Military

Between F-75 and F-61, the ACE ASI section recommended target sets to the DOCC, and identified threats along potential aviation routes. By F-65, the ASI began to receive answers to its RFIs, which continued to flow into the ASI section throughout the rest of the F-Hour sequence. Intelligence operations elements, i.e., the TNT, began to provide mapping and terrain products to the ACE such as gridded photo plots and 1:12,500 scale maps. It produced one map board for each EA. Map boards and imagery products were continuously updated throughout the decide, and detect and track phases.

At approximately F-61, the next targeting board occurred in the DOCC, marking the transition to the detect and track phase. (Note: Although TF Hawk targeting boards occurred daily at 1000Z, targeting boards did not always coincide exactly with F-Hours listed.) DOCC targeting boards were attended by the G2, ACE Chief, ACE Collection Manager, NIST Chief, and ACE DOCC Liaison Officer (LNO)/G2 Planners.

No later than F-38, results of initial imagery taskings began flowing from the ACE into the DOCC. At approximately F-37, TF Hawk held another targeting board. By F-36, ACE ASI personnel, in coordination with the Attack Aviation and Corps Artillery S2, had produced an extremely detailed EA Situation Map (SITMAP). The ACE handed off target sets to aviation and artillery S2 sections at approximately F-36. Thereafter, aviation and artillery S2 personnel refined the target sets.

However, the ACE continued to monitor target and ADA threat development throughout the detect and track, and deliver phases, maintaining target history folders containing intelligence data from multiple sources. The DOCC maintained target lists derived from the initial target recommendations presented by the ACE. Target development, target tracking, EA and route monitoring data, in the form of Communications Intelligence (COMINT), Measurements and Signatures Intelligence (MASINT), and Electronic Intelligence (ELINT) flowed into the ACE throughout the detect and track, and deliver phases.

At F-24, an initial squadron brief was conducted in the rehearsal tent, known as "Cody Hall." The Attack Helicopter Regiment (ATKHR) S2 briefed the threat for air routes and EAs at this time. Also part of the initial squadron brief, the Corps Artillery S2 briefed the SEAD targets. Thereafter, ACE ASI personnel conducted initial collateral damage assessments, looking at Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) issues, Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) unit placement, and potential building damage. After the initial squadron brief, the ACE Collection Manager nominated additional targets for the IMINT collection deck and developed a plan to cross-cue collection assets.

Between F-24 and F-16, a UAV was on station over the EA. National imagery target development continued. The Joint Surveillance Target/Acquisition Radar System (JSTARS), ELINT and COMINT pictures were updated by ACE ASI personnel no later than F-14 and rolled into the aforementioned target history folders. Follow-up imagery products were also delivered to aviation and corps artillery units at F-14.

From F-13 to F-1, the ACE ASI personnel conducted collateral damage assessments and monitored IDP. The collection manager continued cross-cueing collection assets and nominating targets for the imagery collection deck. At approximately F-13, the task force conducted another targeting board (1000Z). At F-8, TF Hawk conducted a rock drill for all mission-essential personnel. The ACE Collection Manager, TNT NCOIC, ATKHR S2, and Corps Artillery S2 were key intelligence participants in the rock drill. Although the ACE used F-6 as the cut-off point for deliberate target and SEAD planning, ACE ASI personnel continued to monitor the enemy situation throughout the remainder of the mission, providing threat updates to the DOCC as necessary. The UAV was on station from approximately F-6 to F-3. National imagery assets tracked targets, and monitored EAs and routes. At F-4, the ACE provided a final comprehensive intelligence update to the DOCC. At F-3, the corps commander made the final Go/No-Go decision for the MRE.

NATO Air Strike Support

As mentioned earlier, once it became apparent that TF Hawk aviation and artillery assets were not to engage the enemy, the ACE's focus changed. This change of focus roughly coincided with the metamorphosis of the DOCC Plans Cell into a targeting tool.

The ACE provided the DOCC Plans Cell with the intelligence necessary to nominate high priority targets for NATO air strikes. The DOCC plans cell stood up on 11 May 1999 and consisted of seven members: one Field Artillery (FA) lieutenant colonel and one FA captain, two Military Intelligence (MI) majors, an Aviation (AV) major, an AV captain, and one U.S. Air Force major. Among the Plans Cell's initial missions were:

• Recommending upcoming intelligence collection as part of the daily TF Hawk targeting board (1000 Zulu).

• Developing courses of action for the attack of specified EA.

• Proposing a plan for the attrition of enemy ground forces through field artillery means only.

On approximately 27 May 1999, the TF Hawk Deputy Commanding General (DCG) gave the DOCC Plans Cell the additional mission of nominating and prioritizing the "Top 10" targets for NATO air attacks. This mission gradually took precedence over all others, as it became apparent that neither attack helicopter nor artillery assets were to be used against the enemy. Top 10 target nominations were made twice daily with input from the ACE. The TF DCG approved all nominated targets. After DCG approval, the Field Artillery Intelligence Officer (FAIO) in the ACE inputted the targets into the Automated Deep Operations Coordination System (ADOCS) and sent them SIPRNET through the Battlefield Coordination Element (BCE) to the CAOC.

The Top 10 targeting mission marked a distinct change of focus for the TF, and for the DOCC Plans Cell and ACE in particular. Although the TF Hawk had previously passed intelligence updates from the ACE to the CAOC on a regular basis, the TF had never before directly planned targets for NATO bomber strikes.

The timeline below reflects the final DOCC Plans (and Targeting) Cell decision-making process and intelligence coordination schedule with the ACE.

TF Hawk employed various means to detect targets. In addition to national systems that provided data to the ACE through various channels, TF Hawk used its attached Hunter UAV and an AN-TPQ-37 artillery-locating radar to detect and verify targets. The ACE also eventually received HUMINT reports, in Siize/Activity/Location/Unit/Time/Equipment (SALUTE) format, on enemy units from friendly forces operating near the Albania-Kosovo border.

In one instance, the TF Hawk ACE, through the use of its Hunter UAV downlink, guided NATO air assets to strike an enemy M-87 Multiple Rocket Launcher (MRL) artillery system, which was on the move. Additionally, the combination of Q-37 radar and HUMINT reports provided timely and accurate intelligence regarding the position of highly mobile enemy artillery and armor elements. This type of reporting resulted in massive destruction to Serbian forces on Mount Pastrik, Kosovo, shortly before the suspension of NATO bombing. The ACE successfully used DataMaster software to quickly leverage national imagery to aid target tracking and/or revalidation.

However, the ACE lost visibility on targets after strike packages were nominated to the CAOC by a FAIO. The CAOC did report BDA back to the ACE via the BCE, but the CAOC reported BDA by grid coordinate, not by target number -- the system the ACE regularly used. Upon reception of BDA, targets were purged from ADOCS or revalidated by the FAIO.

UAV SUPPORT

TF Hunter was organized around the Hunter Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) from a Forces Command (FORSCOM) Corps MI Bde. It deployed into Camp Able Sentry, Macedonia, in March 1999, to provide IMINT support for Joint Task Force Noble Anvil (JTF-NA). During OAF, the UAV TF flew 246 sorties, totaling 1,357 flight hours, while attached to JTF-NA and later to TF Hawk. Although the UAV Company had performed extremely well during exercises at the National Training Center, it proved itself for the first time in a contingency operation as an invaluable and reliable intelligence asset to commanders at all levels. It flew more flight hours than any other NATO reconnaissance platform.

TF Hunter proved that the UAV could be responsive to the supported commander's ever-changing intelligence requirements. TF Hunter relied on its pre-deployment METL training to successfully support OAF and devised new TTPs during operations to meet new challenges. This contingency operation showed the importance of individual and unit training proficiency in the airborne relay mode. TF Hunter could not have been successful without this capability. Unable to provide the desired video downlink to all supported units using organic assets, TF Hunter was furnished with a national asset, the Joint Broadcast System, to provide the necessary live video feed. Finally, this operation allowed the UAV Company to refine, and, in some cases, create, TTPs to better support the commander's intelligence requirements.

For a brief description of the key components of the Hunter UAV system, see Appendix B.

Task Organization

TF Hunter deployed with personnel and equipment to provide JTF-NA with a 24-hour capability. It could sustain one relay mission per day and one single air vehicle mission during each 12-hour shift. During a relay mission, one UAV gathers intelligence while the second performs a relay function (Figure 4). However, the mountainous AO required that nearly all UAV missions be flown in the relay mode to support intelligence requirements. Subsequently, when TF Hawk assumed operational control over the UAV TF, it requested that TF Hunter provide a sustained capability of flying four relay missions per day, two per 12-hour shift. To support this new requirement, TF Hunter required additional equipment and personnel.

Mission Preparation

Upon arrival in theater, TF Hunter had to quickly coordinate several issues, including aviation procedures, communications architecture, and maintenance and logistics.

Expediting departure from the airport control zone (CZ).
Staying away from high traffic areas by avoiding feeder routes.
Using map display in Ground Control Station (GCS) to maintain traffic separation.
Lining up two UAVs simultaneously on the runway for take-off when conducting a relay mission,with a 30-second separation between each take-off.

TF Hunter personnel also briefed other NATO aviation units on UAV procedures to promote confidence and safety in mixed traffic.

The three organizations used secure communications systems exclusively, including Secure DSN using the STU-III phone, Secure Mobile Subscriber Equipment (MSE), Ptarmigan (a British secure communications system), and SIPRNET. All parties relied on the SIPRNET as the primary means for passing mission requests, targets, and mission summaries. To further enhance communications between the three organizations, TF Hunter provided two liaison personnel to both the CAOC and the TF Hawk.

The flow of repair parts for the Hunter UAV was slow because of scarcity of parts, initial shortage of Air Force logistics flights, and delays in host-nation customs. The Program Manager (PM) remedied this problem by positioning a representative in Germany, who smoothed customs clearance and expedited the return of damaged and repaired parts.

Despite these challenges, TF Hunter maintained Fully Mission Capable (FMC) rates of 89 percent and 80 percent during the first two months of operation, sometimes relying on controlled substitution to meet mission schedules. As a result of this operation, the UAV Company updated its 30 DOS maintenance package:

• Increased prescribed load list (PLL) from 112 lines to 205 lines of repair parts.

• Identified engines, video monitors, and 50-hour phase maintenance kits (specifically clutches) as critical spares.

Mission Execution

TF Hunter overcame mission execution challenges of unit proficiency in the relay mission, intelligence dissemination, and risk management. During this phase, it also developed TTPs for flight in icing conditions, flight in mountainous areas, UAV laser designation, and in-flight re-tasking.

Varying ingress/egress routes through the Macedonian-Kosovar border.
Limiting loiter time over targets.
Maximizing stand-off distance with coordinated use of Restricted Operations Zones (ROZs) that kept UAVs outside the range of 75 percent of the threat weapons systems yet allowed adequate imagery resolution.
Ensuring proper Identification, Friend or Foe (IFF) operation with the Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) to reduce the hazards of fratricide.