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TASK ORGANIZATION:

Each Brigade Combat Team (BCT) deploys to JRTC with a subordinate aviation task force that is organized around an assault or attack battalion or Air Cavalry Squadron headquarters. FORSCOM Regulation 350-50-2 authorizes 39 aircraft for a typical aviation task force broken down as follows:

This task force organization creates unique challenges for the different types of aviation headquarters that provide its command and control. This is particularly challenging for an assault battalion headquarters, who do well in the employment of lift assets but due to lack of expertise and less robust staffs have a more difficult time employing attack and cavalry assets. FORSCOM Reg 350-50-2 does not distinguish between types of headquarters; it simply allows the task force to bring 487 personnel. Since there is no TOE for a task force, it is incumbent on the task force commander to ensure that his organization is augmented with the necessary personnel to ensure he has the capability to command and control all elements of his command. For instance, an assault battalion headquarters must bring an FSE and augmentation of the S2 shop. All aviation task forces must have staff augmentation to ensure that assault, heavy lift, air cavalry, attack, and MEDEVAC are represented.

REALISTIC EXPECTATIONS:

TM 1-1520-248-10, dated 30 April 1999 (commonly known as the OH-58D Dash 10), states the following, "The OH-58D helicopters are designed for use in close combat aerial reconnaissance, intelligence gathering, surveillance, target acquisition, and is armed for self-defense and targets of opportunity. Used for weapons guidance, the sight laser range finder/designator can designate targets for laser-seeking weapons or can accurately determine distance and direction from the helicopter to an intended target (for self defense, target handover to an attack helicopter, TAC AIR, or conventional field artillery engagement)."

Despite the fact that our light division's attack battalions are equipped with OH-58Ds (Kiowa Warriors), the aircraft was not designed for use as an attack helicopter. This is not to say that the Kiowa Warrior is not effective on the JRTC battlefield; when given appropriate missions it has been the most effective aircraft utilized at JRTC.

SEARCH AND ATTACK:

Integration of Army aviation into the BCT's search and attack operations has long been a problem at JRTC. Such nondoctrinal command relationships as "in support of" or "direct support" have been tried without much success. Lately the trend has been to OPCON aircraft to the infantry battalions. The problem with OPCON is that it takes the aviation task force staff out of the planning process. The infantry battalion commander is not only faced with determining the best way to employ the helicopters but also such things as FARP requirements and locations, what type of turns the aircraft will make, weapons loads, locations of holding areas, battle positions, support-by-fire positions, and, of course, a fighter management plan.

One of the best ways to ensure integration of Army aviation in the conduct of search and attack is for the BCT commander to provide the aviation commander doctrinal reconnaissance and security missions along with the stated intent and a prioritization of effort. Additionally, the BCT commander must require his aviation commander and each of his infantry battalion commanders to include in their backbrief how they will integrate aviation and infantry into the fight. This will ensure the optimization of both aviation and infantry staffs in determining the best use of their assets, and may well include OPCON of aircraft to an infantry battalion at a specified time and place.

DEFENSE (SECURITY ZONE, MBA, AND REAR AREA):

During the defense, aviation will be required to fight across the entire BCT's area of operations. This will normally be broken down into three distinctively different fights: deep/security zone, main battle area, and rear area.

In most successful BCT defenses, aviation assets destroy the majority of enemy vehicles prior to them reaching the MBA. This is accomplished by the aviation task force owning the ground, having priority of fires, and quickly massing upon located enemy. The deep/security zone fight is also where the aviation staff can be quickly overwhelmed. Ensuring that an attached/OPCON unit's CS and CSS requirements are met, a complete medical evacuation plan is developed, and coordination of a passage of lines is done, are not a normal part of an aviation staff's MDMP process. In addition to infantry and armor units, it is not unusual for the aviation task force to be given engineers, military intelligence sensors, medical personal, ADA, and support assets. Aviation staffs, by design, are much smaller than that of an infantry battalion; therefore, it is essential that when the aviation task force is given additional assets, the staff be augmented with personnel with expertise in all the areas represented.

The main battle area fight is in most cases the most difficult for the aviation task force. The BCT commander must resist the temptation to piecemeal his aviation assets by giving scout weapons teams (SWTs) to each of his infantry battalions. Instead he must allow the aviation commander to fight his task force in a way that allows him to quickly mass his forces when and where the enemy is located. The identification of aviation battle positions (BPs) and support-by-fire positions (SBF) are essential to the MBA fight; however, they should never be used as holding areas. A hovering helicopter is very susceptible to being destroyed on the modern battlefield. One way that battle positions and support-by-fire positions have been successfully used on the JRTC battlefield is to establish a phase line to the rear of the BPs/SBFs and have the aircraft screen the PL looking deep with their target identification systems. Upon identification of a target, from whatever source, the aircraft move to the BP/SBF that best supports the engagement of the target, firing, and then moving to another BP/SBF or returning to the phase line.

As one of the few BCT maneuver elements that can quickly respond to any threat in the brigade's area of operations, Army aviation will always be an important part of the rear battle. In addition to aviation, the BCT will normally have a company-size mobile reserve/counterattack force that is task organized under brigade control. This sometimes creates a command and control and clearance of fires problem because you have two units with the same mission working in the same area. Additionally, a brigade headquarters is designed to fight battalion (05 level) units, not companies that have no staffs to do fire support planning, coordination for route clearance, passage of lines, and other staff related activities normally done by a battalion level headquarters. What has worked well has been to put reserve/counterattack under the aviation task force. The BCT can still maneuver the reserve/counterattack force (through the aviation task force), but now you have one headquarters commanding and controlling all rear area combat forces and doing all coordination required to integrate these forces.

CONCLUSION:

The challenge for Army aviation is to train on the integration of all Battlefield Operating Systems (BOS) into the planning and execution of aviation missions. The challenge for the BCT commander is to avoid the urge to piecemeal his aviation forces, instead of requiring the aviation commander to accomplish doctrinal missions according to stated intent and prioritization of effort.

REFERENCES:

CALL Newsletter No. 00-5, Mar 00, Aviation Operations at the Joint Readiness Training Center

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• Attack aviation units must carefully analyze the terrain at the JRTC, understand its limitations, and determine how best to use attack aviation in restricted terrain. Ensure that you establish a rapport with the supported brigade as early in the process as possible to obtain their SOPs and make them aware of your capabilities.

• Aviation battalion staffs are often specialized - attack, lift, or cavalry. Consider bringing an assistant S3 from any attached units and integrate them into your staff as early as possible.

• The aviation task force commander must carefully select the aviation liaison (LNO) for the brigade his TF is supporting. The LNO must be knowledgeable enough to answer technical and tactical questions regarding the employment of aviation assets in support of maneuver. Consider using one of the field grade officers in the TF or a master warrant to serve as the aviation LNO.

• Aviation units have had difficulty maintaining their communications equipment, especially when they deploy to the JRTC as a task force. Aviation battalions should request a signal officer be attached from their parent aviation brigade when deploying to the JRTC.

• Aviation unit commanders must ensure fighter management, weather, and capabilities are articulated when briefing their ability to support current and future operations. Fighter management must be explained to the ground maneuver commander and staff so that this limitation is considered when developing and analyzing various courses of action.

• Large numbers of personnel and aircraft are lost in aviation assembly areas because aviation units have difficulty securing themselves. Maneuver commanders must carefully weigh the risk to their aviation assets in determining whether to secure them with infantry or letting them use organic assets (which in most instances are very limited).

• Units must be able to run night tactical pickup zone (PZ) operations at the platoon level.

• Get the aviation liaison involved early in planning.

• Always plan for hot landing zones (LZs) and have a bump plan.

• Consider both single and multiple LZs during planning.

• If LZs are obvious to you, they are also obvious to the enemy.

• The suppression of enemy air defense (SEAD) plan must be coordinated with the infantry.

• Have a downed aircraft/crash site security plan.

• Use aviation to reposition frequently and rapidly.

• Use aviation to ensure communications, reconnaissance, and the aerial adjustment of fires.

• Adherence to the critical tasks associated with a zone/area reconnaissance and the commander's PIR will help define the purpose of the reconnaissance for aircrews. Flight techniques are important while conducting zone reconnaissance.
  • Units that plan a zone/area reconnaissance with supporting graphics and control measures have greater success in thoroughly searching a zone. For a zone reconnaissance, the graphics break a zone up into logical segments that can be systematically executed; i.e., phase line to phase line.

  • Due to the nature of the terrain, it is imperative that aircrews fly slow enough to search down into the trees. A common trend is for aircrews to fly at speeds between 50-80 knots, which is too fast! Crews that slow down to speeds from effective transitional lift (ETL) to 30 knots are more successful in finding the enemy, cache sites, and other targets.

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