CHAPTER 5
FIRE SUPPORT (TA.2)
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- Use top-down fire planning with bottom-up refinement. Fire support plans developed by the brigade fire support officer (FSO) include the commander's intent and can be refined by battalion and company FSOs. These plans should be transmitted digitally.
- The use of all elements of accurate and predicted fires improves all fires. Do not forget the mortars. The field artillery (FA) battalion can help improve mortar-firing accuracy by using its survey sections to place declination stations for the mortar aiming circles. It can survey in obstacles, provide meteorological data, and position area survey. These assets are often not used or considered, but should be in the planning process.
- Target lists should be short. Insist every target have a task and purpose, meet the commander's intent, and be tied into the scheme of maneuver. Target list management is a challenge. Fewer well-focused targets and rehearsed targets, which meet the commander's intent, produce better results. Every target must have a purpose, a location, a trigger, an observer with backup, a designated communication system, and be rehearsed. Meeting these six requirements also helps to focus targeting while reducing the size of the target list.
- Terrain management is an issue that affects every FA battalion in every operation. Some brigades put the FA position areas on operational graphics early in the planning process. This technique shows where the FA battalion is located, yet quickly highlights potential terrain management issues.
- The fire support coordinator (FSCOORD) and FSOs must explain FA combat power in terms that make sense to maneuver commanders; e.g., minutes of smoke, number and size of smoke screens, battalion and battery volleys by ammunition type, and the effects that can be generated or expected from volleys given the target description.
- In the attack, plan on getting "eyes" out early and locate the enemy. Place harassing fires on the enemy to slow his defensive preparation as well as to inflict casualties to destroy his engineer capability.
- In the defense, fires often fall behind the moving enemy because trigger points have not been established. Triggers need to be established, used, and rehearsed to ensure that maximum effective fires are placed on the enemy. Some units use siting parties to check time/distance factors and target visibility. A good combat observation and laser team (COLT) is able to understand the task and purpose for the target. The team can select a good observation point and still have time to adjust in the area denial artillery munition (ADAM) or remote antiarmor mine (RAAM) minefield. They may also take the initiative and place mines where they believe the enemy can breach their obstacle. If the enemy does not find the obstacle, the rest will be history.
- Use a priority target drill. This will speed up the responsiveness of fires. As an example, along a company's movement corridor, priority targets are designated about every 1500 meters, activated and deactivated as the unit moves (by the FSO). If contact is made, the currently active priority targets are fired. This gets the enemy thinking, as well as possibly blocking a route of egress. It is far faster to adjust from the active target than by sending an adjust fire mission. Most units today use a precision lightweight global positioning system receiver (PLGR) drill upon contact and make their "call for fire" using an 8-place grid rather than the polar plot method. They find this helps mortar crews in their computation and responsiveness. It also reduces fratricide in the close fight. The drill used is truly dependent on the state of unit training and confidence.
- At brigade a daily targeting meeting is critical. Brigades generally plan operations from 24 to approximately 36 to 48 hours in the future. Ensure the targeting meeting keeps a focus on future operations. In the targeting process brigade future operations should look out as far as possible. Attempt to read the battle 48 to 72 hours out. It is hard to do, but successful brigades do it in addition to religiously conducting a daily targeting and synchronization meeting.
- Do not oversell the capabilities of the Q-36 radar. The way brigades find, fix, and destroy the enemy is by getting every BOS representative involved in the MDMP and all the decide, detect, deliver, and assess assets focused on completing the job. The Q-36 is only a small part of the targeting process. Additionally, it can be a magnet for enemy fires and CLF killer teams. Ensure that it is well secured and positioned so that it can do its job. Remember that digital interface and maintenance is important.
- Counterfire operations are too important to leave to only the direct support (DS) FA battalion. Counterfire is a combined arms operation. One must bring in intelligence, jamming, ground maneuver, aviation, and any other asset that will assist in the fight. OPFOR mortars will prove to be inordinately troublesome should you try to fight them with field artillery. The best killer and finishing force for the mortars is maneuver forces. You should fight the mortars with brigade systems. The Q-36 is a sound combat multiplier, but not the "silver bullet." The systems approach must be trained before going into combat for the rotation.
- Use the targeting meeting to synchronize the force on a daily basis. Ensure that high-value targets (HVTs)/high-payoff targets (HPTs) are being serviced by multiple systems.
- The FSCOORD and brigade FSO should take the MICO and the EW effort under their wing to ensure EW becomes a fully synchronized brigade effort. Jamming works; however, brigade must push the issue. Do not presume division will "blank out" the correct nets.
- Unobserved fire is a waste of munitions. One brigade, during the conduct of night operations, fired 370 naval gunfire rounds into the dark, hit nothing, and then watched the ship sail off to reload its magazines. Ten minutes later two Apaches, who could have observed and adjusted the fires, came on station. This is a perfect way to not coordinate: the responsible staff officers were less than eight feet from each other in the TOC. Staff huddles can work in eliminating this kind of problem.
- Do not pass up an opportunity to rehearse. Rehearsals are part of the planning process. Include them in the MDMP. Most brigades conduct a fire support rehearsal. If the FS rehearsal is a separate rehearsal, it is better to conduct the FS rehearsal before the combined arms rehearsal. During the combined arms rehearsal, the FSOs should brief fires with maneuver commanders. One brigade commander had FSOs initially brief maneuver and battalion commanders brief fires. His teaching point was that everyone needed to know and understand the details of the plan.
- The FSCOORD and the FSOs should be where they can contribute the greatest success to the operation. Battalion and company FSOs actively participate in every part of the planning process. They should attend all coordination meetings and every order, briefing, briefback, or rehearsal. Remember: Station yourself where you need to be when fulfilling your tactical requirements and mission. And your tactical requirement is RESPONSIVENESS.
- The FA battalion should contribute to the brigade's intelligence effort. Commanders should ensure their staffs share information and assist each other. The Q-36 radar assists in the counterfire effort. FOs, FSOs, COLTs, survey, battery OPs, advanced parties, and the FA staff can all contribute to providing and passing critical combat information to the brigade. The brigade S-2 should seek FA battalion input, and the FA S2 should provide intelligence information and analysis to the brigade S2.
- Precision munitions. One brigade used three Copperheads in a night MOUT fight. The first knocked out the power station, causing problems and confusion for the OPFOR. The next two rounds destroyed a building in which the enemy TOC was located. There is no substitute for a sound reconnaissance element passing the correct information coupled with a quick-thinking FSO who is aware and responsive to the situation as it presents itself.
- Maneuver graphics must enhance fire control, not restrict it. Company commanders know they always have priority of fires for their own mortars. These fires can be cleared and adjusted quickly in close proximity to troops. "Use mortars first" is a good rule to follow. Commanders should be able to fire 60mm mortars in a company AO without asking permission. The same holds true for battalion fires in their sector/zone.
- Regrettably, some infantry battalion commanders do not know how to communicate with their FSO. They do not use precise terms in providing attack guidance. A few want the FSO to prioritize targets and rarely describe the percent of damage desired. Understand munition types and effects.
- Ensure that all obstacles are covered with fires and be sure that "eyes" are covering the target.
- FA battalion S3 and brigade FSO interface is necessary for many reasons. Some of the major reasons are to closely and concurrently plan with the brigade, for targeting, for ammunition management, and for ammunition forecasting and terrain management.
- Reporting is a challenge. Train to have a "push vs pull" system for reporting. Less energy is expended when soldiers follow their SOPs for reporting. Commanders and staffs should not continually have to seek information that, by SOP, should be reported. Enforce timely reporting standards.
- An effective method of integrating mortars into the fire plan is to include the leader of the mortar platoon or section in the planning and coordination of the fire support plan. Inclusion of this key individual will ensure that the task force (TF) maximizes the value of the mortars. It is essential that the mortar leader understands the scheme of maneuver and develops a support plan accordingly. If the mortars are unable to provide responsive fire to the maneuver force, the fire support plan is not adequate. Units that involve the FSO in the positioning and planning of mortar fires are more successful than those that do not.
- Emphasize the use of crater analysis throughout the brigade as another means for finding indirect fire systems. The FA battalion can teach the specifics in professional development training for the brigade.
- A successful technique during offensive operations for controlling mortar fires is to position them behind or with the lead company/team and assign the priority of mortar fires to that maneuver force. This provides protection and movement control and facilitates their ability to provide immediate fires in support of the maneuver force.
- In
the defense, commanders select positions to mass fires on likely dismounted
infantry avenues of approach and to provide illumination or screening fires
to the scouts screening in front of the force. Some common problems of mortar
employment are:
- Maneuver commanders do not plan mortar final protective fires (FPF). Since mortars are such an effective weapon when properly used, it is important that the FSO advise commanders on their use to maximize their advantages.
- Company fire support officers do not use mortars. Remember: use mortars first.
- Mortar platoons do not receive target lists, OPORDs, airspace coordination areas (ACAs), final protective fires (FPFs), or priority targets.
- FSOs do not know against which targets mortars are most effective. In the defense, select positions where mortars can be massed. In the offense, position forward behind the leading company and assign that company priority of fires.
- TF FSOs and maneuver S3s fail to manage mortar ammunition. Though planning movement and CSS functions are a maneuver responsibility, ensure the fire supporters are fully integrating mortars into the fire plan.
- The maneuver commander, TF FSO, and mortar platoon leader fail to coordinate their efforts (positioning, movement, support).
- Communications between the FSO and the mortar platoon leader during the battle is limited. An effective technique is for the TF FSO to eavesdrop on the maneuver battalion command net and call the mortar platoon leader directly on the mortar platoon net when necessary.
- The effective use of indirect fires in support of the maneuver commander necessitates that the FSO work closely with the S3 in developing control measures to minimize fratricide while echeloning fires. This entire system must be wargamed and synchronized prior to execution.
- FSOs need to be familiar with the minimum safe distances of the munitions they are employing in support of the maneuver, and address these measures when developing and wargaming the scheme of fires.
- During the mission analysis brief, the FSO needs to ensure he briefs the details of CAS and naval gunfire (when available) and how long it takes to get rounds on target.
- The fire support execution matrix is an essential tool for briefing and executing the fire support plan for the offense or defense. Once approved by the commander, it becomes a tool FSOs, FOs, and maneuver commanders can use in executing the plan.
- The company FSO must manage his time well, understand his role in the battalion fire support plan, and know exactly what his commander wants indirect fires to do in every phase of the battle. He must develop SOPs and have checklists for rehearsals, mortars, observers, and for missions standards. Does your company FSO have his fighting tools? In briefing the fire support plan, is the FSO using the fire support matrix to include the fire support execution matrix, the target list worksheet, and overlay? These are proven ways to communicate the fire support plan.
- During the low-intensity conflict (LIC) and deliberate attack phases, most forward observers (FOs) do not have their PLGRs on, or in the continuous mode, while moving. More often than not, the lead element of the platoon makes contact and the FO has lost his ability to utilize the PLGR to immediately and accurately determine the target location. Keep the PLGR on and in the continuous mode, and upon a chance contact, use it to send the FO's present location and initiate a fire mission utilizing the polar plot call for fire.
- Firing units often have difficulty in conducting out-of-traverse missions. The XO fails to derive the minimum QE for each octant, the fire direction center (FDC) fails to compute terrain gun position correction (TGPCs) for each octant, and the howitzer sections have equipment (usually the prime mover or camouflage net) that prohibits true 6400-mil capability. Additionally, howitzer sections routinely do not emplace their aiming posts correctly, resulting in the inability to have an aiming reference point and pick-up displacement for all possible azimuths. Gunners and section chiefs are not comfortable with using aiming posts to pick up displacement. In many instances, units are not using distant aiming points (DAP) despite being available. The result is terribly slow fire mission response times, particularly when responding to counter-fire missions.
- FSOs are not providing timely meteorological data (MET) or coordinating for survey (declination) support for the task force's organic mortars. Also, mortar platoons and sections are not aggressively conducting registrations as a means to improve their accuracy. The battalion FSO should coordinate with the FA battalion S3 to get MET messages (computer MET if the unit is using the Mortar Ballistic Computer) and survey support. The maneuver task force should be included in the FA battalion's priorities of survey support (with the priority going to the main effort task force). The FSO, in concert with the maneuver task force S3, should establish which units should conduct registration for the mortars and ensure this tasking is included in the OPORD.
- Few units use the LTACFIRE/IFSAS to manage targets, conduct fire planning, and conduct tactical fire direction. The common results are fire plans that are not disseminated or fired, inefficient use of resources, and failure to meet the commander's attack criteria. Inexperienced operators, along with failure of the chain of command to force the use of the system, are the primary reasons. While units often have excellent LTACFIRE standing operating procedures, they are rarely used. Digital fire control systems greatly facilitate and ease target management, fire planning, tactical fire direction, and the dissemination of information.
- Both operators and leaders must fully understand the capabilities of LTACFIRE/IFSAS. Effective LTACFIRE/IFSAS sustainment training, using realistic and demanding operational scenarios, should be established and enforced to instill the necessary confidence. Incorporate and enforce the use of LTACFIRE/IFSAS during all Home Station training events to ensure that this becomes the primary means of fire control and planning.
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