CHAPTER 4
MANEUVER (TA.1)
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- Security Zone - questions and options. Does each forward battalion own its security zone and fight the counter-recon fight with tanks forward, or does it use one headquarters forward to control the security zone fight; i.e., a cavalry unit or a delta company? What is mission, enemy, terrain, troops, and time (METT-T) driven? The C2 of this fight is never easy, but a decision must be made early and the force must be adequately supported.
- Tanks in the security zone. TTP/consideration: One brigade used the tanks forward. It confused the enemy. The enemy believed the Blue Force was defending further forward than they were. Additionally, this tactic confused the OPFOR. Tanks forward greatly enhanced the Blue Force capability to kill the enemy recon vehicles, since the BRDM and V150/300s do not have weapons systems that can damage or destroy tanks. That brigade destroyed 100 percent of the OPFOR division and brigade recon assets with tanks forward. The trade-offs to be considered are: (1) mechanized/armor forces must be secured with infantry; (2) a trigger must be identified as to when to withdraw these forces; and (3) units must be prepared to pass these withdrawing forces under contact.
- TOW platoon vs. MP platoon for route security during the LIC phase; traffic control points (TCP) for convoys to and from the ISB. The MP platoon is most certainly a critical asset and can perform the previously stated tasks. In many instances they release the TOW systems from tasks that do not maximize their combat capability. The brigade S3 must be sure to integrate MP assets early in the planning cycle.
- Use of heavy forces in the "restrictive terrain" of the JRTC or elsewhere. Heavy forces have greater off-road mobility than the average light infantryman gives them credit. Get them off the road - do to the OPFOR what OPFOR does to Blue Force regularly. Avoid the most likely avenues of approach - it is often mined. Secure your mechanized forces with infantry, especially in the restricted terrain of the JRTC.
- The S2/MICO must come to the daily targeting meeting with a complete event template for the time period and HVTs to drive the targeting process. The FSO should recommend high-payoff target list (HPTL). Do not limit targeting to fire supporters (it is not their job). The commander, S2, and other BOS representatives are key players.
- Units have experienced favorable results by using the Kiowa Warriors at night when the air is cooler, by picking up dismounted infantry with their FLIR.
- Consider ambushing the enemy reseeding mines along the main supply route (MSR), either at the initial mine site or, if found, the enemy hide site.
- In low-intensity conflict (LIC) ensure the company stays close enough together to mass platoons (squads) upon making contact.
- The brigade should complete FRAGOs early to ensure that the battalions can also complete their FRAGO in time for the companies to finish planning, rehearsals, and resupply by nightfall. This will enable movement at first light (or have adequate time for preparation prior to a night infiltration).
- Place preparatory tasks on the TOC timeline in defense. Ensure the maneuver plan, the obstacle plan, and the movement plan are "synched." Status of defense preparation should be briefed at shift change and at commander briefings.
- Ensure the staff wargames the consolidation, reorganization, and defeat of the enemy counter-attack forces phases of an attack operation.
- CSS must be part of the maneuver daily battle rhythm. NO water, NO tactical execution.
- Consider having a battalion reserve to handle "unforeseen missions" in LIC operations or in a movement to contact so that companies will not be constantly getting new or changing missions.
- Do not overcommit the scouts; limit the number of missions they are given. NAI observation could very well be tasked to the infantry battalion via patrols and OPs.
- Getting too close to the enemy during the day and making too much noise at night generally compromises scouts.
- Do not search for the enemy at night during LIC operations, but do use listening posts (LPs). Search during the day.
- On an OPFOR company defensive position, expect to find only two-thirds or less of the defending enemy on the objective; the remaining elements will be in some type of counter-recon or dispersed defense (i.e., contingency operations).
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