APPENDIX E
BATTLE TRACKING
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- Battle-tracking
at the battalion level should include, as a minimum, the following:
- Subordinate unit locations and movement.
- Adjacent and supporting unit locations/movement.
- Enemy size/location/movement/activity.
- Weather status.
- Enemy minefields, low-intensity conflict (LIC) phase.
- Friendly minefields (defense).
- Fire support coordination measures.
- Fire support systems status (artillery/air naval/army aviation).
- Friendly/enemy contacts.
- Civilians on the battlefield and location as well as movement in the LIC phase.
- Army aviation readiness/status.
- Supply/personnel status.
- Critical equipment status.
- Status of current order execution.
- Reports to higher headquarters.
- Reports from subordinate headquarters.
- Commander's Critical Information Requirements (CCIR).
- Most tactical operations centers (TOC) have the proper tools to conduct good battle-tracking; however, it occurs in only 20 percent of battalions. In many instances, TOC procedures are not followed or enforced. This causes battle-tracking charts to be outdated and not good in clearing fires, coordinating the battlefield operating systems (BOS), and supporting decision making.
- Graphics must meet standards, be detailed, and convey critical information (such as control measures, weapons' locations, and minefields). All must work off the same scale map.
- TOC battle staffs must be trained on procedures that would facilitate TOC operations. Information coming in to the TOC must be tracked, analyzed, and/or disseminated.
- Battle captains must be aware of what is important or relevant to current operations. They must track key information from orders and know when and how to update information charts. They must analyze or integrate BOS input and fully understand the higher commander's CCIR.
- TOC NCOs acting as battle captains must aggressively pursue information from company commanders. Consider enrolling NCOs in the Battle Staff NCO Course (BSNCOC).
- Radio operators must be trained in message distribution procedures to ensure reports are expeditiously routed to the relevant staff officer.
- SOPs must detail battle-tracking procedures in the TOCs, and those procedures must be followed.
- Information pursuit must be a systematic procedure, not driven by personalities.
- Periodic updates must be focused, follow a format, and be attended by key personnel.
- TOC
layouts must be functional.
- S2, S3, and fire support officers are collocated.
- The battle captain station facilitates monitoring and controlling of TOC operations.
- Map scales are the same in all sections.
- The plans/briefing area is separate from current operations.
- Alternate
command post (CP) SOPs should ensure that:
- The alternate CP staff is designated and periodically updated on the current situation.
- Tracking tools in the alternate CP are consistent with the main CP.
- Communications and equipment supporting the alternate CP are periodically checked.
- The TOC must have a good system to track requests for information (RFI). The battle captain must know the "WHY" behind the RFI and by "WHEN" he must have a response from higher.
- Know who is tracking the reports and what to do when you do not receive one. Who posts the information from them?
- All TOC charts should be self-explanatory and have an "as of" date/time group on them.
- The battle captain should have a SIGACTS chart to brief the commander and visitors and to assist in coordinating actions.
- Battalions are consistently unable to keep track of all friendly units operating in their zone. Although the TOC generally has a good view of where its organic subordinates are on the battlefield, it often lacks awareness of brigade or division forces deployed within the battalion's boundaries. This leads to clearance of fires problems and increases the probability of fratricide. Battalion TOCs must be proficient in battle-tracking techniques. (Specific techniques are discussed in CALL Newsletter No. 95-7, Tactical Operations Center (TOC), May 97.) Brigades should not assign units missions within battalion sectors without designating a command relationship or issuing specific coordinating instructions. For example, the brigade air defense artillery (ADA) officer wants to employ an Avenger in a battalion sector in order to cover a likely enemy avenue of approach. An often seen but usually unsuccessful technique is for the ADA company commander to keep the Avenger under brigade control and position the asset in sector without coordination. A more effective technique is to task organize the Avenger to the battalion, and give the battalion the specified task in instructions to subordinate units of denying the air avenue of approach. This method achieves both the desired tactical effect and forces appropriate coordination.
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