CHAPTER
2 A2C2
PLANNING AND INTEGRATION:
TOP
DOWN AND BOTTOM-UP EFFORT
A2C2
PLANNING AND INTEGRATION:
TOP
DOWN AND BOTTOM-UP EFFORT
by CPT Nicholas Arata and CPT Christopher D. Niederhauser
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As the airspace above the battlefield becomes increasingly saturated, synchronization of these assets becomes more critical. The National Training Center (NTC) is one of the few places in the world where units are able to exercise with all of the players vying for a piece of the air over the battle. Units who come to the NTC unprepared and untrained in the implementation and execution of airspace control measures (ACM) quickly find they are unable to mass all of their combat power at the decisive time and place on the battlefield.

Top-Down Planning
So which manual do units use for airspace doctrine? FM100-103, Army Airspace Command and Control in a Combat Zone,1987, is still in print, but units generally agree that FM 100-103-1, ICAC2 Multiservice Procedures for Integrated Combat Airspace Command and Control,1994, is probably the most up-to-date and best written doctrine on airspace. No special staff elements exist at the brigade and battalion level to perform the A2C2 function (FM 100-103-1), but as discussed later, FM 71-3, The Armored and Mechanized Infantry Brigade,places responsibility for airspace management on the S-3 Air. Therefore, on-hand staff members normally perform A2C2. The staff members who normally comprise the A2C2staff element include the S-2, S-3 air, FSO, ALO, and liaison officers from ADA, ATS, and other aviation elements. All elements within the A2C2network form vertical and horizontal channels to pass critical information. Usually a small percentage of those required to attend actually take part in the MDMP. If not all airspace users are available for planning, who is ready to fill in to answer critical questions? Unfortunately, at the NTC we often see an LNO doing the airspace planning for a brigade combat team (BCT) with little or no input from other users because the staff has focused on a two-dimensional instead of three-dimensional battlefield in their train-up.
A2C2in the BCT main command post is a continuous process that begins in the mission analysis phase of a BCT's MDMP and ends after execution of an operation. A2C2success relies directly on the BCT's ability to focus on this continuous process of managing its airspace. Too many times at the NTC we see the BCT staff's inability or oversight of designating one officer to fill the role and responsibilities of the BCT "airspace manager."
According to FM 71-3, the S-3 Air at the brigade level is the A2C2cell leader. It is his responsibility to synchronize and deconflict ACMs to ensure that maximum combat effectiveness of all airspace users occurs. The S-3 Air must be the one staff member who is always thinking in the third dimension. All plans and COAs developed and approved must have the S-3 Air constantly asking himself, "What is affecting airspace if we do this?" He must constantly consult with and be available to other members of the A2C2cell -- the ADAO, FSO, ALO, S-2, and aviation LNO -- during and after the MDMP. At the NTC we see aviation LNOs attached to the BCT staff assuming duties of the S-3 Air because the designated S-3 Air is usually a planner. Although this may be feasible, issues usually arise from this arrangement.
The heart and soul of A2C2integration in the BCT occurs at the wargame phase of the BCT's MDMP. When the BCT develops the combined operations overlay as a result of the wargaming phase, improper integration often occurs. The S-3 Air and/or the aviation LNO often begin their air corridor and ACM development after the staff plots all the artillery position areas, operational areas, EAs, BPs, and FASCAM minefield targets. The products that result when the ACMs are developed after the ground maneuver graphics include poor air corridors and other ACM locations. This is not integration. The proper A2C2integration will occur when all combat systems in a BCT simultaneously build the operations overlay while recognizing each other's requirements to contribute to the fight. Good, early development of ACMs will result in a useful, flexible A2C2plan that will result in truly decentralized execution of A2C2and the ability of Army aviation to be a combat multiplier.
Role of the LNO
According to the U.S. Army Aviation Center LNO Handbook, FM1-100, Army Aviation Operations, and FM 71-3, the role of the LNO is to represent the aviation unit commander at a designated headquarters for the duration of an operation. The LNO must involve himself in the command estimate process to ensure the planned employment is within the aviation capabilities of assets available and is doctrinally correct. If the LNO is to accomplish these duties properly, it becomes very difficult to accomplish the S-3 Air duties concurrently, especially if the LNO is only at the BCT TOC for the duration of an operation. It is important to remember that Army aviation is not the only airspace user that needs synchronization in a BCT's area of operation.
Another problem seen at the NTC is the inability of the BCT S-3 Air and LNO to request, receive, and integrate bottom-up ACM refinement from the aviation task force. The S-3 Air and aviation LNO can develop ACMs at the BCT; however, they should send this information to the aviation task force in a timely matter for refinement. After all, do we want our aviators at the task force involved in this process? Absolutely!
Of course, once the A2C2plan is developed, the mode by which this information is shared also becomes critical. One of the most preferred systems to share this information is the TACLAN. This system makes it possible for bottom-up refinement of all ACMs in a way not much different from the way artillery units share fire support coordination measures through AFATADS or IFSAS. The least preferred option would be, of course, the runner in the lone HMMWV. Whichever system is available to the aviation task force and the BCT, it is imperative that the unit refines as early as possible to expedite its dissemination up and down and especially if ACMs are integrated into the air tasking order.

Units must develop clearly defined checklists and follow them to aid in execution and to ensure the safety of aircrews. With this checklist, units can follow a standard delineating the dissemination of airspace control measures in the BCT. The standard can be voice, MCS, TACFAX, AFATDS, or messenger; however, the information must be passed for it to be effective.
Bottom-Up Refinement - Battalion and Company Level Planning
As stated above, no special staff element exists in the battalion to perform A2C2 functions. A2C2normally falls on the shoulders of a battle captain in the TOC. New and refined ACMs are usually kept at the company or battalion level and not passed to the brigade. This problem goes back to staff organization at battalion and planning cell requirements in the company. Units do not make someone responsible to track new or changed measures and ensure it is passed up and down the chain.
Once the order is complete and briefed, aviation company commanders usually feel they have no options and must live with the ACMs in place. Unfortunately, the company is usually the best level at which to conduct detailed planning and analysis of an existing plan. It is incumbent on the company to conduct a thorough analysis of the measures in place versus the commander's intent and mission, identify conflicts, and refine the ACM to maximize aircraft survivability on the battlefield. Battalion A2C2elements, if established, do not understand their responsibilities. Some of these responsibilities include the following:
This is a check and balance system that provides redundant effort at the brigade, battalion, and company level.
Companies do not refine the battalion plan for company execution. Companies usually receive their mission graphics on an overlay. The amount of refinement normally consists of moving the graphics from the overlay to the Aviation Mission Planning System (AMPS). Very seldom is the AMPS used to refine routes, attack-by-fire (ABF) positions, or observation posts (OPs). Companies should, at a minimum, develop routing from release point (RP) to ABF/battle position (BP), review ABF/OP/BPs for suitability and feasibility, and rehearse their plan to identify conflicts and offer solutions to battalion.
If companies do, in fact, refine the battalion plan, they often do not consider other elements using the airspace and how they can support the company's execution. For example, knowing the grid zone identifiers of artillery weapons and selecting firing positions for Copperhead are not mutually exclusive; however, many companies do not know where the firing units are and whether or not their targets are in range.
In addition to all the other things a staff must do to succeed at the NTC, the synchronization of airspace using systems is usually the last thing considered at the BCT level. To be effective, every staff must remember A2C2as part of their planning. As personnel review and change existing information, it is imperative that all airspace users receive these updates as soon as possible. It is not just Army aviation using the sky anymore.
Tactics, Techniques and Procedures
1. A2C2must be a continuous process - from initial planning through wargaming and execution.
2. Assemble the appropriate personnel to plan properly (S-2, S-3 Air, AVN LNO, FSO, ALO, ADA, ATS).
3. Educate the supported ground unit(s) on unit needs, or send a full-time LNO to perform S-3 Air functions.
4. Aggressively refine ACMs from the bottom up (aviation company level) and ensure this information is communicated back to the higher headquarters.
5. Develop a system to notify the right people at the right time of any changes.

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