NTC TRENDS AND TTP, 1&

MOBILITY/SURVIVABILITY BOS

(Trends are numbered sequentially for cross-reference and are not in any priority order.)

Needs Emphasis

TREND 1
SUBJECT: Engineer Understanding of Enemy Mobility and Survivability (M/S) Capabilities

OBSERVATION (Engineer): Engineer units frequently do not have a full understanding of the equipment, organization, and capabilities of enemy engineers.

DISCUSSION: The lack of understanding leads to only a superficial briefing of enemy engineer efforts and rarely includes the enemy's most likely location, timing, and method of employment. As a result, any plans to counter these actions are not resourced or synchronized into the friendly maneuver plan, and the commander is not prepared when the enemy uses M/S assets against him.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Engineers must conduct engineer battlefield assessment (EBA) IAW Appendix A, FM 5-71-2, Armored Task-Force Engineer Combat Operations.

2. Review and assess enemy capabilities, organizations, and employment as addressed in FM 100-61 , Armor- and Mechanized-Based Opposing Force Operational Art. These capabilities should be wargamed against the terrain and mission at hand to refine them from a doctrinal standpoint to a most likely method of employment.

(TA.6 Mobility and Survivability)

TREND 2
SUBJECT: Breaching Operations

OBSERVATION (Engineer): During offensive operations, the brigade plan does not adequately address the brigade's responsibilities for task force (TF) level breaching operations.

DISCUSSION: Brigades are having difficulty synchronizing combat multipliers needed to isolate the point of penetration and to achieve the suppress, obscure, secure, reduce (SOSR) breach fundamentals. While the assistant brigade engineer (ABE) uses reverse breach planning to task organize mobility assets and provide the required redundancy at the breach, the brigade staff does not adequately use the reverse planning process to determine the brigade's actions at the breach or bypass. As a result, many brigades are unable to set conditions for the fight prior to committing to the breach and are rapidly destroyed by the defending enemy.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Brigades can improve breach operations by conducting combined arms breach planning as part of the brigade Military Decision-Making Process (MDMP). The brigade staff should use the reverse planning process to allocate combat power, fires, and mobility assets from the objective back to the line of departure based on the templated enemy obstacles and expected enemy overwatch positions.

2. The staff should understand that a breach or bypass operation is always deliberate for the unit (company/team, TF, brigade) conducting and applying the breach tenets. The size of the enemy force overwatching an obstacle should drive the type of breach organization that should be used at that particular level.

3. Ensure that the brigade staff also considers transition to a brigade-level breach organization should the TF-level breach fail.

4. Improve the brigade breach plan by defining the breach organization in the brigade OPORD, and by specifying the brigade's actions at the breach required to achieve SOSR in a concept sketch showing the enemy, terrain, and obstacle. Discuss the brigade or TF actions at the breach as part of the brigade scheme of maneuver, not just as part of the engineer annex:

a. Brigade or TF initiates suppression/obscuration to set conditions.

b. Support force occupies support-by-fire position and provides direct fire suppression.

c. Breach force establishes near-side security.

d. Breach force reduces, proofs, and marks the lanes.

e. Breach force establishes far-side security.

f. Assault force conducts the assault and secures the objective.

5. Brigades, TFs, and company/teams should address their responsibilities to set conditions for a subordinate unit breach or bypass operation. The brigade staff should use the wargame to synchronize combat multipliers across the brigade to set the conditions for TF-level breaches or bypasses. The breach plan should synchronize combat multipliers such as artillery, CAS, air defense, electronic warfare, SCATMINEs, smoke, and deception to isolate the part of the enemy defense that a subordinate unit has the ability to penetrate.

6. Include a brigade plan for traffic control at the breach lanes or the forward passage of lines (FPOL) to employ military police for maneuver mobility support to maintain the brigade's momentum during the attack.

Depiction of Situational Obstacle Planning

7. Responsibilities by BOS:

- Artillery: isolate breach site and suppress enemy; CFZ management.
- CAS: isolate and suppress enemy, disrupt counterattack.
- AHs: isolate and suppress enemy, disrupt counterattack.
- IEW: identify directional find and jam MRB and overwatching MRC at the point of breach (POB).
- Obscuration (projected and generated): isolate the POB.
- SCATMINEs: prevent repositioning of enemy forces without hindering friendly actions on the objective; disrupt counterattack.
- ADA: isolate and cover the POB.
- MP: provide maneuver mobility support for FPOL, establish traffic control points, route marking.
- Chemical reconnaissance: force protection at the point of penetration (POP) and POB.

8. Both brigade and TF staffs should focus the synchronization of these combat multipliers during the wargame and rehearsal to assist in setting conditions for subordinate unit breach operations. Include breaches or bypasses as a significant event in the synchronization matrix.

9. TF plans should also address TF responsibilities to synchronize their own combat multipliers and set SOSR conditions for a company-/team-level breach or bypass operation. Synchronize execution by including the breach at the brigade, TF, and company/team rehearsals, conducting both walk-through and mounted rehearsals.

(TA.6.1.1.1 Breach Obstacles)

TREND 3
SUBJECT: Marking Breach Lanes and Bypass Lanes

OBSERVATION (Engineer): Light, airborne, air assault platoons do not adequately mark breach lanes and opposing forces (OPFOR) FASCAM bypass lanes for forward passage of lines (FPOL) with heavy task forces (TFs).

DISCUSSION:

1. Light platoons are not resourced with enough marking material to adequately emplace an initial lane marking system in restricted terrain for the forward passage of lines with a heavy TF.

2. Because light engineer platoons do not mark FPOL lanes for heavy TFs to standard, significant mechanized TF combat power is lost as units run into OPFOR minefields that the light engineer platoon had earlier identified or breached.

3. There is a lack of light/heavy integration and no exchange of brigade combat team (BCT) and TF tactical SOPs (TACSOPs) which show the initial lane marking SOP.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. During the RSO&I training week, the BCT must designate the standard for breach lane marking and bypass lane marking material and layout for mechanized traffic. Copies of the lane marking SOP must be published in a BCT FRAGO during RSO&I.

2. The heavy engineer battalion must cross-level additional marking material to the light engineer platoon during RSO&I. Light engineer platoons must bring additional lane marking material to heavy/light operations.

3. The engineer platoon must rehearse emplacement of marking material for breach lanes and OPFOR FASCAM bypass marking during RSO&I.

4. The engineer platoon must plan to push forward additional marking material on trucks or by sling load after they have secured restricted terrain while dismounted (i.e., AASLT operation followed by dismounted assault on restricted terrain objective) so they can upgrade lane marking and far-recognition markers for heavy TF traffic.

(TA.6.1.1.1 Breach Obstacles)

TREND 4
SUBJECT: Minefield Breaching

OBSERVATION (Engineer): Light engineers are often using inappropriate minefield breaching techniques.

DISCUSSION:

1. During recent light rotations, dismounted engineer platoons have chosen to "lasso" mines as their primary method of breach. This technique is essentially an inappropriate use of the airfield clearing TTP. While the light engineer company mission training plan (MTP), ARTEP 5-025-31-MTP, does not specify the method for breaching, Task 05-2-0111, "Conduct minefield clearing operations," clearly specifies detonation by explosives as the primary method.

2. The lasso technique developed for airfield clearing is too slow to be adequate for maintaining maneuver momentum as part of a combined arms breach, and light platoons generally do not carry adequate materials to use this technique on an obstacle of substantial depth.

3. Current threat mines are often magnetically or seismically triggered. SAPPERS moving through the minefield placing grappling ropes with heavy, metallic hooks around the mines are at high risk of causing premature detonation.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Light engineers should follow procedures outlined in ARTEP 5-025-31-MTP, FM 5-34, Engineer Field Data, and FM 20-32, Mine/Countermine Operations, for obstacle reduction.

2. The lasso technique for clearing airfields, which is designed to remove the mine without damaging the airfield surface, should be re-examined given the technologies employed in current threat mines.

(TA.6.1.1.1.1 Breach Minefields)

TREND 5
SUBJECT: Task Force Engineer Situational Obstacle Planning

OBSERVATION (Engineer): Engineer companies have difficulty planning and executing situational obstacles.

DISCUSSION:

1. If situational obstacles are planned, it is primarily done at the engineer battalion level based on the brigade plan. This typically results in critical countermobility assets, such as the ground Volcano, being taken away from the engineer company and frequently consolidated into an ad hoc platoon under the control of varying leaders in the engineer battalion from the S3 to an excess lieutenant.

2. Situational obstacles are not integrated into the task force (TF) plan or battle space and are less responsive to the needs of the TF commander.

3. The obstacles are frequently not tied to TF triggers and often are employed at a time and place inside the TF sector that does not support the scheme of maneuver. This situation frequently leads to an increase of minefield fratricides and to greater restriction of the commander, rather than providing him freedom of maneuver.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Situational obstacles such as ground Volcano or MOPMS should be planned at TF level.

2. If the assistant brigade engineer (ABE) identifies critical situational obstacles in the brigade scheme of maneuver, the obstacles should be listed in tasks to subordinate units. This allows the TF engineer to plan command and control, movement, force protection, and integration into the TF plan.

3. Frequently the engineer company assault and obstacle (A&O) platoon leader should command and control the situational obstacles assets. He is familiar with the TF plan and is able to position himself to best accomplish the mission. The unit can then attack enemy maneuver using a target (specific organization, not just "enemy"), location, and effect while maintaining its freedom to maneuver. This is synchronized by a set of triggers based on friendly and enemy actions. The final result is a situational obstacle plan that accomplishes mission essential tasks and remains responsive to the TF commander.

(TA.6.2.1 Secure/Select Location of Obstacles)

TREND 6
SUBJECT: Integrating Situational Obstacles with the Scheme of Maneuver

OBSERVATION (Engineer): Most brigades and task forces (TFs) have difficulty synchronizing the execution of scatterable mines (SCATMINEs) as situational obstacles integrated with the scheme of maneuver.

DISCUSSION:

1. Due to a lack of a detailed observer-trigger plan, many brigades employ SCATMINEs using friendly or time-based triggers rather than using enemy-based triggers. As a result, the brigade is often unable to effectively influence the enemy's maneuver or limit, modify, or encourage an enemy COA. This is largely due to the limited situational obstacle planning conducted by the brigade staff during the Military Decision-Making Process, and causes the majority of situational obstacle planning to be conducted by the assistant brigade engineer (ABE) and subordinate TF engineers after the brigade planning process is complete.

2. The ABE has difficulty developing an adequate situational obstacle matrix as part of the brigade OPORD and often struggles to refine the plan prior to the mission.

3. The lack of a detailed observer/trigger plan typically results in the early execution of situational obstacles and often results in SCATMINEs self-destructing during the fight.

4. Late dissemination of the SCATMINE plan across the brigade and a lack of situational awareness among units are the primary causes of minefield fratricide incidents during the campaign.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. The brigade staff should focus training on integrating situational obstacle planning during course of action development to improve synchronization with the brigade's scheme of maneuver. This technique will also improve integration of situational obstacles with fires needed to effectively influence the enemy's maneuver. The brigade staff, not just the engineer, should develop a situational obstacle trigger and observer plan linked to decision points in the DST.

2. Applying Targeting Methodology to Situational Obstacle Planning. To improve situational obstacle planning at the brigade or TF level, recommend that the assistant brigade engineer (ABE) or assistant TF engineer is included as an integral part of the targeting process and participates in the targeting meeting.

3. Engineers should consider applying "Targeting Methodology" as found in FM 6-20-10, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for the Targeting Process, to situational obstacles planning. This technique would include developing "Essential Situational Obstacle Tasks" (ESOT) similar to Essential Fire Support Tasks (EFST). An "ESOT" could then be defined as "a combined arms task to emplace and overwatch a situational obstacle that is required to achieve an intended obstacle effect on the enemy's maneuver." Engineer, field artillery, and/or aviation units would have to emplace the situational obstacle to provide the time needed to acquire and destroy the enemy with direct fires, indirect fires, and/or close air support (CAS). An ESOT would have to be accomplished to set the conditions for mission success of a combined arms operation or else the commander may be required to alter his tactical or operational plan.

4. The following technique is based on combining aspects of situational obstacle planning as shown in FM 90-7, Combined Arms Obstacle Integration, with targeting methodology shown in FM 6-20-10:

a. Determine the FOCUS OF OBSTACLES. Determine WHAT you want situational obstacles and fires to do to the enemy.

b. IDENTIFY THE TARGET. Specify WHO you want situational obstacles to effect and establish initial battlefield criteria (enemy and/or friendly) for employment.

c. Identify the TARGETED AOI. Specify WHEN and WHERE you want situational obstacles and fires to influence the enemy's maneuver. Refine using terrain analysis products.

d. INTEGRATE obstacles and direct/indirect fires into the scheme of maneuver. Develop essential situational obstacle tasks to specify the task, purpose, method, and end state for situational obstacle employment. Allocate and prioritize emplacement assets.

Task: Specify enemy formation, function of that formation to influence, and the intended obstacle effect on the enemy's maneuver (disrupt, fix, turn, block).

Purpose: Focus on friendly maneuver purpose and how integration of obstacles, fires, and maneuver will achieve a unified effect (delay, disrupt, limit, destroy).

Method: Obstacle emplacement asset and direct/indirect fires required to achieve those results.

End state: Quantifiable terms to determine technical parameters that will achieve the stated task and purpose.

e. TIME/DISTANCE ANALYSIS. Perform rough battle calculus to maximize the effects of obstacles and fires. Consider time requirements for situational obstacles: (T) enemy movement from NAI to TAI (M) commit asset (E) emplacement time (A) arming time (C) integration of fires. Using enemy movement rates from the NAI to the TAI, reverse-plan the time to execute and overwatch the obstacle from the TAI.

f. Develop OBSERVER/TRIGGER PLAN. Identify and position observers to link NAIs and decision points with triggers. Synchronize obstacle execution and overwatch in DST/execution matrix during the wargame.

g. Develop and disseminate a SKETCH to VISUALIZE THE SCHEME OF OBSTACLES. Include the target, task/purpose, method, observers, emplacing asset positions, and trigger to link the NAI/DP with the TAI and overwatch element positions.

h. Establish OWNERSHIP of obstacles in the sub-unit instructions of OPORD in order to specify responsibility for obstacle emplacement and overwatch. Use top-down planning and bottom-up refinement. Use obstacle control graphics to allow subordinate units the flexibility to refine the plan within the higher commander's intent and the overall scheme of maneuver.

Visualization of the Scheme of Obstacles

i. REFINE AND DISSEMINATE. Apply targeting methodology to refine the situational obstacle plan as part of the TARGETING MEETING. Disseminate the refined plan across the unit to reduce risk of minefield fratricide.

Decide: Verifies or updates the scatterable mine execution matrix with the current focus of situational obstacles.

Detect: Verifies, updates, re-tasks available collection assets to accomplish the observer/trigger plan.

Deliver: Allocates/reallocates/repositions emplacement assets to execute situational obstacles.

Overwatch: Confirms the element tasked to overwatch the obstacles with direct or indirect fires/CAS needed to achieve the intended obstacle effects on the enemy's maneuver.

j. REHEARSE. Include situational obstacle triggers/execution/overwatch as part of the combined arms rehearsal.

5. Improve ownership of situational obstacles by including execution and overwatch as specified tasks to subordinate units in the brigade OPORD. The ABE must include an initial brigade situational obstacle matrix as part of the brigade OPORD and disseminate a refined situational obstacle plan and consolidated obstacle overlay prior to the brigade rehearsal in order to improve synchronization and situational awareness. The brigade must ensure that all units disseminate the SCATMINE warnings across command nets to improve situational awareness and reduce minefield fratricides.

(TA.6.2.2 Emplace Obstacles)

TREND 7
SUBJECT: Engineer Platoon Survivability

OBSERVATION (Engineer): Light engineer platoon leaders are not conducting survivability plans to standard.

DISCUSSION:

1. Light engineer platoon leaders are not conducting survivability estimates based on assets available, time available, and the task force (TF) commander's priority of work for each unit and weapon system. This lack of preparation leads to inefficient operations that are not reported or tracked in the TF TOC.

2. Light engineer platoon leaders are not preparing a matrix for inclusion in the TF OPORD to show all TF leaders how many of each type of weapon system per unit are planned to be dug IAW the TF commander's guidance.

3. Most engineer annexes do not contain a plan for C3 of heavy equipment, a Class III resupply plan, maintenance support, or a rest plan for operators in the form of a timeline.

4. Light engineer platoon leaders do not leave a cartoon sketch of where and how many of each weapon systems per unit are planned to be dug in the TF TOC for the battle captain to update as he receives survivability work reports. Because the TF TOC does not battle track the survivability effort during the defensive preparation phase, the TF commander is never kept informed on a regular basis on the survivability work status.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Light engineer platoon leaders must conduct an estimate of how many of each type of weapon system per unit can be dug in based on A&B platoon productivity estimates, time available, equipment available, light and weather conditions, and the TF commander's priority of work.

2. Light engineer platoon leaders must communicate the TF's survivability plan in a survivability matrix IAW FM 5-71-2, Armored Task Force Engineer Combat Operations, as an appendix of the engineer annex.

3. Light engineer platoon leaders must write the C2, Class III resupply, maintenance support, and rest plan at the bottom of the survivability matrix with a timeline.

4. Light engineer platoon leaders must leave in the TF TOC a cartoon sketch of the survivability plan, with which the battle captain can update and easily brief the TF commander on the current status of the survivability effort.

(TA.6.3 Enhance Survivability)

TREND 8
SUBJECT: Company Nuclear, Biological, Chemical (NBC) Staff

OBSERVATION (Mech): Many companies do not have a trained NBC staff.

DISCUSSION:

1. Most companies do not have MOS-trained NBC NCOs, and the battalions seldom train and integrate the alternate NBC NCOs into the task force missions.

2. The SANATOR is usually maintained by soldiers at the support platoon and remains in the BSA during the entire rotation.

3. The operational decontamination plan at task force level is seldom rehearsed or resourced. As a result, none of the logistic assets that are required to execute the plan are aware of the requirement. The chemical officers (CMLOs) plot a few decontamination points on the map, but neither the SANATOR operator nor the 5,000 gallon truck driver know these points.

4. The CMLO does not speak to his company NBC NCOs during planning. As a result, chemical defense equipment (CDE) is not tracked, and NBC operations integration is never achieved.

5. Units have no system in place that ensures the battalion NBC staff and the company NBC NCOs exchange experiences and/or information regularly. As a result, the company and battalion do not work in unison to create an effective NBC staff. There is no effective cross talk between battalion and company NBC personnel.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Create a working NBC staff in accordance with page 5-3 of FM 3-101, Chemical Staff Considerations. NBC staffs at battalion and company level must:

a. Identify the NBC threats and determine if current chemical force is sufficient.

b. Monitor the status of NBC defense equipment in the battalion.

c. Monitor the status of NBC preparedness in the force.

d. Develop training plans to correct NBC defense training deficiencies.

e. Develop chemical support plans to support current operations.

f. Develop NBC defense plans to protect the force.

g. Monitor the NBC situation.

h. Monitor the status of chemical units.

2. A working NBC staff must:

a. Recommend changes to the plan based on the NBC situation and coordinate with higher headquarters for support as necessary.

b. Continuously update the commander on all NBC operations and remain technically and tactically proficient in all NBC issues as they relate to the unit's mission.

c. Create a program that ensures the battalion NBC staff discusses NBC issues regularly with their company counterparts via low density NBC MOS training.

d. Set clear standards for assessing and evaluating training based on published field manuals.

(TA.6.3.1 Provide Battlefield Hazard Protection)

TREND 9
SUBJECT: Unit Contamination Prevention Measures

OBSERVATION (Engineer): Unit leaders do not ensure that soldiers maintain the proper level of MOPP as ordered by higher headquarters.

DISCUSSION:

1. The Battle Dress Overgarmet (BDO) was developed as a permeable suit to provide protection against chemical agent vapors, liquid droplets, biological agents, toxins, and radioactive alpha and beta particles for a minimum of 30 days with no exposure to liquid or vapor chemical agent and a maximum of 24 hours once contaminated.

2. Leaders do not maintain or adjust the MOPP levels based on MOPP analysis, risk mitigation during force protection analysis, and risk management implementation.

3. Supplies and equipment are left out in the open unprotected with no barrier to prevent contamination.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Refer to:

a. STP 21-1-SMCT, page 343, Task Number: 031-503-1008 (Protect Yourself From Chemical And Biological Injury/Contamination While Eliminating Body Waste When Wearing MOPP 4)

b. STP 21-1-SMCT, page 376, Task Number: 031-503-1015 (Protect Yourself From Injury/Contamination With Mission Oriented Protective Posture).

c. STP 21-24-SMCT, page 5-46, Task Number: 031-503-3008 (Implement Mission- Oriented Protective Posture).

d. FM 3-4, NBC Protection, page 1-0 (Protective Ensemble) and page 2-2 (Standard Mission-Oriented Protective Posture).

2. Soldiers must assume the proper MOPP level based on the performance measures outlined in STP 21-1-SMCT. Training on this task can be incorporated into daily activities within the battalion at Home Station or during deployment.

3. Leaders must implement and ensure soldiers are in the proper directed MOPP level based on the performance measures outlined in STP 21-1-SMCT and STP 21-24-SMCT. "Implement MOPP" is a semiannual training requirement based on STP 21-24-SMCT, page 2-6, and can be incorporated into daily activities within the battalion at Home Station or during deployment.

4. In the tactical SOP (TACSOP), outline pre-combat inspections (PCIs) that must be conducted by the battalion chemical NCO prior to deployment, identifying no-later-than times this must be accomplished. This will ensure that all soldiers have their full IPE, and soldiers can be questioned on their knowledge of MOPP.

5. Establish procedures that will enable MOPP flexibility to subordinate units while not going below the directed MOPP level set by higher headquarters. Ensure that barrier equipment is utilized and outlined in the unit TACSOP to ensure needed supplies are not contaminated.

6. Train to standard, not to time.

(TA.6.3.1.1 Protect Individuals and Systems)

TREND 10
SUBJECT: Use of Chemical Alarms

OBSERVATION (Mech): Scout platoons routinely do not employ chemical alarms in their assembly areas (AAs).

DISCUSSION: None.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: The scout platoon must identify an "NBC track" and enforce the proper emplacement of the M8A1 automatic chemical agent alarm.

(TA.6.3.1.1.4 Employ Protective Equipment)

TREND 11
SUBJECT: Use of M9 Chemical Agent Detector Paper

OBSERVATION (Engineer): Leaders do not ensure that all soldiers have M9 paper attached to their MOPP suits, vehicles, and equipment.

DISCUSSION: M9 paper is used to confirm or deny the presence of a liquid chemical agent on MOPP suits, vehicles, and equipment. It also allows individual leaders and personnel the flexibility to upgrade to a higher level of protection and identify personnel, vehicles, and equipment that may be contaminated. It can also be a tool used by the commander to mitigate risks during force protection analysis and risk management procedures.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Refer to:

a. TM 3-6665-311-10, Operators Manual For M9 Chemical Agent Detector Paper.

b. STP 21-1-SMCT, Page 395, Task Number: 031-503-1020, Detect Chemical Agents Using M9 Detector Paper

c. FM 3-4, NBC Protection, page 1-11 (Chemical Agent Detector Paper).

d. FM 3-3, Chemical and Biological Contamination Avoidance, page 1-5 (Chemical Vulnerability Analysis).

2. Soldiers must help each other put M9 paper on MOPP suits and conduct buddy-buddy checks periodically to ensure the standard is always maintained.

3. Mark all vehicles, equipment, and supplies with M9 paper at locations where the driver, vehicle commander, or ground sentry can see it.

4. Identify areas where M9 paper can be attached to like types of equipment. For example, on the M998: 12-inch piece centered on the front and rear of vehicle, 6-inch piece attached to the passenger and driver mirror frames, 6-inch piece placed on the front and rear sides of the vehicle, two 4-inch pieces placed on the outside top of hood, and one 4-inch piece placed on the top of the antennae. This method would also provide a method of estimating how much M9 paper is required for the unit.

5. Set up quality control (QC) checks at the entrance and exit to the unit perimeter. This ensures that all vehicles entering and exiting the perimeter are marked properly with M9 paper, identifies vehicles that may be contaminated, and prevents the spread of contamination.

6. Ensure the unit tactical SOP (TACSOP) addresses the marking procedure in detail, providing graphic representation of vehicles with properly marked areas of all assigned equipment and supplies.

(TA.6.3.1.1.4 Employ Protective Equipment)

TREND 12
SUBJECT: Use of M256A1 Chemical Agent Detector Kit

OBSERVATION (Engineer): When tested on the use of the M256A1 detector kit, most soldiers make minor mistakes.

DISCUSSION: The M256A1 chemical agent detector kit is issued at squad level, so that every squad has the capability to detect and classify chemical agents. Solders' inability to properly use the detector kit reflects mostly on the training they received prior to deployment. Many soldiers only have the sampler detector ticket and are unfamiliar with the complete M256A1 chemical agent detector kit.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Refer to:

a. STP 21-24-SMCT, page 4-82, Task Number: 031-503-2001 (Use M256A1 Chemical Agent Detector Kit).

b. TM 3-6665-307-10 (Operator's Manual For Chemical Agent Detector Kit M256A1).

c. FM 3-4, NBC Protection, page 1-12 (M256 Series Chemical Agent Detector Kit).

d. FM 3-3, Chemical and Biological Contamination Avoidance, page 3-5 (M256 Series Chemical Agent Detector Kit).

2. The use of the M256A1 chemical agent detector kit is required training at the unit level at quarterly intervals as outlined in STP 21-24-SMCT. This training may be accomplished in any type of training environment and should be incorporated into all training that is conducted. Units should retain or try to obtain the carrying cases for the M256A1.

3. Once the M256A1 kit expires, it is taken out of the case and turned in, leaving the carrying case available for use in training (have your chemical NCO check the DRMO).

4. Ensure all soldiers are familiar with the operation of the M256A1 under all weather and environmental conditions as outlined in TM 3-6665-307-10.

5. In the tactical SOP (TACSOP), address pre-combat check/pre-combat inspection (PCC/PCI) procedures to be conducted at different levels of command to ensure M256A1s are serviceable and that the required quantities are on hand.

(TA.6.3.1.1.4 Employ Protective Equipment)

TREND 13
SUBJECT: Use of the M8A1 Automatic Chemical Agent Alarm (ACAA)

OBSERVATION (Engineer): Units are not employing the M8A1 ACAA to standard, if at all.

DISCUSSION: Units do not ensure that all M8A1 ACAA systems are emplaced correctly, do not correct deficiencies that are noted, and do not ensure that they deploy with the required amount of batteries and maintenance for the M8A1 ACAA. As a result, units are not alerted that a chemical agent is about to drift over their position.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Refer to:

a. STP 21-24-SMCT, page 5-51, Task Number: 031-504-3001 (Supervise Positioning of The Chemical Agent Alarm).

b. TM 3-6665-312-12 &P (Operator's And Unit Maintenance Manual For The M8A1 Automatic Chemical Agent Alarm).

c. FM 3-3, Chemical and Biological Contamination Avoidance, page 3-1 (Detection and Identification).

2. Unit leaders must supervise the positioning of the chemical agent alarm. It is the chemical NCO's responsibility to advise the commander on actual positions for the M8A1s and ensure that they are employing them doctrinally as outlined in FM 3-3.

3. Technical manuals must be made available for the M8A1 so that operators are capable of understanding how the system works, performing PMCS, connecting commo wires to standard, and ensuring the M8A1s are configured correctly.

4. The tactical SOP (TACSOP) must address the employment of the M8A1 once the unit occupies a new assembly area. This procedure should be practiced until it is automatic. A technique is to have the quartering party doing this task in case of a chemical attack during occupation.

5. Train on the equipment at Home Station.

(TA.6.3.1.1.4 Employ Protective Equipment)

TREND 14
SUBJECT: Task Force Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical (NBC) Operations

OBSERVATION (Mech): Task forces are not prepared to operate in a nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) environment.

DISCUSSION:

1. Most NBC staffs and task forces have a written NBC TACSOP; however, in most cases, the SOPs were not previously implemented or used at Home Station. As the task forces plan NBC operations, smoke operations, and respond to chemical attacks, there is minimal emphasis placed on NBC training at Home Station.

2. Companies do not consistently send up NBC 1 Reports to the TOC after entering the contaminated area, and do not use their M8/M9 paper or M256 kits in known or suspected contaminated areas.

3. There are often critical chemical defense equipment (CDE) shortages, such as M8 alarm batteries, MOPP suits, and M9 paper. The battalion NBC staffs often do not cross-level or order critical CDE even after they discover the shortages.

4. Task forces deploy without 54B NBC NCOs in many of their companies.

5. Most soldiers adopt the "run away" technique and become chemical casualties because they enter contaminated areas and do not don their protective gear.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Task forces must train using standard procedures:

a. For NBC avoidance refer to FM 3-3, Chemical/Biological Contamination Avoidance>.

b. For NBC protection refer to FM 3-4, NBC Protection.

c. For NBC decontamination refer to FM 3-5, NBC Decontamination.

d. For NBC defense refer to FM 3-100, NBC Defense, Chemical Warfare, Smoke and Flame Operations.

2. Task forces must staff their companies with NBC NCOs.

3. Units must conduct individual soldier-level NBC training at company/platoon level at Home Station to enable task forces to operate in a contaminated environment.

4. Produce and implement a workable NBC TACSOP at Home Station. Integrate the approved NBC TACSOP into all Home Station training events so that units are familiar with the procedures and are able to understand the role of the smoke platoon, decontamination platoon, and chemical reconnaissance section. Units must also be able to react to an NBC threat IAW their NBC TACSOP without losing personnel, equipment or the main objective.

(TA.6.3.1.2 Remove Battlefield Hazards)

TREND 15
SUBJECT: Chemical Casualty Decontamination Planning and Support

OBSERVATION (Mech): Brigades and task forces do not adequately plan for patient decontamination sites (PDS).

DISCUSSION:

1. Often, task forces rely solely on the brigade concept of support for all aspects of chemical decontamination, despite organic capabilities.

2. Chemical strikes are often predicted accurately and templated accordingly; however, graphic control measures, proposed sites, or pre-positioned assets are not established within the brigade combat team (BCT) or task force.

3. Triggers to establish the sites are not defined.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Establish and publish graphic control measures and triggers for PDS in the task force OPORD.

2. Divide chemical patient decontamination and treatment sets, kits, and outfits (SKOs) between battalion aid station/advanced trauma life support (BAS/ATLS) teams to allow greater flexibility and continuity of support.

3. Commitment of water assets to chemical decontamination sites is imperative for responsive PDS setup.

4. SOPs must include augmentees with responsive transportation to active PDS. Sole reliance on brigade support for chemical decontamination is impractical due to time-distance factors.

5. Update/validate TACSOPs with inclusive Home Station training.

(TA.6.3.1.2.1 Decontaminate Personnel and Systems)

TA.3 Air Defense BOS Narrative

TA.7 Combat Service Support BOS Narrative

NEWSLETTER

Join the GlobalSecurity.org mailing list