NTC TRENDS AND TTP, 1&

NTC TRENDS AND TTPs
1st and 2nd Quarters, FY 99

Organized by BOS, these are the trends submitted by NTC O/Cs and pulled from unit Take Home Packages (THPs) and After-Action Reviews (AARs) for 1st and 2nd quarters, FY99. As appropriate and/or available, they provide doctrinal references and tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) for the needed training emphasis. Each trend is annotated with Blueprint of the Battlefield codes for use in long-term trend analysis.

INTELLIGENCE BOS

(Trends are numbered sequentially for cross-reference and are not in any priority order.)

Positive Performance

TREND 1
SUBJECT: Scout Platoon IPB Process

OBSERVATION (Mech): The scout platoon leader was able to take terrain and enemy situation and refine it at platoon level to plan OP positions and routes into sector.

DISCUSSION: None.

SUSTAINMENT TECHNIQUES:

1. Continue to do IPB at platoon level.

2. Train subordinate leaders in the IPB process to assist them in section and squad level planning. The greater the detail, the better the understanding for subordinate leaders.

(TA.5.2.1 Collect Information on Situation)

Needs Emphasis

TREND 1
SUBJECT: S2 Section Organization and Operations

OBSERVATION (Mech): S2 sections do not work efficiently or as a team and are not task organized according to METT-T.

DISCUSSION:

1. S2 sections often operate on a 12-hours-on, 12-hours-off shift schedule without regard to mission requirements. This leads to mass turnover of personnel twice a day and offers little continuity in planning and execution.

2. The S2 and perhaps one assistant generally do all the work, which does not take advantage of the capabilities of all members of the S2 section.

3. Most S2 sections set up a plan team (which is a good idea) but do not fully brief the plan to the rest of the section for execution.

4. The most underutilized member in most S2 sections is the NCOIC. S2 section NCOICs are usually senior NCOs with maneuver backgrounds and years of experience who could offer great assistance to the S2.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Phase soldiers into work schedules; work and sleep plans should be based on METT-T.

2. Avoid having a massive turnover of personnel twice a day.

a. Do not give soldiers 12 hours off in one day. This is excessive and sacrifices too many available manhours.

b. Ensure that detailed shift change briefings are conducted and at least one individual works swing shifts to maintain section continuity.

3. Utilize the S2 NCOIC. Regardless of his MOS, he can offer valuable insight gained through his years of experience. Do not let the NCOIC become bogged down with all the details involved with running the entire TOC.

(TA.5 Intelligence)

TREND 2
SUBJECT: Reconnaissance and Surveillance (R&S) Operations

OBSERVATION (Mech): R&S operations routinely falter due to a lack of emphasis by commanders and a lack of integration of all staff elements and BOS during planning and execution.

DISCUSSION:

1. S2s seldom assist commanders in developing good and detailed priority intelligence requirements (PIRs). S2s are developing R&S matrixes that usually cover too many named areas of interest (NAIs) and give little guidance to sub-units on when to look at the NAIs and what to look for.

2. Other factors that can be attributed to R&S problems are:

a. R&S operations are treated as a part of the current operation and not seen as important and independent.

b. Guidance and orders for R&S operations are usually disseminated with the task force OPORD and not put out early enough to give sub-units time to prepare and execute.

c. No one is put in charge of the R&S fight. No one is being identified as the one responsible for tracking, adjusting and updating the R&S effort.

d. Commanders are not giving guidance or developing good PIRs to guide the R&S effort.

e. The R&S plan is usually reduced to a matrix in the intelligence annex. The matrix usually addresses NAIs that cover key terrain and known or templated enemy locations. Mission statements and a task and purpose for each mission or reconnaissance element are not given.

f. R&S operations are rarely rehearsed.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Specific techniques for the S2:

a. The S2 must develop detailed PIRs that are tied to friendly decision points. Assign LTIOVs (Latest Time Intelligence is of Value) or LEIOVs (Latest Event Intelligence is of Value) to the PIRs so that you don't continue to try to answer a question that is no longer relevant.

Bad PIR: What is the composition of the regimental reconnaissance and along what routes will it enter the task force sector?
Good PIR: Will regimental reconnaissance elements (one BMP and one BRDM) go through NAI 4 along AA 2A before 232200 Dec 98? LTIOV 232300 Dec 98 friendly decision point: commit 2ndPlatoon, Charlie Company to kill regimental reconnaissance team.

b. The R&S matrix must give sub-units detailed and specific guidance on what they are looking for and when they are looking for it.

Bad: Scout platoon will report all enemy activity on NAI 4.
Good: Scout platoon will confirm or deny existence of enemy OP at NAI 4 (NK 123456). Look for one BMP or one BRDM and possible dismounts. Start looking at 231900 Dec 98 and check every hour until 232300 Dec 98 for enemy activity.

2. Task force R&S techniques:

a. R&S planning and execution should be the initial main effort of the task force. It should not be afterthought and considered the "S2's business."

b. The commander must give clear and concise guidance on what he needs to know in the form of PIRs or IRs and a commander's intent for what he wants R&S to accomplish.

c. The S2 must understand the capabilities and limitations of all assets in the task force. He should not get in the habit of thinking that only the scout platoon and ground surveillance radars are the only collection assets. Company/teams, CSS assets, fire support assets, ADA assets, chemical assets, and higher headquarters can often gather intelligence, thus saving the scouts for the more critical missions.

d. R&S plans must be developed by the entire staff and integrated across all of the BOS.

e. R&S should be treated as an operation of its own and not as an annex to the current task force OPORD.

f. R&S guidance and orders must be put out as early as possible in order to allow the task force scouts and other assets time to conduct their own mission analysis and prepare their own orders.

g. Rehearse! Rehearse! Rehearse!

(TA.5.1 Develop Tactical Intelligence Requirements)

TREND 3
SUBJECT: Engineer Reconnaissance

OBSERVATION (Engineer): Throughout most campaigns, the task force (TF) engineer and S2/S3 do not incorporate engineer reconnaissance into the overall reconnaissance & surveillance (R&S) plan.

DISCUSSION:

1. Employing engineer reconnaissance in the offense is a critical task for the engineers. However, they are often sent out as an afterthought without a clear task and purpose.

2. Engineer reconnaissance is an engineer squad task, yet the majority of the units rotating through the NTC cannot conduct this task to standard. It is not trained.

3. Most units have not developed an SOP for conducting obstacle reconnaissance either prior to the commitment of the breach force, to identify the point of breach, or to identify the parameters of an obstacle in order to mark the bypass. As a result, the TF is often held up or delayed during the attack, losing momentum while engineers attempt to execute what should be a well-trained battle drill.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Engineers must provide increased input to the battalion TF plan.

a. The TF engineer and S2 must develop engineer-specific NAIs and decision points, and ensure that observation responsibility is assigned to the appropriate collection asset.

b. The TF engineer must synchronize the reconnaissance effort with the battalion TF R&S plan, and establish a system for reporting key engineer intelligence directly to the TF engineer representative and S2 in the TOC.

c. The engineer company should issue clear and complete orders (IAW the TF R&S plan and applicable scout platoon plan) to the engineer reconnaissance teams (ERTs) and ensure they deploy with graphics, maps, reporting matrixes, and a communication plan. They must also establish a system for tracking the location and activity of the teams, and receiving, analyzing, and disseminating this critical information. This should be done regardless of the task organization.

d. Use the TF O&I net or the engineer company net for the communications plan.

2. Recently, engineer battalions have deployed to NTC and employed an engineer reconnaissance platoon (ERP), sending out ERTs to conduct obstacle reconnaissance. THIS IS NOT RECOMMENDED. Engineers do not own battle space, and as a result, fratricide usually occurs with the ERTs and TF scouts. Engineer reconnaissance is an engineer squad task. The reconnaissance effort should be directed and controlled at the TF level, and tied into the TF R&S plan to facilitate coordination on the battlefield. The engineers should come from the engineer company executing the breach, and be integrated into the TF scout platoon and feed off the same support systems.

3. Reports must come back to the TF TOC where the engineer company XO can gather the OBSTINTEL and report it to the engineer company and/or breach force. If the OBSTINTEL is reported only to the engineer battalion, it is of NO USE, because the engineer battalion staff will not be conducting the breach. The information must be passed to the executors with the minimum number of middlemen to facilitate accurate and timely reporting.

4. Engineer squads must train reconnaissance tasks at Home Station. Obstacle reconnaissance is becoming a lost art in the engineer community. In order to maintain the momentum of the TF attack, engineers must be able to execute a battle drill for identifying the point of breach or obstacle bypass, and then must conduct the marking drill rapidly to allow combat power to safely reach the far side and continue the attack.

(TA.5.1 Develop Tactical Intelligence Requirements)

TREND 4
SUBJECT: Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB)

OBSERVATION (Mech): Units are not conducting a thorough IPB of the battlefield.

DISCUSSION:

1. Although most units arrive at the NTC with the color coded maps that designate "slow-go" and "no-go" terrain, they often do not analyze these areas for potential opposing forces (OPFOR) ambush positions.

2. Units seldom identify mobility corridors, which allows the OPFOR to maneuver on the flanks and rear of rotational units.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. The commander must conduct a thorough IPB process to implement a complete direct fire plan. Knowing likely enemy locations and mobility corridors enables the unit to assign these areas for surveillance.

2. Any terrain on which armored vehicles cannot maneuver must still be watched because of the threat of enemy dismounts and rotary wing aircraft.

(T.A.5.2.1 Collect Information on Situation)

TREND 5
SUBJECT: Terrain Analysis

OBSERVATION (Mech): Task forces seldom develop or use terrain analysis products.

DISCUSSION: Units frequently do not have an understanding of the terrain and its potential effects on friendly and enemy actions.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. The engineers must produce Terrabase products during the intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) to facilitate effective direct fire planning for offensive and defensive operations.

2. The S2 lays out the effects of terrain in an intelligence annex.

3. Use Terrabase products to augment both map and leader reconnaissance.

4. During course of action (COA) development, units must gain an understanding of the effects of terrain on friendly and enemy actions. This is an imperative in direct fire planning for both offensive and defensive missions. With an understanding of how the terrain can affect the task force, the element that makes contact with the enemy will be better prepared to use the terrain to their advantage.

(TA.5.2.1 Collect Information on Situation)

TREND 6
SUBJECT: Engineer Terrain Assessment

OBSERVATION (Mech): Engineer units are not conducting engineer battlefield analysis (EBA) to standard.

DISCUSSION:

1. While most engineer units are deploying with Terrabase or Terrabase II capabilities, their training level is rudimentary at best. Engineer companies frequently struggle to produce any useful EBA products, and these products, if produced, are rarely used to focus the staff and commanders as they develop their estimates.

2. During mission analysis, there is little detailed discussion of the terrain and how it will affect both friendly and enemy maneuver plans. The S2 often gives a general description of terrain that defines the area of operations (AO), but the S2/engineer team does not brief terrain effects in enough depth to assist the commander and staff in understanding the environment to any useful degree. As a result, the unit commander is not prepared for the challenges the terrain will pose for his unit as he fights the battle.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Engineers should conduct EBA in accordance with the guidance in Appendix A of FM 5-71-2. The information from the EBA provides a guide to the XO as he contributes to the IPB process during mission analysis.

2. The engineer representative should brief the effects of terrain using a modified combined obstacle overlay (MCOO) and the observation, concealment, obstacles, key terrain, avenues of approach (OCOKA) format during the mission analysis brief. Use the same formats for the task force OPORD brief to the company commanders.

3. Units must become proficient in the use of terrain analysis tools prior to deployment. They must develop standard products that will be produced for each type of mission.

a. These products must be produced as early in the mission analysis process as possible.

b. If possible, line-of-sight (LOS) projections should be produced at 1:50:000 scale on acetate. These should be distributed to other staff sections and subordinate units for their use in parallel planning.

c. As additional information becomes available on the COAs to be considered, the products must be refined. Refined terrain products should be included with the engineer annex to further assist subordinate commanders in their continuing planning process.

(TA.5.2.1 Collect Information on Situation)

TREND 7
SUBJECT: Engineer Battlefield Analysis (EBA)

OBSERVATION (Mech): The engineer unit commander frequently does not have a full understanding of the equipment, organization, and capabilities of the enemy engineer.

DISCUSSION: A lack of understanding of enemy capabilities leads to a superficial briefing of enemy engineer efforts and rarely includes their most likely location, timing, and method of employment. As a result, the commander is not prepared when the enemy uses mobility/ survivability assets against him. The plan to counter these actions are not resourced or synchronized into the friendly maneuver plan.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Engineers should conduct EBA in accordance with Appendix A of FM 5-71-2.

2. Address enemy capabilities, organizations and employment as outlined in FM 100-61, Armor- and Mechanized-Based Opposing Force Operational Art.

3. Wargame these capabilities against the terrain and mission at hand to refine them from a doctrinal standpoint to a most likely method of employment.

(TA.5.2.1 Collect Information on Situation)

TREND 8
SUBJECT: Air Defense Involvement in the Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB)

OBSERVATION (Mech): Air defense platoon leaders seldom provide air threat information to the S2 during the planning process.

DISCUSSION:

1. Air defense officers (ADOs) do not understand air intelligence and cannot determine how the enemy will use his air assets to support his scheme of maneuver.

2. Neither the S2 nor the ADO brief the air threat during mission analysis and preparation of the OPORD. On occasions when the air IPB is briefed, the ADO's intelligence is completely different from that of the S2.

3. The task force commander does not identify air defense priorities because of a lack of information on the enemy's air capabilities.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. The ADO should coordinate with the S2 to ensure that the air IPB is developed and supports the enemy ground scheme of maneuver.

2. Identify who will brief the air threat during mission analysis and OPORD preparation. The air IPB should be refined as information is collected on the enemy use of assets, his position, obstacles, and capabilities.

3. The ADO should develop an adequate ADA concept of operation which can support the task force scheme of maneuver.

(TA.5.2.1 Collect Information on Situation)

TREND 9
SUBJECT: Engineer Battlefield Assessment (EBA)

OBSERVATION (Engineer): Engineer company XOs, as task force planners, are not conducting EBA to standard.

DISCUSSION:

1. There is little detailed discussion of the terrain and how it will affect both friendly and enemy maneuver plans during the planning process. The S2 often gives a general description of terrain that defines the area of operations (AO), but the S2/engineer team does not brief terrain effects in enough depth to assist the commander and staff in understanding the environment to any useful degree.

2. Task force engineers are not adequately using terrain analysis systems and products. While most engineer units deploy with Terrabase or Terrabase II capabilities, their training level on the system is rudimentary. Engineer companies frequently struggle to produce any useful products, and these products, if produced, are rarely used to focus the staff and commanders as they develop their estimates. The end result is the unit commander is not prepared for the challenges the terrain will pose for his unit as he fights the battle.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Engineers should conduct EBA IAW FM 5-71-2, Appendix A. This provides a good guide to the XO as he contributes to the IPB process during mission analysis.

2. The engineer should brief the effects of terrain using a modified combined obstacle overlay (MCOO) and the observation, concealment, obstacles, key terrain, avenues of approach (OCOKA) format during the mission analysis brief and the TF OPORD brief to the company commanders.

3. Units should become proficient in the use of terrain analysis tools prior to deployment. They should develop standard products that will be produced for each type of mission. These products should be produced as early in the mission analysis process as possible.

4. If possible, line-of-sight (LOS) projections should be produced at 1:50:000 scale on acetate. These should be distributed to other staff sections and subordinate units for their use in parallel planning.

5. As additional information becomes available on the courses of action (COAs) to be considered, the products must be refined. Refined terrain products should be included with the engineer annex to further assist subordinate commanders in their continuing planning process.

(TA.5.2.1 Collect Information on Situation)

TREND 10
SUBJECT: Engineer and Task Force S2 Integration

OBSERVATION (Engineer): The engineer battlefield assessment (EBA) is not adequately integrated with the task force S2's IPB, SITEMP, and R&S plan.

DISCUSSION:

1. The platoon leader, as the task force (TF) staff engineer, seldom works with the TF S2 to integrate enemy engineer capabilities into mission analysis and COA development. Very often, the TF S2 templates the enemy's obstacle without regard to estimating the enemy's capabilities given time and assets available to the OPFOR engineers. This lack of integration usually occurs when light TFs do not conduct all the steps of the Tactical Decision-Making Process (TDMP), thus leaving the platoon leader with very little time to conduct mission analysis or provide input to the S2.

2. Most TFs are reluctant to integrate SAPPER teams into the TF's scout platoon R&S plan, which results in very little OBSINTEL prior to LD on offensive missions.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: The engineer and TF S2 should always work together to:

a. Template enemy engineer assets and assess their capabilities.

b. Template enemy obstacles and weak points in the enemy defensive plan.

c. Analyze terrain in the TF AO using Terrabase II products and developing a MCOO.

d. Develop engineer-specific PIR and NAIs covering templated obstacles.

e. Develop a R&S plan to collect OBSINTEL.

f. Ensure that engineers move and position engineers with TF scouts focused on specific NAIs.

(TA.5.2.1 Collect Information on Situation)

TREND 11
SUBJECT: Brigade Reconnaissance and Surveillance (R&S) Planning: Observers

OBSERVATION (FS): Brigade observer plans lack detail and synchronization.

DISCUSSION:

1. Brigade reconnaissance and surveillance (R&S) planning often does not address in detail striker or combat observation lasing team (COLT) missions.

2. Brigade R&S planning often does not address named area of interest (NAI) or target responsibilities.

3. Brigade R&S planning lacks continuity with respect to responsibilities and how these flow into the execution of brigade deep fires.

4. Often observer teams deploy lacking a clear understanding of how their mission fits into a task and purpose for the brigade's fire plan.

5. The brigade planning staff leaves planning of insertion operations by ground/air, route planning, and casualty evacuation (CASEVAC) to the brigade reconnaissance troop commander (or chief of reconnaissance), which often results in observers being out of position to perform their planned mission.

6. Under the new conservative heavy division (CHD) design, units equipped with brigade reconnaissance troops are using the striker platoon leader as outlined in ST 6-20-92, having him locate with the brigade reconnaissance troop commander and serve as his FSO. The end result in every rotation has been that command and control of strikers is difficult, and strikers are usually out of position and not prepared to execute the fire support plan developed during the brigade's planning process.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. The observers exist to support the brigade's fight, and their employment requires the integrated and synchronized planning efforts of the entire brigade staff. Planning for observer operations should begin as soon as high-value targets (HVTs) are identified, be refined as a course of action (COA) is developed, and be finalized during the wargame. This technique should ensure full utilization of and execution by a critical asset and key combat multiplier for both the R&S plan and the brigade fires plan execution. Suggested responsibilities for staff planning include:

a. S2/striker platoon leader/fire support officer (FSO) - Determine the requirements for strikers. Identify target areas of interest (TAIs) and NAIs for the purpose of providing intelligence and destroying high-payoff targets (HPTs).

b. S2/assistant brigade engineer (ABE) - Conduct a terrain analysis to identify possible observation posts (OPs) using Terrabase and the expertise of the staff.

c. S3/chief of reconnaissance - Allocate resources for the mission (enlisted terminal attack controllers (ETACs), Sappers, intelligence and electronic warfare (IEW) personnel, scouts, aircraft, needed supplies and transportation, additional communications, and so forth). Plan for the insertion and extraction mission like any other operation, to include determining infiltration methods, planned routes, checkpoints, LZs, PZs, false insertions, FPOL or RPOL, and emergency resupply. Make coordination for aircraft, retransmission (retrans) vehicles, and land management.

d. Brigade signal officer (BSO) - Determine the overall communication plans and the requirement for retrans positioning. Assist in the coordination and use of alternate communications assets.

e. S4 - Support the infiltration and extraction. Plan resupply, CASEVAC, and if applicable, storage caches.

f. FSO/striker platoon leader - Prepare orders, give backbriefs to the commander, and conduct pre-combat checks and pre-combat inspections (PCCs/PCIs). Ensure rehearsals are conducted both at the team level and at the combined arms reserve (CAR).

g. S2/S3/FSO - Execution. Provide staff supervision until the mission is complete.

2. The striker platoon leader should remain at the brigade main command post (CP) to help in the planning and execution of strikers' missions, and the execution of fires by strikers in accordance with the brigade's plan. The platoon sergeant should locate with the brigade reconnaissance troop CP to help facilitate preparation of teams, deal with logistical issues, and perform liaison with the brigade reconnaissance troop commander.

(TA.5.2.2 Collect Target Information)

TREND 12
SUBJECT: Scout Platoon Use of Thermal Night Vision Equipment

OBSERVATION (Mech): Scout platoons are not using their organic thermal night vision equipment.

DISCUSSION:

1. The thermal sight is a significant night vision asset that the scout platoons do not use during force-on-force operations.

2. The scouts use PVS-7s in their observation posts (OPs) during night operations, and as a result, are not able to identify many enemy vehicles on the battlefield. The PVS-7 has a limited range for vehicle identification. When the enemy is using good light discipline, the OPs cannot find the enemy ambush and battle positions.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. The scout platoon must train to use their organic thermal sites in OPs.

2. Scout platoons must deploy to the NTC with the thermal site equipment they have been issued.

3. Battery recharging and replacement challenges should be worked out prior to deployment to the NTC.

(TA.5.2.2 Collect Target Information)

TREND 13
SUBJECT: S2 Evaluation of Threat Information

OBSERVATION (FS): Battalion S2s seldom adequately analyze the effects of weather and terrain or identify probable enemy courses of action (COAs).

DISCUSSION:

1. Most battalion S2s do not provide the intelligence information needed for battalion mission analysis.

2. S2s seldom evaluate the effects of weather and terrain on friendly forces or consider multiple enemy COAs. They have difficulty describing an aggressive, uncooperative enemy to the battalion staff.

3. The staff seldom produces a decision support template (DST) or develops specific commander's critical information requirements (CCIRs) for the course of the wargame.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. S2s should follow the IPB process as described in FM 34-130, Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield.

2. Since the IPB process involves all staff members, not merely the S2, the battalion should train IPB and the orders process as a staff at Home Station.

3. For every mission, SITEMPs should be produced for at least two enemy COAs. These SITEMPs and corresponding event templates drive wargaming and provide the means to facilitate analysis of combat information during the fight.

4. A decision support template (DST) should be developed as a result of the wargame. The DST greatly assists the staff in refining priority intelligence requirements (PIRs) and friendly forces information requirements (FFIRs), in synchronizing combat power, and in developing triggers for movement and resupply operations. By identifying decisions that must be made, the DST serves to focus the battle staff during the course of an operation.

(TA.5.3.1 Evaluate Threat Information)

TREND 14
SUBJECT: Engineer S2 Roles and Responsibilities

OBSERVATION (Engineer): Engineer S2s often do not have a full understanding of their roles and responsibilities.

DISCUSSION:

1. Engineer S2s are not adequately trained at Home Station to understand what products are needed to visualize the battlefield or conduct threat analysis. They do not adequately understand terrain analysis.

2. Engineer S2s are dependent on the brigade S2 for all enemy templates and are not contributing to brigade planners, such as the ABE, with enemy engineer capabilities.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Engineer S2s must, prior to deployment, be thoroughly versed on battalion/brigade SOPs, as well as the engineer battalion commander's intent on shaping the battlefield offensively or defensively.

2. Terrain analysis should be ongoing at home station. Engineer S2s must be able to determine how the OPFOR will use the terrain to their advantage. Understanding OPFOR capabilities is paramount to any unit's success.

(TA.5.3.1 Evaluate Threat Information)

TREND 15
SUBJECT: Event Templates and Matrices

OBSERVATION (Mech): Task force S2s rarely produce event templates or event matrices that focus on critical enemy events.

DISCUSSION:

1. Event templates or matrices, when developed correctly, identify critical enemy events and help distinguish between enemy courses of action (COAs). Without the template or matrix, the focus of reconnaissance and surveillance (R&S) plans is reduced.

2. S2s generally develop two or three enemy COAs for each plan. These COAs are usually developed graphically through a sketch, but are rarely developed in sufficient detail. This causes a unit to misunderstand critical enemy events and time/distance relationships.

3. S2s often enter wargaming sessions with nothing more than a sketch of enemy COAs.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. S2s must understand the importance of the event template. The event template facilitates development of an enemy COA. At a minimum, the following things should be found on the event template:

a. Friendly graphics

b. Key terrain

c. Enemy objectives

d. Avenues of approach

e. Mobility corridors

f. Time phase lines and named areas of interest

2. Other items that can be included, but are not required, are probable locations of high-value targets and enemy decision points.

3. The event matrix is another helpful tool in developing detailed enemy courses of action. It should be used as a companion to the template. An event matrix can help identify key decisions that the enemy commander has to make (such as when to commit the reserve), and can help the S2 determine what the enemy can actually do based on time, distance, task organization, capabilities, and limitations.

4. Event templates and event matrices help the S2 contribute positively to the wargame and significantly improve the task force's understanding of the enemy COAs.

(TA.5.3.4.1 Develop Enemy Intentions)

TREND 16
SUBJECT: Intelligence Reporting

OBSERVATION (FS): Battalion S2s often do not pass important intelligence and combat information to higher levels or subordinate units.

DISCUSSION:

1. S2s send occasional periodic intelligence reports (PERINTREPs), but these reports are sporadic at best. There is also no system to track the times at which PERINTREPs are sent.

2. S2s often have information which would be of tremendous value to batteries, the brigade, DIVARTY, or the DS and/or reinforcing battalion, but do not always relay this information in a timely manner.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Battalion S2s should develop a standard PERINTREP format and a tool to track the times that the reports are sent.

2. Battalion S2s should develop a system to track the commander's priority intelligence requirements (PIRs) and information requirements (IRs), as well as those of his higher headquarters and subordinate units. When information is received that answers a PIR or IR, this information should be sent immediately and the time and contents of this report should be entered in the S2's log.

(TA.5.4 Prepare and Disseminate Intelligence Reports)

TREND 17
SUBJECT: Enemy Course of Action (ECOA) Development

OBSERVATION (FS): Battalion S2s seldom develop several enemy courses of action (COAs).

DISCUSSION: The inability to develop more than one enemy COA is not normally due to a lack of competence on the part of the S2, but rather a result of a restricted planning timeline. S2s are only allowed sufficient time to develop one threat COA, and the staff has no appreciation for the various avenues of approach or forms of contact available to the enemy. If the enemy executes a different COA than what is planned for by the staff, the unit does not have the systems in place to defeat the threat and is unable to react in a timely manner.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. The battalion S2 should coordinate with the brigade combat team (BCT) S2 for early receipt of the situation template (SITEMP) to allow for more time to develop multiple threat COAs.

2. S2s and staffs should practice staff drills at Home Station. S2s must be able to produce SITEMPs in a timely manner to address at least the most likely and most dangerous threat COAs.

3. The S2 should then describe how the enemy will fight and maneuver, not just how and where he will move. With this information, the staff can develop a flexible plan capable of defeating multiple enemy COAs.

(TA.5.4.2 Prepare Reports on Enemy Intentions)

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TA.1 Maneuver BOS Narrative

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NTC TRENDS AND TTPs 1st and 2nd Quarters, FY 99

NTC TRENDS AND TTPs
1st and 2nd Quarters, FY 99