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CHAPTER 5

DIRECT FIRE PLANNING

by CPT Paul A. Mele and CPT John E. Burger

Introduction

Though possessing the necessary combat power, companies often fail to achieve the desired effects during direct fire engagements. Why? Because companies are not developing, rehearsing, or executing successful direct fire plans. Lacking a detailed direct fire plan, companies fail to mass fires, lose the initiative to an agile OPFOR, and suffer excessive losses near the engagement areas (EA). Additionally, without a detailed plan and accompanying rehearsal, companies waste an excessive amount of station time trying to deconflict organic fires, attempting to maneuver as demanded by changing conditions, and employing complimentary systems. The end result is that the company does not accomplish the mission within the commander's intent, and requires additional time and assets to achieve the desired effects.

FM 1-112, Attack Helicopter Operations, explains the eight-step process for EA planning to ensure successful EA development and direct fire planning. "Plan the direct fire fight" (step 4) is the essence of attack helicopter company operations and, doctrinally, the company's responsibility; however, companies generally devote little energy to this task. Additionally, the company commander must understand battalion EA development (steps 1-3) to ensure the company accomplishes the mission within the commander's intent. One technique to develop the direct fire plan is to use the principles of direct fire as a framework to ensure the completeness of the company plan. These principles are not compartmentalized blocks to be addressed in isolation, but integrated steps, each refining the others. Additionally, continuous review of the principles throughout all phases of planning and execution is critical to ensure the fire plan remains viable as battlespace conditions change.

The points below, organized according to the principles of direct fire, focus on some of the repetitive deficiencies prevalent in direct fire plans developed by attack and cavalry aviation units fighting at the National Training Center (NTC). Where applicable, tactics, techniques and procedures are available to help the company avoid the usual pitfalls and develop a detailed, successful direct fire plan.

Mass

Observation: Companies do not bring all available systems to bear on the OPFOR at the critical time and place.
Discussion: Too often commanders, especially in the close fight, do not identify and capitalize on the many fire and acquisition systems available to them. They rarely consider: Are my organic fires enough to accomplish the mission? What complimentary systems are available during my station time? Is CAS loitering within range? Supporting indirect fires? Are mortars available? Are obstacles in the EA? Are there ground units that can help gain and maintain contact? When engaged by only attack aircraft, OPFOR rapidly action all systems toward the attacking aircraft, usually achieving direct hits by ADA and tanks. When employed, supporting fires from complimentary systems destroy OPFOR systems, force OPFOR to fight in multiple directions, and provide covering fire while aircraft maneuver and egress.

Similarly, planners rarely consider obstacles and their effects on the OPFOR in the EA during direct fire planning, even though "obstacles" is one of four characteristics of a good EA listed in Section 3-3 of FM 1-112. Units do not integrate anticipated OPFOR reactions to obstacles in the direct fire plan. Companies must base target array and fire pattern methods of fire distribution on how the OPFOR will look before, during, and after negotiating the obstacles. Companies must also anticipate OPFOR obscuration of obstacles and the resulting degradation of target acquisition and precision-guided munitions performance.

Often, aviation companies lose valuable station time maneuvering and acquiring the OPFOR when other BCT members have already gained contact. Companies must continually seek OPFOR locations and dispositions from all acquisition systems available. Cross-talk between the company and the ground task forces, ground cavalry scouts, COLTs, LRSDs, BRTs, GSRs, and other available intelligence gathering systems will help the company maneuver to engage the enemy quickly and with minimal aircraft losses. Proactive planning and coordination results in responsive, effective use of all complimentary systems to help the company maneuver, acquire the enemy, and maximize effects of their organic weapons.

Company commanders also fail to identify exactly when and where the effects of their fires can be most lethal against the OPFOR. What is the critical time and place? Usually the company is given a time and place to conduct the attack based on the S-2's analysis, but seldom does the OPFOR present itself exactly when and where the S-2 predicted. Companies that identify "XXXX hours" as the critical time and the templated OPFOR positions in the EA as the critical place regardless of battlespace conditions and OPFOR disposition, rarely succeed when forced to develop a maneuver and fire plan on the go. The commander must prepare the company to transition to a movement-to-contact and then a hasty attack when unable to acquire the OPFOR from primary positions. Intelligence must drive company maneuver to defeat the thinking, uncooperative OPFOR. Successful, proactive commanders use validated company battle drills or "plays" to quickly build and disseminate a maneuver plan that places the company where it can best achieve the desired effects. Based on a thorough analysis of the commander's intent and the company refinement of battalion IPB, the commander may choose to wait in present position, maneuver to engage OPFOR, or return to HA/AA.

Leaders Control Fires

Observation: Companies deliver piecemeal fires into the EA because they fail to initiate fires at the critical time and place or to continually assess effectiveness of their fires during the engagement.
Discussion: FM1-112, Section 3-16, details the processes for commanders to control fires; however, companies often fail to mass organic fires or synchronize supporting fires because they have not developed a plan to initiate and control fires. Most units rely on directive measures such as radio messages (fire commands) to initiate fires, but often aircraft dispersed for survivability in broken terrain around the EA fail to receive the command, resulting in piecemealed fires. Rarely do companies develop back-up procedural measures (fire plans) with triggers such as "point on ground," "OPFOR action," or "time." If developed, companies usually fail to properly integrate these triggers into the EA. In many instances, not all crews can observe the trigger point on the ground, nor do they understand what kind of OPFOR element crossing that point should trigger fires. Often, the acquisition of a lone OPFOR vehicle results in unwarranted, premature, piecemealed fires that alert the OPFOR main body to aircraft positions. Likewise, crews do not understand what OPFOR actions should trigger company fires: OPFOR actioning towards aircraft? maneuvering out of EA? establishing defensive posture? Commanders must develop clear intent and engagement criteria that detail each planned fires trigger for both organic and supporting systems to facilitate massed fires.

When "Time on Target" is the backup trigger, units often fail to achieve massed fires because leaders fail to continually assess the OPFOR disposition after takeoff and, accordingly, amend the "time" to initiate fires. The uncooperative OPFOR may not be in range or the disposition expected at the "planned time," but some crews will initiate fires anyway. Similarly, commanders do not understand the necessary tasks and associated time required for those tasks that precede initiation of fires to develop the planned "Time on Target." Often, en route planning is sufficient, but analysis of actions necessary between RP and trigger pull (such as maneuver to and clear of the attack-by-fire position, establish local security, adjust fires distribution, and acquire OPFOR) is insufficient to develop a realistic "time" to initiate fires. The company reverse planning sequence must include detailed analysis of those tasks required between takeoff and trigger pull combined with company IPB, to ensure posturing of all weapon systems to achieve the desired effects at the critical time and place.

Commanders must also develop disengagement and reposition criteria to help preserve the company's plan to mass fires. Commanders seldom evaluate the company's disposition and effectiveness during the engagement. Therefore, aircrews often remain in ineffective positions, achieving little effects, rather than maneuvering to more suitable positions. Commanders that do try to maneuver are unable to clearly articulate the maneuver plan because they have not developed, validated, and trained company battle drills or "plays" to execute in such situations. Consequently, excessive radio traffic and poorly articulated task and purpose cause uncoordinated maneuver with piecemealed fires. Commanders must enforce proper reporting procedures and standards to assess the company's effectiveness (BDA, OPFOR reaction) during their engagement to provide sound, timely recommendations to higher. These recommendations are essential for higher to control the fires and assets in its task organization.

Focus Fires

Observation: Companies fail to mass fires in the EA because company IPB does not identify the critical time and place fires are necessary to achieve the commander's intent.
Discussion: "Our company fires will be focused into the EA." Too often this constitutes the entire effort dedicated to focusing company fires during direct fire planning. Commanders do not understand the criticality of translating the intent from higher into a very specific "what to shoot and when" for their crews. Commanders do not deliberately wargame how the OPFOR will maneuver through the EA or how the OPFOR will look at each stage of the engagement. Usually the company plans to attack a red OPFOR icon, templated in the middle of the EA. To accurately "see the OPFOR," company IPB must break the enemy down to individual vehicles. No unit yet has acquired a red diamond rolling across the desert floor. Once able to "see the OPFOR," the commander must provide guidance to the planning cells to ensure the company plan accomplishes the mission within the commander's intent. One successful method is to enumerate the critical tasks necessary to achieve the desired effects throughout the direct fire engagement. Tasks are METT-T dependent and may be as simple as stating the engagement and target priorities; however, they become more complex during close, combined arms battles.

The commander may list his critical tasks during commander's guidance as such: (1) Get "last read" prior to RP; (2) Alert supporting indirect fires 3 minutes out from ABF; (3) Initiate fires when seven tanks cross PL SAW/or OPFOR begins obscuration operations or if an OPFOR 1 and 2 mix close within 3500 meters of ABF Position 1; (4) Target priorities - smokers (if operating), T-80, or AT BRDM/BMP, 2S3/1, ADA; (5) Engagement priorities per SOP; (6) Maneuver to alternate assault by fire position if 2 x 2S3/1 cross 47 N/S gridline; (7) Maneuver to alternate assault-by-fire position if 2/4 breaches eastern most obstacle belt; (8) Maneuver a team to supplementary assault-by-fire postion if an MRC (3/10) bypasses EA to north; (9) Fire targets AC0024 and AC0032 to support team maneuver; (10) Fire targets AC0025-AC0029 one minute prior to egress.

Focus from the commander allows subordinate leaders and integrated company planning cells to develop a clear task and purpose for each aircrew, determine what effects company fires must have, integrate complimentary systems, and refine company battle drills or "plays." During execution, commanders must maintain situational awareness to understand if and when their focus must change. Success or failure of a particular friendly COA or an unexpected OPFOR action or capability can quickly change the focus of the unit's direct fire plan. With a well-defined "what to shoot and when," the commander can then decide "how" to focus (distribute) the necessary fires given the systems he has available.

Distribute Fires

Observation: Crews executing the direct fire engagement do not know the primary focus of their fires, their alternate area of focus, or the role their fires play in achieving the commander's intent.
Discussion: "Left shoots left and long; right shoots right and close." Sound familiar? Regularly that short statement defines the company plan to distribute fires in the EA. What constitutes left and right? What separates close from long? The commander must provide clarity in the direct fire plan or unanswered questions such as these will continue to cause overkill of some targets while others maneuver from the EA unimpeded. The often used "left shoot left and long..etc." plan is a combination of two doctrinal methods (fire patterns and target array) described in FM 1-112, Chapter 3, Figure 3-26. However, the plan is never truly developed with necessary integrated terrain and OPFOR considerations like shape, size, and disposition of the OPFOR in the EA; definable portions of target array; or vertical relief of the EA terrain. Similarly, units often use the sector method with little or no integration of the EA terrain. Firing positions depicted on blank butcher paper with indiscriminate left and right azimuths as sector boundaries is another example of the normal detail often given fire distribution. Most direct fire plans simply fail to address the methods for distributing fires described in FM 1-112, Chapter 3, Figure 3-26. A simple yet detailed plan employing one or multiple methods of fire distribution will provide greater situational awareness and ensure all crews understand their task and purpose for systematically destroying the OPFOR's systems and capabilities. Simply put, a detailed fires distribution plan with task and purpose for each aircrew helps all crews understand "where" the commander wants the effects of their fires.

Shift Fires

Observation: Units fail to achieve the desired effects throughout the duration of the engagement because commanders fail to shift fires in response to changing battlefield conditions.
Discussion: Most companies do not develop a proactive plan to shift fires based on anticipated changes in battlefield conditions or OPFOR disposition and reactions. Furthermore, company commanders fail to shift fires during the engagement when their fires cease having the desired effects. The plan to shift fires must counter possible OPFOR reactions to company fires, indirect fires, and obstacles in the EA. Additionally, units rarely shift fires to counter OPFOR attacks against company positions or to facilitate maneuver to supplementary or alternate positions. The company can develop a plan to shift fires by wargaming anticipated OPFOR reactions in the EA during the engagement. Using validated and practiced company battle drills or "plays" provides an excellent base from which to build a shift fires plan and an extremely effective method for the commander to articulate his intent when shifting fires by command during the engagement. Commanders should rehearse not only fire commands but calls to shift fires or execute "plays" to ensure crews understand how the call will sound and how they will receive key information. A proactive, rehearsed plan to shift fires is essential to effectively counter OPFOR actions in the EA and deny the OPFOR the chance to seize the initiative.

Fire Plan (All Crews Understand) and Rehearsal

Observation: Units fail to achieve massed fires because aircrews do not understand all elements of the direct fire plan. Additionally, aircrews complete the rehearsal without gaining a lasting mental picture of the sequence of actions within the fire plan.
Discussion: Too often, the rehearsal is the first pre-execution event cancelled when time becomes short. Similarly, if conducted, the emphasis of the rehearsal is often on en route tasks instead of focusing on critical events such as actions at the EA. Often, the rehearsal immediately follows the company mission brief with no time allowed for teams/crews to digest the mission information. Without time to review the plan, crews fail to become active participants and the rehearsal digresses to more dry recitation from the commander. The effectiveness of the rehearsal depends not on the detail of the terrain representation but on the crews' proficiency in reciting their task and purpose for each phase of the engagement. FM 1-112, Section 3-17, lists 17 questions that serve well to gauge the aircrews' understanding of the company's fire plan. The commander may also review the list to determine the completeness of the direct fire plan before briefing.

Additionally, many of the questions serve well as briefing items for aircrews during the scripted rehearsal. When all crews can effectively discuss the 17 listed points, they collectively have a strong mental impression of how the engagement will unfold and can identify all conflicts and elements of the fire plan requiring additional coordination. Crews with a well-developed mental picture of the fire plan have greater situational awareness, spend less time on the radio seeking guidance, and devote more energy to the crew tasks required to acquire and destroy the OPFOR. Furthermore, a well-understood plan provides a strong base from which the commander can disseminate changes with minimal communication and confusion. Company SOPs must detail how the company will execute the rehearsal. FM 101-5, Staff Organization and Operations, Appendix G, provides guidance on how the company can conduct a scripted rehearsal. At a minimum, crews must know the key times and actions they will rehearse, the sequence of events, and information they are to brief. Commanders must develop realistic timelines that permit crews to prepare for and conduct a detailed rehearsal, and then protect the time allotted. Lastly, validated company battle drills or "plays" allow the company to focus on critical tasks during the rehearsal rather than events common to every mission. Every company briefs "Occupy the HA per SOP," but then discusses the maneuver for some length. Developing, validating, and training frequently performed operations, such as IMC breakup, HA/FARP occupation, and team bounding, will cause "per SOP" to become a truly efficient and time-saving measure.

Summary

The first step in correcting difficulties with direct fire planning is to read and understand doctrine. Commanders and their crews must understand the eight steps of engagement area development, how the company's direct fire plan fits into EA development, the principles of direct fire planning, the characteristics of a good engagement area, and techniques for fire distribution. Once the company understands the science of their business, they must then conduct battle-focused situational training exercises or battle drills to gain proficiency. Commanders must break down their METL into executable blocks, and then develop SOPs or "plays" that will allow them to accomplish the mission. To have a valid SOP, commanders should: (1) Brainstorm or chalk-talk possible TTPs for accomplishing the task; (2) Rehearse possible TTPs on a terrain model; and (3) Execute STXs or battle drills to validate the TTP. Once the company accomplishes these three steps, they can evaluate which technique works best and then adopt that TTP as SOP. The unit must then drill these SOPs and "plays" during tough realistic training that integrates an uncooperative enemy, and follow up that training with an after-action review.

Tactics, Techniques and Procedures

1. Continuously review the principles of direct fire planning throughout mission planning and execution.

2. Integrate all available assets (fire support, CAS, ground elements observing the EA, obstacle plan) into the direct fire plan. These systems contribute fire power to help achieve the desired effects and aid in gaining/maintaining situational awareness.

3. Identify critical tasks that, if completed, will accomplish the mission within the commander's intent.

4. Use thorough IPB and wargaming to develop specificity in the direct fire plan, facilitate detailed rehearsals, and help gain/maintain situational awareness during execution.

5. Leaders must control fires and maneuver to ensure the company achieves the desired effects. Detailed trigger plans, maneuver schemes, assessment methods, and trained company "plays" will aide the commander in doing so.

6. Conduct scripted, task and purpose rehearsals focusing on the critical events necessary for mission accomplishment. Ensure aircrews actively participate and can clearly articulate the commander's intent for each assigned task. Rehearsals are not a "one-time, check the block" drill. FM 101-5, Appendix G, and CALL Newsletter No. 98-5, Rehearsals, clearly outline the importance of executing rehearsals throughout the planning and preparation portions of the operation.

7. Develop, validate, and train company "plays." Proficiency at these plays will aid maneuver during execution and facilitate command and control of the direct fire plan. Plays should focus on countering likely enemy reactions in and near the EA; often-executed operations such as occupation of HA, FARP, and AA; and standard company maneuver during mission execution.

8. The use of well-trained planning cells leads to more complete direct fire planning.