CHAPTER 3
INTELLIGENCE (TA.5)
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- Intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) is important, and it is also important that every staff member put on the "red hat" and provide input to the S2 concerning the element or combat multiplier they represent. Consider enemy tactics, weapon placement and ranges, distances, and routes of ingress and egress. Provide that data to the S2 before or early in the course of mission analysis. Many units have developed a preformatted sheet that is completed by the staff and battlefield operating system (BOS) representatives and given to the S2. This will add detail to the IPB and assist the S2 in portraying a viable picture of enemy capabilities to the commander. Reverse BOS planning during the IPB process helps "paint" a picture of the enemy's capabilities and his most likely or most dangerous courses of action (COA).
- The S2 must have a main COA and an alternative COA completed by the mission analysis briefing. These must be down two levels, address all BOS, movement, and critical enemy events. The S2 should develop an initial event template from these two COAs and develop further COAs on sketches. This should drive the reconnaissance and surveillance (R&S) plan.
- Do not be confused and refer to a template with time phase lines as an event template. The event template is the template that addresses all the situation templates. Situation templates should have time phase lines (TPLs) addressing enemy and/or friendly movement and activities.
- Instead of using TPLs, use operational phase lines with a time matrix attached addressing movement. No one has S2 TPLs, but everyone has operations graphics.
- The S2 needs to focus and know why the enemy is NOT doing what he was expected to do. Focus the collection plan in order to answer the priority information requirements (PIR). Staff PIR needs to be specific in order for the commander to make a decision. Understand what the enemy knows about you from the last 24 hours. Indicators answer questions such as, "Why is the enemy shifting focus from minefields to attacking soft targets?" and "Is the enemy now using villages as supply points?"
- A method to assist with pattern analysis of the guerrilla force is the "Olympic Rings" technique. Draw a 1000-meter circle around each contact, minefield, and mortar firing. Where they intersect may be a good place to start looking for the opposing forces (OPFOR).
- Be sure the management information control officer (MICO) explains to the battle staff what his assets can and cannot do (in infantry terms!).
- S2 pattern analysis chart(s) can be very helpful in deducing the time of greatest Cortinian Liberation Front (CLF) activity as well as the least activity (2200-0400 hrs).
- A named area of interest (NAI) must have a specific information requirement attached. If the scout reconnaissance element should confirm or deny, then they either stay at that NAI (if info is confirmed) or move to the next NAI (if info is denied).
- The S2 and S3 must be tightly integrated for the reconnaissance and surveillance (R&S) plan. NAIs must be assigned to subordinate units as specified tasks with task and purpose. Battalions need to consider elements other than scouts to accomplish their R&S plan -- infantry are also trained to conduct reconnaissance. Scouts should be assigned a limited number of NAIs, usually no more than three (one per section). List them as tasks to subordinate units in the order.
- Battlefield awareness is lacking. Attempt to develop an internal system for the debriefing of aircraft crews and truck drivers. Many units do not share what they learn. As an example, one minefield was credited with 60 killed in action (KIA) and wounded in action (WIA), along with 8 key vehicles destroyed. Units knew about the minefield; one TOC even had the location "logged." The information, however, was not disseminated to other units. Brief and debrief your people.
- Develop a plan and assign responsibility for debriefing support platoon drivers on activities in the rear. Talk to higher, lower, and adjacent units about what is happening in their sector/zone at least twice a day.
- Are there any Apache/Kiowa Warrior gun tapes? When are they reviewed and by whom? What happens to that information?
- The S2 must brief the commander on the effects of key terrain on the current operation. This may include chokepoints on an enemy/friendly counterattack route, observation around an objective, or crossing/ford sites on a stream. General statements such as "vehicles cannot cross streams" will not suffice. In the defense, this should be followed up by on-the-ground reconnaissance confirmation.
- During receipt of mission, the S2 section should have a preformatted intelligence estimate addressing weather, light and terrain effects, and enemy situation. This can be used as the IPB appendix to Annex B and will save time later.
- All mission analysis products should be captured following the mission analysis briefing. These products should be obtained from higher headquarters upon receipt of the warning order that follows the briefing.
- Every S2 section must prepare a modified combined obstacle overlay (MCOO) for restrictive terrain. It will assist in deciding where to put sensors and patrols to cover vulnerable points. Staffs must be aggressive in providing this information to subordinate units (e.g., high-speed, open areas where the effects of long-range tank-killing capabilities can be maximized).
- At brigade level consider developing a "red team" to fight the enemy in the wargame. This brings a more appropriate balance and allows the S2 to have BOS experts. In lieu of this, the staff must "red hat" the enemy. (If you were the enemy with his equipment and the mission, this is how you would apply it -- NOT a re-application of doctrine or wishful thinking!)
- Avoid the "chief of recon" concept, as this rarely allows the S2 to use an event template to confirm or deny COAs.
- R&S should be a staff effort and be initiated early. An R&S huddle after the mission analysis brief allows for staff input and R&S assets to be templated, and the commander will be available to ensure shaping of the battlefield.
- The S2/MICO must arrive at the daily targeting meeting with a current situation template, event template, and collection plan for the time period; HVTs to drive the targeting process; and recommended changes to the PIR.
- Do not only use traditional collectors. Maximize collection with TOW thermals, Avenger FLIR, truck drivers, and so on.
- Do not focus on just the gunfighters. Conduct IPB for deep, close, and rear. Linear battlefields are a thing of the past.
- Cross-talk is the most important thing you can do as an S2. S2s are very good at sending spot reports; they need to send analysis. Doctrine states that brigade is the lowest level to do analysis. The reality is that battalion S2s have to do analysis.
- Determine the enemy's task and purpose; the method and end state will fall out. S2s work very hard on what the enemy will do "when"; if we know the "why", it becomes easier.
- The S2 has to be available to the commander. The S2 staff has to produce the products or obtain those products from higher headquarters. S2s must supervise and monitor products, not be product creators.
- SOPs must be in place showing the duties of each position and who substitutes in that person's absence (injury, death, or TAC deployment).
- The S2 should know how many of each product is needed; do not forget subordinates and TAC. Try making sketches and products on 8"x11" paper that can be copied and faxed to expedite production.
- Do not rely totally on automation; always have paper and pencils available. Viruses will occur, generators will fail, and laptops will become inoperable. Be flexible.
- Know where your R&S assets are and their status. Do not assume NAIs are covered.
- Do not try to be psychic. You cannot determine the enemy's main effort from one spot report. Resist personnel (even the commander) urging you to commit without adequate information.
- The S2 should have a weather effects chart that clearly shows the weather and effects at different critical operational times; i.e., line of departure (LD) or pickup zone (PZ) time for an air assault. The S3 can then determine the NLT time to switch to ground movement.
- The S2 should brief on the enemy in the same order as the unit will fight the enemy. This makes it easier to follow the briefing. Basic friendly graphics should be on the S2 map so that enemy action can be seen in relationship to the objective, LD, etc.
- The XO must decide not-later-than (NLT) receipt of mission which tool will be used to display the template. The tool must be large enough to brief the commander and staff, and be useable for COA development, wargaming, and the orders brief. Usually, the S2 re-works the template for each step of the MDMP process because it is not large enough to be seen or used by the staff.
- Use a picture or diagram to display the doctrinal template. Prepare before arriving at ISB based on receipt of order. Distribute down to lowest possible level.
- Begin reorganization and reconstitution of R&S/counter-recon assets upon receipt of WARNO No. 1. This will allow those elements time to deploy shortly after the R&S huddle following mission analysis.
- Remember two things regarding a request for intelligence information (RII). First, your position in the big picture. Are you the main effort or a supporting effort? Is your higher a main effort or a supporting effort? Second, the noisy wheel gets the grease. Track your RII and determine what to be noisy about.
- S2s
should clearly describe the indicators that eliminate enemy COAs from the event
template. Consider the following format:
COA
Confirming Indicators
Denying Indicators
1 - MPCOA 2 - MDCOA - The MCOO, normally developed at Home Station, is usually not updated and used during a unit's rotation. Additionally, units habitually do not refine the doctrinal and situational templates provided by brigade, nor do they develop event templates other than for the defense phase.
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