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Military

CHAPTER 4

ENGAGEMENT AREA DEVELOPMENT
AT THE NATIONAL TRAINING CENTER

by CPT Johnny O. Gass and CPT Brian F. Agena

Chapter 3: Air-Ground Integration
Table of Contents
Chapter 5: Direct Fire Planning

The overall goal of attack helicopter operations is to destroy enemy formations in a given engagement area. To accomplish this goal the battalion staff must understand and exercise the three steps in the engagement area development process as outlined in Chapter 3 of FM 1-112, Attack Helicopter Operations. Trends at the National Training Center (NTC) show that battalion staffs fail to utilize all of the steps outlined in FM 1-112 to conduct engagement area development. This results in engagement areas, battle positions, and attack-by-fire positions becoming nothing more than marks on the map.

Coordinated Staff Effort

To ensure these marks on the map have meaning, the unit must execute detailed engagement area planning during the deliberate decision-making process. The NTC has a diverse and challenging environment, which presents numerous obstacles to unit planners developing engagement areas. These challenges become more daunting if the unit staff does not focus its effort. Often at the NTC staff members are seen working in a vacuum, each on their own agenda. To succeed, the staff must work in a coordinated effort, using all available tools. Additionally, all players must understand the commander's intent.

Planners can ensure adequate integration of the engagement area after they consider and employ all available BOS assets to guarantee maximum destruction of the enemy formation at a pre-determined location. Units at the NTC fall short in this step by failing to integrate indirect fires, obstacles, and organic direct fire planning in the wargaming process.

In the close fight, the unit must understand the ground commander's mission statement and his scheme of maneuver. The attack battalion LNO is the link between ground and air assets, acting as a conduit for a constant flow of ever-changing information to his parent unit.

Know Your Enemy

The S-2 is a key player in assisting the attack battalion in all phases of the operation, not just engagement area development. He must understand the TTPs of the opposing force (OPFOR) and, during the wargaming process, portray them as a uncooperative enemy. Units commonly fail to conduct appropriate IPB, which causes the unit to misread the OPFOR's most probable course of action (COA). As the IPB becomes refined, the S-2 should be able to answer the following questions:

Answering these five questions will yield the enemy's most probable COA, which provides a focus for planning in a specific area of operations. Once the S-2 identifies the enemy's most probable COA, the battalion commander picks the point on the ground where he wants to kill the enemy. This is the point where the commander intends to mass his combat power (FM 1-112).

As the process continues, the S-2 must predict how the enemy will look during movement along his axis of advance, and how the enemy will react once engaged with direct fire weapons. The S-2 provides a description of these reactions while wargaming integration of the engagement area. A good S-2 will show the S-3 how the enemy's actions can unhinge the unit's plan. These actions will constitute the most dangerous COA.

The NTC OPFOR is not a cooperative enemy. They are reconnaissance-oriented, with an increased level of unpredictability. They have shifted from Soviet doctrine and tactics to a capabilities-based force, flexible and adaptable to current and future requirements of the joint team.

In addition to the nine elements of the commander's guidance, units must consider several other factors, such as terrain, weather, and weapons/sensor ranges. The terrain at the NTC allows for the selection of engagement areas that are conducive to flank shots into the OPFOR. Conversely, it allows the OPFOR to shift away from the attacking aircraft while maintaining their forward movement. They will complement this shift by directing reconnaissance elements to use the north/south wadi system to action on attacking aircraft.

Wargaming is Critical

Just as the S-2 conducts action, reaction, and counter-reaction in the engagement area, the S-3/FSO conducts the same drill. The staff must wargame friendly actions versus enemy reactions to determine where to employ artillery, CAS, mortars, and obstacles in the engagement area to shape the battle space for the direct fire fight. By properly integrating the engagement area and portraying an uncooperative enemy, the battalion staff begins to eliminate the OPFOR's options. This will maximize the use of all available weapons systems and provide maximum survivability for the force.

Once wargaming is complete, the unit should have the answer to these six questions.

1. What is the endstate of the indirect fire plan?

  • Task and purpose for targets?
  • Who is the primary/alternate observer?
  • What is the triggers?

2. How much artillery/CAS/mortars are available?

3. Who will initiate fires?

4. How will the unit shift fires?

5. Who will clear fires once the direct fire fight begins?

6. How will the unit maneuver to continue the engagement or break contact?

Conclusion

Destroying enemy formations at the NTC is no small task. The OPFOR is a mobile, thinking, and uncooperative enemy. In addition, less than ideal timelines, stress, and fatigue introduce an increasing level of battlefield friction. Trends at the NTC show units overcoming several internal obstacles. As stated earlier, the number one trend at the NTC is the lack of familiarity with doctrine. The second most common trend is personnel (staffs) who are knowledgeable in doctrine but not organized, and thus do not work effectively together or do not integrate their operations with the ground forces. By answering the questions listed above and completing the three steps in engagement area development (using FM 1-112), your plan should be complete. A plan that produces engagement areas which allow the commander to trap the OPFOR, deny him flexibility, and cause him to be a reactive predictable force will lead to success on the battlefield.

Tactics, Techniques and Procedures

1. Focus the staff. Knowledge in MDMP and organization are critical.

2. Integrate all available assets, including organic direct fires, ground-based direct fires, indirect fires, and obstacles. This requires effective air-ground integration.

3. Know your enemy. The S-2 must aggressively pursue information, know where to get it and how to analyze it. Have other units (air or ground) already encountered this enemy?

4. Conduct thorough wargaming. "Per SOP" is not the answer.

Chapter 3: Air-Ground Integration
Table of Contents
Chapter 5: Direct Fire Planning



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