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CHAPTER 6

AIR VOLCANO OPERATIONS AT THE NTC

by CPT Gregory A. Baker

Air Volcano operations continue to be one the most dynamic aviation operations conducted at the National Training Center (NTC). It is a rare exception to have a brigade combat team (BCT) deploy to Mojavia (NTC's scenario name) without its supporting assault/utility aircraft bringing at least one Volcano system. In most cases units bring two systems into theater. So how has this combat multiplier worked? How have BCTs and aviation units planned what FM 20-32, Mine/Countermine Operations, says requires extensive pre-mission coordination and positive control during air emplacement? What detailed mission planning process should a unit use for missions that almost always go cross FLOT or to the forward edge of the battle area? Unfortunately, the air Volcano system is relatively new to combat support operations. Aviation doctrine (FM 1-113, Utility and Cargo Helicopter Operations) outlines planning responsibilities at the division and aviation battalion level. Mine/countermine doctrine (FM 20-32) places planning responsibilities on the ALO, S-3 Air, engineer, and air defense officer. Additionally, countermine doctrine addresses the critical importance of developing triggers for employment. The question remains: How are units planning air Volcano operations? Does the aircrew execution achieve the desired results? Let us answer one of the questions upfront. How has the air Volcano worked as a combat multiplier?

Scenario #1

The mission: General Support Aviation Battalion (GSAB) employs a block minefield NLT 162000 Mar 00 from NV 263270 to NV 262273 in order to block the Alpine Valley AA from dismounted movement.

This mission is in support of an aviation task force (ATF) and a light infantry defense of the Leach Lake Passes complex. Initial ground commander's intent has the ATF establishing a forward operating base (FOB) in Leach Lake Valley with light infantry in support. The ATF conducts multiple missions, including the air movement of light infantry, establishment of a forward FARP to facilitate conducting attack operations deep in support of division, and operations in support of the light infantry's area defense. The infantry battalion S-2 identified a key mounted and dismounted AA that led through the Alpine Valley into the flank of the FOB and light infantry defense. To secure this AA, infantry and the ATF planned an engagement area, EA APACHE in Alpine Valley. Part of EA APACHE included an integrated Volcano minefield to seal the AA. The infantry engineer planned the minefield at the most restrictive point in the valley. One company from the infantry battalion placed OPs to overwatch the minefield, and TRPs were registered in support of the engagement area. The purpose of the minefield was to disrupt TF Destroyer recon elements from their FSE early in the evening of 16 Mar 00, while the second minefield sowed in the same location would block the main body from using the valley.

That night one of two UH-60As modified for Volcano operations landed at the base forward arming and refueling point (FARP), Dogwood, run by the ASB, and loaded the system. The aircraft departed the FARP and proceeded to the FOB to link up with the TAC and the TF S-3. The possibility of enemy contact caused the crew to displace to a Holding Area (HA) east of the FOB. While at the HA, SPOTREPs were passed reporting enemy vehicles at the entrance of Alpine Valley. The crew emplaced the initial minefield at 2000 hours, returned to the AA, and conducted a crew change out. As expected, TF Destroyer entered Alpine valley and discovered the minefield. After a lengthy breach operation, the forward security element (FSE) moved into EA APACHE, where infantry waited. At 2200 hours, the second crew departed the assembly area, arrived at FARP Dogwood, and loaded a second set of mines. The Volcano aircraft repositioned forward to the HA near FARP Grapefruit and waited for the call to reseed the initial minefield. The standardization instructor pilot (SIP) walked to the TAC to conduct final coordination for the attack. SPOTREPs confirmed enemy vehicles in the Alpine Valley. This mission would have a dedicated suppression of enemy air defense (SEAD) package used to protect the aircrew while it ingressed between two enemy elements. At 0356 hours, a rolling SEAD package fell along the north wall ridgeline and in Alpine Valley. Four minutes later the volcano crew emplaced the minefield as the main body of TF Destroyer approached. At 0405 hours, a BMP, BRDM, and seven dismounts of the main body were destroyed in the Volcano minefield as what the enemy thought was a breached minefield had been reseeded just five minutes before their arrival. The block minefield had been laid in front of the main body of TF Destroyer. TF Destroyer's main body remained stuck in place for 20 minutes while they attempted to breach the block minefield. Fortunately for the Krasnoviaons (NTC OPFOR), the planned multiple launch rocket system (MLRS) attack upon TF Destroyer's main body was never fired.

Overall, a very successful mission. The infantry commander developed the ground tactical intent for the Volcano minefield. The aviation company developed a scheme of maneuver for emplacement of the minefield on the ground. The ATF developed an air movement plan, a pick-up and loading plan, and a staging plan to get the Volcano loads forward on the battlefield. The previous planning sequence should sound very familiar. In fact, it is laid out in detail in FM 90-4, Air Assault Operations.

Air Assault Planning = Volcano Success

The air assault is a mission in which assault forces, using firepower, mobility, and total integration of helicopter assets, maneuver on the battlefield under the control of the ground or air maneuver commander to engage and destroy enemy forces or to seize and hold key terrain. FM 1-113, Utility and Cargo Helicopter Operations, states that the number of aircraft involved in an operation does not define the air assault.

Is an air Volcano mission an air assault? No, but the planning requirements and planning process for air Volcano operations or air assaults remain the same. Under the guidance given in FM 1-113, units must plan and execute the air assault operation, regardless of the number of assets involved, as a combined arms operation. Time required for planning may vary depending upon METT-T, but planning considerations should be the same. The air Volcano mission needs the same level of detailed planning that one sees for an air assault. The best air Volcano operations executed at the NTC have this level of detail because units are treating them like air assaults. The task now is to formalize this procedure into planning guidance and procedures that units can integrate into Home Station training and unit standing operating procedures (SOPs).

Like the air assault, the foundation of a successful air Volcano operation is the commander's ground tactical plan. What is the task and purpose of the Volcano target? How does the minefield tie into the BCT's obstacle plan? More importantly, how does the proposed minefield tie into the terrain and how does the commander on the ground want the minefield to look? All of the above are critical to the aircrew's execution of the minefield. Additionally, the ground tactical plan allows for the development of realistic triggers that prepare the system for deployment. Units must base deployment of the systems on triggers tied into the brigade's recon and security plan with overwatched NAIs and DPs. Once the aviation unit commander knows the ground commander's intent, the unit moves on to the landing plan (Volcano deployment plan).

The Volcano deployment plan must support the ground tactical plan, such as the landing plan in an air assault supports the ground tactical plan. The crew must know the type of minefield (disrupt, turn, fix, or block) and the control technique used to support the minefield deployment (visual identification, time lapse, canister countdown, and GPS/Doppler guidance). Additionally, an initial point (IP) needs to be chosen that will both support the actual minefield deployment and protect the aircraft and crew from direct observation. Important to remember is the point that the air Volcano is not a bomber aircraft flown over the top of approaching enemy formations. Aircrews that fly in bomber profiles do not survive to see the next day's fight. Utility aircraft units need to maximize the use of terrain-based products to enhance their mission planning to include AMPS, ASAS, Terrabase, and any other mission planning systems available. The next step in the planning process is the air movement plan.

Very seldom is just one minefield planned in support of the BCT's scheme of maneuver. The range of planning options for an air Volcano minefield has run the gamut at the NTC from twelve different minefields to just one. At no point should a unit plan to execute more than three air Volcano minefields per system, per mission. Once a staff verifies minefield targets, they should develop tentative flight routes to control, protect, and sequence the Volcano aircraft into its deployment areas. Again, units should apply the same flight route characteristics outlined in FM 90-4 during the planning process. Of critical success to the mission is the integration of SEAD planning along the flight route.

Coordination now shifts to the loading plan. This phase of the planning is separated into two areas of focus. First area of focus is placement of the system in the AO (aviation AA, brigade, HAs) that will give the commander the flexibility to execute the air Volcano mission. This is of critical importance, especially when working with a four-hour duration minefield. The NAIs, DPs, and associated triggers for employment are backward planned to develop the timeline to not only posture the system forward in the brigade's sector, but to initiate appropriate REDCON levels for deployment. Second area of focus is the logistical requirement to upload mines on the system. The most flexible and fastest means of uploading is integrating the procedure into FARP operations. Moving the system to an engineer unit and transloading the mines from a ground system to an air system requires more time.

Staging operations focus on the unit coordinating for the supply of the mines. Volcano mines are in limited numbers and will be under a restricted supply rate. Units must coordinate pick up and transport of the mines. The best transport used at the NTC is the HEMMT Cargo. Otherwise, a forklift works well to move the mine's honeycomb packaging. Whether using an aviation FARP or an engineer resupply point, removing the mines from the honeycombs and uploading the mines on the Volcano system is labor intensive. Staging the air Volcano system is time consuming, and aircrews must accomplish this well in advance of expected deployment times. Units need to develop a standardized Volcano upload point that provides rapid response time whether it is the aviation unit or an engineer unit conducting the upload.

Planning for air Volcano operations now falls into five easy steps: ground commander's intent for the minefield, mine deployment plan, aerial movement plan, loading plan, and staging plan.

What other critical issues are units addressing or not addressing in the conduct of and planning for air Volcano? Let us take a look at another mission flown at the NTC.

Scenario #2

Mission: On order, GSAB emplaces Volcano minefields to disrupt and block AAs, allowing the ATF and the 1st BCT commands to shape the battlefield.

Planning for this mission was complicated. The first mission planned was in support of a covering force battle against the attacking Krasnovian regiment. It used detailed terrain analysis to support the battle. Using both All Sources Analysis System (ASAS) and Maneuver Control System (MCS) products, the unit developed two minefields that would support the battle by denying the Colorado Wadi system and forcing the OPFOR into the open where AH-64As could destroy the regiment. Unfortunately, the planners did not link NAIs to decision points (DPs), nor did they develop well-defined triggers for the mission. That night the air Volcano aircraft arrived at the FARP only to find no Volcano ammunition on hand. Two hours later the ammunition arrived, putting the overall plan four hours behind schedule. After uploading the system, the crew moved to a holding area outside the FARP.

The order to execute the obstacle was given, but there were conflicts in the Army airspace command and control (A2C2) plan from the attack and cavalry aircraft flying that night, thus preventing the launch of the Volcano Bird. The trigger was missed and the OPFOR moved into the Wadi system. The aircrew now defaulted to the contingency missions planned by BCT. The brigade engineer planned five different minefields. To support this effort, the aircrew loaded data loader cartridges of the Aviation Mission Planning System (AMPs) and Doppler/GPS with the contingency minefield initial points (IPs), start points (SPs), and release points (RPs), and the A2C2structure. An execute order was given to place a disrupt minefield. The unit planned this minefield for the Valley of Death and in support of a TF comprised of heavy and light forces. While en route, the aircraft received updated reports advising of enemy contact in the Valley of Death. Just after turning inbound from the IP, the aircraft was engaged by direct fire from T-80s breaching the main obstacle belt. The air Volcano crew immediately aborted the mission. One hour later, the crew was again sent out, this time to a hastily planned minefield located in Red Lake Pass. This minefield was not one of the original five planned minefields. Only an SP and RP were given; the aircrews chose an IP they felt would support the mission. On ingress to the RP, the aircraft was shot down by a BMP.

Unfortunately, too many missions occur this way. What happened in the last mission sequence? Where did the unit go wrong? There is no one single answer except to say it was a series of mistakes, all focusing on coordination issues. How does a unit overcome these problems?

Once the unit selects a course of action which identifies the need for the air Volcano system and issues a WARNO, the aviation unit specifies a location and time for an initial planning conference. Minimum attendance at the initial planning conference should include the brigade engineer, S-2 representative, S-3 Air, aviation LNO, FSE, AMC, and aviation battalion S-3. At the initial planning conference, participants exchange critical information, to include locations of planned minefields with commander's intent, initial triggers, and timeline; they identify locations of loading and staging areas, a tentative air movement plan, a fire support plan, a deception plan, abort criteria, and a communication plan. Once the initial planning conference is complete, the aviation staff takes the information back and the five-step planning process begins. During planning, the aviation S-3 maintains positive communications with the aviation LNO and finalizes any outstanding coordination issues with the BCT. Critical areas of focus during this phase include refining triggers for employment, airspace deconfliction, and fire support planning. Once planning is complete, the aviation S-3 backbriefs the aviation LNO who conducts an AMB at the brigade. The planning process continues with incorporation of the Volcano plan into the aviation battalion's overall plan. The unit publishes its OPORD, conducts the aircrew brief, and finally rehearses from the aircrew through the fire support channels to the brigade. Rehearsing air Volcano triggers and deployment criteria is critical. Finally, the aviation commander conducts condition checks to ensure all criteria is met for mission success.

Conclusion

Air Volcano missions will continue to play a major part in brigade-level operations, not only at the NTC but also across the Army, as TFs deploy to support contingency operations. It is important that units develop planning techniques that are efficient and will facilitate the detailed planning required to complete a mission which needs extensive pre-mission coordination and positive control during air emplacement. A planning technique is already in place that will facilitate air Volcano operations. The five steps of the air assault planning process are well known and easily integrated into a planning process. Units that focus on the ground commander's intent for the minefield and an aerial air movement plan, loading plan, staging plan, and mine deployment plan will be successful. Additionally, the use of a set planning process with WARNOs, initial planning conferences, AMBs, battalion orders, and air crew briefs and rehearsals, plus close coordination between the aviation battalion and BCT aviation LNO will prevent lapses in coordination. The air Volcano system is an excellent combat multiplier. The use of aerial delivered scatterable munitions gives ground commanders great flexibility in the conduct of operations. With proper planning, the air Volcano system will continue to be a major player in force-on-force operations.

Tactics, Techniques and Procedures

1. Planning. Separate Volcano planning into the five plans of an air assault. Most UH-60 units are familiar with this format and it covers all required items.

2. Triggers. Establishing ground commander's intent and developing triggers to support the deployment during MDMP are critical. While planning, strong LNOs are only effective if they understand the air assault planning process and the required coordination necessary through mission execution.

3. Briefing Process (WO, initial planning conference, OPORD, crew brief, rehearsals). LNOs must understand their requirements and how to plan. Ensure all participants understand and review the details of the mission.

4. Logistics. Unit MTOEs are not set up to transport Volcano mines, so outside support is necessary. Establish relationships as early as possible to coordinate how mines will get to aircraft.