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ATTACK HELICOPTER IN DEEP OPERATIONS

by CW4 Clay Santini

Introduction
Table of Contents
Multiple-Launch Rocket System Deep Fires

Attack aviation assets contributed significantly to the agility, lethality, and flexibility of TF Hawk. The biggest challenge presented to the task force was to conduct deep/combat operations with aviation assets as the maneuver force. The U.S. Army had not employed attack helicopters in deep operations since the Persian Gulf War. This article provides TF Hawk Attack Helicopter Regiment (ATKHR) Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs) in four areas: organization, planning, rehearsing, and execution for aviation deep operations in Kosovo. These lessons will assist in preparing and executing future deep operations, especially in mountainous environment against a dispersed enemy.

Organization

The National Command Authority limited the number of attack helicopters in TF Hawk to 24 AH-64s. To facilitate continuous operations, the Task Force ATKHR deployed almost all of its personnel from its headquarters and two squadrons. However, to meet the cap placed on deployed aircraft, each squadron deployed only 12 AH-64s, half the authorized strength. The TF Hawk ATKHR conducted continuous operations by rotating each squadron through 24-hour cycles. The aircrews from each squadron were utilized in a day-on, and day-off cycle. During its day-on cycle, the squadron utilized two troops with five aircraft per troop (10 AH-64A total). The troops conducting the mission cycle worked approximately 12 hours, starting with rehearsals in the afternoon and mission execution in hours of darkness. The remaining troop served as the TF Hawk Quick Reaction Force (QRF) for a 72-hour cycle. The QRF troop could also utilize all non-flying aircrews from the squadron. The unit kept two AH-64s on Readiness Condition 3 (REDCON3). The REDCON 3 aircraft were expected to be airborne within 30 minutes of notification. The QRF crews rotated out at 8-12 hour intervals, thus shortening the crew duty day to a maximum of 12 hours and increasing fighter management (rest period for aircrews).

To increase aircraft availability for continuous operations, both squadrons deployed all their assigned crew chiefs even though only half of their aircraft deployed in theater. By placing two crew chiefs on each AH-64, the squadrons increased aircraft readiness and their ability to conduct continuous operations.

Augmentee personnel further increased the regiment's ability to conduct continuous operations. An additional 11 crews from a CONUS AH-64 company enhanced aircrew readiness and availability of RL 1 (RL1 = Mission training complete) crews. The additional crews were split; eight crews went to one squadron to round out its pilot authorization. The remaining three crews went to the other squadron. Temporary Change-of-Station (TCS) personnel also augmented the regimental staff and squadron headquarters. These TCS personnel worked in planning cells that enhanced continuous operations.

The unit task organization enhanced the ATKHR's mission to conduct full-up Mission Rehearsal Exercises (MREs) to validate Deep/Combat Operations in support of OAF.

Key Lessons:

  • Task Force was more capable and retained greater flexibility by deploying two squadrons of ready crews to support one squadron of aircraft.

  • The ATKHR and squadron staffs were undermanned for continuous operations; these staffs needed augmentation to support task force missions.

  • Despite the requirement for 24 aircraft, equivalent to one squadron, the decision to deploy two squadron headquarters facilitated mission planning and execution.

Planning

To plan and prepare for deep operations, the aviation task force conducted MREs, which were sequenced using an F-hour matrix (F-hour was the time that the aircraft simulated crossing the border). TF Hawk used F minus eight hours (F-8) as the standard for starting the mission planning cycle. An MRE was a rehearsal designed to replicate distances flown during the actual missions. The purpose of the MRE was to exercise the aircrews' ability to rehearse the execution of the required tasks for mission completion. The F-8 hours time matrix allowed ample time to brief, rehearse, and execute the scheduled mission. After several weeks of conducting MREs, one of the attack helicopter squadrons adjusted its mission planning start time to F-7 hours. The other squadron kept its start time at F-8 hours, opting to allow extra time for crews to complete last minute updates and to eat.

TF Hawk aviation planners and aircrews had various mission planning equipment to assist in the aviation planning process. As part of the planning process, aviation planners worked out aviation procedures from the field site so that the task force could safely fly in the tactical Area of Operation (AO) mission airspace. Finally, planners devised abort and mission go/no-go criteria.

Mission Planning Equipment

To prepare for an MRE, the unit used various items of mission-planning equipment, just as it would for an actual mission. This equipment included the use of the Aviation Mission Planning System (AMPS), the Automated Deep Operations Coordination System (ADOCS), Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) Imagery, Tactical Operational Preview Scene (TOPSCENE), and WinCATS.

Air Mission Planning System: The AMPS standardized all mission data for a flight of mission aircraft and provided the only means of loading the data into the Data Transfer Cartridge (DTC). The DTC loads into the AH-64A Data Transfer Unit (DTU), located inside the Co-pilot Gunner's (CPG) station. The DTC allows the Fire Control Computer (FCC) to download map coordinates for waypoints, targets, and present position as well as laser codes. The AH-64A DTC has 256K of memory which limits mission data and capabilities, although it can be upgraded to one megabyte of memory. Unfortunately, the UH-60 DTC was not compatible with that of the AH-64 and required a separate AMPS DTU to load the DTC. Version 4.3 software for the AMPS made some improvements, which included compatibility with a laser printer instead of a low quality dot matrix printer. AMPS software, Version 5.0 Windows NT, had been procured, but had not been fielded to the units. This upgrade will make the AMPS more user-friendly.

Users wanted at least a 17" (19" preferred) computer monitor to view detailed mission graphics. To print maps off the AMPS, pilots used the print screen function, which enables a printout of a small/poor quality map. The quality and resolution of the screen print capability can be enhanced by equipment upgrades.

A team from Communications Electronics Command (CECOM) trained ATKHR personnel on a new mission rehearsal capability of AMPS. The Aviation Mission Rehearsal (AMR) upgrade fielded by the CECOM team allowed pre-flight review of air routes. However, its resolution and quality was not as capable as that of the TOPSCENE simulator, discussed later in this article.

Each squadron had six AMPS available. The squadrons distributed three AMPS to the Tactical Operations Center (TOC) and one to each of the three line troops. Within the squadrons, there were four school-trained AMPS operators, who received their training from CECOM. However, several AMPS within each squadron did not work and no trained maintenance technicians, military or civilian, were available to repair the AMPS in theater.

Automated Deep Operations Coordination System: This system served as the primary mission planner throughout the task force. However, AMPS and ADOCS were not compatible. The ADOCS was used to create flight routes, select Attack-by-Fire (ABF) positions, mission graphics, and to plot friendly and enemy positions. ADOCS and AMPS did not use the same Digital Terrain Elevation Data (DTED) - AMPS did not have the same 1:100,000 scale available that the ADOCS normally used. The AMPS was not capable of displaying flight routes, only waypoints. As a result, the squadrons manually transferred ADOCS mission data to AMPS, creating a break in digital connectivity between the mission planners and executors.

Imagery: Attack helicopter crews used Imagery Intelligence (IMINT) as the primary means of reviewing their objective areas. UAV imagery had good resolution and provided situational awareness to crews on terrain and target array layout. However, most of the available video was at least 24 hours old. Aircrews had access to live UAV video, but often did not have time to review it because of required pre-combat checks.

Squadrons received satellite photo prints of objective areas. However, the resolution was not good enough for identification of individual targets and man-made features, essential for mission execution. It was only adequate for observing terrain features and acquiring target groups.

Tactical Operational Preview Scene (TOPSCENE): This computer simulation system can reproduce imagery from digital mapping. TOPSCENE has a screen print function that allowed aircrews to print objective area photos as viewed from their planned ABF positions. The TOPSCENE photos were good quality when photo-quality paper was used for printing. Aircrews also used TOPSCENE to fly planned mission routes. The use of TOPSCENE enhanced aircrew situational awareness prior to flight and ABF operations.

WinCATS (Version 3.1): This Windows-based software was capable of taking digital mapping information and presenting topographic computer displays. WinCATS also allowed planners to input known locations of threat weapon systems providing aircrews the ability to see "ownship" Line-of-Sight (LOS) information as well as threat lethality rings and LOS of enemy weapon systems. AH-64 crews used WinCATS to refine ABF selection and operations.

Aviation Procedures Guide (APG)

Successful deep operations depended not only on state-of-the-art mission planning equipment, but also on standardized procedures for TF aviators. The TF developed an APG to provide standardization for all TF aviation assets. The APG was established by Air Traffic Services (ATSs) and approved by the Deputy Commanding General (DCG), Air. Aircrews had to read and understand the APG before operating aircraft in the tactical AO. Inadvertent Instrument Meteorological Condition (IIMC) recovery was a key procedure in the APG, which was necessary to ensure operations in low visibility and low ceiling conditions.

Inadvertent Instrument Meteorological Condition (IIMC): During IIMC, within the tactical AO mission airspace, aircraft were required to turn to avoid known obstacles, climb to 5,500' MSL in flat terrain, 9,000' MSL in mountainous terrain, and proceed on a heading toward friendly airspace. Once the aircraft was established in a climb, it contacted the NATO Airborne Early Warning (NAEW) and Tirane RAPCON (Radar Approach Control). Each subsequent aircraft in formation had to climb to an altitude 500' higher than the previous one, or as directed by RAPCON. If GCA (Ground-Controlled Approach) Radar was not available or the aircraft lost communication, the aircrew was required to proceed directly to TIRANE NDB (Non-Directional Beacon) and perform the Tirane Category B NDB approach. Aircraft squawked (used transmission code) 7700 for IIMC or 7600 for lost communications on the APX-100 (V) 1(IFF) Transponder, Mode 3A.

Back-Up Global Positioning System (GPS) Approach: Although the APG prescribed the NDB as the primary instrument approach procedure back into the TAA, the AN/ARN-89 Automatic Direction Finder (ADF), used by the task force's AH-64s to perform this approach, lacked reliability. The TF AH-64s, however, were equipped with the Integrated Navigation System/Embedded GPS Inertial (EGI) system, which had the potential of providing the primary means of instrument navigation. Unfortunately, in its existing configuration, the GPS did not meet U.S.Army requirements for GPS instrument approaches because of a corruptible database purchased for the navigation system. Based on the proven accuracy of GPS, unit Instrument Flight Examiners (IFEs) overcame this problem by using the Terminal Procedure (TERP) manual to develop an emergency GPS approach to back up the navigational approach aid and aircraft instrument suite.

Decision Matrix for Employing Attack Aviation Assets

During the planning process, TF Hawk also developed the following abort criteria and mission No-Go criteria in employing its attack aviation assets.

TF Hawk Abort Criteria:
1. Combat loss of two aircraft in the attacking element of 4-5 AH-64s.
2. Loss of communications from executing elements with Deep Operations Coordination Center (DOCC), Command and Control (C2), or Airborne Command and Control Center (ABCCC).
3. No Joint Suppression of Enemy Air Defense (JSEAD) and no SEAD on known enemy Air Defense Artillery (ADA).
4. En route and Engagement Area (EA) weather less than 1,000 ft. Ceiling and 2-mile (3,200 meters) in-flight visibility.
5. Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR) elements must consist of at least one MH-60 Pavehawk, and one MH-53 Pavelow.
6. Change of Air Mission Commander (AMC) occurs, and mission success is compromised.

TF Hawk Mission No-Go Criteria:
1. Target not approved.
2. Mission rehearsal not completed.
3. Key C2communications inoperative.
4. Target and EA intelligence not current (more than four hours old from time of Forward Line of Own Troops (FLOT) crossing).
5. JSEAD/SEAD not available for en route and in EA for known ADA positions.
6. Weather less than 1,000 ft. Ceiling and 2-mile in-flight visibility.
7. Restricted Operation Zone (ROZ) not approved by CAOC.
8. CSAR minimum package of one MH-60 and one MH-53 not available.

Other Planning Considerations

The task, "Conduct of Deep Operations," was part of the ATKHR's Mission-Essential Task List (METL). However, this regimental task had to be coordinated with the myriad of other essential tasks, many of which were not the regiment's primary responsibility, to ensure success against a stationary, defensively postured, and dispersed enemy force in Kosovo.

1. Task Force aviation elements planned doctrinal deep operations using indirect fires (Multiple-Launch Rocket System (MLRS), 155mm, and 105mm) to target enemy positions along ingress aviation routes and EA.

2. Corps G3 and G2 supported the deep operations planning through detailed joint planning and extensive Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB). Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), the Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS), and the Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS) provided key intelligence-gathering capabilities to TF Hawk.

3. TF Hawk deep operations planners developed JSEAD plans for each MRE, just as they would for actual missions.

4. Task force airspace planners coordinated its Army Airspace Command and Control (A2C2) requirements internally, then forwarded them to the Combined Air Operations Center (CAOC) for approval and publication in the Air Tasking Order (ATO)/Special Instructions (SPINs).

Key Lessons:

  • The standard matrix using a mission planning start time of F-7/F-8 hour ensured adequate preparation, rehearsal, and refinement before mission execution.

  • The AMPS is not compatible with ADOCS, creating a break in digital connectivity between mission planners and executors.

  • Units require the capability to service, repair, and replace AMPS in a tactical environment.

  • AMPS, with the AMR system upgrade, is still not as capable as TOPSCENE.

  • UAV and TOPSCENE provided detailed imagery, helping the aviation unit plan and rehearse missions.

  • UAV imagery can update mission aircrews on current enemy situation; units must develop procedures to provide updates to aircrews before mission launch.

  • Develop a standardized IIMC recovery procedure for tactical AO.

  • Mountainous AOs require development of emergency instrument GPS procedures; EGI is an excellent system for use on unit-developed emergency instrument approaches.

  • AH-64s need reliable ADF as a primary IIMC recovery aid.

Rehearsing

The aviation task force began the execution of MREs at F-8 hours. Rehearsals normally lasted one and one half-hours and were conducted in a large tent that provided room for over 50 personnel, the required map boards, a master hazard map, and a large enough floor area to lay out two complete missions at one time. Engineer tape, placards, rope, and wood blocks of various colors were used to represent control measures, mission graphics, and key mission elements.

All mission executors participated in "Rock Drills" or "Walk Throughs" in the rehearsal tent. These personnel included attack, lift, and combat search and rescue (CSAR) pilots, downed aircraft recovery teams (DARTs), attack aviation unit chain of command, lift aviation unit chain of command, the firing battery and field artillery battalion commanders. Other personnel included in the rock drill were staff members from the various Battlefield Operating Systems (BOSs). Personnel who had to make radio calls during the mission, such as tactical satellite (TACSAT) operators in CH-47 Fat Cow aircraft, were later included in the rock drills. Command elements served as facilitators to the aircrews and BOS representatives. The ATKHR S2 initiated all rehearsals with an updated intelligence brief. Upon completion of the intelligence update, the Regimental S3 conducted a line-by-line review of the execution matrix with the assembly. As each line was read, the appropriate elements executed their action on the terrain board. The facilitators then placed individuals in certain scenarios to see how they would react. Although the TF rehearsals tracked a mission from takeoff to landing, actions at the objective were rehearsed at separate squadron rehearsals, under the supervision of the Squadron Commander, S3 and Troop Commanders. The squadron-level rehearsals were conducted the day prior, and focused on the execution of individual crew and troop actions.

In addition to Rock Drills, aircrews conducted extensive rehearsals using available simulations tools. The task force used much of the mission planning equipment discussed previously to rehearse. Aircrews utilized TOPSCENE to survey the terrain. Crews were able to view terrain on TOPSCENE from 1-5 meter resolution in Albania and Kosovo. Aircrews also used the AMPS, which was upgraded to allow similar mission rehearsal capabilities as the TOPSCENE, although it did not have the same resolution. Furthermore, AH-64 pilots used WinCATS (Version 3.1) to refine ABF operations and actions on the objective.

Key Lessons:

  • Key personnel at rock drills and MREs included attack, lift, and CSAR pilots, DART personnel, attack aviation and lift aviation chains of command, the firing battery and field artillery battalion commanders, staff officers from the various BOSs, and communications personnel.

  • Follow standardized formats when conducting rehearsals.

  • Senior leaders must ensure units rehearse the actions on the objective.

  • Establish a unit-training program that incorporates using all available mission rehearsal tools such as TOPSCENE, WinCATS, and AMPS.

Execution

The ATKHR TF faced numerous challenges in executing deep operations in the tactical AO. Small and isolated enemy target sets precluded the TF from massing attack assets. Extremely mountainous terrain, coupled with the high altitude, degraded aircraft performance and limited flight route and engagement area options. Long flight routes from the TF assembly area to the EAs made fuel considerations paramount. TF Hawk used a number of TTPs to overcome challenges in executing deep operations.

Tactics: The ATKHR task organized Apaches into small strike forces to engage the small target arrays. This TTP was contrary to doctrinal deep operations tactics, which called for massing attack helicopters on the target. However, attack helicopters did not have to mass to service the small target arrays (Target set example: four T-55 tanks, two D-30 towed Artillery Pieces, and one or two Anti-Aircraft Artillery (AAA) systems).

Extreme mountainous terrain (Albanian Alps) channelized or limited attack helicopter flight routes and ABF selection. Unit planning cells used TOPSCENE to locate terrain that they could apply Background, Range, Area to Maneuver, Sun and Moon, Shadows, Cover, Rotorwash, Altitude above target, and Fields of fire (BRASSCRAF) to select positions that could sustain two attack aircraft in the ABF at a minimum.

Based on the conditions provided above, the unit task organized a flight of four aircraft into two teams that utilized Lead/Wingman formations. A fifth attack aircraft flew on some strike packages for security and C2.

AH-64A Wing Stores Configuration: Initially, the ATKHR configured its AH-64A Apaches with an Extended Range Fuel System (EFRS). The ERFS were capable of carrying 230 gallons of fuel on the left inboard pylon, two-19 shot rocket pods (M261) on the outboard pylons, and one missile launcher (four hellfire missiles) on the right inboard pylon (M272). This configuration was in accordance with the current Interim Statement of Airworthiness Qualification (ISAQ). One of the two attack helicopter units had trained with ERFS in mountainous terrain during a recent deployment to Bosnia. However, the unit had performed training with ERFS under more favorable environmental conditions. The other squadron deployed untrained in mountain flying because of limited resources and available training time prior to deployment. The training required for the Kosovo AO included environmental training (flying in mountainous environment) as well as academic training concentrating on high gross weight operation, and power management.

The ERFS increased risk to aircrews because it increased aircraft weight in high altitude flight conditions and lacked ballistic tolerance and crashworthiness. These factors prompted the TF to remove the fuel tanks from the wing stores. However, this required the TF to plan and employ forward refueling points using CH-47 Fat Cows (CH-47 fitted with refuel equipment capable of delivering up to 1,160 gallons of fuel). The ERFS was only employed when forward refueling points were not available.

AH-64 Weapons Configurations: The two squadrons used similar weapons configurations and ordnance loads. The weapons configuration consisted of one to four Hellfire missiles. This was dependent on the number of targets requiring Point Target Weapon System (PTWS) and whether ERFS was utilized. Additionally, the AH-64s carried 440 rounds for the M-230E1 (30MM cannon) which was based on the defensive requirement and weight savings of 560 pounds over a 1,200-round maximum load. The M-261 rocket pods were loaded with three different warhead types, two different fuse combinations, and all with the same rocket motor (MK-66, MOD2). The Task Force used the M261 Multipurpose Submunition (MPSM), M255A1 Flechette, and the M151 High Explosive (HE) rocket warheads. The fuse combination used on the MPSM and Flechette was the M439 RC (Resistance Capacitance Electronic Time Delay, Forward Firing) Fuse. The HE warhead was fused with the M423 Point Detonating (PD) Fuse. The unit procured the M255A1 Flechette from the Special Operations community. The Flechette was tested on the AH-64 and granted an Airworthiness Release (AWR) by Aviation Missile Command (AMCOM) for use in this operation. Additionally, Boeing made a Fire Control Computer (FCC) software modification, upgrading it from -51 to -51K, which allowed the Flechette rocket to be fired from the Aerial Rocket Control System (ARCS) position utilized for MK-66 Smoke (6SK). Arming AH-64s with M255A1 Flechette added the flexibility to engage and suppress personnel and area targets at short to medium ranges.

Night Vision Goggles Usage: Both squadrons used Night Vision Goggles (NVG) to enhance night-flying capabilities in mountainous AO. Both squadrons were untrained in NVG operations prior to deployment. The squadrons used AN/AVS-6 (V) 1A, NVG with OMNI 4 tubes. These NVG noticeably improved visual acuity and did not shut down in high ambient light levels like older models. The NVG's clarity and resolution were better under most conditions than the Target Acquisition Designation Sight (TADS) Forward-Looking Infrared (FLIR) used by the front seat copilot gunner (CPG). NVG allowed the CPG to provide better en route navigation and obstacle avoidance.

However, mountainous terrain presented varied weather conditions that were unforecasted by the unit Staff Weather Officer (SWO). NVG did not perform as well as FLIR when the aircraft encountered bad weather. As a result, AH-64 CPGs transitioned to the FLIR when encountering bad weather, while the UH-60 remained on NVG since it was not FLIR-equipped. This placed the UH-60 at a disadvantage because of its more limited visibility as it struggled to remain with the flight of AH-64s.

As a means of aircraft recognition during blackout operations with NVG, TF AH-64s used infrared chemical lights to aid visual recognition. TF Hawk used several techniques and locations for placing the infrared chemical light but ultimately used flex ties to secure the light to the AH-64 tail wheel-locking handle.

Command and Control (C2): TF Hawk achieved C2of the AH-64s strike package using SATCOM. The mountainous terrain in the task force AO required a redundant C2plan. Single Channel Ground and Airborne Radio System (SINCGARS) and UHF frequency-hopping HAVEQUICK II radios mounted on the AH-64 were not effective in this environment because of line-of-sight interference. A UH-60 (Command Console) equipped with an ARC-212 (SATCOM) served as the link between the AH-64s and Hawk Base. The C2UH-60 flew across the simulated FLOT with the AH-64s communicating directly to Hawk Base via SATCOM. If unable to contact Hawk Base directly, the C2UH-60 used airborne relay via Airborne Command Control Center/Airborne Warning and Control System (ABCCC/AWACS) using SATCOM, FM, and/or UHF to contact them.

Fighter Management: To ensure that the TF aviators were rested for the demanding condition of night deep attack, the ATKHR required individual crewmembers to track duty hours on crew endurance-tracking sheets. Tracking sheets computed daily, weekly, and monthly totals, including flight hours and exogenous factors applied to arrive at an individual's total duty performed. Unit leadership monitored crew fatigue levels using these crew endurance-tracking sheets. Army Regulation (AR) 95-1, Flight Regulations, provides the guidelines for units to establish their Fighter Management Programs. AR 95-1 authorizes aircrew members to work 16 hours of duty, with a maximum of eight hours factored flight time in a 24-hour period. Squadron leaders concluded after the first week of operations that a 16-hour duty day in the TF AO would be excessive for continuous operation. Aviation leaders based this decision on the difficulty of aircrews getting quality rest. Their Life Support Area (LSA) was located close to the high-density traffic airfield (Rinas), where constant air traffic generated high noise levels and made adequate rest difficult. Additionally, units could not segregate day and night crew-sleeping quarters because of size constraints of the LSA. All this led to an attempt to limit normal duty to 12 hours. The leadership made every effort to have aircrews complete flight duties around the 11th hour of duty and to complete after-action reviews (AARs) by the 12th hour of duty. Interviews with regimental aviators revealed that this schedule was sustainable and allowed a higher level of situational awareness during demanding flight duties in the AO.

Key Lessons:

  • If time is available prior to deployment, the unit should review environmental flight considerations for the deployed AO and replicate these conditions within aircraft compatible flight simulators.

  • Aircrews require additional training for external fuel tank operations and when operating in high gross weight conditions.

  • Configure AH-64s to achieve the desired effect based on assigned targets.

  • Utilize TOPSCENE for ABF selection, if available.

  • AH-64s require crashworthy and ballistically tolerant external fuel tanks to improve their range for deep operations.

  • Arming AH-64s with M255A1 Flechette added the flexibility to engage and suppress personnel and area targets at short to medium ranges.

  • NVG enhanced AH-64 tactical night flight operations; AH-64 aviation units should establish NVG training programs in accordance with TC 1-214, AH-64 Aircraft Training Manual.

  • As a means of aiding aircraft recognition during blackout operations with NVG, TF Hawk secured infrared chemical lights with flex ties on AH-64 tail wheel-locking handle.

  • Redundant C2linkage is required when conducting deep operations; the task force used SATCOM radios as its primary means of communication in mountainous terrain, and UHF, VHF, and FM communications from the TF helicopters to ABCCC as backup systems.

  • A 12-hour duty cycle for aviation flight crews allowed best performance and situational awareness during continuous operations.

  • When possible, construct LSAs further away from high density/volume noise areas to give crewmembers better rest conditions. Crewmember rest cycles must be considered when assigning unit areas in the LSA.

  • When possible, units should consider separating aircrew sleeping quarters by work shifts.

  • Employ economy of force based on ABF size and available terrain, utilizing METT-T.

Introduction
Table of Contents
Multiple-Launch Rocket System Deep Fires



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