ATTACK
HELICOPTER IN DEEP OPERATIONS
by
CW4 Clay Santini
Attack
aviation assets contributed significantly to the agility, lethality, and flexibility
of TF Hawk. The biggest challenge presented to the task force was to conduct
deep/combat operations with aviation assets as the maneuver force. The U.S.
Army had not employed attack helicopters in deep operations since the Persian
Gulf War. This article provides TF Hawk Attack Helicopter Regiment (ATKHR)
Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs) in four areas: organization, planning,
rehearsing, and execution for aviation deep operations in Kosovo. These lessons
will assist in preparing and executing future deep operations, especially in
mountainous environment against a dispersed enemy.
Organization
The
National Command Authority limited the number of attack helicopters in TF Hawk
to 24 AH-64s. To facilitate continuous operations, the Task Force ATKHR deployed
almost all of its personnel from its headquarters and two squadrons. However,
to meet the cap placed on deployed aircraft, each squadron deployed only 12
AH-64s, half the authorized strength. The TF Hawk ATKHR conducted continuous
operations by rotating each squadron through 24-hour cycles. The aircrews from
each squadron were utilized in a day-on, and day-off cycle. During its day-on
cycle, the squadron utilized two troops with five aircraft per troop (10 AH-64A
total). The troops conducting the mission cycle worked approximately 12 hours,
starting with rehearsals in the afternoon and mission execution in hours of
darkness. The remaining troop served as the TF Hawk Quick Reaction Force (QRF)
for a 72-hour cycle. The QRF troop could also utilize all non-flying aircrews
from the squadron. The unit kept two AH-64s on Readiness Condition 3 (REDCON3).
The REDCON 3 aircraft were expected to be airborne within 30 minutes of notification.
The QRF crews rotated out at 8-12 hour intervals, thus shortening the crew
duty day to a maximum of 12 hours and increasing fighter management (rest period
for aircrews).
To
increase aircraft availability for continuous operations, both squadrons deployed
all their assigned crew chiefs even though only half of their aircraft deployed
in theater. By placing two crew chiefs on each AH-64, the squadrons increased
aircraft readiness and their ability to conduct continuous operations.
Augmentee
personnel further increased the regiment's ability to conduct continuous operations.
An additional 11 crews from a CONUS AH-64 company enhanced aircrew readiness
and availability of RL 1 (RL1 = Mission training complete) crews. The additional
crews were split; eight crews went to one squadron to round out its pilot authorization.
The remaining three crews went to the other squadron. Temporary Change-of-Station
(TCS) personnel also augmented the regimental staff and squadron headquarters.
These TCS personnel worked in planning cells that enhanced continuous operations.
The
unit task organization enhanced the ATKHR's mission to conduct full-up Mission
Rehearsal Exercises (MREs) to validate Deep/Combat Operations in support of
OAF.
Key
Lessons:
-
Task Force was more capable and retained greater flexibility by deploying two
squadrons of ready crews to support one squadron of aircraft.
-
The ATKHR and squadron staffs were undermanned for continuous operations; these
staffs needed augmentation to support task force missions.
-
Despite the requirement for 24 aircraft, equivalent to one squadron, the decision
to deploy two squadron headquarters facilitated mission planning and execution.
|
Planning
To
plan and prepare for deep operations, the aviation task force conducted MREs,
which were sequenced using an F-hour matrix (F-hour was the time that the aircraft
simulated crossing the border). TF Hawk used F minus eight hours (F-8) as the
standard for starting the mission planning cycle. An MRE was a rehearsal designed
to replicate distances flown during the actual missions. The purpose of the
MRE was to exercise the aircrews' ability to rehearse the execution of the
required tasks for mission completion. The F-8 hours time matrix allowed ample
time to brief, rehearse, and execute the scheduled mission. After several weeks
of conducting MREs, one of the attack helicopter squadrons adjusted its mission
planning start time to F-7 hours. The other squadron kept its start time at
F-8 hours, opting to allow extra time for crews to complete last minute updates
and to eat.
TF
Hawk aviation planners and aircrews had various mission planning equipment
to assist in the aviation planning process. As part of the planning process,
aviation planners worked out aviation procedures from the field site so that
the task force could safely fly in the tactical Area of Operation (AO) mission
airspace. Finally, planners devised abort and mission go/no-go criteria.
Mission
Planning Equipment
To
prepare for an MRE, the unit used various items of mission-planning equipment,
just as it would for an actual mission. This equipment included the use of
the Aviation Mission Planning System (AMPS), the Automated Deep Operations
Coordination System (ADOCS), Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) Imagery, Tactical
Operational Preview Scene (TOPSCENE), and WinCATS.
Air
Mission Planning System:
The
AMPS standardized all mission data for a flight of mission aircraft and provided
the only means of loading the data into the Data Transfer Cartridge (DTC).
The DTC loads into the AH-64A Data Transfer Unit (DTU), located inside the
Co-pilot Gunner's (CPG) station. The DTC allows the Fire Control Computer (FCC)
to download map coordinates for waypoints, targets, and present position as
well as laser codes. The AH-64A DTC has 256K of memory which limits mission
data and capabilities, although it can be upgraded to one megabyte of memory.
Unfortunately, the UH-60 DTC was not compatible with that of the AH-64 and
required a separate AMPS DTU to load the DTC. Version 4.3 software for the
AMPS made some improvements, which included compatibility with a laser printer
instead of a low quality dot matrix printer. AMPS software, Version 5.0 Windows
NT, had been procured, but had not been fielded to the units. This upgrade
will make the AMPS more user-friendly. Users
wanted at least a 17" (19" preferred) computer monitor to view detailed mission
graphics. To print maps off the AMPS, pilots used the print screen function,
which enables a printout of a small/poor quality map. The quality and resolution
of the screen print capability can be enhanced by equipment upgrades.
A
team from Communications Electronics Command (CECOM) trained ATKHR personnel
on a new mission rehearsal capability of AMPS. The Aviation Mission Rehearsal
(AMR) upgrade fielded by the CECOM team allowed pre-flight review of air routes.
However, its resolution and quality was not as capable as that of the TOPSCENE
simulator, discussed later in this article.
Each
squadron had six AMPS available. The squadrons distributed three AMPS to the
Tactical Operations Center (TOC) and one to each of the three line troops.
Within the squadrons, there were four school-trained AMPS operators, who received
their training from CECOM. However, several AMPS within each squadron did not
work and no trained maintenance technicians, military or civilian, were available
to repair the AMPS in theater.
Automated
Deep Operations Coordination System:
This
system served as the primary mission planner throughout the task force. However,
AMPS and ADOCS were not compatible. The ADOCS was used to create flight routes,
select Attack-by-Fire (ABF) positions, mission graphics, and to plot friendly
and enemy positions. ADOCS and AMPS did not use the same Digital Terrain Elevation
Data (DTED) - AMPS did not have the same 1:100,000 scale available that the
ADOCS normally used. The AMPS was not capable of displaying flight routes,
only waypoints. As a result, the squadrons manually transferred ADOCS mission
data to AMPS, creating a break in digital connectivity between the mission
planners and executors. Imagery:
Attack
helicopter crews used Imagery Intelligence (IMINT) as the primary means of
reviewing their objective areas. UAV imagery had good resolution and provided
situational awareness to crews on terrain and target array layout. However,
most of the available video was at least 24 hours old. Aircrews had access
to live UAV video, but often did not have time to review it because of required
pre-combat checks. Squadrons
received satellite photo prints of objective areas. However, the resolution
was not good enough for identification of individual targets and man-made features,
essential for mission execution. It was only adequate for observing terrain
features and acquiring target groups.

Tactical
Operational Preview Scene (TOPSCENE):
This
computer simulation system can reproduce imagery from digital mapping. TOPSCENE
has a screen print function that allowed aircrews to print objective area photos
as viewed from their planned ABF positions. The TOPSCENE photos were good quality
when photo-quality paper was used for printing. Aircrews also used TOPSCENE
to fly planned mission routes. The use of TOPSCENE enhanced aircrew situational
awareness prior to flight and ABF operations. WinCATS
(Version 3.1):
This
Windows-based software was capable of taking digital mapping information and
presenting topographic computer displays. WinCATS also allowed planners to
input known locations of threat weapon systems providing aircrews the ability
to see "ownship" Line-of-Sight (LOS) information as well as threat lethality
rings and LOS of enemy weapon systems. AH-64 crews used WinCATS to refine ABF
selection and operations. Aviation
Procedures Guide (APG)
Successful
deep operations depended not only on state-of-the-art mission planning equipment,
but also on standardized procedures for TF aviators. The TF developed an APG
to provide standardization for all TF aviation assets. The APG was established
by Air Traffic Services (ATSs) and approved by the Deputy Commanding General
(DCG), Air. Aircrews had to read and understand the APG before operating aircraft
in the tactical AO. Inadvertent Instrument Meteorological Condition (IIMC)
recovery was a key procedure in the APG, which was necessary to ensure operations
in low visibility and low ceiling conditions.
Inadvertent
Instrument Meteorological Condition (IIMC):
During
IIMC, within the tactical AO mission airspace, aircraft were required to turn
to avoid known obstacles, climb to 5,500' MSL in flat terrain, 9,000' MSL in
mountainous terrain, and proceed on a heading toward friendly airspace. Once
the aircraft was established in a climb, it contacted the NATO Airborne Early
Warning (NAEW) and Tirane RAPCON (Radar Approach Control). Each subsequent
aircraft in formation had to climb to an altitude 500' higher than the previous
one, or as directed by RAPCON. If GCA (Ground-Controlled Approach) Radar was
not available or the aircraft lost communication, the aircrew was required
to proceed directly to TIRANE NDB (Non-Directional Beacon) and perform the
Tirane Category B NDB approach. Aircraft squawked (used transmission code)
7700 for IIMC or 7600 for lost communications on the APX-100 (V) 1(IFF) Transponder,
Mode 3A. Back-Up
Global Positioning System (GPS) Approach:
Although
the APG prescribed the NDB as the primary instrument approach procedure back
into the TAA, the AN/ARN-89 Automatic Direction Finder (ADF), used by the task
force's AH-64s to perform this approach, lacked reliability. The TF AH-64s,
however, were equipped with the Integrated Navigation System/Embedded GPS Inertial
(EGI) system, which had the potential of providing the primary means of instrument
navigation. Unfortunately, in its existing configuration, the GPS did not meet
U.S.Army requirements for GPS instrument approaches because of a corruptible
database purchased for the navigation system. Based on the proven accuracy
of GPS, unit Instrument Flight Examiners (IFEs) overcame this problem by using
the Terminal Procedure (TERP) manual to develop an emergency GPS approach to
back up the navigational approach aid and aircraft instrument suite. Decision
Matrix for Employing Attack Aviation Assets
During
the planning process, TF Hawk also developed the following abort criteria and
mission No-Go criteria in employing its attack aviation assets.
TF
Hawk Abort Criteria:
1.
Combat loss of two aircraft in the attacking element of 4-5 AH-64s. 2.
Loss of communications from executing elements with Deep Operations Coordination
Center (DOCC), Command and Control (C2),
or Airborne Command and Control Center (ABCCC). 3.
No Joint Suppression of Enemy Air Defense (JSEAD) and no SEAD on known enemy
Air Defense Artillery (ADA). 4.
En route and Engagement Area (EA) weather less than 1,000 ft. Ceiling and 2-mile
(3,200 meters) in-flight visibility. 5.
Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR) elements must consist of at least one MH-60
Pavehawk, and one MH-53 Pavelow. 6.
Change of Air Mission Commander (AMC) occurs, and mission success is compromised.
TF
Hawk Mission No-Go Criteria:
1.
Target not approved. 2.
Mission rehearsal not completed. 3.
Key C2communications
inoperative. 4.
Target and EA intelligence not current (more than four hours old from time
of Forward Line of Own Troops (FLOT) crossing). 5.
JSEAD/SEAD not available for en route and in EA for known ADA positions. 6.
Weather less than 1,000 ft. Ceiling and 2-mile in-flight visibility. 7.
Restricted Operation Zone (ROZ) not approved by CAOC. 8.
CSAR minimum package of one MH-60 and one MH-53 not available. Other
Planning Considerations
The
task, "Conduct of Deep Operations," was part of the ATKHR's Mission-Essential
Task List (METL). However, this regimental task had to be coordinated with
the myriad of other essential tasks, many of which were not the regiment's
primary responsibility, to ensure success against a stationary, defensively
postured, and dispersed enemy force in Kosovo.
1.
Task Force aviation elements planned doctrinal deep operations using indirect
fires (Multiple-Launch Rocket System (MLRS), 155mm, and 105mm) to target enemy
positions along ingress aviation routes and EA.
2.
Corps G3 and G2 supported the deep operations planning through detailed joint
planning and extensive Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB). Unmanned
Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), the Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS), and
the Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS) provided key intelligence-gathering
capabilities to TF Hawk.
3.
TF Hawk deep operations planners developed JSEAD plans for each MRE, just as
they would for actual missions.
4.
Task force airspace planners coordinated its Army Airspace Command and Control
(A2C2)
requirements internally, then forwarded them to the Combined Air Operations
Center (CAOC) for approval and publication in the Air Tasking Order (ATO)/Special
Instructions (SPINs).
Key
Lessons:
-
The standard matrix using a mission planning start time of F-7/F-8 hour ensured
adequate preparation, rehearsal, and refinement before mission execution.
-
The AMPS is not compatible with ADOCS, creating a break in digital connectivity
between mission planners and executors.
-
Units require the capability to service, repair, and replace AMPS in a tactical
environment.
-
AMPS, with the AMR system upgrade, is still not as capable as TOPSCENE.
-
UAV and TOPSCENE provided detailed imagery, helping the aviation unit plan
and rehearse missions.
-
UAV imagery can update mission aircrews on current enemy situation; units must
develop procedures to provide updates to aircrews before mission launch.
-
Develop a standardized IIMC recovery procedure for tactical AO.
-
Mountainous AOs require development of emergency instrument GPS procedures;
EGI is an excellent system for use on unit-developed emergency instrument approaches.
-
AH-64s need reliable ADF as a primary IIMC recovery aid.
|
Rehearsing
The
aviation task force began the execution of MREs at F-8 hours. Rehearsals normally
lasted one and one half-hours and were conducted in a large tent that provided
room for over 50 personnel, the required map boards, a master hazard map, and
a large enough floor area to lay out two complete missions at one time. Engineer
tape, placards, rope, and wood blocks of various colors were used to represent
control measures, mission graphics, and key mission elements.
All
mission executors participated in "Rock Drills" or "Walk Throughs" in the rehearsal
tent. These personnel included attack, lift, and combat search and rescue (CSAR)
pilots, downed aircraft recovery teams (DARTs), attack aviation unit chain
of command, lift aviation unit chain of command, the firing battery and field
artillery battalion commanders. Other personnel included in the rock drill
were staff members from the various Battlefield Operating Systems (BOSs). Personnel
who had to make radio calls during the mission, such as tactical satellite
(TACSAT) operators in CH-47 Fat Cow aircraft, were later included in the rock
drills. Command elements served as facilitators to the aircrews and BOS representatives.
The ATKHR S2 initiated all rehearsals with an updated intelligence brief. Upon
completion of the intelligence update, the Regimental S3 conducted a line-by-line
review of the execution matrix with the assembly. As each line was read, the
appropriate elements executed their action on the terrain board. The facilitators
then placed individuals in certain scenarios to see how they would react. Although
the TF rehearsals tracked a mission from takeoff to landing, actions at the
objective were rehearsed at separate squadron rehearsals, under the supervision
of the Squadron Commander, S3 and Troop Commanders. The squadron-level rehearsals
were conducted the day prior, and focused on the execution of individual crew
and troop actions.
In
addition to Rock Drills, aircrews conducted extensive rehearsals using available
simulations tools. The task force used much of the mission planning equipment
discussed previously to rehearse. Aircrews utilized TOPSCENE to survey the
terrain. Crews were able to view terrain on TOPSCENE from 1-5 meter resolution
in Albania and Kosovo. Aircrews also used the AMPS, which was upgraded to allow
similar mission rehearsal capabilities as the TOPSCENE, although it did not
have the same resolution. Furthermore, AH-64 pilots used WinCATS (Version 3.1)
to refine ABF operations and actions on the objective.
Key
Lessons:
-
Key personnel at rock drills and MREs included attack, lift, and CSAR pilots,
DART personnel, attack aviation and lift aviation chains of command, the firing
battery and field artillery battalion commanders, staff officers from the various
BOSs, and communications personnel.
-
Follow standardized formats when conducting rehearsals.
-
Senior leaders must ensure units rehearse the actions on the objective.
-
Establish a unit-training program that incorporates using all available mission
rehearsal tools such as TOPSCENE, WinCATS, and AMPS.
|
Execution
The
ATKHR TF faced numerous challenges in executing deep operations in the tactical
AO. Small and isolated enemy target sets precluded the TF from massing attack
assets. Extremely mountainous terrain, coupled with the high altitude, degraded
aircraft performance and limited flight route and engagement area options.
Long flight routes from the TF assembly area to the EAs made fuel considerations
paramount. TF Hawk used a number of TTPs to overcome challenges in executing
deep operations.
Tactics:
The
ATKHR task organized Apaches into small strike forces to engage the small target
arrays. This TTP was contrary to doctrinal deep operations tactics, which called
for massing attack helicopters on the target. However, attack helicopters did
not have to mass to service the small target arrays (Target set example: four
T-55 tanks, two D-30 towed Artillery Pieces, and one or two Anti-Aircraft Artillery
(AAA) systems). Extreme
mountainous terrain (Albanian Alps) channelized or limited attack helicopter
flight routes and ABF selection. Unit planning cells used TOPSCENE to locate
terrain that they could apply Background, Range, Area to Maneuver, Sun and
Moon, Shadows, Cover, Rotorwash, Altitude above target, and Fields of fire
(BRASSCRAF) to select positions that could sustain two attack aircraft in the
ABF at a minimum.
Based
on the conditions provided above, the unit task organized a flight of four
aircraft into two teams that utilized Lead/Wingman formations. A fifth attack
aircraft flew on some strike packages for security and C2.

AH-64A
Wing Stores Configuration:
Initially,
the ATKHR configured its AH-64A Apaches with an Extended Range Fuel System
(EFRS). The ERFS were capable of carrying 230 gallons of fuel on the left inboard
pylon, two-19 shot rocket pods (M261) on the outboard pylons, and one missile
launcher (four hellfire missiles) on the right inboard pylon (M272). This configuration
was in accordance with the current Interim Statement of Airworthiness Qualification
(ISAQ). One of the two attack helicopter units had trained with ERFS in mountainous
terrain during a recent deployment to Bosnia. However, the unit had performed
training with ERFS under more favorable environmental conditions. The other
squadron deployed untrained in mountain flying because of limited resources
and available training time prior to deployment. The training required for
the Kosovo AO included environmental training (flying in mountainous environment)
as well as academic training concentrating on high gross weight operation,
and power management. The
ERFS increased risk to aircrews because it increased aircraft weight in high
altitude flight conditions and lacked ballistic tolerance and crashworthiness.
These factors prompted the TF to remove the fuel tanks from the wing stores.
However, this required the TF to plan and employ forward refueling points using
CH-47 Fat Cows (CH-47 fitted with refuel equipment capable of delivering up
to 1,160 gallons of fuel). The ERFS was only employed when forward refueling
points were not available.
AH-64
Weapons Configurations:
The
two squadrons used similar weapons configurations and ordnance loads. The weapons
configuration consisted of one to four Hellfire missiles. This was dependent
on the number of targets requiring Point Target Weapon System (PTWS) and whether
ERFS was utilized. Additionally, the AH-64s carried 440 rounds for the M-230E1
(30MM cannon) which was based on the defensive requirement and weight savings
of 560 pounds over a 1,200-round maximum load. The M-261 rocket pods were loaded
with three different warhead types, two different fuse combinations, and all
with the same rocket motor (MK-66, MOD2). The Task Force used the M261 Multipurpose
Submunition (MPSM), M255A1 Flechette, and the M151 High Explosive (HE) rocket
warheads. The fuse combination used on the MPSM and Flechette was the M439
RC (Resistance Capacitance Electronic Time Delay, Forward Firing) Fuse. The
HE warhead was fused with the M423 Point Detonating (PD) Fuse. The unit procured
the M255A1 Flechette from the Special Operations community. The Flechette was
tested on the AH-64 and granted an Airworthiness Release (AWR) by Aviation
Missile Command (AMCOM) for use in this operation. Additionally, Boeing made
a Fire Control Computer (FCC) software modification, upgrading it from -51
to -51K, which allowed the Flechette rocket to be fired from the Aerial Rocket
Control System (ARCS) position utilized for MK-66 Smoke (6SK). Arming AH-64s
with M255A1 Flechette added the flexibility to engage and suppress personnel
and area targets at short to medium ranges. Night
Vision Goggles Usage:
Both
squadrons used Night Vision Goggles (NVG) to enhance night-flying capabilities
in mountainous AO. Both squadrons were untrained in NVG operations prior to
deployment. The squadrons used AN/AVS-6 (V) 1A, NVG with OMNI 4 tubes. These
NVG noticeably improved visual acuity and did not shut down in high ambient
light levels like older models. The NVG's clarity and resolution were better
under most conditions than the Target Acquisition Designation Sight (TADS)
Forward-Looking Infrared (FLIR) used by the front seat copilot gunner (CPG).
NVG allowed the CPG to provide better en route navigation and obstacle avoidance.
However,
mountainous terrain presented varied weather conditions that were unforecasted
by the unit Staff Weather Officer (SWO). NVG did not perform as well as FLIR
when the aircraft encountered bad weather. As a result, AH-64 CPGs transitioned
to the FLIR when encountering bad weather, while the UH-60 remained on NVG
since it was not FLIR-equipped. This placed the UH-60 at a disadvantage because
of its more limited visibility as it struggled to remain with the flight of
AH-64s.
As
a means of aircraft recognition during blackout operations with NVG, TF AH-64s
used infrared chemical lights to aid visual recognition. TF Hawk used several
techniques and locations for placing the infrared chemical light but ultimately
used flex ties to secure the light to the AH-64 tail wheel-locking handle.
Command
and Control (C2):
TF
Hawk achieved C2of
the AH-64s strike package using SATCOM. The mountainous terrain in the task
force AO required a redundant C2plan.
Single Channel Ground and Airborne Radio System (SINCGARS) and UHF frequency-hopping
HAVEQUICK II radios mounted on the AH-64 were not effective in this environment
because of line-of-sight interference. A UH-60 (Command Console) equipped with
an ARC-212 (SATCOM) served as the link between the AH-64s and Hawk Base. The
C2UH-60
flew across the simulated FLOT with the AH-64s communicating directly to Hawk
Base via SATCOM. If unable to contact Hawk Base directly, the C2UH-60
used airborne relay via Airborne Command Control Center/Airborne Warning and
Control System (ABCCC/AWACS) using SATCOM, FM, and/or UHF to contact them.
Fighter
Management:
To
ensure that the TF aviators were rested for the demanding condition of night
deep attack, the ATKHR required individual crewmembers to track duty hours
on crew endurance-tracking sheets. Tracking sheets computed daily, weekly,
and monthly totals, including flight hours and exogenous factors applied to
arrive at an individual's total duty performed. Unit leadership monitored crew
fatigue levels using these crew endurance-tracking sheets. Army
Regulation (AR) 95-1, Flight
Regulations,
provides
the guidelines for units to establish their Fighter Management Programs. AR
95-1 authorizes aircrew members to work 16 hours of duty, with a maximum of
eight hours factored flight time in a 24-hour period. Squadron leaders concluded
after the first week of operations that a 16-hour duty day in the TF AO would
be excessive for continuous operation. Aviation leaders based this decision
on the difficulty of aircrews getting quality rest. Their Life Support Area
(LSA) was located close to the high-density traffic airfield (Rinas), where
constant air traffic generated high noise levels and made adequate rest difficult.
Additionally, units could not segregate day and night crew-sleeping quarters
because of size constraints of the LSA. All this led to an attempt to limit
normal duty to 12 hours. The leadership made every effort to have aircrews
complete flight duties around the 11th hour of duty and to complete after-action
reviews (AARs) by the 12th hour of duty. Interviews with regimental aviators
revealed that this schedule was sustainable and allowed a higher level of situational
awareness during demanding flight duties in the AO. Key
Lessons:
-
If time is available prior to deployment, the unit should review environmental
flight considerations for the deployed AO and replicate these conditions within
aircraft compatible flight simulators.
-
Aircrews require additional training for external fuel tank operations and
when operating in high gross weight conditions.
-
Configure AH-64s to achieve the desired effect based on assigned targets.
-
Utilize TOPSCENE for ABF selection, if available.
-
AH-64s require crashworthy and ballistically tolerant external fuel tanks to
improve their range for deep operations.
-
Arming AH-64s with M255A1 Flechette added the flexibility to engage and suppress
personnel and area targets at short to medium ranges.
-
NVG enhanced AH-64 tactical night flight operations; AH-64 aviation units should
establish NVG training programs in accordance with TC 1-214, AH-64
Aircraft Training Manual.
-
As a means of aiding aircraft recognition during blackout operations with NVG,
TF Hawk secured infrared chemical lights with flex ties on AH-64 tail wheel-locking
handle.
-
Redundant C2linkage
is required when conducting deep operations; the task force used SATCOM radios
as its primary means of communication in mountainous terrain, and UHF, VHF,
and FM communications from the TF helicopters to ABCCC as backup systems.
-
A 12-hour duty cycle for aviation flight crews allowed best performance and
situational awareness during continuous operations.
-
When possible, construct LSAs further away from high density/volume noise areas
to give crewmembers better rest conditions. Crewmember rest cycles must be
considered when assigning unit areas in the LSA.
- When
possible, units should consider separating aircrew sleeping quarters by work
shifts.
-
Employ economy of force based on ABF size and available terrain, utilizing
METT-T.
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