MANEUVER
BOS
(Trends
are numbered sequentially for cross-reference and are not
in
any priority order.)
Needs
Emphasis
TREND
1
SUBJECT:
Movement to the Objective
OBSERVATION
(Mech): Units often have no movement plan from the line of departure (LD) to
the objective.
DISCUSSION:
1.
Rotational units often establish a time for crossing the LD time and then plan
actions on the objective. When the plan is executed, commanders often race
their units to reach the objective as quickly as possible, moving with haste
rather than speed. 2.
The result of hasty movement is often destruction of the force. TECHNIQUES
AND PROCEDURES:
1.
Units need a plan to follow for moving from LD to the objective. The plan must
take into account where enemy contact is likely. 2.
The commander should conduct a time-space analysis and then try and adhere
to the expected times, allowing his subordinates to move with speed but maintaining
local security. Slowing the pace may take longer but will enable a larger force
to survive. 3.
The speed used in movement should be METT-T dependent. Set the conditions for
success slowly and deliberately and then execute with speed and violence.
(TA.1.1
Move)
TREND
2
SUBJECT:
Paladin Battery Movement and Maneuver
OBSERVATION
(FS): Movement of Paladin batteries is seldom adequately planned or executed.
DISCUSSION:
1.
Artillery movement is not adequately planned for, resulting in a lack of synchronization
with the maneuver plan. 2.
The battalion staff does not correlate the movement plan with the execution
of the brigade's essential fire support tasks (EFSTs).
a. Clear movement triggers are not developed.
b. Most moves are "on order" or based on one unit being "set"
prior to execution of another move.
3.
The capabilities of the Paladin system present some unique movement challenges
for the direct support (DS) FA battalion. TECHNIQUES
AND PROCEDURES:
1.
The staff must properly plan and execute a maneuver scheme for Paladins to
maximize the ability of the battalion to provide responsive fires while remaining
survivable on the battlefield. 2.
To provide the fire support that maneuver forces require, the FA battalion
staff must plan for repositioning during the Military Decision-Making Process
(MDMP).
a. Artillery movement must be planned for in detail as part
of the brigade planning process so that it is synchronized with the brigade
scheme of maneuver.
b. Conduct final coordination during the brigade's combined
arms rehearsal (CAR).
c. The FA battalion refines the movement scheme during their
internal planning process.
3.
Some factors that must be considered as part of the FA battalion's planning
process are:
a. How does the battalion fit into the brigade scheme of maneuver?
b. What are the range requirements?
c. Does the battalion have any ammunition limitations?
d. What are the critical targets in the scheme of fires?
e. What is the planned/acceptable out-of-action time understood
by the brigade commander?
f. What adjacent unit coordination is required?
g. What is the trigger to execute?
- Friendly events?
- Enemy events?
h. Who triggers the movement?
- Brigade commander/S3?
- FSCOORD?
- FA battalion S3?
4.
Paladin battalions must understand and use maneuver
graphical
control measures. Using operational terms and symbols that are common to maneuver
units will aid in an understanding of how Paladins maneuver. 5.
The staff must provide firing batteries with clear guidance and triggers to
conduct survivability moves and tactical moves. Tactical moves should be established
using clear event triggers and Paladin axis (offensive operations) or zones
(defensive operations) into which the batteries will move. 6.
Because the Paladin can occupy places unsuitable for conventional artillery
and has no requirement for sole use of terrain, the maneuver commander's land
management concerns are simplified. Terrain management and coordination will
be simplified once maneuver commanders understand Paladin movement techniques.
(TA.1.1.1
Position/Reposition Forces [Units and Equipment])
TREND
3
SUBJECT:
FA Battery Paladin Movement Planning and Execution
OBSERVATION
(FS): FA commanders often do not conduct proper preparation and planning for
their tactical moves.
DISCUSSION:
1.
Commanders typically give little thought to control measures for ensuring timely,
controlled tactical moves. 2.
Most moves consist only of sending a move order to the guns with no thought
of land deconfliction, boundaries, terrain, movement aids for limited visibility,
reconnaissance, survey points, or movement control measures. TECHNIQUES
AND PROCEDURES:
1.
Paladin movement requires great detail in planning and flexibility in execution.
Commanders should look early for potential problems, define specific control
measures for the movement, and then position key leaders where they can see
and influence the movement. 2.
Movement planning must begin during the commander's mission analysis. Even
if the battalion does not provide sufficient guidance for movement, this does
not absolve the battery commander from planning movement in-depth to support
his battery mission. 3.
An initial examination of the scheme of maneuver, coupled with the Paladin
zones provided from battalion, will give the commander a starting point for
his maneuver plan. 4.
The commander should look for obvious conflicts in the movement plan. By determining
possible conflicts early, a commander can find solutions or work with the battalion
staff to modify the plan.
a. Are several batteries taking the same route at the same
time?
b. Does the route identified by the battalion violate unit
boundaries?
c. Is there a specific route or is that left to the commander's
discretion?
d. Does the movement guidance conflict with the maneuver force's
plan?
5.
The commander must then make specific decisions concerning his planned movement.
a. What type of formation will he use?
b. Move by platoons or by battery?
c. Move in a wedge or in column formation?
d. Give a specific route or specify an axis of advance?
6.
It is here that gunnery sergeants can best assist the commander. Gunnery sergeants
can easily place survey control points along the route if they know to do so
in advance. By conducting a route reconnaissance within limits of the tactical
situation, gunnery sergeants can advise the commander on the terrain, routes,
and possible conflicts. If ground recon is not possible, then the commander
must conduct a detailed map recon.
a. How far will each movement take the battery?
b. When will navigation updates be needed?
c. Who will provide survey support?
d. What are the specific triggers to initiate movement?
7.
The commander then determines how best to pass his movement plan to his platoons.
One successful method is to develop battery graphics and disseminate them while
issuing the WARNO or OPORD.
a. Battery graphics need not be complicated. Some basic graphical
control measures will help ease movement problems and add flexibility to the
entire plan.
b. Graphics should include battery boundaries, routes, or axis
of advance depending on how much movement control the commander needs, Paladin
zones, survey control points and any start points, check points, or release
points.
c. By getting these graphics down to the section chief level,
the commander can ensure all leaders have an understanding of the scheme of
maneuver and can allow him to issue FRAGOs based on the graphics should the
situation change.
8.
Control during the execution of the movement is no less critical than the planning
phase. Commanders generally are good about using gunnery sergeants to link
in with the rear elements of the maneuver forces. This gives commanders eyes
forward while positioning themselves forward to make their own assessment of
the movement. 9.
Commanders should plan for contingencies in their scheme of maneuver. By planning
alternate Paladin zones and alternate routes of march, the commander can easily
shift his unit when the situation changes.
a. The ability of the Paladin to conduct "hipshoots" means
the commander can support maneuver from almost all points of his march.
b. Specific essential field artillery tasks (EFATs), such as
Copperhead or FASCAM, may require specific range or angle-T positioning factors.
Alternate Paladin zones, developed during his mission analysis, allow the commander
to quickly shift his forces into areas where he knows he can meet range requirements
necessary to accomplish his EFATs.
(TA.1.1.1
Position/Reposition Forces [Units and Equipment])
TREND
4
SUBJECT:
Actions on Contact
OBSERVATION
(Mech): Company/teams often make contact with the enemy while still in movement
formation, and are unable to react.
DISCUSSION:
1.
Company/team commanders often have a strong understanding of the threat facing
the company in upcoming missions. However, the company/team commanders are
frequently not able to incorporate the seven forms of contact to terrain. This
results in contact with the enemy while still in or transitioning from movement
to maneuver. 2.
The inability to visualize the enemy forms of contact IAW terrain prevents
the company from executing a company/team reaction-to-contact drill or massing
direct and indirect fires on the commander's decisive point and attaining mission
accomplishment. TECHNIQUES
AND PROCEDURES:
1.
Commanders must practice and gain further knowledge of how the enemy fights
in accordance with terrain. 2.
The commander must focus company/platoon movement and maneuver during the planning
phase to counter the actions.
(TA.1.2
Engage Enemy)
TREND
5
SUBJECT:
Integrating Direct Fire with Maneuver
OBSERVATION
(Mech): Maneuver task forces have difficulty integrating combat multipliers
into the scheme of maneuver.
DISCUSSION:
Units
are routinely not able to integrate fires and smoke into the scheme of maneuver,
resulting in an unsynchronized plan. TECHNIQUES
AND PROCEDURES:
1.
All combat multipliers must be integrated into the scheme of maneuver. Staff
officers must familiarize themselves with weapons capabilities and their effects
to successfully integrate them into the plan. 2.
Determine the most effective application of the weapons systems during the
wargame. Determine the best time for these multipliers to be used. This will
help bring about the desired synchronization and effects of combined arms and
mass. 3.
The task force should establish a three-phase training plan for the staff on
integration of combat multipliers.
a. Phase 1 - Conduct OPD/NCODP to teach the staff the "How
To."
b. Phase 2 - Conduct planning drills/exercises that limit the
time available.
c. Phase 3 - Conclude with a tactical field exercise where
the staff can incorporate the lessons they learned during the first two phases.
4.
Conduct quarterly simulation exercises (JANUS/BBS) to sustain the staff's proficiency
and effectiveness.
(TA.1.4
Integrate Direct Fire with Maneuver)
TA.5
Intelligence BOS Narrative
TA.2
Fire Support BOS Narrative
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