COMMAND
AND CONTROL BOS
(Trends
are numbered sequentially for cross-reference and are not
in
any priority order.)
Positive
Performance
TREND
1
SUBJECT:
Scout Platoon Leader Situational Awareness
OBSERVATION
(Mech): Scout platoon leaders maintain good situational awareness and are proactive
in requesting to move reconnaissance forces further forward on the battlefield
to support the task force's scheme of maneuver.
DISCUSSION:
Scout
platoon leaders monitor the task force command net and remain situationally
aware of the operation. Because of this awareness, the platoon leader is able
to continuously update the task force TOC on the location and disposition of
his forces and can nominate new observation posts (OPs) or missions to support
the maneuver forces. SUSTAINMENT
TECHNIQUES:
1.
Task force commanders have new PIRs that must be answered as the battle progresses.
The scout platoon leader's ability to maintain situational awareness and nominate
new locations and missions has proven to be very successful for many task forces.
2.
During an operation, the task force TOC often loses visibility of the scout
platoon. As such, the scout platoon leader must be situationally aware of the
task force's scheme of maneuver and the scout platoon's location in relation
to the maneuver forces. With knowledge of the task force plan and the commander's
intent, the platoon leader can nominate new positions for his forces to answer
the commander's new PIRs.
(TA.4.1
Acquire and Communicate Information and Maintain Status)
TREND
2
SUBJECT:
TOC Configurations
OBSERVATION
(Mech): TOCs have had various configurations, based on METT-T, which provide
the best environment for battle tracking and TOC operations.
DISCUSSION:
None.
SUSTAINMENT
TECHNIQUE:
Continue
to train and sustain the TOC configuration operation.
(TA.4.1.2
Manage Means of Communicating Information)
TREND
3
SUBJECT:
Mission Analysis
OBSERVATION
(Mech): The mission analysis processes are usually conducted to standard, primarily
due to organization and a focused agenda.
DISCUSSION:
None.
SUSTAINMENT
TECHNIQUES:
1.
Adhere to the mission analysis agenda outlined in FM
71-2,
The
Tank and Mechanized Infantry Battalion Task Force.
Do not cut corners during this step of the Military Decision-Making Process
(MDMP). 2.
Each BOS representative must be prepared to brief specified and implied tasks,
critical tasks, limitations and constraints, assumptions, risks, and assets
available. They should then list their requests for information (RFIs). 3.
Once the commander has heard all of the BOS briefs, he should give guidance
and focus on his intent for the particular BOS. (It is helpful to the commander
if the BOS representative provides suggested uses of their BOS to achieve the
commander's intent.) 4.
The commander should state his decisive point and provide guidance for course
of action (COA) development. 5.
Products that should be derived from the mission analysis brief are:
a. Restated mission.
b. Timeline.
c. Enemy COA brief
d. Focus for the reconnaissance and surveillance (R&S) plan.
6.
Using NCOs and junior enlisted personnel to assist in the process, particularly
the set up, will allow staff officers to focus on the "analysis" and save time.
(TA.4.2.1.1
Analyze Mission)
TREND
4
SUBJECT:
Signal Officer (SIGO) Understanding of the Military Decision-Making Process
(MDMP)
OBSERVATION
(Mech): The majority of all SIGOs have demonstrated a clear understanding of
the MDMP.
DISCUSSION:
SIGOs
initially plan within a vacuum in relation to other BOS elements; however,
over the course of the rotation this is rectified, and the planning is conducted
rapidly and thoroughly. This rapid planning provides valuable time to subordinate
leaders to conduct their planning and execution. SUSTAINMENT
TECHNIQUE:
Continue
to exercise effective planning and rapid assessments of follow-on mission requirements.
(TA.4.3
Determine Actions)
TREND
5
SUBJECT:
Commander's Intent
OBSERVATION
(Mech): The TF commander consistently develops and issues a clear and concise
intent.
DISCUSSION:
A
clear and concise commander's intent focuses the staff during the planning
process and enables them to understand how the commander visualizes the upcoming
battle. SUSTAINMENT
TECHNIQUE:
The
task force commander should continue to discuss his intent in terms of key
task and purpose. By doing this, he focuses the staff where necessary and provides
a common picture of how the battle will unfold.
(TA.4.3.1
Issue Planning Guidance)
TREND
6
SUBJECT:
Troop-Leading Procedures (TLP)
OBSERVATION
(Mech): Medical platoon leaders often demonstrate flexibility and proactive
support in response to condensed timelines and multiple changes in task force
orders.
DISCUSSION:
Medical
platoon leaders often develop and sustain an effective hasty orders/wargaming
process and modified rehearsal technique, which is clearly understood by subordinates.
PCCs and PCIs are usually conducted to standard. Medical platoons maintain
a high degree of motivation throughout each rotation. SUSTAINMENT
TECHNIQUE:
Sustain
effective TLP and incorporate formal process into unit TACSOPs and training
events. Publish timelines and critical tasks. Delegate responsibility to subordinate
leaders.
(TA.4.4
Direct and Lead Subordinates)
TREND
7
SUBJECT:
Coordination for Air Casualty Evacuation (CASEVAC)
OBSERVATION
(Mech): Coordination with higher medical treatment facilities and combat health
support (CHS) officers for aeromedical evacuation support is good.
DISCUSSION:
Medical
platoon leaders effectively coordinate and execute air CASEVAC to battalion
CCPs/BAS when available. Flexibility and anticipatory judgment facilitate responsive
air CASEVAC to Level 2 treatment facilities. SUSTAINMENT
TECHNIQUES:
1.
Sustain unit tactical SOP (TACSOP) and validate during all training events.
2.
Medical platoon leaders must consistently participate in brigade CSS/CHS rehearsals
for detailed coordination.
(TA.4.4.1.2
Coordinate Support)
TREND
8
SUBJECT:
Scout Platoon Pre-Combat Checks (PCCs)
OBSERVATION
(Mech): Platoon section sergeants and squad leaders are conducting quality
PCCs prior to receiving the platoon leader's OPORD.
DISCUSSION:
The
scout platoon NCOs normally receive a quality WARNO from the platoon leader,
allowing the section sergeants to conduct PCCs of their sections prior to the
platoon leader issuing his OPORD. SUSTAINMENT
TECHNIQUE:
The
task force TOC/staff should continue to give WARNOs with sufficient detail
to allow the scout platoon leader to issue a quality WARNO to his platoon.
This allows the scout platoon section sergeants to conduct PCCs prior to receiving
their OPORD and also allows the task force to expedite the deployment of reconnaissance.
(TA.4.4.4
Maintain Unit Discipline)
TREND
9
SUBJECT:
Unit Discipline in the Tactical Operations Center (TOC)
OBSERVATION
(Mech): The soldiers in the TOC are usually well disciplined and eager to ensure
mission accomplishment.
DISCUSSION:
Soldier
discipline and motivation in the TOC is usually high. Most soldiers are well
trained in the tear down and set up of the physical aspects of the TOC. SUSTAINMENT
TECHNIQUE:
Continue
to train and sustain soldier discipline, motivation, and TOC operations.
(TA.4.4.4
Maintain Unit Discipline)
TREND
10
SUBJECT:
BOS Representation in the Planning Process
OBSERVATION
(Mech): Key planners from each BOS are usually present during the planning
process.
DISCUSSION:
None.
SUSTAINMENT
TECHNIQUE:
Continue
to ensure a representative from each BOS is present and prepared to provide
the commander with their capabilities and restrictions for the upcoming mission.
(TA.4.4.5
Synchronize Tactical Operations)
Needs
Emphasis
TREND
1
SUBJECT:
Field Artillery Battalion S2 Coordination
OBSERVATION
(FS): Battalion S2s do not effectively coordinate and work together during
mission planning and execution.
DISCUSSION:
1.
Direct support and reinforcing battalion S2s and staffs tend to work independently
of each other. The two S2s rarely have a standard to determine what information
they should exchange or how to pass this information. As a result, there is
very little sharing of intelligence between the two sections. 2.
The battalion staffs normally conduct their orders processes simultaneously
but separately, causing duplication of effort. As execution draws closer, even
less exchange of information occurs. TECHNIQUES
AND PROCEDURES:
1.
Battalion S2s need to develop a list of essential items that must be shared
between the direct support and reinforcing battalion intelligence sections.
The two S2s must discuss how they will exchange this information. 2.
Rehearse the information exchange process prior to conducting combat operations.
3.
At a minimum, the following information exchange processes should occur: During
the planning process:
a. Reinforcing S2 attends DS FASP and rehearsal.
b. DS S2 passes all intelligence products to the reinforcing
S2, to include:
- Situation templates (SITEMPs).
- Decision support templates (DSTs).
- The intelligence annex.
- Radar deployment order (RDO).
- Reconnaissance and surveillance (R&S) plan.
c. Reinforcing S2 receives copy of DS execution matrix.
d. Both S2s understand the movement plan for the Q-36 radar.
e. Both S2s understand windows of Q-37 coverage and cueing schedule.
During
execution:
a. Both S2s have a common intelligence report format and schedule.
b. Both S2s understand radar reporting procedures.
c. Both S2s know who the radars report to and how they report.
d. Each S2 is an addressee for all periodical intelligence reports
(PERINTREPs).
e. Both S2s know who passes intelligence from radar acquisitions
to higher headquarters.
f. Both S2s know how control of radars is passed from one battalion
to the other, should this become necessary.
(TA.4.1
Acquire and Communicate Information and Maintain Status)
TREND
2
SUBJECT:
Tactical Operations Center (TOC) Personnel Understanding of the Task Force
Communications Plan
OBSERVATION
(Mech): Battle Staffs and TOC soldiers often do not understand the task force
communications plan.
DISCUSSION:
1.
Battle staffs and TOC soldiers are often not trained on what the communications
plan is and how movement of the TOC, following the initial commo plan, and
tracking the battle can enhance the overall "visibility" of the battle. 2.
Frequencies or net identifications are sometimes altered, or communications
assets (i.e., retransmission sites) are moved by other than communications
personnel during critical times on the battlefield. TECHNIQUES
AND PROCEDURES:
1.
All senior personnel (battle captain, operation's sergeant) must be fully aware
of and understand the communications plan. This understanding will enable the
TOC to maintain better situational awareness and enable an initial plan to
be effective rather than reactive. 2.
Movement of the TOC needs to be fully synchronized with the original communications
plan. 3.
Train the TOC personnel to understand the importance of integrating and adhering
themselves to a communications plan. The SIGO should reinforce the commo plan
with the battle captain and operations sergeant. 4.
The communications NCOIC should continually monitor and position himself at
the TOC to supervise the integration of the TOC with the communications plan
while the unit is in contact.
(TA.4.1.2
Manage Means of Communicating Information)
TREND
3
SUBJECT:
Battle Tracking in the FA Battalion Tactical Operations Center (TOC)
OBSERVATION
(FS): The FA battalion TOC is seldom able to track the battle and maintain
situational awareness.
DISCUSSION:
1.
The battalion often has limited means of displaying information within the
TOC. Few, if any tracking or status charts are developed. The product used
most often is the situation map (SITMAP). 2.
The unit is generally not able to consistently track the location and status
of maneuver units on the battlefield. Critical information such as ammunition
status, commander's critical information requirements (CCIR), and mission status
are not tracked adequately throughout each battle. Typically, the staff begins
the battle with a clear status of their units, but are not able to sustain
it throughout the fight. TECHNIQUES
AND PROCEDURES:
1.
The unit should identify the critical information that must be tracked. Prioritize
this information and develop status boards and charts to track and manage it.
At a minimum, display and monitor the following information:
a. Timelines
b. Mission
c. Commander's intent
d. CCIR
e. Essential fire support tasks (EFSTs)/essential field artillery
tasks (EFATs)
f. Class III/V status
g. Combat power
h. Unit locations
i. Enemy battle damage assessment (BDA)
j. Synchronization matrix
2.
Identify specific messages that must be processed in the TOC, and use pre-printed
message forms that automatically provide multiple copies. 3.
Charts are very useful tools for handling some types of information. Consider
the following when developing charts:
a. Determine what must be tracked and displayed. Avoid information
and chart overload.
b. Significantly reduce briefing time by using charts during
the planning process.
c. Build a box to store and transport charts. This reduces
wear and tear, and maximizes space.
d. Keep a miniature version of all charts in a notebook for
use while moving.
e. Use the charts in garrison to discover their value and train
personnel on their use.
f. Conduct AARs on your tracking system. Identify what is useful
and what needs to be improved. Make improvements and document the system in
the unit SOP.
(TA.4.1.3
Maintain Information and Force Status)
TREND
4
SUBJECT:
S2 Battle Tracking and Predictive Analysis
OBSERVATION
(FS): Battalion S2s commonly lack an ability to track the enemy and predict
future actions during the battle.
DISCUSSION:
1.
The battalion battle staff is often unable to maintain a clear picture of the
enemy situation as it relates to ongoing friendly activities. 2.
The S2s of the direct support (DS) field artillery battalion, reinforcing field
artillery battalion, and brigade combat team (BCT) do not consistently share
timely, accurate intelligence. TECHNIQUES
AND PROCEDURES:
1.
Staff sections must "cross-talk" continuously to retain situational awareness
within the TOC. Knowledge of the enemy situation as it relates to the friendly
situation allows the S2 to confirm or deny enemy COA and enables him to make
predictions that commanders or members of the staff can then use to make informed
decisions during the course of battle. 2.
Many units conduct periodic "battle updates" which facilitate the exchange
of information across staff sections during a battle. The S2s must exchange
intelligence information in the same manner, whether by voice or digital. Staffs,
specifically S2s, should develop a system to keep one another informed during
the course of an operation and incorporate this system into their SOP. (TA.4.1.3
Maintain Information and Force Status)
TREND
5
SUBJECT:
Situational Awareness
OBSERVATION
(Mech): Tank crews are often so fixated on looking for large columns of armored
vehicles that they overlook the presence of close in single vehicles.
DISCUSSION:
The
idea of being the killer tank, coupled with the knowledge of reconstitution
on the MILES battlefield, often causes crews to give up local security for
the opportunity to engage multiple targets at a range that is often beyond
the maximum effective range for the weapon system. The big killers (OPFOR)
on the battlefield are increasingly SOKOL, mines, AT-5s from dismounts, and
single vehicles maneuvering on the unit's flank to within 500 meters. TECHNIQUES
AND PROCEDURES:
1.
The track commander must be aware of his environment at all times. 2.
Assign areas for scanning within the unit. The best way to detect enemy forces
around the unit is to position two men out of the hatches with responsibility
for scanning. 3.
Watch for the signature of an AT weapon from the adjacent hillside rather than
for several tanks beyond direct-fire range. The enemy should never be able
to drive a BRDM directly down the middle of a firing line without being observed.
(TA.4.1.3
Maintain Information and Force Status)
TREND
6
SUBJECT:
Task Force TOC Information Management
OBSERVATION
(Mech): There is often no standardized report format in the TOC.
DISCUSSION:
Most
TOCs have multiple charts for tracking statuses. TOC shift personnel are usually
content to get the information and fill out the charts without regard for how
the information might impact on the upcoming mission. With no standardized
report format, information and reports are often copied on the nearest piece
of paper and not filed for future reference. TECHNIQUES
AND PROCEDURES:
1.
Charts are great as long as the soldiers filling them out understand the reason
why tracking those items is important and when the information given requires
further action. Develop an SOP which illustrates "if this - then this." For
example, IF
a
company reports a "two under" Class III/V after LOGPAC, THEN
both
the S4 and the task force XO are to be notified immediately. 2.
The timeliness of information flow can mean the difference between life and
death. Soldiers may die if the battle captain is not quickly informed that
the engineers have received grids to an air Volcano minefield was been employed
along the battle captain's counterattack route. Use a five-ply standardized
report format, fill it out correctly and completely, and distribute it simultaneously
to the battle captain, S2 section, FSE, and engineers. The shift NCOIC should
maintain the fifth copy. This system allows each of the BOS representatives
to receive the same information quickly and reminds the individual taking the
report of which items to include.
(TA.4.1.3
Maintain Information and Force Status)
TREND
7
SUBJECT:
TOC Battle Tracking
OBSERVATION
(Mech): Battle tracking in the TOC is often insufficient.
DISCUSSION:
1.
Battle tracking prior to crossing the line of departure (LD) is often not done
to standard, particularly in the defense. 2.
BOS representatives do not adequately cross-talk or track the commander's critical
information requirements (CCIR) and priority intelligence requirements (PIR)
for the commander. 3.
Graphics are not maintained with the task force and adjacent unit locations.
4.
Combat functions representation at the "map board" is initially inadequate,
but improves with follow-on missions. TECHNIQUES
AND PROCEDURES:
1.
Battle tracking is a continuous process, and emphasis must be placed on timely
and accurate reporting. The operations sergeant and the battle captain must
enforce TOC SOPs. They must ensure the tools (charts, log, report formats,
map with graphics, push pins, and so forth) are available and that shift personnel
use them. 2.
Formal changeover briefs and periodic briefs to key leaders will usually keep
soldiers on their toes. The information that is either captured or missed could
dramatically affect the commander's ability to make informed decisions. 3.
The XO or battle captain in charge at the TOC should be able to focus on the
"big picture" to make decisions and recommendations to the commander. Enabling
the TOC OIC to do this requires the BOS representatives to continuously feed
information to a centralized map board and provide the overall picture. 4.
A Red/Hot TOC configuration plays an important role in the effectiveness of
this process.
(TA.4.1.3
Maintain Information and Force Status)
TREND
8
SUBJECT:
Staff Integration During Execution
OBSERVATION
(Mech): Integration of staff cells is inadequate during mission execution.
DISCUSSION:
Reports
received were not shared with all combat functions representatives. This resulted
in a lack of situational awareness and predictive analysis. The integration
greatly improves with follow-on missions. TECHNIQUES
AND PROCEDURES:
1.
Continue to improve BOS integration by assigning specific personnel to man
radios, take reports, and provide information to the leaders at the map/tracking
board. 2.
Use a five-ply report format to ensure all the BOS representatives receive
the same information in a timely manner.
(TA.4.1.3
Maintain Information and Force Status)
TREND
9
SUBJECT:
Field Train Command Post (FTCP) Battle Tracking
OBSERVATION
(Mech): During tactical operations, the FTCPs rarely maintain clear situational
awareness of the battlefield.
DISCUSSION:
Maneuver
graphics are normally posted to the map in the CP; however, they are not updated,
and there is no centralized tracking and reporting process to ensure a positive
handover in the event of having to assume the role as the main or CTCP. TECHNIQUES
AND PROCEDURES:
1.
HHC commanders should establish a FTCP SOP that clearly explains each soldier's
responsibilities while on shift in the FTCP. 2.
Establish a shift changeover and commander update brief format. 3.
Ensure the FTCP has the proper tracking charts and FTCP organization, which
will allow the FTCP to function as the main CP when needed.
(TA.4.1.3
Maintain Information and Force Status)
TREND
10
SUBJECT:
Medical Platoon Situational Awareness and Battle Tracking
OBSERVATION
(Mech): Although they improve with each mission during the rotation, medical
platoon leaders initially demonstrate inadequate situational awareness and
battle tracking.
DISCUSSION:
1.
Platoon leaders monitor only battalion A&L FM radio frequency. The battalion
command net is not consistently monitored by the medical platoon. As a result,
medical platoon leaders are often unaware of company/team engagements or casualty
densities as they occur. 2.
Company 1SGs and medical crews do not cross-talk. 3.
Front-line ambulance (FLA)/tracked ambulance crews seldom track the battle
or use overlays that template graphic control measures, clean/dirty routes,
and friendly/enemy obstacles. TECHNIQUES
AND PROCEDURES:
1.
Battalion command and A&L radio frequencies must be consistently monitored
by medical platoon personnel for adequate situational awareness. Establish
a redundant FM reporting system with each casualty evacuation (CASEVAC) node,
which emphasizes cross-talk with company 1SGs. 2.
Friendly and enemy graphics must be posted and updated as METT-T dictates.
3.
Develop a battle-tracking system that incorporates current company battle positions
and CCPs, BAS location, contingency positions/routes, and ambulance exchange
point (AXP) locations.
(TA.4.1.3
Maintain Information and Force Status)
TREND
11
SUBJECT:
Graphics Distribution
OBSERVATION
(Engineer): Light engineer platoons do not adequately distribute usable maneuver,
SITEMP, CSS, fire support, and obstacle overlays to the squad level in a timely
manner.
DISCUSSION:
1.
The lack of graphics at the squad level leads to inadequate situational awareness
and initiative along with an increased operational risk category at the squad
level. 2.
Most units run out of overlay material caused by waste and failure to erase
old overlays and to recycle. 3.
Most units suffer from inaccurate overlays due to hasty reproduction methods.
TECHNIQUES
AND PROCEDURES:
The
light engineer platoon must develop and enforce a system that is a part of
the platoon tactical SOP (TACSOP) that addresses who makes the overlays, the
standard map scale, how the overlays are distributed, who gets each type of
overlay, and who conducts quality control of the overlays for accuracy. (TA.4.1.3
Maintain Information and Force Status)
TREND
12
SUBJECT:
Light Engineer Command, Control, Communications, and Battle Tracking
OBSERVATION
(Engineer): Light engineer command, control, communications, and battle tracking
of engineer operations in support of a light task force (TF) are not adequate.
DISCUSSION:
1.
The MTOE of the light engineer platoon does not adequately provide the required
manpower or equipment to effectively command and control continuous engineer
operations in a mid-intensity scenario with a light TF. As a result, the engineer
platoon leader has no staff to continuously man the TF TOC, and has insufficient
communications equipment in the TF TOC to battle track engineer operations
in the TF area of operations. This becomes a big issue when the TF is planning
for transition to the defense and battle-tracking countermobility and survivability
operations during defensive preparations, while at the same time the engineer
platoon leader is on the ground leading his platoon. 2.
While both light engineer battalion and company engineer command and control
nodes are resourced to conduct their job, the engineer platoons supporting
the infantry TFs lack both the personnel and equipment to provide engineer
C3 during continuous operations. This is an on-going problem that has steadily
gotten worse as the Army increases its emphasis on light/heavy brigade operations
to fight in a mid-to-high intensity conflict. TECHNIQUES
AND PROCEDURES:
1.
Change the MTOE of the light engineer platoon to provide the infantry TF the
essential engineer C3 capability required to support continuous operations
in a mid-to-high intensity conflict. This investment in personnel and equipment
will ensure that the light engineer platoon is properly prepared, resourced,
and utilized as it supports light infantry TFs in the Force XXI Army. 2.
The light engineer platoon must be resourced with a TF engineer team that has
the following missions:
a. Help the platoon leader plan for future missions.
b. Produce planning products (i.e., Terrabase II products and
graphics).
c. Conduct coordination with the TF staff.
d. Battle track engineer operations and report to higher engineer
C2 nodes.
e. Brief the TF staff on current engineer operations in the
TF area of operations.
At
a minimum, the TF engineer team should include a 12B30 who is ANCOC and battle
staff qualified and a 12B10 driver with intense computer and communications
equipment training. 3.
The following equipment should be added to the light engineer platoon MTOE:
a. One M998 with AN-VRC-91 FM radio system and a MSE telephone.
b. One OE-254.
c. One remote FM radio speaker.
d. One DNVT with TACFAX.
e. One Pentium III laptop computer with CD-ROM that can run
Terrabase II and TACLAN.
f. One laser-jet printer.
g. A field desk.
h. A map board with tracking charts.
i. One SICUP section that can be connected into the TF TOC
as a TF engineer team work area.
(TA.4.1.3
Maintain Information and Force Status)
TREND
13
SUBJECT:
Integration of the Battalion Maintenance Officer (BMO) in the Planning Process
OBSERVATION
(Mech): The BMO or his representative have little or no participation in the
task force planning process.
DISCUSSION:
1.
There is seldom a maintenance representative present for the task force mission
analysis process and the briefing. As a result, no clear and concise picture
of the task force maintenance posture and no explanation of how it may affect
the upcoming mission were provided. 2.
The S4/S1 were unprepared to brief for the BMO. The result was an incomplete
understanding of the maintenance status of key systems and assets in the task
force (i.e., current and projected M1A1 and M2 slant by company and platoon,
and the status of operational mine plows) prior to course of action (COA) development.
TECHNIQUES
AND PROCEDURES:
If
the BMO cannot attend mission analysis, the S4 and/or S1 must be able to provide
an accurate current and projected maintenance status of the task force and
an articulation of its impact on the course of upcoming operations to the commander
and staff.
(TA.4.2.1.1
Analyze Mission)
TREND
14
SUBJECT:
Decision Point Development
OBSERVATION
(Mech): Task force commanders often do not clearly identify and develop decision
points for the operation.
DISCUSSION:
A
lack of commander's decision points makes it difficult for the staff to focus
their efforts to ensure the plan supports this critical event/location. TECHNIQUES
AND PROCEDURES:
The
commander must establish decision point(s) early in the planning process (mission
analysis) to focus the staff and supporting BOS elements in order to achieve
success.
(TA.4.2.3
Decide on Need for Action or Change)
TREND
15
SUBJECT:
Fire Direction Officer (FDO) Integration into the Military Decision-Making
Process (MDMP)
OBSERVATION
(FS): The FDO's responsibilities during the staff planning process are not
well defined.
DISCUSSION:
The
staff does not analyze the Essential Fire Support Tasks (EFSTs) further than
broad statements such as suppress lead MRBs, attrit the lead MRB, and provide
smoke, FASCAM, Copperhead, and so forth. TECHNIQUES
AND PROCEDURES:
1.
All
members
of the battalion staff must have a good understanding of the staff planning
process and all
members
must contribute in varying degrees. The information and tools each member should
bring to the planning table must be defined. 2.
The FDO can contribute significantly to the planning process by reviewing the
following information from the maneuver order:
a. The commander's intent or concept of fires: This answers
when and where the commander wants fire support, why he wants fire support,
and what he desires in the way of effects, duration, and timing.
b. Commander's criteria (compilation of the following):
- Attack guidance matrix: identifies desired effects
and when to attack a target type.
- HPTs: identifies the priority to attack a target type
by FS means.
c. Target list: Identifies where they plan to attack target
types.
d. FS execution matrix (FSEM): Identifies how the scheme of
fires will achieve the commander's intent.
3.
By front-loading the planning process with an understanding of these areas,
the FDO can determine:
a. The number
of rounds or volleys
necessary
to achieve the commander's intent. For example, if the commander wants to destroy
an MRC west of PL EXCALIBUR with artillery, the S2 can provide the number and
types of vehicles that an MRC would consist of, and the FDO can determine the
volume of fire necessary to achieve the effect.
b. Where
the
commander wants to use artillery to achieve his intent. Based on the target
list and the FSEM, the FDO can determine when
the
commander plans to achieve his effect. This can impact on the artillery's requirement
to position units forward to mass or offset guns for special missions. It can
also contribute to identification of constraints and limitations during the
mission analysis that the FSCOORD may have to resolve or consider.
4.
After COA analysis, comparison, and the decision brief, the staff begins a
deliberate wargame of the selected COA. During this phase, the FDO focuses
on the entire scheme of fires, to include the specifics of the EFST (i.e.,
FASCAM aimpoints and number and type of rounds per aimpoint; Copperhead EAs
and artillery positions; smoke aimpoints and number of rounds; mass missions;
and munitions and volume required to fire).
a. The FS matrix is a systematic approach to understanding
the scheme of fires. Used during the wargame, it focuses the staff on keeping
elements that must be thoroughly understood. This includes triggers, FS event,
observers, intent of the event, effects, and units/munitions to fire.
b. The end of the wargame synchronizes with each other and
against enemy COAs all munitions, ammo resupply, artillery, and maneuver schemes
of movement. The FDO should point out the critical areas within the scheme
of fires where any deviation from the plan would be difficult to execute.
(TA.4.3
Determine Actions)
TREND
16
SUBJECT:
CSS Integration Into the Battalion Military Decision-Making Process (MDMP)
OBSERVATION
(FS): CSS operations are seldom integrated into the battalion's battle rhythm
and do not facilitate the battalion's tactical posture.
DISCUSSION:
1.
Most battalions demonstrate the ability to plan, prepare, execute, and reconstitute
logistics; however, the S4, S1, and XO are not primary players during the orders
process. CSS is often an afterthought and seldom addressed. 2.
The S4 often leaves the wargame to gather information or solve problems that
should be handled by the ALOC. 3.
CSS is briefed but rarely rehearsed during battalion rehearsals. Who, what,
when, where, and how should be briefed during the battalion rock drill for
R3SP, LRPs, medical support plan, MSRs, resupply triggers, and reconstitution
of battalion assets. 4.
The S4s are not using a CSS execution matrix and their CSS plan is rarely rehearsed.
5.
The S4s are not using a checklist during the battalion orders process, hindering
their ability to both validate and synchronize the plan and ensure it supports
the Essential Field Artillery Tasks (EFATs). 6.
The S3 does not provide timely ammunition guidance or establish future requirements,
thus hindering the S4's ability to develop an adequate resupply plan. 7.
Battlefield calculus is rarely conducted, and ammunition requirements/triggers
are not clearly identified (155mm). TECHNIQUES
AND PROCEDURES:
1.
A battalion logistician (S4/S1 or battalion XO) should be present at all battalion
orders drills, aggressively representing the CSS arena and ensuring integration
and synchronization of CSS operations. Better integration of CSS operations
provides necessary time to reconstitute Class III (B) and V and reconfigure
ammunition, thus posturing the battalion's CSS for the future battle. 2.
The battalion XO orchestrates the orders process by acting as the chief of
staff, ensuring all of the necessary players are present and participating.
3.
The S4 must know the battalion's current logistical status before conducting
mission analysis. 4.
Develop a battalion OPORD CSS checklist that lists critical CSS functions which
must occur before, during, and post battle, including grid locations of CSS
entities. The list should be completed by phases of the battle and should include:
a. Logistics essential support tasks (method, purpose, end
state).
b. Specific CSS triggers (Class III [B], Class V, CASEVAC,
recovery, and CAT movement).
c. MSR and ASR.
d. Location of CAT, BAS, AXPs, R3SP, UMCP, chemical CCPs, and
patient decon sites.
5.
At a minimum, answer the essential field artillery tasks (EFATs) before leaving
the battalion wargaming process and include them in any rehearsals.
6.
Clear,
timely
ammunition guidance
from
the S3, better battlefield calculus, and ammunition positioning improves ammunition
operations. 7.
Focus on integrating resupply operations with the battalion operation, whether
it be centralized or decentralized. This facilitates resupply operations in
a more stable environment with less distraction and economizes the use of battalion
logistical assets. 8.
The S4 should maintain situational awareness and status of logistical assets
and provide the S3 advice on execution of the logistics operations.
(TA.4.3
Determine Actions)
TREND
17
SUBJECT:
Task Force Military Decision-Making Process (MDMP)
OBSERVATION
(Mech): Task force planning is inadequate during all phases of the operation.
DISCUSSION:
1.
During the planning process, task forces are not developing the details necessary
to effectively accomplish their mission. Units frequently do not complete the
final phase of the plan to ensure they achieve the commander's desired end
state.
2.
Missions such as forward passage of lines and breaching are seldom planned
with the required detail to synchronize all the BOS. Lack of detail results
in confusion and the need for more refinement later in the process, which takes
planning time away from subordinate units as they wait for information. TECHNIQUES
AND PROCEDURES:
1.
Units must execute detailed planning as outlined in FM
71-2,
The
Tank and Mechanized Infantry Battalion Task Force.
The
staff needs to answer all questions prior to issuance of the OPORD. 2.
Refer to FM
17-95
as
a source for detailed planning of passage of lines and battle handover.
3.
Develop a checklist from these manuals and add it to the unit SOP for use during
planning.
(TA.4.3
Determine Actions)
TREND
18
SUBJECT:
Task Force Military Decision-Making Process (MDMP)
OBSERVATION
(Mech): The MDMP at task force level is not being conducted to standard.
DISCUSSION:
1.
The staff has difficulty establishing and adhering to a timeline and an agenda
for accomplishing this process. 2.
The staff often tries to combine course of action (COA) development and wargaming,
resulting in a lack of focus and a plan that is not synchronized. TECHNIQUES
AND PROCEDURES:
1.
Refer to FM
71-2
for
the steps and procedures for accomplishing this process. 2.
The task force XO or S3 must not only establish a timeline that allows subordinates
to plan and establish priorities of work, but they must also adhere
to
the planning timeline to ensure the complete
process
is
accomplished in the time allotted. 3.
Refer to CALL
Newsletter No. 95-12 Update, Military
Decision Making: "Abbreviated Planning,"
May
97.
(TA.4.3
Determine Actions)
TREND
19
SUBJECT:
Task Force Air Defense Priorities
OBSERVATION
(Mech): Air defense priorities are rarely established.
DISCUSSION:
1.
Task force commanders too often place minimal emphasis on air defense planning.
The task force S3 or the air defender usually determine what the air defense
priorities should be in support of the task force. 2.
In numerous incidents, priorities do not shift with the main effort, resulting
in a plan that does not sustain coverage throughout all phases of the operation.
3.
The lack of guidance, priorities, and where the ADO could accept risk makes
it difficult to focus limited air defense systems. TECHNIQUES
AND PROCEDURES:
The
task force commander should state specifically what his priorities are (i.e.,
Bravo Company or breach force, assault force). This would allow the ADO to
identify essential air defense tasks and what type of air defense coverage
is needed throughout the width and depth of the task force area of operations.
Examples are weighted coverage, mass, defense in depth, early engagements,
or balanced fires.
(TA.4.3.1
Issue Planning Guidance)
TREND
20
SUBJECT:
Course of Action (COA) Development
OBSERVATION
(Mech): Staffs have difficulty producing a COA and the products associated
with it.
DISCUSSION:
Problems
with COA development are usually the effect of a perceived time crunch. The
task force S3/XO often attempts to save time by combining COA development and
wargaming. TECHNIQUES
AND PROCEDURES:
1.
Although the commander provides his COA concept during commander's guidance,
this concept must still be transformed by the commander, the S3, or the S3-air
into a set of maneuver graphics and a task and purpose for each company. Recommend
the S3 refine the concept, leaving the commander free to work the R&S plan
or other issues. 2.
The final products of COA development are a COA maneuver graphic and a COA
statement that includes task and purpose for subordinate units. If the task
force does not have these two products, they will lose valuable time trying
to develop graphics or tasks and purposes during the wargame.
(TA.4.3.2
Develop Courses of Action)
TREND
21
SUBJECT:
Wargaming
OBSERVATION
(FS): Not all battlefield operating systems (BOS) and staff elements are included
in the battalion wargaming process.
DISCUSSION:
1.
Battalion staffs are attempting to integrate and synchronize all resources
without the participation of all the BOS representatives. 2.
Essential field artillery tasks (EFATs), critical events, critical tasks, movement
triggers, and shortfalls are not determined or developed in the detail necessary
for the batteries to execute. TECHNIQUES
AND PROCEDURES:
1.
FM
101-5,
Staff
Organization and Operations,
outlines a very deliberate course of action (COA) analysis and wargaming process.
The wargame should focus the staff's attention on each phase of the operation
in a logical sequence. It is an iterative process of action, reaction, and
counteraction. 2.
The wargaming process, adapted to the FA battalion, is described below.
a. Assemble key players:
- Battalion XO
- S3
- S3 Air
- S2
- Fire direction officer (FDO)
- Radar technician (if applicable)
- Chemical officer (CMLO)
- Reconnaissance and survey officer (RSO)
- Battalion signal officer (BSO)
- S4
- S1
b. Gather tools:
- Synchronization matrix
- Operational graphics
- COA sketch/statement
- Modified combined obstacle overlay (MCOO)
- Situational template (SITEMP)
- Scheme of fires
c. List friendly forces.
d. List assumptions.
e. List known critical events and decision points.
f. List significant factors.
g. Select the wargame method (usually based on time available).
h. Select a recording technique (most units use a synchronization
matrix).
i. Wargame the battle and assess the results. The synchronization
matrix becomes the agenda. The key players should assume roles and follow the
agenda, talking through the timeline by each phase and in detail.
3.
The products that result from the wargame are:
a. Updated operational graphics.
b. Synchronization matrix completed by phase/essential FA tasks.
c. Decision support template.
d. CSS plan/graphics.
e. Identification of hazards, risk assessment, and control
measures to reduce risks.
f. Radar deployment order (if applicable).
(TA.4.3.3
Analyze Courses of Action)
TREND
22
SUBJECT:
Wargaming
OBSERVATION
(Mech): Wargaming at task force level is inadequate.
DISCUSSION:
1.
There is often no synchronization matrix. 2.
All required staff members are not present. 3.
No wargaming technique (such as box, avenue of approach, belt) is established.
4.
Timelines are not established or adhered to. 5.
Graphics are not updated to reflect changes during wargaming. TECHNIQUES
AND PROCEDURES:
1.
Gather all the tools necessary to conduct a wargame (synchronization matrix,
all staff members, and a technique such as the box, avenue of approach, or
belt). 2.
Consider beginning the synchronization with the decision point event/location.
Utilize the matrix to facilitate the process and allow input from all the BOS
representatives. 3.
Establish a timeline and stick to it. Allot a specific amount of time per event.
For example, 30 minutes for the R&S event, 60 minutes for the main attack,
and so on. The XO or S3 must orchestrate the process and is responsible for
controlling the timeline. 4.
Adhere to the ACTION-REACTION-COUNTERREACTION technique. 5.
The commander should at a minimum check on the process, provide guidance, and
ensure that the COA still meets his intent. 6.
Make necessary or "identified" changes to the graphics immediately. This will
save time in reproduction later on in the process. 7.
Have someone designated to record the unresolved or unforeseen issues and capture
both friendly and enemy combat losses while wargaming certain events.
(TA.4.3.3
Analyze Courses of Action)
TREND
23
SUBJECT:
Scout Platoon SOP Knowledge and Understanding
OBSERVATION
(Mech): SOP knowledge and understanding within the platoon and the attachments
is poor.
DISCUSSION:
The
scout platoon SOP is often not familiar to the platoon or made available to
attachments. TECHNIQUES
AND PROCEDURES:
1.
Every soldier within the platoon must have a copy of the platoon SOP and must
know it and be trained to it. 2.
Every soldier attached, whether the medic from HHC, the GSR team from the MI
company, or the ERT, must have a copy of the platoon SOP and be familiar with
it.
3.
At the next rewrite of the platoon SOP, make enough copies for every soldier
in the platoon (to include the soldiers the platoon will receive over the next
six months). Make enough additional copies for the ERTs, COLTs, GSR team, and
any other possible attachments. 4.
Incorporate at least one monthly class for the platoon to review the platoon
SOP and to train soldiers who have recently arrived.
(TA.4.4
Direct and Lead Subordinate Forces)
TREND
24
SUBJECT:
Troop-Leading Procedures and Time Management
OBSERVATION
(Engineer): Leaders at all levels are not conducting troop leading procedures
(TLP) to standard.
DISCUSSION:
1.
Many leaders do not conduct TLP at all. Those that do conduct some TLP do not
conduct them to standard, leaving subordinates unprepared to execute the coming
mission. 2.
Senior leaders frequently do not issue the WARNOs or FRAGOs needed by subordinate
leaders to initiate movement. As a result, platoons and squads habitually link
up with supported units late in the preparation phase, and are unable to conduct
adequate rehearsals prior to mission execution. 3.
Leaders are not using time management techniques, such as timelines, to assist
in tracking task completion and in specifying the critical/essential tasks
to be executed. TECHNIQUES
AND PROCEDURES:
1.
Leaders should apply troop-leading procedures (TLP) to every mission or task,
whether tactical or administrative. This focus will inculcate the TLP methodology
in leaders and their subordinates, making troop-leading procedures a basic
and effective time management and planning tool. 2.
Chapter 2 of FM
5-71-2,
Armored
Task-Force Engineer Combat Operations,
provides an excellent analysis of the relationship between TLPs and the planning
process. (TA.4.4
Direct and Lead Subordinate Forces)
TREND
25
SUBJECT:
Preparing and Completing Orders: FA Battery Defensive Operations
OBSERVATION
(FS): FA batteries generally do not prepare for defensive operations to standard.
DISCUSSION:
1.
Commanders do not ensure that units understand the desired defensive end state
and do not prioritize their work efforts. 2.
Leaders do not supervise and enforce standard occupation defensive preparations.
3.
Batteries seldom do the following in preparation for defensive operations:
a. Address likely threats.
b. Conduct adjacent unit coordination.
c. Properly plan and control movement.
d. Establish target reference points (TRPs).
e. Establish and mark sectors of fire.
f. Discuss direct fire command and control.
g. Build range cards to standard.
h. Plan alternate fire direction center (FDC) and battalion
operations center (BOC) sites.
4.
Positioning of the field artillery ammunition support vehicle (FAASV) is often
an afterthought in defensive preparations. TECHNIQUES
AND PROCEDURES:
1.
Conduct a battery defensive preparation battle drill. Develop a drill that
clearly outlines:
a. Duties and responsibilities.
b. Priorities of work.
c. Pre-combat checks/pre-combat inspections (PCCs/PCIs).
d. Rehearsals.
e. Special teams.
2.
Preparation begins when the battery commander receives the mission. He must
begin his own analysis based on information received during the field artillery
support plan (FASP) briefing.
a. The commander examines his battery's position areas versus
the likely enemy avenues of approach to determine where likely ground threats
may approach.
b. The commander reviews the likely threats to the battery
as reported by the S2 to establish and prioritize PCCs/PCIs to counter these
threats.
c. The commander then issues specific
defensive
preparation guidance in his warning order (WARNO). For example:
"Gunnery
Sergeants will recon and begin defensive preparation of PA 62. This PA is 1
km north of the most likely enemy avenue of approach. Gunnery sergeants, in
addition to refining the position area grids, will look for likely supplemental
positions for direct fire orienting south, plan tentative FAASV overwatch positions,
and recon egress routes in the event of a breakthrough."
3.
The gunnery sergeants then begin their reconnaissance with a specific defensive
concept in mind. 4.
The battery commander issues specific defensive PCCs/PCIs for the platoon leaders,
platoon sergeants (PSGs), and section chiefs to accomplish before
any
movement takes place. For
example: "
The
S2 believes rotary wing aircraft are the greatest threats during Phases 1 and
2. After Phase 2 the greatest threat comes from counter-fire and possible leakers
from the 1st Echelon MRBs. As a result, I want the air threat and counter-fire
threat PCCs completed prior to 1900 hours. We will depart start point (SP)
to PA 62 at 1930 hours. Once in position, conduct mounted and dismounted ground
threat PCCs IAW with the FA TACSOP."
In
these four short sentences the commander has told his junior leaders their
likely threats and control measures to counter those threats, and has established
a priority of work and a completion time. The commander can then address any
changes during his battery OPORD. 5.
The greater challenge of defensive preparation begins after the occupation,
but it need not be a new concept at each position. A defensive battle drill,
focused by the commander as illustrated above, will give the section chiefs
sufficient time to prepare their sections. 6.
Based on the WARNO, the gunnery sergeant should have begun establishing TRPs.
The TRPs serve several purposes:
a. They allow for a division of the established engagement
area.
b. They allow the platoon sergeants to develop the battery
sectors of fire.
c. Set at a known distance, they can help in establishing range
and in coordinating direct fire engagements.
7.
Units should then establish range cards for each crew-served weapon and howitzer.
The combination of range cards and TRPs will allow a section chief to easily
reestablish his sectors of fire and defensive orientation after conducting
a survivability move. Sections should be battle- drill trained to ensure that
they re-mark their sectors of fire after each move. 8.
Listening posts and observation posts (LPs/OPs), either mounted or dismounted,
can be set up based on the threat. 9.
PCCs and PCIs will ensure chiefs cover the specifics of each task. 10.
The battery commander (BC) or a battery leader should conduct coordination
with adjacent units. This coordination ensures each unit knows the other's
location, the established call signs and frequencies, and recognition signals.
Coordination also allows them to tie into defensive positions, and prevents
confusion and misidentification of friendly vehicles. 11.
The commander must consider survivability moves versus hardening of positions.
a. In general it is best to allow the battery to conduct survivability
moves to counter an artillery threat.
b. Harden the FDCs/BOC and the battery trains. The FDCs must
develop killer junior tables using 10/R to allow for correct height of burst.
12.
The platoon leaders and sergeants must plan and rehearse how they intend to
fight their platoons/battery in a direct fire engagement.
a. Who will direct their fires?
b. What kind of direct fire order will they give?
c. Will they mass their platoon fires or allow section chiefs
to pick out their own targets?
d. How will they mark their TRPs for night or limited visibility?
13.
The defensive preparation battle drill is vital. The battery commander, having
determined what measures his battery must take, focuses his battery leadership
through the WARNO and OPORD using PCCs, PCIs, rehearsals, priorities of work,
and planning guidance. Defensive preparation is then a directed effort of priorities
of work based on a logical analysis within the whole timeline, not guesswork
as time permits. (TA.4.4.1
Prepare Plans or Orders)
TREND
26
SUBJECT:
Direct Fire Planning
OBSERVATION
(Mech): Direct fire plans are often not developed or completed for all phases
of an operation.
DISCUSSION:
Units
often plan direct fires on the objective for offensive missions but do not
develop a direct fire plan throughout the maneuver space. Units normally do
well controlling fires upon reaching the objective, but waste time trying to
control fires if contact is made prior to the objective. Enemy vehicles are
often bypassed altogether because no one was focused on likely locations. TECHNIQUES
AND PROCEDURES:
Develop
direct fire plans for all phases of an operation, not just the objective. The
direct fire plan, based on the IPB, will focus scanning and sectors of fire
at all times.
(TA.4.4.1
Prepare Plans or Orders)
TREND
27
SUBJECT:
Platoon SOPs
OBSERVATION
(Mech): Platoon SOPs are frequently not complete.
DISCUSSION:
1.
Mortar platoons do not manage time well, specifically at the squad level. Troop-leading
procedures are conducted sporadically, rehearsals are incomplete, and priorities
of work are different for all squads in the platoons. 2.
Platoon SOPs do not define the standard for each task or how and when they
will be conducted. TECHNIQUES
AND PROCEDURES:
1.
Develop a complete SOP. The SOP is the unit's guide for how it conducts business.
From the SOP, the units identify or establish the standard for how they will
plan, prepare, and execute their mission.
a. A complete SOP enables the platoon leadership to be less
directive, thus allowing more time to conduct pre-combat checks and pre-combat
inspections (PCCs/PCIs) and accomplish tasks.
b. A complete SOP identifies the task and standard for each
type of mission and specifies the order in which those tasks need to be conducted.
2.
Use FMs and TMs to develop the initial SOP, and then further refine it for
specific use at platoon level, revising and prioritizing TTPs as appropriate.
(TA.4.4.1
Prepare Plans or Orders)
TREND
28
SUBJECT:
Integrating the Scout Platoon Sergeant and NCOs into the Orders Process
OBSERVATION
(Mech): Scout platoon leaders often do not tap the expertise of the platoon
sergeant and senior scouts during the orders process.
DISCUSSION:
Although
the scout platoon sergeant is the most experienced scout within the platoon,
the platoon leader seldom utilizes him or other scout NCOs during the planning
process. TECHNIQUES
AND PROCEDURES:
1.
Utilize the experience of the platoon sergeant and NCOs to enhance the platoon's
success during operations. Give them the jobs of selecting routes, preparing
paragraphs 4 and 5 of the OPORD, constructing a quality terrain board, and
risk management. 2.
Include the tasks to be performed by the NCOs in the platoon SOP to streamline
the orders process and to train new subordinate leaders on the specific responsibilities
they have during orders process.
(TA.4.4.1
Prepare Plans or Orders)
TREND
29
SUBJECT:
Scout Platoon OPORD SOP
OBSERVATION
(Mech): Scout platoons rarely have an established SOP for formatting and issuing
their OPORDs.
DISCUSSION:
Most
NCOs used small notebooks to copy information. With the amount of information
covered during OPORD briefings, subordinate leaders are not able to write down
all the important information. TECHNIQUES
AND PROCEDURES:
1.
All leaders should use a platoon OPORD SOP.
a. The OPORD SOP ensures that important information is not
lost, enables the OPORD process to move more quickly, and produces a more accurate
OPORD with greater detail.
b. Using a platoon OPORD format will focus the platoon leader
during the creation of the OPORD and ensure that all information is covered.
The platoon's success will be greatly enhanced during missions when the platoon
leader has all the information from the TF.
2.
Modify the platoon's SOP to include procedures for formatting and issuing OPORDs.
Each leader should use 8 ½" x 11" or 5" x 8" versions of the OPORD format.
The format selected should be the standard for each platoon leader to use when
writing and issuing his OPORD.
(TA.4.4.1
Prepare Plans or Orders)
TREND
30
SUBJECT:
Direct Fire Planning
OBSERVATION
(Mech): During the planning process, units are not planning the detail required
to effectively engage the enemy with direct fires.
DISCUSSION:
The
lack of direct fire planning results in the unit using multiple rounds from
different vehicles to kill the same target. A lack of orientation results in
subordinate units being unable to mass fires due to masking by friendly units
or no established sectors of fire. This lack of mass allows the OPFOR to accomplish
their mission and hampers the BLUFOR's ability to influence the battle. TECHNIQUES
AND PROCEDURES:
1.
The direct fire system is the number one killer on the NTC battlefield. Each
unit must execute detailed planning as outlined in FM
71-2.
Develop a checklist from this manual and add it to the unit SOP for use during
planning. 2.
Use engagement criteria, target criteria, target priority, destruction criteria,
trigger lines, and target reference points to help focus all the direct fire
systems in the task force, thereby achieving mass.
(TA.4.4.1
Prepare Plans or Orders)
TREND
31
SUBJECT:
Situational Obstacle Planning
OBSERVATION
(Mech): Engineer companies are often not planning effective situational obstacles.
DISCUSSION:
1.
When situational obstacles are planned, the planning is primarily done at the
engineer battalion level based on the brigade plan. This leads to counter-mobility
assets, such as the Volcano, being taken away from the engineer company. Frequently
these assets are consolidated into an ad hoc platoon under the control of varying
leaders in the engineer battalion. This results in situational obstacles that
are less responsive to the needs of the task force commander as he fights his
battle space. 2.
Obstacles are frequently not tied to triggers in the task force plan and often
are employed at a time and place inside the task force sector that does not
support the scheme of maneuver. As a result, they frequently lead to greater
restriction of the commander instead of providing him freedom of maneuver.
They also lead to an increase of minefield fratricides. TECHNIQUES
AND PROCEDURES:
1.
Situational obstacles should be planned at task force level. The assistant
battalion engineer (ABE) should identify critical situational obstacles in
the brigade scheme of maneuver, which should then be listed in tasks to subordinate
units. This allows the task force engineer to plan the command and control,
movement, force protection, and integration into the task force plan. 2.
The engineer company assault and obstacle (A&O) platoon leader should command
and control the situation obstacles. He is familiar with the task force plan
and is able to position himself to best accomplish the mission. This allows
the maneuver unit to attack enemy maneuver using a target (specific organization,
not just enemy), location, and effect while maintaining freedom to maneuver.
This is synchronized by a set of triggers based on friendly and enemy actions.
3.
The final result is a situational obstacle plan that accomplishes mission essential
tasks and remains responsive to the task force commander.
(TA.4.4.1
Prepare Plans or Orders)
TREND
32
SUBJECT:
Engineer Direct Fire Planning
OBSERVATION
(Engineer): Engineer leaders too often do not understand direct fire planning.
DISCUSSION:
1.
The only training an engineer officer receives on direct fire planning is from
unit officer professional development (OPD) classes with the task force (TF).
Few of these officers take the initiative to learn the concepts, doctrine,
tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs), and doctrinal terms to facilitate
better understanding of the TF planning process. 2.
More and more, engineer companies serve as the TF breach force as part of TF
combined arms breach operations. Without a direct fire plan for the engineer
company, the engineers are nothing more than the reduction element and are
not in the fight. With a direct fire plan in the defense, engineers can fight
from a battle position using the organic weapons systems to protect the flank
of the TF. NCOs and platoon leaders can better conduct obstacle siting with
the maneuver company/teams if they have a solid foundation of direct fire planning
doctrine and TTPs. TECHNIQUES
AND PROCEDURES:
1.
To fully understand and execute the doctrine and TTPs outlined in 
