• Military Menu                       

• Introduction
• Systems
• Facilities
• Agencies
• Industry
• Operations
• Countries
• Hot Documents
• News
• Reports
• Policy
• Budget
• Congress
• Links

• WMD
• Intelligence
• Homeland Security
• Space

CHAPTER 7

AERIAL INSERTIONS TRENDS AT THE NTC

by MAJ Michael T. Alexander

A trend seen at the National Training Center is that aerial insertions are not receiving the support needed to ensure mission accomplishment. Units regard them as taskings to the aviation unit in support of the maneuver brigade, rather than a combined arms operation with all the detailed analysis, coordination, planning, and rehearsals that this entails. Any aerial insertion beyond the FLOT should have the same significance as an air assault.

Aviation units frequently insert three basic brigade elements: COLTs (combat observation laser teams), ETACs (enlisted tactical air controllers), and brigade scouts. These are all brigade assets and, more often than not, a very important part of the brigade's scheme of maneuver. Therefore, they deserve the most detailed planning that time will allow. The most common trend is the failure of units to set the conditions (fire support; situational awareness, both friendly and enemy; abort criteria; extraction plan for both the team being inserted and the aircrew; command and control; and FARP operations) for mission accomplishment. This article will briefly review each condition, trends, and possible solutions.

Fire Support

Suppression of enemy air defense (SEAD) too often falls into the "too hard to do" category, is forgotten in the planning process, or misunderstood by the staff and poorly planned. While SEAD is very challenging to plan and execute, without it a cross-FLOT operation is at increased risk for failure. METT-T will determine the proper amount, type, and employment method for SEAD. Too often units think that they have to destroy an ADA system to have a successful SEAD mission. At unit AARs, the NTC's OPFOR ADA commander consistently reports that this is not the case. Units need to explore what type of SEAD is available, appropriate, and adequate for the mission. A suppression mission to keep the ADA system in check while the aircraft passes through the effective range of the system is mission accomplishment. Nonlethal SEAD can also be extremely effective. If you can jam the enemy's radar and command and control frequencies, you can effectively take away his eyes and ears.

Situational Awareness

Situational awareness is essential to mission success. Without knowledge of the scheme of maneuver (why the insertion is occurring), the aircrew is executing the mission in the blind. It is also very important for the aircrew to receive the S-2's most current intelligence update. Without this condition check, the unit should seriously consider aborting the mission. This is an invitation for an aircraft to be shot down and lost along with the aircrew, passengers, and equipment. Even worse, it is a recipe for fratricide. One proven method for aircrews to attain maximum situational awareness is to involve them in mission planning. This does not mean the aircrew plans the mission instead of the staff. It means timely and effective staff planning, specifically issuing solid orders, and allowing the company or troop an appropriate amount of time to execute proper troop-leading procedures. It means conducting the Military Decision-Making Process (MDMP) efficiently to give commanders, at all levels, the most information possible at the proper time so they can make informed decisions on the mission. A good format to follow is the air assault planning procedures outlined in FM 90-4, Air Assault Operations. If you treat an insertion like an air assault, it will receive proper, detailed planning and become a successful, coordinated action.

Abort Criteria

Abort criteria is critical because we do not want to reinforce failure. If a unit loses aircraft to enemy weapon systems, there has to be a point when the chain of command decides to initiate an alternate course of action. All tactical situations are unique and various units have different SOPs, but all units must establish such a decision point. The commander, using his experience and recommendations from his staff, sets that condition and determines the least amount of assets required to accomplish the mission and any contingencies. Too often units do not brief or explain abort criteria in orders or rehearsals, and the result is the loss of invaluable assets for follow-on missions.

Extraction Plans

Extraction plans are critical in more ways than one. Aircrews want to know that if shot down, someone is going to come and extract them. They want to know that there is a specific plan, briefed and rehearsed, to accomplish this mission. The same goes for the ground element. They will find comfort in knowing they are not expendable and that there is a plan in place to extract them, with specific personnel and equipment identified to extract them if the OPFOR becomes a factor. A trend is that a finite number of aircraft are available for mission support, and aviation units create more mission requirements than they can adequately support. Consequently, when establishing priorities, units cancel internal support missions first. A solution is to make the commander and liaison officer at the supported unit understand how many aircraft and aircrews are available and what missions they can perform. This can only help the ground unit plan more effectively.

Command and Control

Command and control, with extended lines of communication, is essential to mission success. Everyone understands the need to communicate with aircrews during missions. However, another trend at the NTC is to overlook how far the aircraft is actually flying or to conduct poor terrain analysis of the route of flight for communication line of sight. Terrabase analysis can help determine when and where to establish a retransmission site or possibly a ROZ, to employ a command and control aircraft to maintain communications for the duration of the mission. The ability to communicate between aircraft executing the mission and their command and control element is critical. This allows the unit to control SEAD, to gain real-time intelligence from the aircrew, to change to alternate routing based on other available intelligence, and to initiate a recovery operation, if needed.

FARP Operations

The greatest potential for an accident is at the FARP. Many units overlook the numerous considerations for successful FARP operations (FARP layout, marking, landing direction, traffic patterns, go-around plan, emergency actions). The most overlooked items are briefing and rehearsing FARP operations to aircrews. Even while conducting day operations, the NTC offers abundant sand and wind to challenge this operation. At night, FARP operations become more difficult. How many aircraft will cycle through at the same time? Who has the priority? Is there a mix of different airframes (UH-60s with AH-64 security)? Do the aircraft all receive fuel from the left/right side, or are they different? The answers to these questions seem obvious: put more emphasis on getting FARP plans briefed and rehearsed. Disseminate sketches to the aircrews, and ensure any updates and/or changes are briefed.

Conclusion

The answers to the issues raised in this article begin with increased emphasis in the detailed planning of the mission. Units can address many mission issues at Home Station. Conduct an initial planning conference prior to deployment. This involves getting all the participants together and reviewing the plan to establish all the conditions discussed previously. Develop checklists and SOPs that save time. Additionally, ensure that the liaison officer understands the requirements for an insertion and has a way of tracking combat power so that he can intelligently speak for the commander at his level.

Tactics, Techniques and Procedures

1. Fire Support. Begin planning fire support as soon as you receive the mission, with or without an assigned FSO, and the earlier the better. Educate the staff on the capabilities of available field artillery units.

2. Situational Awareness. Involve operators in all mission planning. Detailed planning, briefings, and rehearsals sound obvious, but units often do not execute them.

3. Abort Criteria. Manage risk carefully, forecast potential future missions, and determine the unit's priorities. Establish the conditions for success.

4. Extraction Plans. Take the time to plan an extraction plan. Soldiers will work harder to make the mission successful if they believe they are coming back. Also, have a good communications plan for contacting LNOs.

5. Command and Control. Seemingly obvious, but often overlooked. Involve the SIGO in the planning process. He may be able to coordinate alternate means of communication.

6. FARP Operations. Do not take FARP considerations for granted. Again, everyone knows how to do this, but not everyone briefs and rehearses actions at the FARP.