Military

To accomplish its SEAD mission, the battalion had to operate forward of the base camp making the forward-positioned launchers vulnerable to enemy attacks. Since the launchers were probably considered high payoff targets, TF Hawk attached units from the infantry, air defense artillery (ADA), military police (MP), and engineers to the MLRS unit for increased force protection.

The MLRS battalion abandoned its shoot-and-scoot tactics because of the restrictive terrain and low enemy threat and developed new TTPs to provide accurate and timely SEAD fires. It implemented new employment techniques, a MLRS FOB, and a force protection package to operate effectively and efficiently.

Each launcher has a hide area that is no more than 100 meters away from the firing point. The hide area is a concealed area for the launcher while awaiting a fire mission. After firing, the launcher moves to a reload point at least 800 meters from the firing points and at least 500 meters from any other elements. Normally, each battery has six reload points and at least two Survey Control Points (SCP) per platoon OPAREA (a total of six per battery). The SCPs are normally collocated with the reload points to reduce travel time of the launchers. Each of three platoon headquarters controls three launchers, with the ammunition holding area (AHA) located 100 to 300 meters from the platoon headquarters. The AHA can be collocated with the platoon headquarters.

The MLRS unit in TF Hawk employed many non-doctrinal techniques to overcome METT-T challenges in accomplishing the mission. The battalion used raid-like assaults to employ the MLRS batteries. The battalion tactical operations center operated from Base Camp Hawk at Tirana Airfield while the batteries occupied OPAREAs 2x1 km in size. The battalion normally controlled one battery at a time consisting of 9-12 launchers. The number of launchers varied from mission to mission based on the number of targets in the fire plan. The fire plan provided an azimuth of fire from the OPAREA into the known engagement area.

In the battery OPAREA, each launcher had one firing point and the firing points were only 75-150 meters apart. Figure 1 shows a launcher on a firing point. Under this new employment concept called linear configuration, the SCPs were located on the firing points. This allowed more accurate and safer firing. The "linear configuration" focused on positioning the launchers in a straight line on firing points that were 75-150 meters apart. The battery had approximately 12 SCPs per 2x1-km battery OPAREA. The reload points, two for each battery OPAREA, were only 75-150 meters away from the firing points. The firing batteries also positioned ammunition pods adjacent to each launcher to speed up reloading.

Under the linear configuration, the battery did not use hide areas, platoon headquarters, or the AHAs. The platoon headquarters elements were available, but were not needed, since the battery OPAREA was so small. The battery headquarters controlled the launchers instead of the platoons. The MLRS battalion did not designate hide areas since the air and counterfire threats were low. Table 1 compares doctrinal techniques of employment versus those implemented by TF Hawk. When firing from the linear configuration, the MLRS unit had to ensure that the launcher danger areas were cleared and safe. The MP and mechanized forces blocked all roads and did not allow any personnel inside of the back-blast area during firing.

TF Hawk used a linear firing configuration because of restricted terrain and absence of enemy air and counterfire threats. Vehicles risked getting stuck in the mud if they got off the main roads and tank trails. Since the conventional threat was extremely low, this configuration allowed for a smaller, more easily defensible perimeter to protect the launchers from more likely threats, such as terrorists. The MLRS unit also employed the launchers in "lazy W" and "diamond configurations" to conform more appropriately to the terrain. Otherwise, these two configurations were similar to the linear configuration.

The MLRS unit in Albania deployed one firing battery and a force protection package to a FOB to get within range of enemy targets using rocket and cannon artillery fires. The FOB was located approximately 100-km forward of Base Camp Hawk, with only the Kosovo Liberation Army and the Albanian military troops separating it from Serb forces. The commander of the MLRS battalion maintained operational control over the 380 soldiers in the FOB. The forces at the FOB comprised a task force.

The field artillery forces at the FOB consisted of a MLRS battalion tactical operations center (TOC) (Forward), a MLRS firing battery, a 155mm-Paladin platoon, and a meteorological section. The force protection package consisted of:

• Dismounted infantry company.
• Platoon of M2 Bradley Fighting Vehicles (BFVs).
• A 120mm-mortar section.
• ADA section with a Bradley Stinger Fighting Vehicle (BSFV) and Avengers.
• Scout platoon.
• MP platoon.
• Engineers.
• Counterintelligence and civil affairs personnel.
• Ground surveillance radar section.

A medical section, a signal section, and a maintenance section provided combat service support. The task force set up in a defensive perimeter at the FOB. TF Hawk rotated troops from base camp to the FOB as needed. For survivability, the engineers dug positions for all tracked vehicles. Forces at the FOB also provided logistical support to artillery location radar (AN/TPQ-37) located 25 kilometers away.

The MLRS battalion forward TOC communicated with the battalion main TOC and the corps Fire Support Element (FSE) located at Base Camp Hawk via satellite communication (SATCOM) and MSE. While at the FOB, the battalion task force executed numerous rehearsals involving rocket and cannon artillery fires. The battalion-forward TOC controlled these rehearsals using organic battalion personnel and equipment. While forces at the FOB continued to train and rehearse daily, the battalion main TOC and the firing batteries at Base Camp Hawk did likewise. Maintaining two TOCs simultaneously was a major C2challenge for the MLRS battalion. It overcame this challenge with detailed preparation and leadership.

TF Hawk augmented the MLRS unit with a robust protective force at the FOB described in the previous section. During movements, the maneuver commander maintained operational control, while the FA MLRS battery commander assumed a support role. However, once the MLRS unit occupied the battery area and firing points, the FA commander assumed operational control of all assets.

There were four main components of deploying a firing element from the base camp to a battery operational area:

• Reconnaissance of the operational area.
• Advance guard.
• Infantry main body with artillery advance party.
• Artillery main body with a security element.

The maneuver and field artillery leadership began operations with a joint reconnaissance of the operation area. The key leaders deployed from the base camp and selected locations for the battery headquarters, reload points, firing points, traffic control points (TCPs), and retransmission (retrans) sites based on guidance from the battalion headquarters. The positions enhanced battery survivability and communications between the battery headquarters and the battalion TOC. Once the key leaders completed the reconnaissance, they returned to the base camp to prepare for deployment.

The second element, advance guard, consisted of Military Police (MP) and mechanized forces. It deployed to the local training area to sweep and secure the route before deployment by the main body. The advance guard dropped off MP personnel to establish TCPs. The MPs, along with an Albanian Police escort, were responsible for traffic control. The advance guard also established the initial security in the battery OPAREA to prepare for the infantry main body and the artillery advance party.

The third element, infantry main body with the artillery advance party, consisted of the MLRS battery commander, the Position and Azimuth Determining System (PADS) team, wrecker and firing platoon leadership. It was augmented with a platoon-sized force protection package, which consisted of MPs, air defense artillery (ADA), and mechanized infantry forces. The ADA provided protection from enemy air attacks. The mechanized infantry was prepared to defend the MLRS units from possible ground attack. One of the key tasks for this element was to sweep and secure the OPAREA and begin artillery development of the positions. After the infantry main body and the artillery advance party secured the OPAREA, they were ready for the artillery main body. The artillery main body, the final element, followed the advance party by an hour. It consisted of the battery operations center and the battery launchers and a mechanized force that provided protection for the main body.

The force protection package developed a 360-degree battery defense perimeter. The MPs controlled any traffic into the perimeter and escorted all local civilians through the area. The dismounted infantry conducted routine patrols of the perimeter, while the BFVs covered all high-speed avenues of approach. The ADA covered all known air avenues of approach with Avengers and a BFSV. The company force protection package provided protection for 9-12 MLRS launchers against an enemy company-sized element. An attack by a larger force would require reinforcements.

The firing battery required an infantry company to protect it at the OPAREA. Logically, it would take an infantry battalion to help secure the OPAREA for an MLRS battalion. The U.S. Army does not have the force structure to provide force protection packages to MLRS battalions but neither does the MLRS battalion have the resources to safeguard itself in a FOB.

The MLRS battalion's mission is to provide accurate and timely fires to suppress, neutralize, or destroy the enemy with rockets or missiles and to integrate fire support as a part of the combined arms operation. A MLRS battalion is assigned a tactical mission of general support (GS), general support reinforcing (GSR), or reinforcing (R). When possible, a MLRS battalion is not assigned the tactical mission direct support (DS).

What was the tactical mission of the TF Hawk MLRS unit? Many believed that the MLRS battalion was providing DS to an attack helicopter regiment (ATKHR). However, an MLRS unit does not have the internal assets to execute a DS mission. Normally, MLRS units should reinforce the habitually associated DS cannon unit rather than assume the DS mission on its own.

In fact, the MLRS unit was assigned a GS mission to provide timely and accurate fires. However, at times the mission of providing deep SEAD fires for attack aviation appeared to mirror a non-standard tactical mission, assigned when one of the seven inherent responsibilities of a FA unit is changed, limited, or amplified. The seven inherent responsibilities are 1) answers calls for fire in priority from; 2) has as its zone of fire; 3) furnishes fire support team (FIST) or fire support element (FSE); 4) furnishes liaison officer; 5) establishes communication with; 6) is positioned by; 7) has its fires planned by. The MLRS unit provided deep SEAD fires for the aviation attack.

Of the seven inherent responsibilities, the MLRS battalion answered calls for fire from the fire support element (FSE) located with the Deep Operations Coordination Cell (DOCC). With SATCOM, the battalion was prepared to answer calls for fire (CFF) from the attack helicopters. The battalion practiced orienting a launcher on the center of an engagement area to provide responsive fires. The unit envisioned shooting at targets of opportunity, targets that would assist the helicopters in breaking contact or targets that helicopters could not engage from the assault by fire positions. This made the MLRS battalion's zone of fire the same as that of the ATKHR.

The MLRS did not provide FISTs or a FSE because it is not assigned those assets. To fulfill the fourth inherent responsibility, the MLRS battalion provided a liaison officer to the DOCC. The MLRS battalion established communications with the FSE at the DOCC and the ATKHR. While the FA Battalion Commander (at times) positioned the FA units, the FSE at the DOCC planned the fires for the FA MLRS battalion. Table 2 compares the FA standard tactical missions versus the TF Hawk mission with respect to the seven inherent FA responsibilities.

The corps and the FA battalion commander shared the task of positioning the MLRS unit. This GS mission was similar to a non-standard tactical mission because the MLRS battalion commander and not the force field artillery headquarters positioned the MLRS battalion (at times). Additionally, the FA battalion had to establish communications with the ATKHR. These are minor changes to two of the seven inherent responsibilities for a GS mission. Although the mission of the MLRS battalion in Albania had many characteristics of a non-standard tactical mission, it was more like a GS mission.

According to FM 6-60, TTP for MLRS Operations, developing MLRS fires and achieving the desired effects on target is a multi-step, multi-channel operation. It involves thorough and effective fire planning. The TF Hawk MLRS battalion supported planned attack helicopter strikes against enemy ground forces with timely SEAD fire planning. Any delay in executing a fire plan would significantly affect the corps' timeline for attack. The battalion conducted numerous rehearsals to fine-tune its techniques. The SEAD fires rehearsals normally consisted of a fire plan with two or more groups. The MLRS battalion fired each group having two or more targets, separately, but under the same plan. Most fire plans contained a coordinated mix of rocket and missile targets. The number of targets in the fire plan ranged from anywhere from 30 to 110 targets. The time to fire the plan ranged from one to two hours.

Fire mission processing for the battalion started at the corps level. The corps Fire Support Element (FSE) developed all fire plans in support of the TF mission. The Corps FSE sent the fire plans directly to the MLRS battalion Fire Direction Center (FDC). Normally, the corps would send fire plans through the brigade Fire Control Element (FCE). However, the brigade did not deploy to Albania initially. Non-Nuclear Fire Plan (NNFP) or conventional fire plans proved ineffective because the battalion's Fire Direction System (FDS) did not allow any flexibility to add targets to the fire plan. Adding additional targets to a conventional fire plan using FDS required the battalion FDC to generate a new fire plan. This process was not timely. Therefore, the battalion received fire plans from corps FSE at the DOCC in a Fire Mission Call for Fire format (FM: CFF) as time on target (TOT) or Time to Fire (TTF). This gave the battalion more flexibility to add targets to the plan. Each target in the fire plan had a specific time that it had to be suppressed or destroyed.

After receiving the targets from corps FSE, the battalion FDC went through several steps to prepare for the corps fire support technical and task force rehearsals. The battalion FDC plotted the targets and verified the F-Hour, the time that the aviation helicopters crossed the FLOT to attack targets in the engagement area. Next, the battalion FDC sent targets to the battery FDCs, which immediately assigned primary launchers for each target in the fire plan and generated fire missions for them. The unit assigned back-up launchers against key targets for redundancy suppression of these targets.

The battery FDC used the TTF method of control for the primary launchers and "At My Command " (AMC) control for the back-up launchers. The TTF method of control required a specific launch time. After receiving the fire mission from the battery FDC, the launchers determined the time of flight for each target. The battery FDC recorded the time of flight and sent the data down to the back-up launchers in case the primary launcher could not fire. Now the unit was ready for the corps rehearsal.

Prior to the rehearsal, the battalion sent down a time hack to all elements to ensure that every element had the correct time. During the rehearsal, the battery FDC ensured that both primary and back-up launchers were laid on the targets. Prior to firing, the battalion FDC used code words to notify the attack helicopters that the MLRS battalion was about to fire. The ATKHR developed these code words to minimize traffic on the deep strike aviation net (satellite communication). The units used voice communications over digital as the preferred method to maintain better C2of the process. Once the launchers fired, they called "shot" to the battery FDC on the FM-voice net. The battery FDC then called "shot" to the battalion FDC on the battalion FM-voice net and the battalion FDC notified the attack helicopters and the corps FSE on the deep strike aviation voice net.

At the completion of the SEAD, the attack helicopters would then move forward to destroy the enemy in the engagement area. The primary launchers would move to the reload point to download pods and reload ammunition. The back-up launchers stayed on the firing points, in position, prepared to fire.

Survey, meteorological, ammunition support were critical to the MLRS operation in Albania. These three elements provided adequate and timely support to ensure that the tactical mission was a success. Survey personnel used the precision lightweight GPS receiver (PLGR) to conduct their initial survey. Meteorological section provided accurate and timely met data to TF Hawk units while the MLRS unit received its ammunition resupply by ground and air delivery.

Instead, the MLRS unit used the PLGR to establish survey control, a process that required approximately four hours because of weather effects. The low cloud cover and rain in the region made it very difficult for the PLGR to locate satellites. The unit took the average reading of two PLGRs to establish a survey control point.

After the survey data was established with the PLGR, the MLRS unit initialized the Position and Azimuth Determining System (PADS), which took approximately three hours. Once PADS was initialized, the PADS team was prepared to provide survey to the launchers. To ensure accurate data for the PLGR and PADS, the MLRS unit initialized both using the world geodetic system - 1984 (WGS 84). The unit used the datum with WGS 84 maps to determine such information as the spheroid and grid zone. It was very critical that the battalion used the same WGS.

FM 6-1, Survey Operations, states that "as new products with new datums are developed by DMA, a variety of conflicting maps and survey information may exist that cover identical areas. Some of these products may be based on the old datum and others on the current (preferred) datum." Other field artillery units in the region used the old datum called the European 1950, which required a correction to the data for the PLGR and PADS. Without this correction, the data would contain errors, significantly impacting firing accuracy. The other field artillery units converted to the new system, WGS 84, to avoid any mistakes in establishing survey control.

To have greater survey accuracy, the MLRS battalion coordinated with an Army topographic engineering team from Germany, which arrived in the region after the deployment of the battalion's main body. The topographic team took approximately four days to establish a SCP in the battalion area. The SCP was a permanent structure embedded in the ground 3-6 feet using concrete. After receiving survey data from the topographic team, the MLRS unit determined that it had established survey with the PLGRs to within + 1.7 (meters) in easting, - 1.3 (meter) in northing, and -1.2 in elevation.

The battalion survey teams used the SCP constructed by the topographic team to extend survey to the firing points. This required a zero-velocity (Z-VEL) correction for the PADS. The survey manual states that the Z-VEL correction allowed the PADS to correct itself to its present location. Ten minutes was the maximum Z-VEL allowed. In other words, the PADS had to stop during convoy operations every 10 minutes to update its system, which took only 30 seconds. More SCPs by the topographic team in the area of operation would have eliminated extending the survey control so far. Continuously running the PADS to extend survey damaged the components. At one time during the operation, the battalion had two out of three PADS non-mission capable. Therefore, the battalion had to rely on the M270 IPDS launchers, which had the capability of establishing survey control for the other launchers.

Meteorological Support: The five general requirements for achieving accurately predicted fire are:

• Target location and size.
• Firing unit location.
• Weapon and ammunition information.
• Computational procedures.
• Meteorological (MET) information.

If all five requirements are satisfied, a MLRS unit will deliver accurate and timely fires. MET information is needed for rocket, but not missile, firing because rockets are particularly sensitive to low-level winds.

For a MET message to be valid in gentle rolling terrain, the firing unit must be less than 20 km from where the MET section releases its balloon flights. However, this distance requirement decreases to 15 km in coastal areas. In the TF Hawk Area of Responsibility (AOR), where the terrain is mountainous, the distance requirement was 10 km or less.

A six-person MET section from the corps field artillery brigade deployed with the MLRS battalion to Albania. Initially, the MET section occupied a position with the MLRS battalion at Base Camp Hawk, Albania. While at the base camp, the MET section supported the MLRS battalion, 155-mm M109 Paladins, M119 105-mm battery, 120-mm mortars, and the Air Force with MET data. The MET section averaged two flights per day at the base camp.

When the MLRS battalion deployed a MLRS battery (+) to a FOB, the MET section also moved forward. While at the FOB, located 100 km from the base camp, the MET section provided MET data to the MLRS battery, 155-mm M109 Paladin platoon, Q-37 radar, and the 120-mm mortars. The MET section continued to fly two balloon flights per day in support of the units with meteorological data. While the MET section deployed forward at the FOB, the Base Camp Hawk firing elements were without MET coverage. Deploying an additional MET section to TF Hawk could have resolved this issue.

To resupply the MLRS battery at the firing points with rockets and missiles, the MLRS battalion planned to use a combination of HEMTTs and CH-47D helicopters to transport the ordnance. The HEMTTs required an hour of travel time to resupply the launchers, located 20-30 kilometers from the Base Camp Hawk's ASP. The HEMTTs were capable of transporting four LPCs/GMLAs, a total of eight with the trailer. However, the HEMTTs did not deploy to the firing points with trailers because of narrow roads and mountainous terrain in the host nation.

The CH-47D helicopters had the task of resupplying firing elements further than 20-30 km from the base camp. The medium lift helicopters were capable of internally or externally transporting four LPCs or GMLAs, weighing approximately 20,000 pounds. The aviation unit preferred sling-loading the LPCs because this method was faster than internal loading and less risky to aviation personnel. The task force dedicated two CH-47Ds to the MLRS battalion for the resupply of rockets. Carrying two LPCs per CH-47D externally, the helicopters required 45 minutes to cover the 100-km distance to the firing points.

MLRS unit leaders were concerned about sling-loading the GMLAs. The GMLAs are very sensitive and the missiles are prone to damage if dropped. FM 6-60 states that the GMLA no-tolerance drop restrictions preclude external transport. In seeming contradiction, FM 10-450-4/MCRP 4-23E, Multiservice Helicopter Sling Load: Single-point Rigging Procedures, showed detailed diagrams on how to transport missiles externally using CH-47D helicopters. Logisticians believed that external loading of the GMLAs was not an option. As a result of these concerns, TF Hawk did not plan to externally transport the GMLA missiles. A diagram of the ammunition resupply plan is shown in Figure 3.

COMMUNICATION ASSETS

FM 6-60 states that communication in MLRS battalions is critical to providing fire support. The MLRS unit faced problems with communications because of the wide dispersion of the battalion, long distances to subordinate units, and unfavorable mountainous terrain. To address this problem, the MLRS unit used a combination of AM-voice, FM-voice, FM-digital, mobile subscriber equipment (MSE), and satellite communications, employing retransmission stations when necessary. The MLRS unit's AM radio, AN/GRC-193, proved to be unreliable. Figure 4 shows the communications architecture of the MRLS battalion.

The MLRS battalion employed retrans stations, manned and equipped from TF Hawk's signal unit, to communicate effectively between firing units. The battalion operated on four main nets:

• FA battalion command net.
• Battalion voice fire direction net.
• Battalion digital fire direction net.
• Force protection/infantry battalion command net.

SATCOM and MSE communications proved to be an invaluable asset to the battalion. Although SATCOM was not part of the MLRS unit's MTOE, both the battalion headquarters and firing batteries received them. During one stage of the operation, the unit used a total of 16 SATCOM radios. When part of the battalion deployed to the FOB, the MLRS unit relied on MSE and SATCOM to communicate because of the great distance between the firing and controlling elements. Because of the unit's reliance on SATCOM, signal personnel trained unit operators on the SATCOM.

According to the MLRS battalion's communications architecture, the battalion TOC communicated with the batteries via FM-voice, FM-digital, AM-voice, MSE, or SATCOM. The batteries, in turn, communicated with the launchers via FM (voice and digital). The battery commander at the firing point maintained FM communications with the force protection commander. The battalion TOC (main) communicated with the battalion TOC (forward) via MSE and SATCOM.