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CHAPTER 3

AIR-GROUND INTEGRATION

by CPT Robert T. Ault

The challenge of air-ground integration at the National Training Center (NTC) is to synchronize aviation operations into the ground scheme of maneuver. Air-ground integration is critical to all aspects of aviation operations. Units must integrate attack and cavalry operations as well as assault and general support missions with the operations occurring on the ground beneath them. This article will address a few of the trends observed at the NTC.

The three critical components of air-ground integration are: understanding the ground scheme of maneuver, proper liaison, and deconfliction. Brigade combat team (BCT) planners down to the individual aircrews should consider these three elements of good air-ground integration. A failure to properly consider these components can result in a desynchronized and ineffective plan or even friendly losses due to fratricide.

Understanding the Ground Scheme of Maneuver

Observation: Planners from BCT to the aviation task force must focus on integrating aviation operations into the scheme of maneuver.
Discussion: This is the most critical element of good air-ground integration. Developing and maintaining good situational awareness starts with a plan at the BCT and aviation task force that is built around the ground scheme of maneuver. Observed planning trends are:

• Failure to rehearse key events together such as fire support, battle handover, and passage of lines.
• Failure to post friendly graphics on operational maps.
• Lack of visualization by staffs and commanders on how the battle will look at various stages.
• Failure to ask for a ground LNO at the aviation TOC during the planning phases.
• Failure to publish appropriate ground frequencies on which the aviation task force will be operating.
• Failure to deconflict airspace.
• Failure to develop appropriate fratricide prevention methods.

Observation: Planners must work across their particular lanes of expertise.
Discussion: Cross-talk at all levels is vital to ensure that integration of the unit's actions into the BCT's overall plan do not stand alone. This is particularly critical when it comes to air-ground integration. Aviation task force key personnel (staff) are essentially the same as the BCT staff, with the addition of the tactical operations officer. Key planners at the BCT level that aid in air-ground integration are:

• BCT S-3
• BCT S-2
• Aviation LNO
• BCT FSO
• ADA LNO
• S-3 Air
• ALO/TALO
• SIGO

Observation: Employ aviation at the critical point on the battlefield.
Discussion: A plan that integrates aviation into, not just above, ground elements enhances combat power. Integration essentially means the application of Army aviation at the ground commander's critical point on the battlefield. Numerous observations from the NTC indicate that at the time of execution, aviation assets are simply brought forward to find targets without coordination.

An example of poor air-ground integration: aviation forces conducting a screen line in close proximity to friendly ground forces and not having necessary frequencies to pass real time intel/spot reports. This lack of air-ground integration greatly reduces the effectiveness of both air and ground units. In most cases, aviation elements spend an inordinate amount of time attempting to clear fires or gain direct fire clearance through aviation channels. This can be a cumbersome system on a fast moving battlefield. Additionally, a lack of communication, and the lack of situational awareness that accompanies it, greatly increases the chances of fratricide from improper identification of friendly vehicles.

Recommendation: A well-integrated plan that contains ground graphics and the means to communicate with units on the ground is the first step in developing good situational awareness and air-ground integration.

Proper Liaison

Observation: Liaison at all levels is important to the integration of Army aviation.
Discussion: Observed trends regarding LNO operations:

• Units send inexperienced officers or warrant officers to act as LNOs.
• Vague guidance from the aviation task force.
• LNOs do not have a habitual relationship with the supported unit and do not have a working knowledge of SOPs and commander's intent.
• LNOs are not equipped with the proper radios and/or vehicles to conduct liaison operations.
• LNOs are not taking an active role in mission analysis to interject the capabilities or limitations of aviation beyond their primary aircraft (lack of aviation knowledge).
• A hesitation by aviation S-3s to request an LNO from a supported ground unit to aid in integration.
• LNO does not coordinate with other members of the task force or BCT staff to facilitate aviation operations.
• BCT LNOs are not aware of their role in airspace management and deconfliction or how to request airspace.
• LNOs are not forwarding the airspace coordination order (ACO) to the aviation task force in a timely manner.
• A failure of aviation assets to conduct face-to-face coordination prior to conducting operations in the ground unit's sector.
• Failure of the BCT aviation LNO to keep the aviation task force informed of BCT rehearsals and other key events.

Observation: Once the battle begins, the aviation LNO must work hard to push information down to the aviation task force.
Discussion: An active BCT LNO will assist the aviation S-3 by battle-tracking, conducting the running staff estimate, and issuing predictive analysis to avoid the "911" use of aviation. These actions at the BCT level will increase the aviation task force's situational awareness as the battle progresses.

Recommendation: Units must train LNOs at Home Station prior to arrival at the NTC and/or prior to conducting operations in support of the BCT.

Deconfliction

Observation: Deconfliction is a continual process conducted across the various staffs at both the BCT and aviation task force.
Discussion: Beginning in the planning process, aviation units must deconflict their operations from:

• Indirect fires.
• Fixed wing assets such as close air support and containerized delivery system (CDS) drops.
• Smoke operations.
• Special operations aviation missions.
• Unmanned aerial vehicles.
• Air defense artillery.

The aviation task force must consider the missions listed plus deconfliction between other aviation companies in the task force. An example would be deconfliction between a scout insertion of one company and the conduct of a zone reconnaissance by another.

Deconfliction continues during mission execution. The following are trends regarding ongoing deconfliction:

• Improper vehicle identification.
• Aircrews not developing an accurate picture of the ground situation.
• Failure to understand engagement criteria.
• Lack of battlefield visualization by company commanders and aircrews.
• Lack of dissemination of weapons' control status to aircrews.
• Lack of understanding by all aircrews of engagement criteria.

Recommendation: A well-integrated plan will lead to a deconflicted plan, but only if aviation works to be in the plan and not separate from it.

Conclusion

The synchronization of a commander's assets on the modern battlefield poses a serious challenge. The BCT must integrate aviation and ground units to enhance combat effectiveness. The BCT is designed around its ground maneuver battalions. Any plans and orders are essentially ground schemes of maneuver that must include aviation, not simply add them as an afterthought. The use of LNOs is critical, both in the planning process and to the development of situational awareness. Deconfliction is an ongoing process that units must conduct until completion of the mission.