sector to ensure the right stuff in
the right amounts goes to the right place. He should also act as a coordinator,
contacting TF S4s to ensure they know what is coming into their sector and
to verify that they have a plan to assume responsibility for the material.
The key to the S4's success is communications.
The engineer battalion S4 must be able to talk to the key players.
2.
There is one key to success that may not be part of any doctrinal manual or
formal tactic, technique, or procedure (TTP), but seems to be shared by most
units who conduct a successful defense. The engineer battalion S4 and the maneuver
TF S4s are on a first-name basis. The engineer S4 knows the brigade S4 as well
as the SPO, and they have already established a close working relationship
long before their arrival at the NTC. During defensive planning for these units
the brigade S4, SPO, and the engineer S4 develop the Class IV/V barrier plan
together (from information provided by the ABE), and execution follows easily
from a sound plan that all key players understand. (TA.7.5.2
Supply the Force)
TA.6
Mobility/Survivability BOS Narrative
TA.4
Command and Control BOS Narrative
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