APPENDIX F
SIGNAL
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- Many maneuver unit S6s have allowed themselves to become the tactical operations center (TOC) communications officer, focusing only in installing and troubleshooting equipment, and do not fulfill their doctrinal duties and responsibilities to the commander, staff, and subordinate elements. This leads to poor planning, coordination, synchronization, and execution of signal aspects in support of the unit's mission. The communications chief (NCO) should be responsible for maintaining and troubleshooting communications at the TOC, allowing the S6 to recognize and anticipate battlefield activities.
- The signal officer (SIGO) must be prepared to brief the commander on communication (commo) equipment status, resources available to the unit from higher, multiple subscriber equipment (MSE) coverage, modifications to signal operating instructions (SOI), frequency changes, alternate means of communications, the anti-jamming plan, and the net compromise plan.
- The SIGO must plan deployment of and security for the retransmission (RETRANS) team.
- The SIGO must have a plan for battery resupply.
- The SIGO must develop a plan to train all members of the TAC, TOC, and trains on communications procedures and operator maintenance in garrison. He cannot do it all in the field.
- Consider cross-loading communications equipment during moves so that the loss of one vehicle does not leave you without communications.
- A COMMO representative needs to be in the advance party that selects the new TOC site.
- Include COMMO net status as part of the shift change brief and commanders' updates, so that you do not start working on communication problems after all the nets are down.
- The SIGO must be involved in communications planning for scouts and the recon element.
- The net control station (NCS) must enforce net discipline to include net member status, radio telephone operator (RTO) procedures, and correcting improper net traffic.
- Communications exercises (COMEXs) should be listed on the TOC timeline and the times included in the warning order (WARNO) to companies.
- Brief the communication compromise plan at the orders brief and include it in the operations order. The task force (TF) will usually receive additional units that are not familiar with your unit's procedures.
- Mobile
subscriber radio telephones (MSRT) continue to experience significant outages
at the JRTC. MSE network planners generally cover the area occupied by subscribers
with wireless radio access unit (RAU) access to the area common user system
(ACUS), but MSRT operators are poorly trained to operate/troubleshoot their
equipment. Procedures, such as MSRT/KY-68 OTARs and faxing (UXC-7A) from an
MSRT to a digital non-secure voice telephone (DNVT), are beyond almost every
owner-operator. Successful MSRT communications in the maneuver area is based
on four pre-conditions:
- Operator certification programs and monthly MSRT COMMEXs at Home Station.
- A locally produced, pocket-sized, ready reference (complete with remoting instructions and a troubleshooting chart) for every MSRT operator.
- A successful COMMEX of MSRTs in the intermediate staging base (ISB). (Manual up-load of the frequency plan in support of this COMMEX is highly encouraged.)
- Staff planning/coordination by the brigade signal officer and MSE company commander for support to MSRT subscribers once they enter the maneuver area. Planning should include the disposition/location of communications-electronics (C-E) maintenance personnel, priority of each KY-68 and RT-1539 (P)A(C)/G in the combat team (to include those at the RAUs), and assigning responsibility to one individual for tracking MSRT status. Refer to FM 11-43, The Signal Leader's Guide, and FM 11-30, MSE Communications in the Corps/Division, for further information.
- Compromise Procedures. When a real or suspected compromise occurs, units cannot make an informed decision because they do not know what communications security (COMSEC) was involved and they do not have procedures for assessing the impact of the compromise or developing recommendations to the commander. Signal officers need to develop a battle tracking system for COMSEC and net IDs in each radio. This system cannot be static, as elements will tend to change/increase net IDs in their radios as operations expand. At a minimum, the signal officer should be aware of every automated net control device (ANCD) on his battlefield and the contents of each ANCD.
- Once a suspected or known compromise occurs, the unit must have a council that is prepared to assess the impact. This council should include representatives from maneuver, intelligence, and command and control. The council determines what was compromised and how that compromise might be exploited by friendly/enemy and the impact of an over-the-air rekeying (OTAR) on current/future operations. The council prepares both an assessment of the compromise and a recommendation to the commander. The recommendation may include continued normal operations, continued operations with suspected enemy monitoring, changing net IDs, a delayed OTAR, or an immediate OTAR. An ill-advised quick fix for compromises is changing the Julian Date on SINCGARS nets. Changing the Julian Date or time on the SINCGARS radio is never an option. This action runs the tremendous risk of isolating the unit from assets which move across boundaries, particularly general support (GS) elements or aviation. Any unit entering the area of operations (AO) or theater after a Julian Date change may be electronically isolated for an indefinite period.
- Integration of slice elements (communications) at the ISB. Slice element communications are not properly integrated into the combat team at the ISB. Signal planners in the higher headquarters are often unaware of the extensive and unique assets that the slice elements bring with them to the battlefield. Slice elements at a typical combat training center rotation include the following: the tactical air control party (TACP), air and naval gun fire liaison company (ANGLICO), civil affairs and PSYOP teams, the MSE signal company, air defense assets, armor/tech team, military intelligence (MI) company, and special operations command and control element (SOCCE). Three fixes can alleviate any integration problem.
- The higher headquarters should provide a complete set of SOPs to the slice element which includes a one-page "cookbook" highlighting key procedures, drills, and codewords.
- The signal planner at the higher headquarters should develop a slice integration checklist. The checklist should include an equipment density (by model; i.e., A-model SINCGARS radios), battery requirements, and a communicator PAX density. The signal planner should also coordinate with a slice representative and make an assessment of operator skill level (SINCGARS, MSE, S/C TACSAT) in the slice, and discuss how doctrinally the slice C2s itself and arrays itself on the battlefield.
- Successfully integrating slice communications in a solid C2 rehearsal. The C2 rehearsal de-conflicts frequencies, ensures interoperability of equipment, confirms that slice elements understand various communications codewords and procedures, and verifies that the slice elements understand the combat team's C2 architecture. For the signal planner, a successful C2 rehearsal indicates that the communications capabilities of the slice elements have been best incorporated into the plan.
- While it is impossible to completely remove the enemy's SIGINT capability, there are numerous procedures that can be instituted to mitigate the risks. The best starting point is for units to establish measures to protect their COMSEC equipment from capture. Establishing a COMSEC tracking system that outlines who has what COMSEC and where the COMSEC is located is a must. Units should identify the lowest level where items such as ANCDs, SOIs, and KYK-13s are allowed to roam freely around the battlefield, and ruthlessly enforce compliance with that standard. When it is necessary to move ANCDs around the battlefield, the ANCD should have the CIK removed and preferably transported in a separate vehicle in the convoy. Units should also have the net ID 999 loaded into all unused positions of the SINCGARS radio. No unit in the Army is assigned the net ID 999, so if a radio were captured with this net ID, it would not compromise anyone's net.
- Once a compromise occurs, units must have procedures for reporting compromises and executing local (within the effected unit) or global (applies to all units) mitigation procedures. The determination of the unit's reaction to a compromise should not be only an S6 function. A council of the S6, S3, S2, and XO should discuss the compromise and make a recommendation to the commander on how to best mitigate the compromise. Typical local mitigation procedures range from changing net IDs to switching to an alternate means of communication. A typical global mitigation procedure involves obtaining permission from the COMSEC controlling authority (21st ID at JRTC) to changing the TEK and/or SOI edition. In order to accomplish a TEK/SOI change within a 12-hour time frame, units must be trained in executing OTAR (over the air re-key) procedures. To be effective in tactical COMSEC management, units must place more emphasis and actively train on COMSEC protection and mitigation procedures prior to arrival at JRTC.
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