NTC TRENDS AND TTP, 1&

FIRE SUPPORT BOS

(Trends are numbered sequentially for cross-reference and are not in any priority order.)

Needs Emphasis

TREND 1
SUBJECT: Targeting Team Operations

OBSERVATION (FS): Brigade staffs often do not conduct a consolidated targeting effort.

DISCUSSION:

1. Despite all the capabilities and situational awareness available to Force XXI brigade staffs, they seldom fully integrate the unique intelligence-gathering capabilities within the brigade and link them with lethal and nonlethal fire support assets to engage the enemy with a synergistic combined arms effort.

2. Location of key personnel across the battlefield and lack of a clear understanding of individual duties and responsibilities leads to breakdowns in targeting.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. The targeting team plans for brigade level engagement of the enemy. The brigade staff, not just the targeting officer or fire support officer (FSO), must forecast and anticipate events so the enemy is attacked simultaneously throughout the entire depth of the battlefield. The targeting effort is the critical decide element in the decide-detect-deliver-assess methodology. The focus of the targeting process comes from the brigade's mission statement, the commander's intent, the division's high-payoff target (HPT) list, and the attack guidance matrix (AGM).

2. The targeting team includes, but is not limited to, the following:

a. Brigade commander and XO.

b. Brigade S2 and S3.

c. Direct support (DS) artillery battalion commander (FSCOORD).

d. Brigade FSO and targeting officer or non-commissioned officer (NCO).

e. Intelligence and electronic warfare support element (IEWSE) personnel.

f. Other staff members, as necessary, including the air liaison officer (ALO), chemical officer, S3-air, air defense officer, engineer, and so forth.

3. The functions of the targeting team include:

a. Nominating targets for execution.

b. Developing the brigade's high-priority target list (HPTL).

c. Developing the brigade's AGM.

d. Establishing target selection standards (TSS).

e. Nominating targets to higher headquarters.

f. Receiving and monitoring target damage assessment.

g. Synchronizing lethal and nonlethal fires.

4. The timing and structure of the targeting team meeting may vary but it should include the following agenda items:

a. Current enemy situation (S2).

b. Current friendly situation (S3).

c. High-value targets (HVTs) (S2).

d. Attack guidance (commander).

e. Collection plan (S2).

f. Assets available (FSO).

g. HPTs (FSO).

h. Target priorities (FSO).

i. Synchronization of attack assets (FSO).

5. The agenda, formality, and sequencing of the targeting meeting in the Military Decision-Making Process (MDMP) will depend upon mission, enemy, terrain, troops, and time available (METT-T). The process, however, should never be eliminated completely from the decision- making process.

6. The products produced by the targeting process include, but are not limited to, the following:

a. HPTL.

b. AGM.

c. Intelligence collection plan (vital to providing a clear task and purpose to the striker platoon).

d. Draft fire support execution matrix (FSEM).

7. The HPTL and AGM at the brigade and battalion levels are normally more detailed and focused than at higher levels. They provide information that observers require for identifying and attacking HPTs.

(TA.2.1 Process Ground Targets)

TREND 2
SUBJECT: Fire Support Planning

OBSERVATION (FS): Brigade fire support elements (FSEs) struggle with providing timely and essential information to the battalion/task force fire support officers (FSOs) to permit concurrent planning.

DISCUSSION: The FSEs are hesitant to plan fires in support of the close fight, anticipate and provide for the transition from the deep to the close fight, and assign specific tasks to battalion FSEs for execution. The resulting fire support plans lack sufficient detail, flexibility, and the synchronization necessary to enable the brigade combat team (BCT) to attack the enemy throughout the depth of the battlefield and appear to the enemy as fighting one continuous fight.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Upon receipt of the new mission, the FSE should begin a battle drill to confirm the current status of the fire support system. He also must gather other information for the first step in fire support planning, to include:

a. Higher headquarters' warning order (WARNO) or operations order (OPORD).

b. Facts from the FA battalion, aviation liaison officer (ALO), others.

c. Facts from higher and subordinate FSEs and fire support teams (FISTs).

d. Intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) products.

e. Enemy courses of action (COAs) as developed by the S2.

f. High-value targets (HVTs) by enemy phase or critical event.

2. The FSO must:

a. Understand the higher maneuver and fire support plan.

b. Organize and analyze facts.

c. Identify specified and implied tasks.

d. Translate status of assets into capabilities and limitations.

e. Analyze effects of IPB on fire support.

3. The FSO must brief the results of his mission analysis to the commander and conclude his brief with recommended essential fire support tasks (EFSTs). Prior to COA development, the FSO should receive the commander's approved EFSTs and issue a WARNO to his subordinate FSOs and to the FA battalion.

4. As COA development begins, the FSO must conceptualize how to integrate fires into the developing COA. The commander's guidance becomes the start point for where and how the FSO allocates assets to each COA. The results of the mission analysis become the foundation for fire support COA development.

5. The FSO uses these results to plan the method for accomplishing the EFSTs. As a minimum, the fire support portion of a COA allocates acquisition assets (collection plan), attack assets, planned attack locations (target/TAI/engagement area), and the sequence (concept of fires) of these attacks required to achieve the effects specified in the EFSTs.

6. The desired output of COA development is a draft fire support plan. The plan must include:

a. Concept of fires/draft fires paragraph.

b. Draft fire support execution matrix (FSEM).

c. Draft target list worksheet and overlay.

d. Draft target synchronization matrix.

e. Collection or reconnaissance and surveillance (R&S) plan.

7. The draft fire support plan provides the sequence of EFSTs and outlines the task, purpose, method, and end state for each EFST of the operation.

8. The more complete the fire support plan is before COA analysis and comparison, the more efficient and effective the wargame. The wargame provides final detail and refinement, validates capabilities, and synchronizes the fire support plan. Based on issues identified by the wargame, the FSO can modify the draft fire support plan and products to improve the plan. The wargame also provides a means to test the strength of the plan and build in flexibility by identifying decisions and branches for the fire support plan.

9. At the conclusion of the wargame, the FSO should have:

a. Final fires paragraph.

b. Final FSEM.

c. Final target list and overlay.

d. Final scheme of fires.

e. Final target synchronization matrix.

10. Use a cartoon sketch to help convey the fire support plan more clearly. Once approved, the consolidated products become the fire support annex and are added to the maneuver order.

(TA.2.2.1 Conduct Lethal Engagement)

TREND 3
SUBJECT: Transition of Fires

OBSERVATION (FS): Brigades often do not fully define the transition of fire support from the deep to the close fight.

DISCUSSION:

1. The transition of fire support from deep to close is arguably the single most critical fire support event that takes place during a battle. Brigades often do not fully define the point or times for transitioning from brigade to task force, resulting in a lack of focus and massed fires.

2. Transitioning of fires is often based on who has the greatest enemy threat to his front rather than on the identified high payoff targets (HPTs).

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. The transition of fires must be planned and then rehearsed with the assets to support the close fight.

2. The trigger-to-transition fires from either deep to close or from close to close (shifting priority of fires) has to be based on a decision that should be linked to an essential fire support task (EFST) to reach the desired end state.

3. Several conditions must be met to fully assume fires (i.e., communications are established and responsibilities are fully understood by all). The chart below further defines many of the conditions that must be met to make the decision to transition fires.

Chart which depicts conditions which must be met for transition fires

(TA.2.2.1 Conduct Lethal Engagement)

TREND 4
SUBJECT: Development of Essential Field Artillery Tasks (EFATs)

OBSERVATION (FS): Many field artillery battalions do not understand how to properly develop EFATs after receiving the brigade operations order.

DISCUSSION:

1. EFATs generally lack the detail required to support the brigade essential fire support tasks (EFSTs) because units do not wargame each task in sufficient detail down to fire unit selection.

2. Staffs do not adequately develop detailed support requirements, decision points, and triggers for their synchronization matrix, do not tailor each EFAT to the specified mission, and do not publish this in full detail in the field artillery support plan (FASP).

3. Battery commanders often leave the orders briefing and rock drills knowing little more than the sequencing of movement and the primary/alternate shooters for special munitions.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. At FA battalion level, during the battalion-level wargaming process, translate brigade- level EFST into EFATs for battery commanders.

EXAMPLE:

EFST:	TASK:	Destroy the combat security outpost (CSOP) or force its withdrawal.
	PURPOSE:	Prevent the CSOP from engaging the task force (TF) with direct or indirect fires from the line of departure (LD) to PL Ohio.
	METHOD:	One round Copperhead (CPHD) (most dangerous target = T-80 tank), followed by a battalion 3 rounds dual-purpose improved conventional munitions (DPICM).
	END STATE:	CSOP destroyed (four vehicles), or at a minimum, two vehicles destroyed (CSOP withdrawal criteria = 50%).

EFAT:	TASK:	Destroy T-80 tank and at least two BMPs of the CSOP (assume CPHD miss).
	PURPOSE:	Prevent the CSOP from engaging the task force with direct and indirect fires from LD to PL Ohio.
	METHOD:	One round CPHD at WP0012, followed by battalion six rounds DPICM. Batteries in place ready to fire (RTF) NLT 181900 Aug 98; one round CPHD to A/B batteries NLT 181700 Aug 98. A/B conduct rehearsal using CPHD trainer NLT 181700 Aug 98. A/B link with COLT 4 on FD 4 at 181930 Aug 98 to confirm OP location (Angle-T less than 800 mils), pulse repetition frequency (PRF) code of 124. A/B ensure FDCs can execute mission; rehearse mission from observer to guns NLT 182030 Aug 98. MET broadcast at 0600, 0700, 0800 hours. C battery DNL WP0012 DPICM NLT 190615 Aug 98. A/B DNL WP0012 CPHD at 190615 Aug 98. B/C place entire BTRY AMC WP0012 (DPICM) when A Battery reports "READY" WP 0012 CPHD. A Battery execute AMC WP0012 CPHD tentative time 190630 Aug 98 (TF LD). A/B/C execute AMC WP0012 (DPICM) 1 minute following CPHD shot. A Battery CPHD crew joins second volley DPICM. Trigger to execute CPHD is TF LD. Trigger to execute battalion six rounds (DPICM) is CPHD shot plus time of flight (TOF).
	END STATE:	CSOP destroyed or withdrawn before LD.

2. After developing the EFATs to this level of detail as a product of the wargaming process, provide them to the battery commanders so they can focus on preparation and execution. Include this level of detail on the EFATs to subordinate units in the FASP. Most tasks of a repetitive nature may evolve in the unit SOP as FASCAM, CPHD, and smoke drills, but the EFAT will require tailoring to meet current mission requirements and MUST be published completely in the FASP.

(TA.2.2.1 Conduct Lethal Engagement)

TREND 5
SUBJECT: Integrating Fire Support with Maneuver: Close Fight

OBSERVATION (FS): During most rotations, brigade fire support officers (FSOs) are able to develop a fire support plan for the deep fight in support of the brigade; however, developing fires in support of the close fight often presents a problem.

DISCUSSION:

1. Some FSOs are reluctant to plan fires for a task force (TF) close fight for fear of "planning how the TF will fight." As a result, the direct support (DS) S3 of the supporting FA battalion is often not allowed to appropriately plan how he will support the brigade's scheme of fires.

2. FSOs who do develop a plan for fires in the close fight often do not hold TF FSOs accountable for timely refinement. Refinements are seldom received prior to rehearsals, resulting in the unit conducting additional wargaming and not rehearsing the plan.

3. The end result is always a lack of responsiveness of fires, and often a lack of focus and mass of fires during execution.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. To enhance the focus of fires, formal fire planning should be conducted through a deliberate top-down process, with bottom-up refinement. The primary advantage is that the fire support plan is developed early, which allows the artillery staff to plan concurrently. This process also allows for a workable plan in a short period of time that focuses the fires effort exactly where the commander wants it on the battlefield. For the company fire support team (FIST), the commander referred to here is the brigade commander who "owns the DS artillery battalion." This is an ongoing process; the exchange of information between echelons is continuous. The downward dissemination and upward refinement of the plan do not stop until the established cut-off time.

a. To assist in formulating the commander's initial intent at each level, the FSO provides the commander with an updated estimate on fire support capabilities. The commander, in turn, describes what he wants his fires to accomplish in order of priority. The FSO then identifies where the commander's desires exceed the resources available. This give-and-take communication results in a realistic expectation of what fires can achieve.

b. Fire plans are originated at higher levels (brigade) and refined at lower levels (company FISTs). In this case, it originates at brigade level beginning with the commander and the fire support coordinator (FSCOORD). The intent is to focus the fire plan at each level and give the supporting field artillery unit a manageable number of essential fire support tasks (EFSTs). It provides detailed execution and guidance, allocates resources, assigns target execution responsibility, and fully supports the combined arms commander's scheme of maneuver.

c. At the TF level, the commander receives the top-down fire plan from brigade. This plan focuses the fire support effort exactly where the brigade commander wants it on the battlefield. It provides detailed execution guidance, develops EFSTs, allocates resources, assigns Target Areas of Interest (TAIs) for the planning of targets by subordinates, assigns target execution responsibility, and fully supports the combined arms commander's scheme of maneuver.

d. The TF FSO, after receiving the initial focus of the brigade plan, can begin working early to refine guidance and targeting information based on how the TF commander intends to integrate his plan into the brigade plan. He also begins planning for the fire support assets the TF commander owns (mortar sections and company FISTs). The result is a TF fire support plan that supports execution of the brigade EFSTs and focuses the fires of the TF.

e. As the EFSTs are developed at the brigade and TF level, often the responsibility to refine and trigger these fires is pushed down to the observer level who has "eyes on" the target. This does not mean company FIST only executes what it is given. The FIST and the company commander take the execution guidance given and any resources allocated and develop a scheme of fires to accomplish the EFSTs and support the scheme of maneuver.

f. On the Force XXI battlefield, the observer that triggers EFSTs may be any digitally- equipped platform. The digital calls for fire initiated by these platforms will cut across the traditional BOS. It is the company FIST's responsibility to coordinate these platforms as sensors and assist the company in managing the information.

g. As automated systems such as position navigation and far-target locating enhance the capability of maneuver units to execute EFSTs, the commander will have more flexibility regarding who can observe and trigger EFSTs. When designating execution responsibility in heavy units, the commander should consider these system capabilities when establishing the parameters for meeting the standard.

(1) The accuracy of the position navigation system of the M1A2 tank must be within only two percent of the distance traveled by that vehicle since the last update. Given METT-T, the commander must know what distance an M1A2 can travel before the position navigation system's inherent error does not meet the target selection standards.

(2) The commander must also establish standards for initializing position navigation systems for maneuver platforms to identify targets. In other words, he must establish procedures for the company/team to go through to initialize their position navigation system based on the accuracy of their initialization point (map spot, survey, etc.).

h. The maneuver commander is responsible for ensuring that fire support is thoroughly integrated into his scheme of maneuver and for executing an assigned EFST. When he develops his plan, the company FIST leader, his fire support coordinator, should be at his side, totally involved in the planning process. Each task must be planned in detail and specifically assigned to an individual. If a task is not specifically assigned, everyone will tend to assume it is someone else's responsibility and the task probably will not be accomplished. An observer must know that he has been assigned responsibility for executing a particular EFST, and he must fully understand all of the aspects of the target.

When planning fires, it is essential to address the following aspects of each EFST and/or target: purpose, location, trigger, shooter/backup shooter, positive clearance of fires, communications structure, rehearsal, and delivery assets. If each of these are not identified, planned, resourced, and rehearsed, the successful accomplishment of that EFST is as risk.

2. Top-down fire planning is a continuous process of analyzing, allocating, and scheduling fire support. It must be flexible to accommodate unexpected and rapid changes. The plan at each level contains only those EFSTs necessary to support the commander's guidance for fire support. Remaining targets or assets are allocated to the subordinate commanders according to the priorities for fire support. The planning process results in a determination of:

a. How fire support will be used; the EFSTs are identified.

b. How EFSTs will be prioritized in the IFSAS/AFATDS.

c. The types of targets that will be attacked. This results in the high-payoff target list to refine the brigade's Target Management Matrix in IFSAS/AFATDS).

d. The types of targets that will not be attacked.

e. Collection assets that are available to acquire and track the targets (detect/track).

f. Sensors that are available and responsible to trigger EFSTs.

g. Assets that will be used to attack different targets; the munitions, expected effects, and when and where they will be engaged.

h. System preferences for various targets (mortars, FA, air, Naval gun fire, [NGF]).

i. Assets that are available to verify (assess) effects on the target.

3. Allocation of resources. The allocation of resources in top-down fire planning should emphasize the purpose, planning, and execution of fire tasks. For example, allocating targets A, B, and C to the company FIST for planning does not give the purpose or intent of those targets or the relationship with other EFSTs. Instead, allocate a subordinate to plan the execution of an EFST in order to destroy a specified platoon during a specified portion of the operation. This guidance provides:

a. A purpose for the target.

b. The desired effects.

c. A possible fire delivery asset.

d. Deconfliction of fires in time and space with other EFSTs competing for the same limited fire support assets.

3. Bottom-up refinement. Bottom-up refinement is a key element of top-down fire planning and the company FIST is the linchpin of this effort.

a. As mentioned earlier, the company FIST usually provides the "eyes on" target. During the decision-making process, targets and any decentralized digital links are planned on the basis of map spots and situational templates (SITEMPS). Targets must be refined on the basis of the reconnaissance effort, actual occupation of the terrain, and updated intelligence. Digital systems and focusing fires through critical fire tasks will enhance the refinement effort. With the establishment of EFSTs early in the planning process, company FISTs can be proactive in their refinement and planning. Targets that facilitate the accomplishment of EFSTs can be nominated during the bottom-up refinement early in the planning process.

b. In most cases, if fire support targets need refinement, it is better to delete the obsolete target and plan a new target with a new target number. This prevents confusion by observers and firing units who may receive two grid locations for the same target number. A technique used by many units is to initially use every fifth target number in planning. For example, the initial targets for a plan may be AB 5000 and AB 5005. Then, as those targets are refined, the next higher target number is available for use. In other words, if the example targets are refined once they would be changed to AB 5001 and AB 5006. This technique allows for the tracking of a target as it is refined to help eliminate any confusion as to the original purpose of that target.

(TA.2.3 Integrate Fire Support)

TREND 6
SUBJECT: Integrating Fire Support with Maneuver: Observation Plan

OBSERVATION (FS): Observation plans are seldom synchronized with the task force (TF) scheme of maneuver.

DISCUSSION:

1. TF and squadrons experience difficulty developing and executing an observation plan to support essential fire support tasks (EFSTs), the scheme of fires, and the scheme of maneuver.

2. Fire support officers (FSOs) seldom synchronize the observer plan with the scheme of maneuver during the wargaming process.

3. Plans are not refined at the company/team level.

4. Rehearsals are inadequate.

5. Fire support teams (FISTs) have difficulty getting into position at the right time and place to acquire the enemy before maneuver finds itself decisively engaged in the enemy commander's battle space.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Per FM 6-71, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Fire Support for the Combined Arms Commander, company/team commanders are the executors of the plan and FISTs are the maneuver commander's precision target acquisition assets. Success can be achieved with top-down planning, bottom-up refinement, and decentralized execution.

2. To set conditions for maneuver, maneuver commanders must possess the tactical patience necessary to allow observers to get into position and execute their assigned task and purpose. If an observer must be in position to see the commander's decisive point or EFST, the maneuver commander must be willing to commit the assets necessary to get the observer into position.

3. The observer plan must be constructed in concert with the S2 and S3 using Terrabase computer programs to assist in position selection. Position selection is critical for providing the detect function of the targeting process IAW FM 6-20-10, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for the Targeting Process.

4. The observation plan must be synchronized during the wargame with the scheme of maneuver. There must be a thorough terrain analysis, coupled with a complete understanding of the enemy's capabilities that define the enemy commander's battle space. The TF FSO provides the top-down plan; company FSOs refine the plan in conjunction with company team commanders.

5. The TF FSO must plan to have observers in position to support the maneuver commander's decisive point and each EFST.

a. The plan must address where the observers need to be, the route they will take to get there, security, and communications.

b. Other assets to consider as viable observers are forward observers (FOs), scouts, combat observation laser teams (COLTs), and maneuver shooters (calls for fire by non-artillery observers). (Refer to FM 6-30, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Observed Fire.)

c. Consider employing the reserve team's FIST as a TF COLT (an option discussed in FM 6-20-10).

6. Rehearse the plan during both TF and company/team rehearsals.

7. Initiative, cross-talk, and coordination between FISTs are imperative during execution.

(TA.2.3 Integrate Fire Support)

TREND 7
SUBJECT: Fire Support Team (FIST) Degraded Operations

OBSERVATION (FS): Task forces (TFs) do not employ FIST personnel and equipment to maximize target acquisition and location capabilities when their vehicle (FIST-V) is non-mission capable (NMC).

DISCUSSION:

1. When the FIST-V is down for maintenance, the company fire support officer (FSO) frequently moves to the commander's Bradley or HMMWV equipped with a manpack SINCGARS, binoculars, compass, and map. The entire remainder of the team's personnel and equipment go with the FIST-V to the unit maintenance collection point (UMCP) and wait.

2. The ground/vehicle laser locator designator (G/VLLD) is not employed in the dismounted mode.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: TFs should develop a plan that provides several options for FIST degraded operations based on personnel and equipment availability and METT-T (see example options below). The plan should be approved by the TF commander, incorporated into the TF tactical SOP (TACSOP), and followed by all commanders and FSOs. These initiatives can ensure that FISTs are employed with the maximum capability possible.

Example options:

Option 1: FIST-V turret or TSCD inoperable:

For offensive missions, employ the G/VLLD mounted on the vehicle deck. For defensive missions, employ the G/VLLD dismounted and dug in (on or off vehicle).

Option 2: FIST-V inoperable:

FSO and fire support sergeant or a radio telephone operator (RTO) operate from a 1SG or maintenance team M113 with the G/VLLD w/tripod, batteries, power cable, thermal sight, forward entry device (FED), binoculars, compass, AN/GVS-5s and three SINCGARS.

For offensive missions, employ the G/VLLD mounted on the vehicle deck. For defensive missions, employ the G/VLLD dismounted and dug in (on or off vehicle).

Option 3: FIST-V and team M113s inoperable:

FSO and fire support sergeant, or an RTO operate from a non-firing Bradley or the company commander's HMMWV equipped with the G/VLLD w/tripod, batteries, power cable, thermal sight, FED, binoculars, compass, AN/GVS-5s and two SINCGARS.

(TA 2.3 Integrate Fire Support)

TREND 8
SUBJECT: Integrating Fires and Maneuver

OBSERVATION (FS): Task forces (TFs) and squadrons typically experience difficulty developing a logical and executable concept of fires with clearly defined essential fire support tasks (EFSTs).

DISCUSSION: None.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. The commander must state his desired task and purpose (what and why) for each fire support asset (FA, mortars, CAS), and the desired end state.

a. The task is defined in terms of a desired effect on an enemy formation and its function (EXAMPLE: Suppress the southern MRC for 30 minutes with FA preventing it from employing effective direct fire).

b. The purpose is defined in terms of a specific friendly maneuver event (EXAMPLE: Allow A Mech to occupy SBF Position 1 without taking effective enemy direct fire).

c. The end state is the achievement of the purpose defined in quantified terms (EXAMPLE: A Mech set in SBF Position 1 with no loss of combat power).

2. FM 6-20-10, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for the Targeting Process, describes the relationship between EFSTs and the targeting process.

a. Decide = Task and Purpose

b. Detect and Deliver = Method

c. Assess = Did we achieve our end state?

3. FM 6-71, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Fire Support for the Combined Arms Commander, provides further discussion of commander's guidance for fire support.

a. Task = What

b. Purpose = Why

c. The logically sequenced EFSTs comprise the concept of fires and constitutes the fire paragraph.

(TA.2.3 Integrate Fire Support)

TREND 9
SUBJECT: Integrating Fire Support: Critical Friendly Zones (CFZs)

OBSERVATION (FS): Task forces (TFs) are experiencing difficulty planning, refining, and activating CFZs.

DISCUSSION: None.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. During the wargame, the fire support officer (FSO) must plan CFZs to cover movement, attack-by-fires, support-by-fires, breach sites, tactical assembly areas (TAAs), battle positions, and hide positions through the depth of the zone or sector, and then establish activation triggers.

2. During execution, the fire support sergeant or targeting officer must refine and activate the zones using reports from fire support teams (FISTs) and company/teams via cross-talk with the TOC battle captain to ensure zone coverage where the force is located on the battlefield. Use EPLRs and Applique situational awareness to complement the refinement and activation battle drill.

3. The number of zones allocated to a task force is limited. It is therefore essential that the task force commander states his force protection priorities for CFZs to ensure a critical unit or main effort, such as a breach force, is covered.

(TA.2.3 Integrate Fire Support)

TREND 10
SUBJECT: Fire Support Integration into Engagement Area Development

OBSERVATION (FS): Task forces are experiencing difficulty integrating fire support into engagement area (EA) development during defensive missions.

DISCUSSION: None.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. The task force fire support officer (FSO) should develop a scheme of fires to support the commander's decisive point. This includes:

- Observer planning
- Target emplacement based on planned obstacles
- Target refinement based on the actual obstacle siting/emplacement
- Trigger emplacement - both tactical and execution (include limited visibility/thermal)
- An EA mounted rehearsal

2. Tasks should be prioritized with an established timeline and the status of preparation reported and tracked in the TOC. This must be a coordinated effort between the task force FSO/FSE and company/teams.

3. Execution can be centralized or decentralized. The task force fire support sergeant is the subject matter expert and should supervise and coordinate the overall effort.

4. Trigger kits should be standardized and resourced. Time/distance factors are different for an enemy moving during day and night, and response and shift times for mortars and artillery are different.

a. Establish both tactical and execution triggers. Emphasis must be focused on emplacing tactical and execution triggers based on precision time/distance factors IAW the moving target engagement procedures published in FM 6-30.

b. Primary and alternate observers should observe the marking of targets and the emplacement of triggers from their OPs to ensure they can see them, and they must record lased (AZ, VA, range) data to both.

c. FISTs should conduct target area surveys and prepare terrain sketches and visibility diagrams.

(TA.2.3 Integrate Fire Support)

TREND 11
SUBJECT: FA Battalion Radar Zone Management

OBSERVATION (FS): Planning and executing radar zones (critical friendly zones [CFZs]) to facilitate the maneuver commander's force protection priorities is a problem area for the direct support (DS) field artillery (FA) battalion.

DISCUSSION:

1. The DS FA battalion seldom provides responsive counterfires that support the maneuver commander's priorities for force protection. Planning, rehearsing, and triggering the radar employment plan is rarely synchronized with the reinforcing artillery or DIVARTY assets available and the rest of the brigade's plan. The crucial missing piece is the linkage of the DS FA battalion TOC to the radar during the execution of the zone plan.

2. Synchronizing and coordinating with DIVARTY for redundant AN/TPQ-37 coverage and the deconfliction of zone coverage within the brigade's sector/zone is a problem area. This consistently leads to ineffective radar cueing and zone activation.

3. Digital transmission of radar zones and orientation data are seldom used. This greatly slows down the zone activation and creates unnecessary work.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Properly planned, rehearsed, refined, verified, and digitally executed radar zones can initiate responsive, prioritized counterfire during key times or events in the battle. Effective radar employment begins with the interpretation of the maneuver commander's planning guidance for his priorities for force protection.

2. During the brigade's wargame of the selected COA, the brigade FSE/FSCOORD should identify the probable locations of the events or units, obstacles, breach points, or routes critical to success.

3. A FSCOORD's/FSO's priority to ensure success must be to integrate zone management for planning, allocation, approval, dissemination, and rehearsals into the overall FS planning cycle. Develop a top-down radar zone plan so bottom-up refinement can occur.

4. Establish counterfire priorities and make certain they are understood to ensure responsive fires to support the force protection priority reflected by the planned zone.

5. Once the zones are consolidated and approved at the brigade FSE, the plan must be incorporated into maneuver and Fire Support Execution Matrices (FSEMs) or any other locally used products, such as a scheme of fires worksheet.

6. The DS FA battalion S2/S3 and FA targeting technician must use the higher headquarter's order/matrices as the planning guidance required to perform the bottom-up refinement necessary to develop the radar deployment order (RDO), position areas, and cueing plan for the radar.

7. The DS battalion S3, S2, brigade FSE, TF FSEs, and the FA targeting technician must understand their roles in the triggering, refinement, and verification of the zones to match the scheme of maneuver. Verification of the unit or event location covered by the planned zone is critical to the success of the plan. Accordingly, the zones planned for maneuver elements must be planned, verified, and triggered by the supported FSEs. To ensure success, the zone, cueing, and radar movement plans must be integrated into the fire support rehearsal, FA technical rehearsal, FA rehearsal (rock drill), and combined arms rehearsal (CAR) (see CALL Newsletter No. 98-5, Rehearsals).

8. Once the radar acquisitions are received, the DS battalion TOC's counterfire battle drill must process, clear, and initiate responsive counterfires. There are many moving parts and coordination requirements to make an effective counterfire plan work. Effective coordination with DIVARTY for zone deconfliction and radar orientation is curtailed to ensure the targeting system is not overloaded with acquisitions. FA battalions must develop a TTP that incorporates the digital link and works for their unit similar to the process described above. Once they develop a TTP, incorporate it into the local SOP.

(TA.2.3 Integrate Fire Support)

TREND 12
SUBJECT: Integration of FS with Maneuver: Counterfire Battle Drill, (CFBD)

OBSERVATION (FS): Direct support (DS) FA battalion tactical operations centers (TOCs) often do not plan and execute responsive counterfires to provide force protection from enemy indirect fires.

DISCUSSION:

1. The maneuver commander's force protection priorities often include DS counterfires against enemy indirect fires during critical times of the battle. The DS FA battalion TOC is responsible for planning and executing responsive counterfires. Although they are key to successful force protection for indirect fires, the DS FA battalion TOC seldom properly employs the AN/TPQ-36 firefinder radar, establishes critical friendly zones (CFZs), or conducts a counterfire battle drill (CFBD) rehearsal.

2. Without a well-thought-out and rehearsed CFBD, radar acquisitions will quickly overload the fire direction center and negate a responsive counterfire plan.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Clear and concise procedures for digital/voice reporting and target processing of radar acquisitions must be defined and most importantly rehearsed for each mission.

2. Each individual within the TOC must understand the flow of the acquisition from the initial receipt through the clearance of fires, engagement of the target, and BDA. Several steps must occur simultaneously in order to minimize acquire-to-fire times and maximize effects. Once an acquisition is received it must be used to:

a. Refine the situational template (SITEMP) (enemy artillery positions)

b. Verify radar zones

c. Ensure range capabilities of the radar are optimized

d. Most importantly, ensure acquisitions are targeted (cleared for engagement/attack guidance) by the most expeditious means.

3. Once the CFBD has been defined it must be refined and incorporated in the unit's SOP and training plan. Incorporate the CFBD into the TOC's pre-command checks (PCCs) and rehearsals.

4. Rehearsal of the CFBD during the FA technical rehearsal will ensure the TOC, fire direction center (FDC) and designated counterfire shooter(s) understand the counterfire mission's priority and execution versus the competing demands of the developed scheme of fires. Technical difficulties can be identified and resolved during the rehearsal.

5. The DS FA battalion must fully integrate a GS/Reinforcing FA battalion (when task organized) into the planning, rehearsals, and execution of the counterfire battle.

6. Clearly defined procedures for requesting additional fires and handing off missions must be established and rehearsed.

7. Each TOC must maintain situational awareness of the counterfire battle through identified communication links.

8. Appendix A of FM 6-121, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Field Artillery Target Acquisition, lists techniques for processing targets within a FA TOC. Although the discussion is primarily focused at the DIVARTY/FA brigade level, the procedures can be tailored to fit a DS FA battalion TOC.

(TA.2.3 Integrate Fire Support)

TREND 13
SUBJECT: Integrating Mortars into the Fire Plan

OBSERVATION (Mech): Task force commanders seldom give the mortar platoon a specific task and purpose for each phase of an operation.

DISCUSSION: A fire support matrix with mortar priority of fires (POF) and priority targets is normally issued to satisfy the concept of mortar integration. This matrix, however, does not identify the task or purpose for the use of the mortars; it simply states some priorities. As a result, the mortar platoon is often not in a position or prepared to support the task force mission.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Task force commanders should give the mortar platoon a specific task and purpose during each phase of an operation. The platoon's mission must be realistic and clearly understood by both the platoon and the observers who will be calling for fire.

2. The task force fire support officer (FSO) should develop two key products during the planning process: the target list/overlay and the fire support execution matrix (FSEM).

3. Provide a copy of the target list/overlay and FSEM to the mortar platoon for technical data processing. This enables the mortar platoon to precompute firing data for each planned target, thereby reducing response time. If multiple firing positions are planned, the sections can compute firing data from each firing position for each target.

(TA.2.3 Integrate Fire Support)

TA.1 Maneuver BOS Narrative

TA.3 Air Defense BOS Narrative

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